Negotiations Regarding Dimona
Inspections
(November 25, 1964)
This document reflects
ongoing concern about Israeli nuclear program
and pressure exerted on Israel to submit to
inspections. It is particularly interesting
that the U.S. was intent on passing information
from inspections on to Israel's principal
enemy, Nasser, on the pretext that this would
discourage him from taking extreme measures
and become even more intimately involved with
the Soviet Union.
109. Telegram From the Department
of State to the Embassy in Israel1
Washington, November 25,
1964, 7:40 p.m.
441. For Ambassador. Following instruction supersedes Deptel 434.2
In response to PM Eshkol's informal plea to President on Dimona,3 you should make following points to Eshkol privately, indicating that
you are speaking on Presidential authority:
1. President appreciates the frankness of Eshkol's informal message
outlining the problems posed for him by the timing of our next visit
to the Dimona reactor. We can of course understand the ever present
difficulty of reconciling conflicting domestic and foreign interests.
2. Nevertheless, President does feel bound to urge the importance of
the semi-annual visits on which we have previously agreed. We are engaged
in a continuing effort to prevent proliferation of sophisticated weapons,
not least in the Near East. We believe Eshkol fully agrees that this
effort is in the interests of Israel. A vital element in its success
is our ability to assure all parties that none of them has attained
or is seeking a nuclear capability, and to give this assurance we must
be able to satisfy ourselves on this score.
3. The problem is made more acute by the recent explosion of a nuclear
device by Communist China. It has alarmed many countries and made some
of them--such as India--think again whether they should not attempt
nuclear programs of their own. This is likely to focus Arab suspicion
even more upon Israel.
4. Our interest in the security of Israel remains unchanged, but the
grave responsibility which this puts upon us convinces us that we must
leave no stone unturned in our efforts to maintain peace. President
hopes, therefore, that Eshkol will see his way clear to arrange for
a visit by our people to Dimona in late November or early December.
FYI we regard early inspection of Dimona as imperative. End FYI.
5. In return, President has authorized following measures which we
hope will ease Eshkol's problem:
a. We willing consider waiving Israel commitment to another six-monthly
inspection until after November 1965 elections, contingent upon satisfactory
findings next inspection and without prejudice to resumption schedule
of six-monthly visits thereafter.
b. We also willing postpone passing results inspection to Nasser until
after November 1965, unless situation in Near East such that US and
Israeli interests better served by informing him. We would, of course,
consult GOI before such step. However, you should emphasize that the
agreement on semi-annual visits to Dimona is particularly important
to our efforts with Nasser, because he knows, as does the rest of the
world, that Israel is probably the only country in the Near East which
has the scientific capability to produce nuclear weapons and also has
a facility in being which could be converted to such production. If
we were unable to reassure Nasser periodically, for example, he might
well be driven to greater dependence on the Soviet Union and even to
irrational military action against Israel. He would, of course, be more
resistant to our urgings that he limit his own arms development, particularly
in the middle field.
6. If Eshkol avers that his problem is with "hard liners"
in Cabinet, you can point out our difficulty in understanding this argument,
since BG personally agreed to periodic inspections in May 1963, presumably
with concurrence of Cabinet.
Rusk
Notes
1 Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE 11-2 ISR. Secret; Immediate; Exdis.
The text was received from the White House; cleared by McGeorge Bundy,
Talbot, and Davies; and approved by Harriman.
2 Telegram 434 was similar in substance to telegram
441, except that points 1-4, which Barbour was to convey to Eshkol,
were framed as an oral message from Johnson to Eshkol. (Ibid.) A November
18 memorandum from Komer to the President, enclosing a November 5 memorandum
from Harriman to Bundy and a draft of telegram 434, is in the Johnson
Library, National Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. III.
3 See footnote 2, Document 101.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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