Editorial Note on U.S. Supplying Arms to Both
Israel and Jordan or Neither
(February 20, 1965)
The United States tells Israel it will either supply
both Israel and Jordan with arms or neither and leaves the decision
to Israel.
Editorial Note
In a 13-minute telephone conversation on February 20, 1965, President
Johnson discussed the question of arms sales to Jordan with New York
banker Abraham Feinberg, Chairman of the Executive Committee of the
American Trust Company. Feinberg said that McGeorge Bundy had suggested
he call because the President was on the horns of a dilemma with respect
to the Jordan situation and felt he had not heard a clear expression
of Israeli views. (Johnson indicated later in the conversation that
he had received indirect reports that Ambassador Harman was expressing
opposition to arms sales to Jordan.) Feinberg told Johnson that he had
given Bundy a rundown of the Israeli point of view as he had received
it in a conversation that morning. He said the way to get a clear expression
of Israeli views was to let Prime Minister Eshkol send Foreign Minister
Golda Meir to Washington and meet with her. Johnson said they had reviewed
this proposal a couple of days earlier and he thought it would be "about
the worst thing that could happen" because it would attract worldwide
attention. He said he had asked Averell Harriman and Robert Komer to
go to Israel to talk to Eshkol, tell him the importance that Johnson's
advisers attached to responding to King Hussein's request for arms,
and obtain his views.
Johnson told Feinberg: "We can go one of two ways, and I'm willing
to go either way. If the Israel friends in this country want to substitute
their judgment about the consequences of Soviet planes and don't think
it makes much difference, kind of like what Mike Feldman argued in the
meetings up here, I'm prepared to tell my advisers that that is the
course. I'd be perfectly willing. I don't look with much approval on
becoming a munitions maker." He continued in this vein, telling
Feinberg that he would leave the decision to Eshkol but making it clear
that he thought failure to provide arms to Jordan would lead to disastrous
results. He indicated that if the United States did not sell arms to
Jordan, it would not sell arms to Israel. His judgment and that of his
advisers, he told Feinberg, was that they should not let King Hussein
"go down the river," but "if you want to turn him over
and have a complete Soviet bloc--well, we'll just have to, and we'll
get out of the arms business." He would let the Israelis make the
decision, he told Feinberg, "but it's got to be in or out. If we
go in, of course we've got to be of some help to Israel. If we get out,
then we've just got to say, well, we're not taking part, we're not going
to supply arms to one side or the other, we're just not going to be
in here to sell a lot of munitions."
Feinberg said one of Israel's major concerns was that the United States
would reach an agreement with Jordan without further discussion with
Israel. He again raised the question of a Meir visit. Johnson again
rejected it. He repeated his view of the importance of selling arms
to Jordan but said again that the decision was up to Israel: "What
I want is, I want Eshkol to tell me what he wants to do. And I don't
want him to just tell me, I want him to tell the people over here what
he wants to do." He repeated that "we'll furnish both of you"
but if Israel did not want that, "we'll furnish nobody." (Johnson
Library, Recordings and Transcripts, Recording of Telephone Conversation
Between Johnson and Feinberg, February 20, 1965, 11 a.m., Tape F65.08,
PNO 1-2)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |