Jordan Arms Sale Moves Forward
(February 1, 1965)
The Johnson Administration
is inching toward an agreement to provide
arms to Jordan, but on a limited scale. The
view is this will not adversely affect Israel's
military edge. The telegram also notes that
tanks provided to Israel through Europe was
well-known and expresses irritation with what
the State Department views as deliberate leaks
from Israel.
131. Telegram From the Department
of State to the Embassy in Israel1
Washington, February 1, 1965,
9:02 p.m.
672. For the Ambassador. Subject to final review by the President,
Talbot scheduled discuss our decisions on Jordan's arms request in Amman
end of January or early February. When you are notified of President's
approval, you should at earliest opportunity inform Prime Minister Eshkol
of the decision2 drawing on following presentation:
As Prime Minister aware, USG over past six months has been pondering
painful dilemmas posed by Jordan's request to buy arms, using funds
made available by Unified Arab Command. Jordan has resisted heavy pressure
from the UAC to acquire Soviet equipment, against arguments stressing
merits of standardization military equipment among Egypt, Syria, Iraq,
and Jordan, by assessing that it can and prefers to depend on Western
sources of supply. Jordan has also refused agree to positioning of non-Jordanian
UAC forces in Jordan except in time of war. If we refuse now to supply
arms, particularly armor and aircraft, almost inevitably Jordan will
acquire Soviet equipment with UAR military trainers with all the dangers
that entails.
Our assessment is that even if US-Jordan relations are put on the line
to prevent arms acquisition, Hussein will feel he has no alternative
but to accept UAC decision to modernize and expand his forces. Aside
from his "image" in Arab World which would be impaired if
he abandoned Arab ranks for Western subsidies, his own armed forces
would not accept such an outcome. We believe that although Hussein recognizes
that acceptance of the Soviet/UAR alternative could be beginning of
end for his regime, he would do it rather than take immediate consequences
of isolation from rest of Arab world.
We have reached conclusion that some positive response to Jordan's
request is necessary to avoid disastrous confrontation with UAC which
would be strengthened, not weakened, by our refusal sell equipment to
Jordan. Prime Minister will realize that UAC objective of improving
Arab military posture relative to Israel makes our dilemma especially
painful. However, positive USG response less disadvantageous than other
possible alternatives.
Our strategy seeks to hold Jordan's arms purchases to minimum necessary
enable Hussein withstand UAC pressures, and to space deliveries so that
there will be no unacceptable rapid arms build-up in Jordan. By avoiding
confrontation with UAC, time may well permit divisive Arab forces to
effect the weakening or destruction of UAC and policy of diverting sorely
needed resources to arms.
Jordan has requested USG sell GOJ approximately $90 million equipment
including modern tanks and supersonic aircraft. Planned use ground equipment
includes modernization JAA and creation five new brigades. Latter will
be manned by approximately 8500 men in existing National Guard and 6000
to 7000 new recruits. On air side, King seeks to purchase one 20 plane
squadron of F-104G fighters.
After months of exhaustive study, we have decided inform King Hussein
in next few days of our willingness sell for cash ground equipment to
be delivered over calendar years 1965-1969 inclusive which prices out
at about $50 million. We are prepared extend credit not to exceed $7
million at any time. We will seek to hold tanks to M-48s on grounds
of cost and to phase deliveries through period.
On supersonics we will seek to dissuade Hussein from acquisition any
supersonics this juncture, but frankly we not likely succeed. We will
inform Hussein that if he convinced no alternative to acquisition, we
unwilling sell American aircraft and could not countenance Soviet MIG
21s. We will urge Jordan purchase supersonics in West Europe. Supersonic
squadron cannot be operational until 1968 to 1969 at earliest.
In reaching our decisions, we have had ever in mind requirements of
Israeli security. Planned Arab buildup will not threaten existing Israeli
over-all military superiority over Arabs for foreseeable future. We
are confident Israel will agree USG decision is least unattractive alternative
from viewpoint both American and Israeli interests.
You should inform Eshkol we distressed that, contrary to Israel's assurances
about ability maintain secrecy M-48A3 tank transaction 2-3 years, entire
transaction known to Arabs and to large segments general public. He
will appreciate under circumstances and in order mitigate political
repercussions in Arab world, we compelled either 1) invoke security
clause to cancel conversion kit procurement agreement or 2) respond
favorably to Jordanian request for similar tanks.
We are disturbed at continued press campaign about alleged role Cubic
Corporation in UAR rocket program and hiring of German technicians from
Litton subsidiaries. Given the Secretary's assurances that allegations
about Cubic clearly distortion, we cannot escape conclusion continuing
press campaign has tacit approval GOI and stimulated by Israeli leaks.
We hope Israel can take effective steps end further sterile and misleading
publicity.3
In this connection, you should apprise Eshkol questions raised by Israel
and press have stimulated interest in problem export sophisticated technological
equipment and know-how abroad. View large amount electronic equipment
and related information going to Near East, we fear such exports encouragement
to escalation arms race. We looking into ways control flow. Of course,
as Secretary noted in letter to Mrs. Meir, any controls necessarily
applied regionally despite possible hardship to American business.
Ball
Notes
1 Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Top Secret;
Limdis. Drafted by Davies and Killgore on January 25; cleared by Meyers,
Bunte, Solbert, and Talbot; and approved by Ball. Repeated to Amman,
London, and Bonn.
2 Telegram 675 to Tel Aviv, February
2, informed the Embassy of the President's approval and authorized discussion
with Eshkol. (Ibid.) Telegram 682 to Tel Aviv, February 3, authorized
Barbour to discuss it with Foreign Minister Meir, omitting the reference
to the M-48 tank transaction with Israel in the third to the last paragraph
of telegram 672. (Ibid.) Telegram 919 from Tel Aviv, February 4, reported
that Barbour presented U.S. views on Jordan arms to the Foreign Minister
that morning. (Ibid.) Telegram 920 from Tel Aviv, February 4, and telegrams
921 and 922, both February 5, reported that Meir expressed unhappiness
at the prospect of U.S. provision of tanks to Jordan. (Ibid.)
3 Foreign Minister Meir alleged in
a letter to Secretary Rusk, not found, that the Cubic Corporation was
involved in the supply of a missile telemetry system to the UAR. Telegram
490 to Tel Aviv, December 12, 1964, summarizes the letter and states
that Gazit had been informed that the charges were unfounded. (Ibid.,
SCI 11 UAR) Rusk replied in a January 18 letter to Meir, not found.
Telegram 627 to Tel Aviv, January 22, 1965, recounts a meeting between
Jernegan and Harman in which Jernegan commented on Rusk's letter and
provided additional information on the subject. (Ibid.) Barbour reported
in telegram 926 from Tel Aviv, February 5, that in a February 4 meeting
with Meir, he stressed U.S. concern about "public campaigning"
on this subject, and Meir referred to the Secretary's "unsatisfactory"
letter of January 18. (Ibid.)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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