Memorandum on Latest Developments on Jordan Arms Problem
(February 13, 1965)
The United States is having trouble getting Jordan to accept its
arms offers and is weighing its options if Jordan obtains an unlimited
supply through Soviet channels.
Briefing Memorandum by the
Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern
and South Asian Affairs (Talbot)1
Washington, February 13, 1965.
SUBJECT
Latest Developments on Jordan Arms Problem
I have been in Jordan February 7-10 negotiating with King Hussein on
the arms problem. Simultaneously, several meetings with the President
were held here as developments unfolded.
In the initial presentation to King Hussein, I was authorized to offer:
(1) The basic M-48 tanks, (2) A $42 million ground equipment package
to be delivered over a five-year period and to include the tanks, (3)
U.S. acquiescence in Jordanian acquisition of a West European supersonic
fighter squadron, and (4) a $7 million revolving credit. This was not
enough to satisfy King Hussein.
The King revealed his knowledge of the supposedly secret tank deal
between the Federal Republic of Germany and Israel which, as the King
pointed out, included the 105 mm gun. He argued that it was not fair
to offer Jordan a tank inferior to that which Israel is getting. The
King was also dissatisfied with the delivery schedules envisaged in
our offer, the amount of credit, and the West European supersonic. He
and the Jordanian side argued that the over-all American offer was not
sufficient to enable Jordan to withstand Unified Arab Command pressures
to accept Soviet equipment.
After the second long meeting on February 8, I reported that the real
issue had become whether to sell arms to both Jordan and Israel or to
Israel alone, following Jordanian acquisition of Soviet materiel. I
recommended increasing the credit to $15 million, offering the M-48A1
tank with a fall-back to the M-48A3 (with diesel engine), cooperating
with Jordan to find a suitable Free World supersonic fighter (with American
supersonics to be held eventually in the offing if a suitable non-American
plane could not be found) and speeding up of deliveries to the extent
feasible.
After a February 9 White House meeting, the Department authorized me
to offer (1) $15 million credit, (2) the basic M-48 tank for the first
part of the Jordanian order with an agreement to reconsider the possibility
of getting the M-48A3 for the second part, but (3) to offer nothing
further on supersonics beyond our original offer.
In a final meeting February 10 the King held firm to his request for
the M-48A3, but did not insist on delivery before late 1967-1968. He
did, however, ask for an agreement to supply 100 of the M-48's in calendar
years 1965-1966. Brigadier Khammash later specified 50 M-48 tanks in
1965 and 50 in 1966. The King is obviously convinced he cannot successfully
resist the pressures of the UAC with anything less than the above assurances.
I am persuaded he has soberly estimated his position and is staking
his chances for continued close relations with the West on our supplying
what he judges will be necessary to hold his membership in the Arab
Club. Our offer to help Jordan find an acceptable aircraft from Free
World sources remains. We are proposing to the President that he concur
in our proposals to supply 100 M-48 tanks in 1965-66 and 100 M-48A3
tanks with the 105 mm gun in late 1967-68.
Meanwhile, Robert Komer has gone to Israel as a special emissary of
the President in order to convey our rationale for providing arms to
Jordan and to reassure Israeli leaders of our continuing deep interest
in Israel's security and welfare.
We anticipate agreement to sell arms to Jordan and cancellation of
German military assistance to Israel will create pressure for direct
sale of U.S. arms to Israel. To mitigate the severe political damage
this would cause the U.S. in the Arab world, NEA has recommended that
we compensate for any disproportionate Arab military buildup only in
return for Israeli agreement 1) to support actively U.S. aid to Jordan
and to assist in abetting the stir over aid to the U.A.R., 2) to forego
nuclear weapons and accept full IAEA safeguards, 3) not to deploy offensive
missiles, and 4) not to undertake premature preemptive action against
Arab diversion works.
Notes:
1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER. Secret. Drafted by Killgore
and Lee F. Dinsmore of NE on February 12 and cleared by Davies. Filed
as an attachment to a February 15 memorandum from Talbot to Rusk.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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