Barbour And Eban Disagree Over Israel's Nuclear Program
(September 14, 1966)
The Ambassador of Israel sent a telegram to the
State Department informing them of his recent meeting with Israeli Foreign
Minister Abba Eban. At this
meeting, Barbour stressed to Eban the need for Israel to publicly foreswear
nuclear weapons for the interests of the region. Eban was upset by the
U.S. statement that Israel would lose U.S. support if it went forward
with the development of a nuclear weapons program.
Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department
of State/1/
Tel Aviv, September 14, 1966, 1115Z.
946. Ref: State 17501./2/
1. Emphasizing I had no specific instructions to raise
the matter, I stressed to FonMin Eban Sept 13, in meeting arranged at
my request and in anticipation of his prospective meeting with the Secretary
in New York, our fervent hope that Israel would find way make clear
to world in unmistakable terms that it would forswear nuclear weapons.
I mentioned IAEA controls as vehicle accomplish end. I recognized that
our visits Dimona and PriMin Eshkol's statement on subject gave us considerable
reassurance in this respect but noted that as long as Israel seemed
retain option take nuclear route, no matter how self limited it might
be, this added to already acute danger world confronts in problem nuclear
proliferation. I stressed the Secretary's personal interest and concern
as this problem touches Israel and the Middle East and expressed my
belief that the Secretary would wish discuss in New York. I stressed
that essence of issue is not only that Israel remove this card from
its hand but be seen publicly to do so. I used familiar arguments as
to importance Israeli peaceful image, as stabilizing force in area etc.,
and added that since it obvious, as result various leaks, that Israel
in fact not embarking on weapons production, GOI had nothing to lose
and everything to gain in making gesture suggested.
2. Eban said he impressed with importance Secretary
attaches to matter and that my comments lent urgency to full briefing
on subject including consultations with PriMin he intended to undertake
prior his departure for New York. He noted limitations of time and pressures
of other matters in New York and expressed hope there would be opportunity
discuss subject in detail it deserved. Expressed also his opinion that
nuclear arms race somewhat more remote contingency in area than it had
been, less pressing immediate possibility for example than clash with
Syria. Referring to the Secretary's conversation with Rafael, he took
exception to what had been reported to him as the suggestion the U.S.
would be "through with Israel" if Israel did not do what we
wanted in this respect. He felt this suggestion of sanctions against
Israel was not in accord with the atmosphere of trust and good will
that should prevail between good friends. (I responded that the Secretary's
frankness with Rafael should be understood both in the context of our
countries' friendship and of the strength of the Secretary's feeling
on this subject. I added it not question of sanctions, on contrary it
matter of losing U.S. support.) Eban said that Israel had said it would
not manufacture nuclear weapons and would certainly not be the first
to introduce them into area. This was an extraordinary assurance when
set against the constant threats of Israel's neighbors to destroy it.
More weight should be given to the PriMin's assurances. (I replied that
this was an important contribution, but that a further dramatic gesture
was essential.) Eban concluded that he had the signal. He hoped to be
well versed on subject on arrival in New York and hoped to have something
substantive to say.
3. Comment: In spite of Eban's testiness about some
things and indications he considered matter had less immediacy than
it had had, I believe he will try to get mandate from PriMin (it not
excluded judging by some innuendos of his comments that he already has
it) to make some useful contribution in direction we desire, and hope
that he will go to New York prepared to discuss matter concretely and
constructively. He will be interested in our views of Egyptian attitudes.
We may be sure he will lay stress on Israel's immediate security concerns
vis-a-vis Syria. I reminded him that we had done much lately to permit
Israelis to sleep more soundly in their beds, and this is a factor obviously
in favor GOI understanding this problem.
Barbour
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Repeated to
Cairo.
/2/Document 312.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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