Israel-UAR Missile Development
(June 17, 1966)
This memorandum from Secretary of State Dean Rusk
to the U.S. Embassy in Israel discusses a few key issues in U.S. policy
toward Israel and the Arab world. The U.S. attempted to encourage Israel
to abandon its missile program (which Israel began due to threats from
the United Arab Republic [a union between Egypt and Syria from 1958-1961]).
One strategy to do that was to tell the Israelis that they overestimated
the UAR missile program.
Airgram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Israel/1/
CA-12335
Washington, June 17, 1966, 8:26 p.m.
SUBJECT
Israeli and UAR Offensive Missiles
REF
Tel Aviv's 1229 and A-1000/2/
1. The Department agrees with Embassy Tel Aviv that
Prime Minister Eshkol's stand on the missile question is eminently reasonable
and encouraging. We consider it provides a basis for further efforts
to resolve this aspect of the UAR-Israel arms race. However, before
considering how this question might best be handled further in both
Tel Aviv and Cairo, we believe it would be helpful to clarify the kind
of UAR undertakings which Israel would consider acceptable, and the
kind Israel would be prepared to make in return. This is the more important
in view of the Israeli estimate of the UAR missile program which implies
that acquisition of gyros is the sole obstacle to activation of a 50-60
missile UAR stockpile. If Eshkol, whether or not he is firmly convinced
of the accuracy of this estimate, feels his actions must be governed
by it, the question of undertakings may involve verification and/or
destruction.
2. What we have in mind would be some sort of private
statement by each side, through the US or in some other manner, that
each is prepared to abandon both indigenous offensive (meaning surface-to-surface
ballistic) missile activities and acquisition of such missiles from
abroad. To see how feasible this might be, Embassy Tel Aviv is requested
to approach Eshkol along the following lines soon after his return from
Africa:
A. We are gratified at the Prime Minister's statesmanlike
position on the missile question evidenced in the May 24 conversation.
B. We believe this may afford an opportunity to encourage
the UAR to abandon its missile program if Israel were to do likewise.
We would have in mind that neither nation would (1) import offensive
missiles or parts or (2) make such missiles or parts. We would assume
that private declarations, either through the US or in some other manner,
would be acceptable. (FYI. It would be helpful to have as precise a
statement from Eshkol as possible on these points. End FYI.) If Eshkol
resists committing Israel on its indigenous program the Embassy may
state that continuing research work in either Israel or the UAR would
presumably not be precluded. However, missile production and testing
would have to be foresworn.
C. You should mention in low key that US information
on the UAR missile program does not support the Israeli assessment handed
to Ambassador Barbour on May 24. If discussion ensues on this question,
you may say that, for example, our information indicates the UAR is
having trouble with numerous aspects of its program, including structural
problems, guidance difficulties, other design problems, and skyrocketing
costs of research and development.
D. If Eshkol raises questions about either verification
or destruction, you should seek his reasons. You may suggest that he
remain flexible on these questions for the moment, until UAR views can
be ascertained. You may point out in this connection that we recognize
these questions may become problems but that we think such factors as
the rising costs and poor progress of the UAR missile program, as well
as Cairo's presumed desire for Israeli restraint, might make some mutually
advantageous arrangement possible.
3. FYI. The Department is giving careful thought to
possible modalities for enabling Israel and the UAR, should some private
understanding be attained on non-introduction of missiles, to carry
off the matter publicly without undue repercussions should the two countries
so desire. End FYI.
4. For Cairo. The Department would appreciate the Embassy's
comments on possible modalities that might help enable Nasser to make
a private self-denying declaration of some sort on missiles. On what
basis might some public position be desirable and feasible? It occurs
to the Department that the UAR leadership may already have given thought
to this subject, what with the lagging progress of its current missile
program, its growing economic headaches generally, and the prospect
that as things now stand Israel will probably be in position to deploy
offensive missiles long before the UAR can demonstrate a capability
to do so.
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 UAR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by
Wolle; cleared by Symmes, Brewer, Rochlin, Toumanoff, Garthoff, Sisco,
DePalma, and Acting SCI Deputy Director J. Wallace Joyce; and approved
by Davies. Also sent to Cairo and repeated to Paris and London.
/2/See Document 293 and footnote 3 thereto.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |