Letter Asking Israeli PM Eshkol To Accept Nuclear
Safeguards
(May 21, 1965)
President Johnson agrees to stop inspections
of the Dimona reactor until after the Israeli elections.
President Johnson then asks Israel to accept international safeguards. He assures Eshkol that
Israel's neighbors do not have nuclear capability yet and
will not for sometime. He reminds Eshkol that if Israel does
not foreswear nuclear arms, it could force Nasser to get
nuclear weapons from the USSR.
218. Letter From President
Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol/1/
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have been thinking over our exchanges on
visits to the Dimona reactor as well as recent
unfortunate publicity on this subject. I can
understand that secret visits pose problems
for you. On the other hand, failure to make
such visits on a regular basis poses a difficult
problem for us and we feel compelled to continue
them. Recognizing, however, that you face
parliamentary elections and that a visit before
they are held would cause you increased internal
political problems, we have agreed to defer
the next six-monthly visit until after the
elections.
A preferable alternative to these bilateral
arrangements would be for Israel to place
the Dimona reactor and all other nuclear facilities
under IAEA controls, as you have already agreed
to do for the Nahal Soreq reactor and for
any U.S. materials or equipment transferred
to Israel in connection with the U.S.-Israel
desalting program. Because of our unalterable
opposition to any further proliferation of
nuclear weapons, our policy is to press for
extension of IAEA or similar safeguards to
all nuclear facilities in those countries
not now possessing nuclear weapons. We have
made substantial progress thus far, and nineteen
countries including the United States have
accepted IAEA controls over all or part of
their nuclear facilities.
Such action by Israel would help establish
an effective ceiling beyond which the Near
East arms race would not escalate. In order
to protect Israel from any political injustices
in the IAEA--which we by no means anticipate
or even believe could occur--my government
is prepared to support a statement by Israel
with a withdrawal clause on the part of Israel
that it would give up safeguards unless its
own neighbors accepted them.
We do not see any U.A.R. nuclear capability
for the foreseeable future and are convinced
the U.S.S.R. will not supply Nasser with nuclear
weapons. Suspicion that Israel is developing
nuclear weapons, however, might stimulate
Nasser to make concessions to the U.S.S.R.
that could result in a Soviet nuclear support
program similar to the one that was attempted
in Cuba. Voluntary adoption of IAEA safeguards
would cost Israel only the questionable deterrent
provided by fear of an unknown nuclear capability,
would clearly demonstrate Israel's peaceful
intent to the whole world, would go far toward
easing area tensions and abating the arms
race, and would put pressure on other countries
to do likewise.
I make this proposal earnestly and strongly
urge you give it your most serious consideration.
For the next several years, Israel can rest
secure in the knowledge of its military superiority
over the Arabs and the steadfast assurances
of U.S. support against aggression. Our military
experts consider U.A.R. missiles only a psychological
threat with negligible military potential.
In my judgment an initiative by Israel to
adopt IAEA safeguards would be in its own
interest, since it would help assure Israel's
long-term security by removing the threatening
shadow of nuclear war in the Near East. Israel's
example would also reinforce our efforts to
persuade President Nasser to limit sophisticated
weapons acquisition and encourage other countries
to renounce the awesome decision that automatically
would make them subject to possible preemptive
attack. We have reason to believe the U.A.R.
will accept IAEA safeguards if it acquires
a large nuclear reactor.
I realize that the delicate internal political
situation in Israel might make acceptance
of IAEA safeguards difficult at this time.
I urge you, therefore, to consider agreeing
now to accept these safeguards after your
parliamentary elections this fall.
You may be sure that our interest in the
security of your country remains unchanged.
The grave responsibility which this puts upon
us is an important factor in my conviction
that we must leave no stone unturned in our
efforts to maintain peace.
Sincerely,
Lyndon B. Johnson
/1/Source: Johnson Library,
National Security File, Special Head of State
Correspondence File, Israel, PM Eshkol Correspondence.
Secret. No drafting information appears on
the letter, but see Document 214. The letter
was transmitted to Tel Aviv in telegram 1188,
May 21. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR)
Barbour reported in telegram 1510 from Tel
Aviv, May 25, that he had delivered the letter
on May 24. Eshkol's preliminary comments were
(1) that Israel was already among the countries
that had agreed to IAEA inspection of part
of its nuclear reactors, and (2) that the
cost to Israel of relinquishing a psychological
deterrent was in his view a matter of importance
in the Israeli security picture. (Ibid.) A
briefing paper prepared in NEA/IAI on September
19, 1966, noted that President Johnson never
received a reply to this letter. (Ibid., POL
ISR-US)
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |