Letter to Israeli PM Eshkol Regarding Dimona
Reactor
(March 19, 1964)
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I am distressed to learn from Ambassador
Barbour that you feel unable to approve of
our reassuring President Nasser about the
peaceful character of the Dimona reactor./2/ We are far from confident that apprehension
as to Israel's atomic potential will, as you
suggest, help deter Nasser from attacking
Israel. Quite the contrary, we believe that
Nasser's fear of a developing Israeli nuclear
power may drive him to a choice between accelerating
the UAR military buildup or a desperate pre-emptive
attack. Either of these choices would have
the gravest effects on the security of Israel.
We think it plain that any possible deterrent
value that might come from keeping Nasser
in the dark is trivial compared to these risks.
It is also hard to see how Nasser could adversely
exploit reassurance that Israel's nuclear
activities are for peaceful purposes. We certainly
do not intend to provide him with details.
Nor did he misuse our reassurances when, with
the agreement of your government, we last
informed him along these lines. Indeed our
doing so served to ease Arab-Israeli tensions.
Therefore I hope you will reconsider your
decision on this matter, on which I am sure
you will agree that our ultimate interest--enhancement
of Israel's security--is the same as yours.
With warm regards,
Sincerely, Lyndon B. Johnson.
[George Ball suggested that LBJ] make following
points orally to Eshkol:
1. Nasser aware past US visits to Dimona
and eventually will learn of January visit
from other countries Israel has agreed we
may take into our confidence. Preferable permit
us give Nasser information directly to gain
maximum favorable results.
2. Content February 22 Nasser speech not
new. Every Arab politician must inveigh against
Israel to survive politically. Realistic and
moderate resolutions taken by Arab Summit
Conference reflect Nasser's position more
clearly than his words.
3. Al-Ahram editorialist Hassanain Haikal,
confidant of Nasser, has publicly voiced UAR
recognition that war against Israel is not
possible because of US support.
4. Israel's security lies in US capability
and preparedness to ward off aggression. Total
security is not possible, however; even US
lacks that.
5. Tank issue unrelated to Nasser reassurance./3/
FYI. Jewish Observer February 14 carried
article entitled "Dimona Report Studies"
that referred to "a top secret report
from American experts who had studied the
potentialities of Israel's principal nuclear
reactor at Dimona. . ." While word visit
not used, idea is implicit especially to those
aware already of our earlier inspection. Moreover,
early in February Israeli newsman here specifically
inquired about US interest in Dimona and rumored
visit by US scientific team. End FYI.
Ball
Notes
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66,
AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Limdis. Drafted at the
White House; cleared by Davies, Harriman,
and McGeorge Bundy; and approved by McKesson.
A March 14 memorandum from Komer to the President
states that he had "greatly toned down
State's rather abrasive draft" of the
letter to Eshkol. Bundy initialed the President's
approval on Komer's memorandum and sent the
revised draft to Benjamin Read with an attached
note of March 19 stating that it was approved
by the President. (Johnson Library, National
Security File, Special Head of State Correspondence
File, Israel, Presidential Correspondence)
/2/Telegrams 916 and 919 from Tel Aviv, March
3 and 4, reported a March 3 conversation between
Barbour and Eshkol, in which Eshkol argued
that a degree of apprehension as to Israel's
nuclear potential would serve as a useful
deterrent to Nasser. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR)
/3/Telegram 976 from Tel Aviv, March 23,
reported that in a meeting with Eshkol that
morning, Barbour delivered Johnon's message
and made the five points in telegram 810.
(Ibid.)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |