

~~SENSITIVE~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

INSPECTOR

Date _____

6/26/96

X101

1") RELEASE
1") ~~EXCISE~~
1") DENY

() DECLASSIFY
IN PART

9200109
EO: Classification

INCOMING TELEGRAM

FOIA Exemptions
FOIA Exemptions

() DOWNGRADE TS to () S or

~~SECRET~~

NO0541

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03815 01 OF 06 162333Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

COPY 5 OF 20 COPIES

-----022072 162340Z /60

O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3940

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015

~~NOTES~~ DECAPTIONED

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

E.O. 12356: UECL: OADR
TAGS: PEPR, PINT, PINS, MOPS, MILI, SY, LE, US, IS
SUBJECT: HABIB/DRAPER MISSION: MEETING WITH PRIME
- MINISTER BEGIN, DECEMBER 16

1. ~~(SECRET-ENTIRE TEXT.)~~
2. SUMMARY: AT OUR MEETING TONIGHT, THURSDAY, DEC. 18, WITH BEGIN, SHARON, AND THEIR COLLEAGUES, I OUTLINED IN DETAIL WHAT I CONSIDERED A REASONABLE POSITION ON THE ISRAELI OCTOBER PROPOSAL, POINT BY POINT, COVERING WITHDRAWAL, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS, NORMALIZATION, ETC. I MADE THIS PRESENTATION IN THE CONTEXT OF AN APPROACH CALLING FOR THE WIDEST POSSIBLE COMMON UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS RELEVANT TO A SOLUTION FOR THE SITUATION IN LEBANON. I STRESSED THE NEED FOR URGENCY AND SET THE STAGE TO GO INTO DETAIL ON A "COURSE OF ACTION" ALONG THE LINES WE DISCUSSED IN WASHINGTON.

3. BEFORE MOVING TO SPECIFICS, HOWEVER, I ASKED FOR THE ISRAELI REACTION. AT THIS POINT SHARON -- ENJOYING THE DRAMA OF THE SITUATION -- REPORTED THAT THROUGH SECRET DISCUSSIONS, ISRAEL AND LEBANON HAD COME TO AN AGREEMENT ON A "WORKING PAPER" WHICH CONSISTED OF GUIDE-

~~SECRET~~

85 0251 7517 31458739

~~NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY~~

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State INCOMING
TELEGRAM



~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

JERUSA 03815 01 OF 06 162333Z

LINES FOR DIRECT ISRAELI-LEBANESE NEGOTIATIONS. THE GUIDELINES COVERED ARRANGEMENTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF PLO, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI FORCES FROM LEBANON, SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS BETWEEN LEBANON AND ISRAEL, AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR FUTURE RELATIONS BETWEEN THEM. ACCORDING TO SHARON, THESE GUIDELINES HAD BEEN WORKED OUT IN EXTENDED NEGOTIATIONS AND HAVE BEEN APPROVED BY PRESIDENT GEMAYEL, SUBJECT TO CERTAIN CLARIFICATIONS, ALTHOUGH NOT SHARED WITH HIS CABINET. THE WORKING PAPER IS TO BE SUBMITTED TO THE ISRAELI CABINET ON DECEMBER 19, AFTER WHICH NEGOTIATIONS FOR A FORMAL AGREEMENT COULD THEORETICALLY BEGIN WITHIN A FEW DAYS. THE WORKING PAPER REFLECTS KEY POSITIONS WHICH THE ISRAELIS HAD PUT FORTH IN PREVIOUS DISCUSSIONS AND THERE SEEMS LITTLE DOUBT THAT IT WILL BE APPROVED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET.

4. DESPITE THE ASSERTION THAT GEMAYEL HAD APPROVED THE PAPER, WE WILL NEED TO CONFIRM THIS OURSELVES BY GOING TO BEIRUT TOMORROW. IF GEMAYEL IS ON BOARD, A BREAK-THROUGH OF SORTS WILL HAVE BEEN ACHIEVED. EVEN SO THERE WILL BE DIFFICULTIES. GEMAYEL WILL NEED CABINET APPROVAL. THE WITHDRAWAL SCHEME CALLS FOR PLO DEPARTURE TO BE COMPLETE BEFORE ISRAEL BEGINS WITHDRAWING. FURTHERMORE, THERE WILL REMAIN THE NEED TO CONVINCE THE SYRIANS TO AGREE TO SIMULTANEOUS WITHDRAWAL WITH THE ISRAELIS. OTHER COMPLICATIONS COULD ARISE BECAUSE OF THE FACT THAT GEMAYEL MAY HAVE AGREED TO CERTAIN ISRAELI DEMANDS THE SYRIANS (AND PERHAPS OTHER ARABS) WILL FIND DIFFICULT TO ACCEPT. THUS, UNTIL WE HAVE MET WITH GEMAYEL WE SHOULD RESERVE JUDGEMENT AS TO THE EXTENT OF PROGRESS. IT IS ALSO OF UTMOST IMPORTANCE THAT THIS REPORT BE ON A CLOSE-HOLD BASIS; PARTICULARLY PENDING ISRAELI CABINET CONSIDERATION.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
03130730
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03815 01 OF 06 162333Z

5. PLEASE NOTE THAT AT THE END OF THE MEETING, I MET ALONE WITH BEGIN TO DELIVER THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER AND TO STRESS THE NEED FOR CLEAR AND RAPID PROGRESS. END SUMMARY.

6. JOINED BY AMBASSADOR LEWIS AND DRAPER, PLUS STAFF, I MET FOR TWO HOURS WITH BEGIN THE EVENING OF DEC. 15. BEGIN WAS JOINED BY SHARON, ACTING FOREIGN MINISTER NISSIM AND A FULL PANOPLY OF MILITARY AND CIVILIAN ADVISERS.

7. I SAID THAT DRAPER AND I HAD COME FROM CONSULTATIONS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE INTENTION OF RESTORING OUR DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL AND SEEKING SUBSTANTIVE UNDERSTANDING, SO THAT WE COULD ACCELERATE PROGRESS TOWARDS THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. I SAID THAT DRAPER'S TRIP TO LEBANON HAD BEEN SOLELY TO ACCELERATE LEBANON'S TALKS WITH THE PLO AND SYRIA, AND HAD SUCCEEDED, AS DEMONSTRATED BY GEMAYEL'S PHONE CONVERSATION WITH ASSAD AND HIS SENDING OF AN EMIS-SARY (DBAYU) TO DAMASCUS YESTERDAY. WE WOULD CONTINUE TO PRESS THE LEBANESE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH THE SYRIANS AND PLO.

8. I STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF MOVING FORWARD RAPIDLY ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES, AND ARGUED THAT DELAY WOULD ONLY LEAD TO INCREASED DISORDER IN LEBANON AND PLAY INTO THE HANDS OF FOREIGN ELEMENTS OPPOSED TO A PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF LEBANON'S PROBLEMS. I SAID THAT WE WERE AWARE OF THE LEBANESE AND ISRAELI POSITIONS, AND THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE ALSO KNEW EACH OTHER'S POSITIONS VERY WELL. I SAID THAT THE TIME HAD NOW COME TO TRY TO WRAP UP SUBSTANTIVE POSITIONS ON EVERY ISSUE. WE DID NOT HAVE A US BLUEPRINT, BUT WE WANTED TO DISCUSS EACH ELEMENT TOGETHER AND SEE WHERE

~~SECRET~~

03130730

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM



~~SECRET~~

NUD543

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03815 02 OF 06 162341Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----023000 162345Z /60
O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3941

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03815

NODIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

WE ARE TOGETHER. WE WERE NOT DOING THIS AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR ISRAELI/LEBANON DIRECT TALKS, WHICH WE CONTINUED TO SUPPORT, BUT IN ORDER TO ENSURE THAT WHEN THOSE TALKS BEGAN THERE WAS A SOLID BASIS OF COMMON UNDERSTANDINGS WHICH WOULD FACILITATE THEIR RAPID CONCLUSION. I SAID THAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT A PROTRACTED PROCESS, AND THAT I BELIEVED LEBANON AND ISRAEL AGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT. I THEN PROCEEDED TO TAKE EACH OF THE POINTS IN THE ISRAELI CABINET DECISION OF OCTOBER 10, BEGINNING WITH THE SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL, AND PRESENTED "US IDEAS" ON EACH:

- A) SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL: WE AGREE THAT, AS A FIRST STEP, ALL PW'S, MIA'S AND BODIES SHOULD BE RETURNED, BUT ASK WHAT HAPPENS TO THOSE INDIVIDUALS WHOM ISRAEL HAS TAKEN INTO CUSTODY FOR ACTS HOSTILE TO ITS SECURITY?
- AS A SECOND STEP, WE BELIEVE THAT THE PLO SHOULD "BEGIN TO LEAVE LEBANON," AND THAT WE SHOULD NOT BE TIED TO THE ORIGINAL ISRAELI CONDITION THAT ALL THE PLO MUST LEAVE.

-- THIRD STEP -- SYRIAN/ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT, WITH MNF AS INTERPOSITION FORCE -- GIVES US NO PROBLEM. IN CONTRAST TO THE ISRAELI POSITION, WE WOULD FORESEE THE COMPLETION OF PLO WITHDRAWAL AT ABOUT THIS STAGE. THIS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

N
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
S

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State
INCOMING
TELEGRAM~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03815 02 OF 06 162041Z

WOULD BE PART OF A PACKAGE PLAN FOR FULL WITHDRAWAL.

--FOURTH STEP -- SYRIA AND ISRAEL COMPLETE THEIR WITHDRAWAL WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE BEGINNING OR END OF THE INITIAL DISENGAGEMENT OPERATION (EXPECTED TO REQUIRE ONLY 3-4 DAYS). AS WITHDRAWAL OCCURS, COORDINATION AMONG THE LAF, MNF, AND INTERNATIONAL FORCES WILL BE NECESSARY.

-- B. PRINCIPLES OF SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
-- PREVENTION OF ALL ACTS OF HOSTILITY FROM THE TERRITORY OF EITHER SIDE: WE AGREE, AND FEEL THIS SHOULD BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS TO PROHIBIT ALL HOSTILE ACTS, THE UNAUTHORIZED CROSSING OF BORDER BY ARMED INDIVIDUALS OR MILITARY EQUIPMENT, HOSTILE PROPAGANDA, AND INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS. IN ADDITION, THERE WOULD BE A CONFIRMATION OF THE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY.

-- PREVENTION OF STATIONING OF OR ENTRY BY ANY FOREIGN FORCES INTO LEBANESE TERRITORY UNLESS AGREED TO BY BOTH PARTIES: WE AGREE IF THIS MEANS A RECIPROCAL PROHIBITION ON THE STATIONING OF HOSTILE RPT HOSTILE FOREIGN FORCES. IT COULD NOT COVER SOMETHING LIKE THE MNF. BEYOND THIS, THERE HAS TO BE SOME WAY OF DEFINING WHAT IS HOSTILE AND WHAT IS NOT. IN THIS CASE, WE WOULD PROPOSE THAT THE TWO PARTIES ACCEPT THE JUDGMENT OF THE U.S.

-- PREVENTION OF ACTIVITY BY PLO AND OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS: YES, WE WOULD SUPPORT RECIPROCAL UNDERTAKINGS TO REFRAIN FROM SUPPORTING OR ACQUIESCING IN SUCH ACTIVITIES. THERE WOULD BE NO EXTRATERRITORIAL RIGHTS FOR THE PLO OR OTHER TERRORIST GROUPS, AND THERE COULD BE NO CONTINUATION OF THE STATUS QUO ANTE.

~~SECRET~~

03100700

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NO DIS NO DIS NO DIS

DECLASSIFIED



Department of State
INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03815 02 OF 06 162341Z

-- SECURITY ZONE ENSURING THAT NO ISRAELI SETTLEMENTS ARE WITHIN ARTILLERY OR ROCKET RANGE: YES, EXCEPT FOR BELIEVING THAT LIGHT ARTILLERY SHOULD REMAIN IN THE HANDS OF THE LAF, WE AGREE THAT THE SECURITY ZONE WILL BE BOUNDED ON THE NORTH BY A LINE ABOUT 40 KMS FROM THE BORDER.

-- WE AGREE THAT THE LAF SHALL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR ENSURING SECURITY WITHIN THE SECURITY ZONE. LOCAL MILITIA CURRENTLY OPERATING IN THE ZONE SHALL BE INCORPORATED IN AUTHORIZED LEBANESE ORGANIZATIONS OR DISBANDED. HADQAD'S FORCES SHALL BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE REINTEGRATED IN THE LAF OR INCORPORATED IN A BORDER POLICE FORCE, THERE WILL BE A LEBANESE SOLUTION REGARDING MAJOR HADQAD HIMSELF. UNIFIL MAY HAVE A ROLE IN THE NORTHERN PARTS OF THE ZONE AND IN THE PROTECTION OF THE PALESTINIAN CAMPS IN SIJON AND TYRE. WE DO NOT RULE OUT AN MNF ROLE IN THE SECURITY ZONE.

-- AS FOR AGREED SUPERVISORY AND EARLY-WARNING ARRANGEMENTS, WE DO NOT BELIEVE ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY WARNING STATIONS ARE WARRANTED, BUT ISRAELI AND LEBANESE MILITARY LIAISON OFFICES SHOULD BE ESTABLISHED WITH DIRECT COMMUNICATIONS, MEETINGS AT REGULAR INTERVALS, AND ALTERNATION OF MEETINGS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. HIGH-ALTITUDE ISRAELI RECONNAISSANCE FLIGHTS SHALL NOT BE CONSTRUED AS HOSTILE ACTIVITIES. ISRAELI NAVAL PATROLS SHALL BE CONDUCTED OUTSIDE TERRITORIAL WATERS. UNTSO SHOULD CONTINUE TO HAVE A ROLE.

-- WE BELIEVE THAT PEOPLE AND GOODS SHOULD MOVE ACROSS THE BORDER IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE NATIONAL LEGISLATION OF EACH COUNTRY AND ON THE BASIS OF CONTINUING LEBANESE-ISRAELI CONSULTATIONS.

~~SECRET~~

03100700

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

005316
INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

N00544

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03815 03 OF 06 162350Z
ACTION N00S-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 N

0 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3942

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03815

~~NODIS~~

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

-- WE AGREE THERE WILL BE ARRANGEMENTS FOR NEGOTIATING
FUTURE DETAILS OF NORMALIZATION BETWEEN ISRAEL AND
LEBANON. WE AGREE THAT THE FULLEST POSSIBLE NORMALIZA-
TION SHOULD BE STATED AS A GOAL.

-- THERE WILL BE REPRESENTATION OF EACH STATE IN THE
TERRITORY OF THE OTHER. HOW THIS IS MANAGED SHOULD BE
RESOLVED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON. WE BELIEVE IN THE
NECESSITY OF DISCUSSING A FULLER AND GREATER
NORMALIZATION, ENDING, WE HOPE, IN A PEACE TREATY. THE
LEBANESE TOO SEE THIS AS AN EVOLUTIONARY PROCESS.

-- IN LIEU OF FORMAL PROCEDURES FOR NEGOTIATING A
PEACE AGREEMENT, WE BELIEVE THERE SHOULD BE A CONFORMA-
TION OF THE TERMINATION OF BELLIGERENCY AND THE ABSENCE
OF A STATE OF WAR. HOWEVER, WE BELIEVE IT IS TOO EARLY
TO ESTABLISH A MECHANISM FOR NEGOTIATING A PEACE TREATY.
THE NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS SHOULD BE ALLOWED TO
EVOLVE.

9. THE ISRAELIS HAD VERY FEW QUESTIONS ABOUT MY PRESEN-
TATION OF OUR IDEAS. WHY THIS WAS SO BECAME APPARENT
ONLY LATER. THEIR MAJOR QUESTIONS FOCUSED ON THE FOLLOW-
ING AREAS:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

JERUSA 03815 03 OF 06 162350Z

-- NATURE OF TALKS WITH SYRIA AND PLO. BEGIN WAS VERY CONCERNED ABOUT WHO WOULD TALK TO THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO. I REVIEWED OUR EFFORTS TO URGE THE LEBANESE TO INTENSIFY CONTACTS WITH BOTH PARTIES. ON THE PLO, THE LEBANESE HAD ALREADY TAKEN THE FIRST STEP. WE ENVISAGED THE SAME PROCEDURES AS THIS SUMMER, WITH THE LEBANESE NEGOTIATING WITH THE PLO AND THE US BEING HELPFUL WHENEVER IT COULD, PARTICULARLY ON SUCH ISSUES AS DESTINATIONS, FINANCING OF DEPARTURES, ETC.

-- PRIORITY OF PLO DEPARTURE. BEGIN STRESSED THAT IT REMAINED ISRAEL'S POSITION THAT ANY MOVE BY ISRAELI FORCES SHOULD BEGIN AFTER THE PLO HAD LEFT. I PRESSED HIM TO ACCEPT OUR IDEA THAT ISRAELI FORCES COULD BEGIN TO DEPART WHEN THE PLO FORCES HAD STARTED TO LEAVE, BUT HE CAME BACK WITH A VEHEMENT "NO." WARNING THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO GUARANTEE THAT THE TRAGEDIES AND AGGRESSIVE ACTS OF THE PAST WOULD NOT OCCUR AGAIN. I ARGUED THAT THE PLO WOULD CERTAINLY NOT STAY IN LEBANON WITHOUT SYRIAN PROTECTION AND THAT IN ANY CASE IT WAS DESIRABLE TO GIVE THE LEBANESE SOME FLEXIBILITY AND ROOM TO MANEUVER ON THIS ISSUE. BEGIN WAS UNMOVED, SO I LEFT IT THAT WE WOULD SEE HOW THINGS DEVELOPED. DRAPER LATER REMARKED THAT THE ISRAELI POSITION LEFT THE PLO WITH A "VETO" OVER PROGRESS.

-- REGARDING NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE SYRIANS, I REPEATED THAT THE PROCESS HAD STARTED, BUT WENT ON TO SAY THAT THE LEBANESE HAD TO BRING THEMSELVES TO DEMAND A SYRIAN WITHDRAWAL IN EXPLICIT TERMS, PERHAPS WITH A DATE CERTAIN. THIS I KNEW, FROM MY TALKS WITH ARAB LEADERS, WOULD BE SUPPORTED BY OTHER ARAB STATES, AND SYRIA WOULD HAVE TO HONOR THE LEBANESE DEMAND. HOWEVER, SYRIA WAS

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED

NO DISSEMINATION



DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03815 03 OF 06 162350Z

A DIFFICULT PARTNER AND MIGHT WELL UPSET THE BEST OF PLANS. FOR THIS REASON, IT MIGHT BE BEST TO SPEAK OF "CONCURRENT," NOT "SIMULTANEOUS" DEPARTURES. GEMAYEL HAD CALLED ASSAD YESTERDAY THANKS TO DRAPER'S EFFORTS.

10. AFTER THE ISRAELIS HAD POSED THEIR FEW QUESTIONS, SHARON EXPRESSED HIS HAPPINESS AT MY REFERENCE TO CO-OPERATION BETWEEN US ON LEBANON, SINCE, HE SAID, ALL THREE PARTIES, INCLUDING LEBANON, HAVE THE SAME BASIC INTERESTS THERE. HE WENT ON TO DIFFERENTIATE BETWEEN THE DEPARTURE OF FOREIGN FORCES, WHERE HE RECOGNIZED THE USEFULNESS OF AMERICAN "GOOD OFFICES," AND THE NEGOTIATION OF SECURITY AND NORMALIZATION ARRANGEMENTS, WHERE HE STRESSED THAT DIRECT LEBANESE-ISRAELI NEGOTIATIONS WERE THE ONLY WAY TO GO. HE THEN REVEALED POINTEDLY THAT HE HAD BEEN WORKING ON THIS FOR SOME 60 DAYS, MEETING WITH "REPRESENTATIVES OF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT AND PRESIDENT GEMAYEL," AT THE DIRECTION OF BEGIN AND SHAMIR. TWO DAYS AGO (DECEMBER 14), THE TWO PARTIES HAD MANAGED TO ARRIVE AT A COMMON WORKING PAPER INCORPORATING THE MAIN POINTS THAT WOULD ALLOW THE INITIATION OF DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS. US PARTICIPATION WOULD BE WELCOME, AND ISRAEL WOULD BE HAPPY IF THE US WERE PREPARED TO SIGN OR PROVIDE GUARANTEES. SOME POINTS REQUIRED FURTHER CLARIFICATION, BUT BASIC AGREEMENT HAD BEEN REACHED.

11. SHARON THEN READ THE FOLLOWING PAPER, WHICH HE AGREED TO GIVE US AT A FUTURE TIME (THE TEXT BELOW IS AN AMALGRAM OF OUR NOTES, AND THE ACTUAL PAPER MAY VARY SLIGHTLY):

BASIC ELEMENTS AND GUIDELINES

WORKING PAPER

DECEMBER 14, 1982

~~SECRET~~

0315547000

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

JERUSA 03815 03 OF 06 162350Z

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED

DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

SECRET

N00553

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03815 04 OF 06 170030Z
ACTION NODS-06

INFO OCT-00 AOS-00 /000 W

O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4

FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3943

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03815

NODIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT: SUBPARA E)

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

B1

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03815 04 OF 06 170030Z

[REDACTED]

B1


~~SECRET~~

0310547000

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 04

JERUSA 03815 04 UP 06 170030Z

[REDACTED]

B1

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS
S
NODIS
S
NODIS
S



DECLASSIFIED
0000000000
17 1992 10 16
Department of State

005018
INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

NOD547

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03815 05 OF 06 170004Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----023025 170012Z /61
O 162257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TU SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3944

S E C R E T SECTION 05 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03815

NODIS

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

[REDACTED]

Y
B1

SECRET

0000000000
DECLASSIFIED

NODIS

NODIS

NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02

JERUSA 03815 05 OF 06 170004Z

CREATE ANY PROBLEMS CONCERNING DIRECT AGREEMENTS FREELY REACHED BETWEEN ISRAEL AND LEBANON; WE HOPED TO ASSIST THE TWO IN REACHING ACCOMMODATIONS WHICH WOULD PERMIT THE RAPID WITHDRAWAL OF EXTERNAL FORCES.

13. I ASKED SHARON WHAT THE NEXT STEPS WERE. HE SAID THAT THE FIRST WAS FOR THE ISRAELI CABINET TO APPROVE THE WORKING PAPER, AND TO DECIDE ON HOW (AND WHERE) DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS COULD BEGIN. (FOLLOWING THE MEETING, KIMCHE TOLD LEWIS THAT GENEVA WAS THE LIKELY SITE, WITH ROME A SECOND CHOICE). IF THE CABINET AGREED, NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN "SHORTLY", WHICH SHARON SAID COULD BE AS EARLY AS NEXT WEEK. AT THOSE NEGOTIATIONS, ISRAEL WOULD PRESENT A DRAFT AGREEMENT ON SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS AND NORMALIZATION, WHICH WOULD BE BASED ON THE OCT. 10 ISRAELI CABINET DECISION AND THE AGREED WORKING PAPER.

14. I ASKED SHARON WHETHER THE WORKING PAPER HAD BEEN APPROVED BY THE LEBANESE CABINET. SHARON SAID IT HAD NOT, AND SAID THAT HE EXPECTED GEMAYEL TO PUT IT TO THE CABINET SHORTLY. SAM LEWIS AND I PRESSED SHARON ON WHETHER GEMAYEL HAD IN FACT REALLY ACCEPTED THE DOCUMENT IN FULL. SHARON SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD READ THE DOCUMENT AND ACCEPTED IT, BUT WANTED CLARIFICATIONS. FOR EXAMPLE, GEMAYEL HAD ASKED WHAT WOULD HAPPEN IF AN ISRAELI JEEP WERE AMBUSHED ON THE WAY TO RESUPPLY ONE OF THE ISRAELI-MANNED EARLY-WARNING STATIONS. (SAM PURSUED THE EXTENT OF GEMAYEL'S ACCEPTANCE OF THE WORKING PAPER AGAIN FOLLOWING THE MEETING. TO PROVE THAT GEMAYEL HAD ACCEPTED THE PAPER, SHARON SHOWED LEWIS THE ORIGINAL DRAFT, WHICH HAD LINES DRAWN THROUGH A PROVISION INDICATING THAT LEBANON WOULD BECOME A NEUTRAL COUNTRY. SHARON SAID THAT THE REFERENCE TO LEBANON'S NEUTRALITY HAD BEEN INCLUDED,

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03815 05 OF 06 170004Z

BUT THAT GEMAYEL HAD SUBSEQUENTLY CHANGED HIS MIND AND ASKED FOR ITS DELETION.)

15. I SAID WE WERE PLEASED THAT THE ISRAELIS AND LEBANESE HAD APPEARED TO ACCOMPLISH SO MUCH, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IT REMAINED URGENT THAT WE COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS AND BEGIN THE WITHDRAWAL. I ASKED SHARON HOW LONG HE THOUGHT IT WOULD TAKE TO COMPLETE NEGOTIATIONS. SHARON SAID THAT ISRAEL IS PREPARING A DRAFT AGREEMENT, WHICH HE EXPECTED TO REVIEW TOMORROW. HE SAID THAT THE DRAFT WOULD BE PRESENTED AT THE OPENING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. HE REFUSED TO SPECULATE ON THE LENGTH OF NEGOTIATIONS, SAYING THAT IT WAS MORE IMPORTANT THAT THE DOCUMENT BE SOUND AND FORESTALL ANY NEED FOR ISRAEL TO ENTER LEBANON AGAIN. I ASKED SHARON HOW LONG WITHDRAWAL WOULD TAKE ONCE AGREEMENT WERE REACHED, AND AGAIN MENTIONED OUR IDEA OF A 30-DAY WITHDRAWAL PERIOD. SHARON SAID THIS WAS A TECHNICAL MATTER WHICH DEPENDED ON LOGISTICAL CONSIDERATIONS AND DECLINED TO SPECULATE.

16. I ASKED SHARON WHETHER HE ENVISAGED AN INITIAL DIS-ENGAGEMENT AS PART OF THE PACKAGE, AND WHETHER HE FORESAW AN INTERPOSITION ROLE FOR THE MNF. SHARON SAID THAT AFTER THE LEBANESE HAD SIGNED THE AGREEMENT, AFTER ISRAELI POW'S AND MIA'S AND FALLEN BODIES HAD BEEN RETURNED, AND AFTER THE PLO HAD COMPLETELY WITHDRAWN, A SIMULTANEOUS ISRAEL/ SYRIA DISENGAGEMENT WAS CONTEMPLATED. THE ISRAELI DISENGAGEMENT LINE WOULD RUN FROM SOUTH OF DAMOUR, THROUGH BAYT-A-DIN, NORTH OF JANNIN, CROSSING JABUL BARUK, AND TO QUARIN LAKE. THE SYRIANS WOULD LEAVE THE MOUNT LEBANON RANGE TO THE BEKAA. THE MNF WOULD DEPLOY AS AN INTERPOSITION FORCE. THEREAFTER, SIMULTANEOUS ISRAEL/ LEBANON WITHDRAWAL WOULD PROCEED IN ACCORDANCE WITH AN ALREADY AGREED SCHEDULE. (COMMENT: THIS SEQUENCE OF

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

03100700

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

N00549

PAGE 01 JERUSA 03015 06 OF 06 170013Z
ACTION NODS-00

INFO OCT-00 ADS-00 /000 W

-----023714 170022Z /61
O 102257Z DEC 82 ZFF-4
FM AMCONSUL JERUSALEM
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3945

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 00 OF 06 JERUSALEM 03015

~~N0013~~

FROM HABIB/DRAPER

MOVEMENTS, WHICH IS APPARENTLY INCORPORATED IN THE
LEBANESE/ISRAELI WORKING PAPER, IS IDENTICAL TO THE
SEQUENCE OF MOVEMENTS PRESENTED IN THE ISRAELI CABINET
DECISION OF OCT. 10).

17. I THEN OUTLINED FOR BEGIN MY NEXT STEPS. I SAID THAT
I WOULD GO TO LEBANON TOMORROW AND MEET WITH GAMAYEL.
I WOULD DISCUSS THE WORKING PAPER, BUT EMPHASIZED THAT I
WOULD NOT OBJECT TO ANYTHING WHICH LEBANON HAD ACCEPTED.
I SAID THAT IT WOULD COME BACK SUNDAY TO LEARN OF THE
ISRAELI CABINET DECISION, OR EARLIER IF NECESSITATED BY
MY TALKS WITH GAMAYEL. AT THIS POINT, SHAMON INTERRUPTED
TO SAY THAT THERE WAS A PROBLEM IN MY GOING OVER THE
SPECIFICS OF THE DOCUMENT WITH GAMAYEL. HE STRESSED THAT
GAMAYEL DID NOT KNOW THAT ISRAEL WAS SHARING THE PAPER
WITH US, AND CAUTIONED US ABOUT GOING OVER THE DETAILS
WITH GAMAYEL SINCE GAMAYEL STILL NEEDED "CLARIFICATIONS"
ON SEVERAL POINTS.

18. I RE-EMPHASIZED THAT WE HAD NO INTEREST IN INTER-
FERING WITH WHAT ISRAEL HAD ACHIEVED. HOWEVER, IT WAS
IMPORTANT THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN UNDERSTOOD FULLY WHERE
THINGS STOOD. PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD INDICATED PUBLICLY

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

NODIS
NODIS
NODIS



DECLASSIFIED
DO NOT WRITE

Department of State

INCOMING
TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 02 JERUSA 03815 06 OF 06 170013Z

HIS SUPPORT FOR LEBANESE SOVEREIGNTY, THE WITHDRAWAL OF FOREIGN FORCES, AND ISRAELI SECURITY. THE PRESIDENT WAS COMMITTED TO EACH OF THESE GOALS AND WANTED TO KNOW WHERE THINGS STOOD. HE WAS ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT THE TIMING. LEWIS ADDED THAT A QUICK ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT WAS IMPORTANT SO THAT THE UNUS COULD BE PUT ON SYRIA TO ACCEPT A SCHEDULE OF WITHDRAWAL. SHARON THEN AGREED THAT I SHOULD DISCUSS THE PAPER IN A MEETING WITH GAMAYEL ALONE.

19. FOLLOWING OUR MEETING, I MET PRIVATELY WITH BEGIN AND DELIVERED THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER, WHICH BEGIN READ AND CHARACTERIZED AS WARM. I REPEATED THE NEED FOR CLEAR, VISIBLE AND EARLY PROGRESS, AND THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITMENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF ALL FOREIGN FORCES. HE DID NOT TAKE ISSUE. BEGIN AGREED THAT WE WOULD MEET AFTER THE CABINET SESSION ON SUNDAY SO THAT I COULD HAVE A FULL READ-OUT FOR THE PRESIDENT ON WHERE WE STOOD AND WHAT NEXT STEPS WERE CONTEMPLATED.

20. WHILE I WAS MEETING PRIVATELY WITH BEGIN, TAMIR TOLD KHECZKO THAT THE ISRAELI CABINET WOULD BE ASKED TO APPROVE DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS IN EUROPE. KIMCHE SEPARATELY TOLD LEWIS THAT GENEVA WAS THE PREFERRED SITE, BUT THAT ROME WAS A POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVE. IN RESPONSE TO KHECZKO'S QUESTION, TAMIR SAID THAT HE DID NOT THINK THAT EITHER TUENI OR SALIM KNEW ABOUT THE SECRET NEGOTIATIONS OR THE AGREED WORKING PAPER. (TAMIR SAID THAT HE HAD NEGOTIATED THE TEXTS; KIMCHE SAID THAT HE HAD BEEN PRESENT AT MOST OF THE SESSIONS. SHARON SAID THAT THE WORKING PAPER HAD GONE THROUGH FOUR DRAFTS.) TAMIR SAID THAT HE WAS NOT SURE, BUT THAT HE BELIEVED THAT FATTAL KNEW ABOUT THE TEXTS. TAMIR ALSO SAID THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE THAT DIRECT

~~SECRET~~

DO NOT WRITE
DECLASSIFIED

N
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
SN
O
D
I
S

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED
Department of State

**INCOMING
TELEGRAM**

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 03

JERUSA 03815 06 07 06 170013Z

NEGOTIATIONS WOULD BEGIN WITHOUT THE WORKING PAPER BEING MADE PUBLIC. HE THOUGHT THAT PERHAPS ONLY FATTAL WOULD KNOW ABOUT ITS CONTENTS, BUT THAT IT WOULD NEVERTHELESS "GUIDE THE NEGOTIATIONS."

21. COMMENT: IT IS IMPORTANT THAT WE NOT REACH ANY HASTY CONCLUSIONS. FIRST AND FOREMOST, I WILL NEED TO CONFIRM WITH GEMAYEL PERSONALLY WHETHER OR NOT GEMAYEL ACCEPTS THE WORKING PAPER, AND THE EXTENT OF THE "CLARIFICATIONS" WHICH HE MAY REQUIRE CONCERNING IT. THEN, WE WILL NEED TO SEE IF GEMAYEL CAN SELL THE DOCUMENT TO HIS OWN CABINET AND IF IT IS ACCEPTED BY THE ISRAELI CABINET. IF THIS IS POSSIBLE, THEN THERE MAY BE A BREAKTHROUGH -- SUBSTANTIAL ISRAEL/LEBANON AGREEMENT ON THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES -- WITHOUT HAVING HAD TO PRESENT AN AMERICAN "PLAN."

22. THE ABSENCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL FORCE IN THE SECURITY ZONE IS A MAJOR DIFFERENCE COMPARED TO PREVIOUS PROPOSALS, BUT THIS DOES NOT APPEAR A FATAL FLAW IF OTHER ARRANGEMENTS ARE SATISFACTORY. THE DIFFICULTIES REGARDING THE PHASING OF PLO, SYRIAN AND ISRAELI WITHDRAWAL WILL HAVE TO BE RESOLVED, PRIMARILY THROUGH LEBANESE NEGOTIATION WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE PLO.

23. AN UNANSWERED QUESTION OF GREAT IMPORTANCE CONCERNS THE TIMING AND DURATION OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE WITHDRAWAL PROCESS. WE STRESSED AT EVERY POINT THE NEED FOR RAPID AND CLEAR AGREEMENT. WHILE SHARON SPOKE OF MOVING QUICKLY TO NEGOTIATION, HE AVOIDED BEING PINNED DOWN ON THE DURATION OF NEGOTIATIONS OR A SPECIFIC TIME-TABLE FOR WITHDRAWAL. END COMMENT. GROVE

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED
DECLASSIFIED