United States Department of State

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. WILLIAM P. CLARK THE WHITE HOUSE

agSUBJECT: Status of the Lebanon Negotiations

In recent days the Lebanon negotiations have taken an open outpour of turn. Progress has been made by a painstaking but productive combination of Phil Habib's separate discussions and the direct Israel-Lebanon talks in which Morris Draper and his team have participated. Habib has concentrated on moving Israel and Lebanon closer together on the central problem areas in the negotiation--security arrangements and mutual relations -- while in the direct Israel-Lebanon talks the actual language of the less contentious elements of an agreement is being hammered out.

Agreement has been reached (ad referendum) on a number of provisions concerning less contentious issues: creation of a g provisions concerning less contentious issues: creation of a greement \leq and development of further negotiations; establishment of an \leq 2 \leq 5 snaeli office in Lebanon; and prevention of cross-border terrorist attacks and inviolability of the border. important development this week, Lebanon finally fielded technicians to participate in bilateral "experts meetings" on economic affairs and narcotics matters.

Habib has pressed ahead despite the earlier Israeli reluctance to deal with security issues until Moshe Arens is in place. In the area of mutual relations, Habib and Draper are attempting to broker a consensus that builds on a Lebanese offer of interim "practical" arrangements on the movement of people and goods until a final agreement is reached. political damage for Lebanon of the interim arrangements would be finessed by describing the details only in a "verbal understanding", not as part of the formal, public agreement. The Israeli team now does not reject (ad referendum) the suggestion that negotiations on a final agreement could begin not later than six months after the withdrawal of the IDF from Israel wants greater specificity and elaboration of "practical" arrangements on movement of people and goods during the interim period until a final agreement is reached. Lebanese have proposed specific ideas on the movement of persons, and Habib and Draper are working on ideas for movement of goods.

On security arrangements, there is basic agreement on the concept of a security zone in southern lebenon, within which there would be force and weapons limitations. Dispute remains

85 D251 .7517

130 00

5


DECL: OADR



on the extent of these limitations and the northern boundary of the zone. Israel still seeks five Israeli-manned "observation posts" in Lebanon.

proposing joint Lebanese/Israeli patrols to verify compliance as a further bridging idea. With regard to Haddad and his militia, Israel continues to insist that Haddad should be given a command position in southern Lebanon, and that his forces should be integrated into the Lebanese security forces in the area. Lebanon is prepared to integrate the Haddad militias but wants to reserve its sovereign right to determine their ultimate deployment, as well as Haddad's personal future. The Lebanese are, however, prepared to seek an "honorable" solution for Haddad, possibly by posting him abroad as Defense Attache or Ambassador. A further Habib bridging idea is the use of UNIFIL to protect Palestinian refugee camps throughout Lebanon; Israel remains opposed to any UNIFIL presence in the security zone.

Habib is now in Beirut to explore Lebanese reactions. Phil considered a trip to Damascus to begin work on the difficult Syrian angle and has decided that for now the Lebanese should take the lead with the Syrians. Indeed, another visit to Damascus by Lebanese emissary Jean Obeid is underway. Phil's judgment is that it would be best to have an Israeli-Lebanon agreement in place before he turns to the task of trying to nail down Syrian and PLO withdrawal, although the Lebanese are continuing their discussions with both parties on this subject.



Once the Lebanese-Israeli agreement is closer to final shape we will need to ensure that it is packaged carefully for Arab consumption and then obtain moderate Arab support.

i. Paul Premer, III Executive Secretary



B/

81

-3-

Drafted: NEA/ARN--CDWelch/AEJonestpdw x21018 2/24/83 #3023C

