U.S. Report on Israeli Nuclear Policy
(November 3, 1966)
This memorandum summarizes Israel's position regarding
nuclear proliferation and a potential Israeli nuclear buildup. Israel
expressed its support for a nuclear non-proliferation treaty, particularly
as it appears that Egypt is now willing to accept Israel's intentions. Israel declared that keeping
Egypt uncertain is the best way to prevent an Egyptian arms buildup.
The U.S. then discussed ways to ensure Israel had control over any nuclear
installations.
Telegram From the Embassy in Israel to the Department
of State/1/
Tel Aviv, November 3, 1966, 0855Z.
1540. Ref: State 68096./2/
1. After delays caused primarily by Security Council
consideration of Israel complaint against Syria re Fatah, FonMin Eban
and I finally had opportunity discuss together arms control in ME at
long lunch session on Nov 2. Having heard me out on Secretary's oral
message contained reftel, Eban made following points:
A. He had not for moment thought that lack of reference
this subject at his Oct 7 meeting with Secretary indicated any loss
of interest on our part.
B. GOI too has put considerable thought on this matter.
As reflected in Raphael Nov 2 speech in New York GOI stands solidly
behind anti-proliferation treaty and will give it active public and
moral support.
C. From all evidence available to GOI, Egypt now fairly
relaxed as to Israeli intentions re nuclear weapons.
D. In fact, PM has been convinced by President Johnson
that effort keep Nasser uncertain as to Israeli intentions is no longer
worth risk of Egyptian weapons escalation.
E. However, due Egyptian predilection for sabotage
and plotting, GOI must find middle ground between letting Egyptians
be assured GOI not manufacturing bombs and giving them full info as
to Israel's scientific nuclear facilities.
F. Therefore, GOI cannot accept IAEA system of controls
to which Egyptians have access at all levels and, furthermore, it wishes
be sure we (and presumably others) do not pass on to Egyptians specifics
as to location or functions of Israeli installations.
G. Possibility remains that some kind of political
controls can be worked out but recent Egyptian speech in Vienna makes
Israelis less convinced of Egyptian willingness.
H. Israelis too have hopes of being included in general
non-proliferation treaty before long which they would prefer to being
singled out in some special arrangement in way contrary Israel's sovereign
status.
2. I pointed out that treaty not yet a reality and,
much as we all support it, we do not know when it will be. Furthermore,
this being imperfect world, Israeli gesture to assure its suspicious
neighbors that it not moving toward nuclear weapons would promote peace
of area. Acceptance of IAEA controls would be best way accomplish this.
I suggested that although my instructions did not go this far, if Israel
cannot see its way clear accept these, verification scheme including
Israel and Egypt with third country is another possibility. Still another
which would have advantage of being unilateral act of sovereign state
would be GOI invitation to scientists of other countries to participate
in research projects at Dimona.
3. Then I brought up May 24 conversation with PM in
which he stated missiles were at least two years away (Embtel 1229 to
Washington)/3/ and suggested that since UAR running into difficulties
in missile development, this type of sophisticated weaponry too should
be subject control arrangement.
4. Eban said he not informed on history our missile
discussions and would look into matter. He added that he would discuss
points made in our conversation with PM and would get in touch with
me for further discussion.
Comment: Although GOI does not appear any closer now
than it ever was to accepting IAEA controls, I think we are making progress.
It is significant that Eban now says President was successful in convincing
PM that tactic of keeping Nasser in state of uncertainty as to GOI intentions
was dangerous. Also, it hopeful sign that GOI is supporting anti-proliferation
treaty and that Eban for first time appears genuinely interested in
keeping dialogue going on this subject. Airgram with further report
conversation follows./4/
Barbour
/1/Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E. Secret; Exdis.
/2/Telegram 68096 to Tel Aviv, October 18, transmitted
the text of an oral message from Rusk to Eban. The message stated that
Rusk hoped to have a second meeting with Eban while he was in the United
States (for the first meeting, see Document 328) to discuss arms control,
especially actions that might be taken to prevent the escalation of
the Arab-Israel arms race into the nuclear field. Noting that this was
a major U.S. concern, it expressed the hope that the U.S.-Israeli dialogue
on the subject could continue. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E)
/3/Document 293.
/4/Airgram A-263, November 5. (National Archives and
Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12 NEAR E)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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