U.S. Policy on Israel's Nuclear Program
(July 28, 1966)
The Secretary of State sent this memo to update
the Embassy in Israel of Israel's nuclear position. The U.S. argued
that if Israel agreed to IAEA safeguards its Arab neighbors and the
USSR would go along. The Israelis responded that they were concerned
about the threat of conventional weapons and that they would not be
the first to introduce nuclear weapons in the Middle East. Rusk said
that the U.S. would not support Israel if they obtained nuclear weapons.
Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy
in Israel/1/
Washington, July 28, 1966, 8:39 p.m.
17501. After discussion Israeli proposal on refugee
problem (State 16922),/2/ Secretary raised question of Israeli nuclear
intentions. He noted Soviet interest in denuclearization and said that
if Israel would agree to IAEA safeguards, he believed its Arab neighbors
would also agree and USSR would go along. Would Israel agree to IAEA
safeguards, he asked.
Ambassador Rafael said Israel was not giving any thought
to it at present because of GOI's concern for broader problem of conventional
weapons. Rafael said Soviets did not indicate to Israelis in Geneva
they would be willing to limit conventional arms in area in exchange
for nuclear ban. He added Israel made clear its position it would not
be first to introduce nuclear weapons in Near East.
Secretary noted our assumption GOI does not wish go
nuclear, and added: If you do, you will lose US support. If on the other
hand, you accepted nuclear ban, he continued, your neighbors would follow
you and that would be first step toward reduction of tensions. Secretary
said we cannot guarantee USSR interested in conventional arms limitation,
but nuclear question can be separated out and that consideration is
fundamental to US position.
Secretary then told Israelis that nothing would be
more disastrous to GOI than enter nuclear weapon field, and urged them
to agree to international safeguards. When Rafael protested nuclear
ban does not take care of GOI's problem with conventional weapons, Secretary
said: This means then you want to hang on to the threat of nuclear weapons.
Rafael said no, GOI has made position clear in Knesset, but there are
some people in Israel--not in govt--who say Israel should go nuclear.
Secretary said either this card is in your deck, or
it is not. If it's not, then get it out of the way by accepting safeguards.
He again noted that if Israel is holding open the nuclear option, it
should forget US support. We would not be with you, he said.
Secretary asked Israel to bring this matter to attention
of Eban. They suggested it might be discussed further while Eban is
in US for GA.
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by
Campbell, cleared by Symmes and Sisco, and approved and initialed by
Rusk. Repeated to Geneva for Goldberg.
/2/Document 310.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |