U.S. Wants to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation
In The Near East
(May 10, 1965)
Rusk writes to President Johnson, asking
him to talk Prime Minister Eshkol about nuclear weapons in
Israel. He is concerned that Arab states are forcing Israel to develop nuclear weapons and that Israel's actions might
provoke the Arab states to do teh same. Rusk wants to see
safeguards and closer monitoring of Israel's arms. He is
very concerned about this "arms race" that is developing
in the Middle East.
214. Memorandum From Secretary
of State Rusk to President Johnson/1/
SUBJECT: Preventing Nuclear
Proliferation in the Near East
Recommendation
That you authorize negotiations with Israel
designed to extend IAEA safeguards to all
Israeli nuclear facilities and that you approve
the enclosed letter to Prime Minister Eshkol
as the first step in this new approach to
prevent Israel and the United Arab Republic
from developing or acquiring nuclear weapons./2/
Discussion
1. The Pressures on Israel: The arms rivalry
in the Near East has reached a dangerous stage.
As U.A.R. missile technology improves, Israel
seeks to develop an unmatched, economical
counterdeterrent. This seems destined to lead
to development of nuclear warheads for Israeli
missiles purchased from France.
2. The Israeli Strategy: Prime Minister Eshkol
has told us orally that Israel's nuclear activity
is peaceful and that Israel would not be the
first to introduce nuclear weapons into the
Arab-Israel area. He later said, however,
that Israel could not forever foreswear nuclear
weapon development in the absence of binding
security guarantees. (In 1963 President Kennedy
determined that we could not afford politically
to guarantee Israel's security and that, in
any event, such a guarantee would not give
Israel better protection than our present
close association and commitment to oppose
aggression in the Near East provide.) We must
remember Israel deliberately misled us initially
about the nature of the nuclear facility at
Dimona. Therefore, we must assume Israel intends
to make its decisions on whether to produce
nuclear weapons without consulting us. Lower
level Israeli officials speak frankly about
Israel's strategy toward the United Arab Republic:
a) surface-to-surface missiles targeted on
the Nile delta, and b) a capability to bomb
and release the waters behind the Aswan High
Dam. Destruction of the Aswan Dam would require
a nuclear warhead; bombing with high explosives
could not be counted on to do the job.
3. What We Can Do: Our efforts to slow down
the U.A.R. sophisticated weapons program--as
well as potential nuclear weapons programs in
India and elsewhere--will be influenced by the
example we set in dealing with Israel. We very
much need a breakthrough on the problem of preventing
proliferation by presently non-nuclear states.
The world recognizes Israel's nuclear capability
and the fact we have compelling leverage on
Israel because of our special relationships.
So long as the Dimona reactor operates without
publicly recognized safeguards, the credibility
of our worldwide efforts to prevent proliferation
is in doubt. Moreover, acceptance of safeguards
in contrast to promises of peaceful intent would
provide tangible evidence of Israel's good faith.
Israel has signed the partial Test Ban Treaty,
is a member of IAEA, and has accepted IAEA
safeguards on its small research reactor provided
by the United States. It is, therefore, reasonable
for us to ask Israel to accept IAEA safeguards
on all of its nuclear facilities. If Israel
does not intend to produce a nuclear weapon,
acceptance could lose only the questionable
deterrent provided by fear of an unknown nuclear
capability. Unilateral action by Israel to
place all of its nuclear facilities under
IAEA safeguards would place great international
pressure on the U.A.R. and other states to
follow suit. The U.A.R., which has consistently
opposed safeguards since the establishment
of IAEA, recently has demonstrated a new,
more forthcoming attitude. President Nasser
confirmed to Assistant Secretary Talbot on
April 18, U.A.R. acceptance of the principle
of international safeguards. This more flexible
attitude encourages the hope the U.A.R. may
agree to application of safeguards, not only
to the large power reactor for which it is
now shopping, but to all its nuclear facilities.
The prospect of Israeli acceptance of safeguards
could provide an added inducement.
We should make clear to Israel we expect another
U.S. team of scientists to visit Dimona after
the parliamentary elections next November. At
the same time, we should press Israel now for
acceptance of IAEA safeguards immediately after
the elections. To obtain maximum leverage, we
should make our approach before the arrival
in mid-May of an Israeli military team to discuss
direct U.S. arms sales to Israel.
I think that you alone carry the weight to
persuade Eshkol to take this unilateral action.
For this reason I am enclosing a draft letter
that you might send to him.
There is great urgency about this matter
in view of the disturbing signals we have
been getting from Israel. I think, therefore,
that this is something we must come to grips
with promptly. A letter along the lines of
the enclosed would seem an essential initial
step.
Dean Rusk
/1/Source: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Special Head of State
Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence.
Secret; Exclusive Distribution. The memorandum
has no drafting information, but another copy
indicates that it was drafted by Russell on
April 30 and cleared by Talbot, Jernegan,
SCI Acting Director Herman Pollack, Thomas,
ACDA Assistant Director for International
Relations Jacob D. Beam, ACDA Assistant Director
for Science and Technology Herbert Scoville,
Jr., and Davies, and in substance with Scott
George of G/PM. (National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66,
POL 27 ARAB-ISR) The memorandum was sent to
the President with a May 19 memorandum from
Komer commenting that he and Harriman had
pressed the matter with Eshkol to no avail.
It was Komer's judgment that Israel was determined
to keep the option open as a deterrent against
the Arabs. Nonetheless, he thought the letter
would be a useful reminder to the Israelis
of the President's personal interest in the
matter.
/2/A copy of the draft is attached to the
copy of the memorandum cited in footnote 1 above. Johnson
sent a revised version to Eshkol on May 21; see Document
218.
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |