

POLITICAL-MILITARY PLANNING FOR A PALESTINE-ISRAEL PERMANENT STATUS AGREEMENT

PART 1: MEDIUM TERM

1. International Monitoring and Implementation Mission (IMIM)

The medium term is concerned with the implementation of a permanent status agreement between Israel and a Palestinian state. The objectives of a third party mission are:

- to implement all aspects of agreements reached;
- to monitor and verify the implementation of agreements reached;
- to ensure compliance with agreements reached;
- to enable on-going decision-making in the implementation of agreements reached; and
- to guarantee adherence to on-going decision-making throughout this interim period.

The guiding principle of an IMIM is joint implementation between the parties, with international personnel as guarantor of legitimacy and effectiveness.

The IMIM may have any name acceptable to the parties—such as an International Administrative Assistance Mission; Joint Transitional Administration; International Administrative Presence, etc.—but which is not at variance with the intended nature of the mission.

The nature of the mission and its concept of operations must be unambiguous, which will require the development of a political-military or comprehensive campaign plan prior to deployment. It is not merely an international assistance mission with no independent means of effectiveness. Nor is it a mission that assumes full powers and responsibilities in the area of operation (AO) independently of the parties. Rather, it shares control functions, in varying measures, with the parties in all aspects of the agreements reached.

The elements of such a mission include two levels of decision-making at the operational level and two levels of implementation at the operational and tactical level:

- (i) a Joint Monitoring Commission as a legitimate source of operational authority with the capacity for effectiveness;
- (ii) Joint Monitoring Committees responsible to the JMC in each sectoral area critical in the agreements reached (such as the military, law and order, movements of peoples) and addressing greater degrees of detail than the JMC;

- (iii) an international operational executive composed of the civilian political commander, with the subordinate military force commander and directors of the civilian components; and
- (iv) international military and civilian components jointly functioning with the parties.

I. OPERATIONAL LEVEL

2. Joint Monitoring Commission (JMC)

The JMC is the critical feature of the mission. It is presumed that a transitional administration with legislative and executive powers—of the kind in Eastern Slavonia, Kosovo or East Timor—will not be acceptable to the parties. Nor may it be necessary or cost-effective. Nevertheless, the JMC must function as a political authority, with joint decision-making power that binds the parties and their respective legislative and executive capacity.

The JMC is the political will cell for the mission that harnesses the convergence of the parties and sponsors of agreements reached and carries it through the implementation of the terms of those agreements. It translates to the operational, and in turn tactical levels, the political will behind decisions made at the strategic level, and generates further momentum in implementation through confidence and leverage. It also fills gaps in the grip of an operation that are missing in the overall agreements. It provides a means for the common interpretation of terms of agreements reached. It is a court of appeal in the event of disagreement in implementation. It can also be the core of a longer-term, post-operational security cooperation organization for the two parties. It affirms that the process belongs first to the parties, and the international role is to assure the parties fulfil their own agreement. It is a political decision-making authority, and much more than merely a coordinating mechanism, and should be distinguished from what it is not, merely a diplomatic body that does not guarantee further agreements reached:

—*Cambodia*: During the 1992-93 peace process, a Supreme National Council (SNC) composed of the four factions competing for control of Phnom Penh was established by the Paris Peace Accords as the location of sovereignty during the UN's presence. But the SNC became a forum for disagreement because there were no outside guarantors genuinely fostering decisions.

—*Former Yugoslavia*: The International Conference for the Former Yugoslavia was a diplomatic forum and did not pretend to guarantee results.

—*"Friends of..." Groups*: These are loose groups voluntarily established for different countries, such as Haiti, Guatemala and East Timor. They can have an

influence on conflicts, but their impact varies according to the degree of commitment of the membership. For El Salvador, the UN Secretary-General's personal and direct involvement played a key role. Such groups are ad hoc and lack any consistent criteria for ensuring an effective model. Above all, they are strategic level bodies that can be helpful in addition to an existing JMC, but cannot be a replacement for it at the operational level.

—*Former Soviet Union*: Russia established Joint Control Commissions (JCCs), consisting of itself and local belligerents, in places such as Moldova. These were effective, but by no means impartial; the JCCs openly served Russia's interests and did not operate according to an objective legal standard. However, they provide useful lessons for joint functioning.

—*US Coalitions*: The US has had experience in building multinational military coalitions for the 1991 Gulf War and 1992-93 humanitarian intervention in Somalia, which illustrate the unifying influence Washington's representatives can have. However, the disparate diplomatic agreements underpinning such joint ventures are not the same as a standing civilian JMC acting as a political guarantor in the field.

Useful lessons can be drawn from the JMC that supervised the decolonization of Namibia in 1989-90. The JMC comprised Angola, Cuba and South Africa, with the US and Soviet Union as "active observers" and UN officials heading the separate peace mission as "expert observers". It helped develop consensus and a peace agreement, and played a significant mediating role when the process nearly derailed. The parties in the JMC could not be relied on to keep the process on track; at the same time, only they could ensure its success. The JMC was akin to a 'court of appeal' that met regularly to interpret agreements and act collectively and continuously. It was a politico-operational unit separate from the diplomatic Contact Group which was helping to increase the numbers of interested states and widen the strategic sources of influence during mediation.

In the last decade, significant operational experience can help refine this approach and tailor it better to this particular case. Exercising international political authority in transition, shifting from mission organization to the administration of territory and experiments in various types of missions has provided perspectives on how best to ensure legitimacy and effectiveness in interim periods. Most specifically, it is possible to integrate better than before all the elements of the mission listed above: on-going decision-making in the field with joint functioning; or, in other words, the integration of a JMC within an operational framework.

There are several factors to consider in the establishment of a JMC:

—*Composition*: In addition to the Palestinian Authority and Israel, a broker is needed that is more powerful than the sum of these two parts. That is most likely

the United States. In addition, the JMC requires other interested and committed states that are acceptable and trusted by either or both of the parties (perhaps the witnesses of the 1995 Interim Agreement). The number should not be large, but the members should be key actors.

—*Level of Members*: The JMC is an in-theatre body that meets regularly, perhaps weekly or bi-weekly. Therefore the state members need to be of a credible level, but deployed permanently and operationally active.

—*Chair*: Sometimes, the operational commander chairs the JMC, most commonly in exclusively military operations in which the JMC is composed of military representatives, and this works best. However, in complex missions to guarantee agreements reached, the chair may need to be the most powerful member of the JMC for effectiveness. The operational commander must be fully integrated in the JMC as something more than an observer, but still *ex officio*.

—*Staff*: The JMC requires a small staff or secretariat, which could be attached directly to the chair, or be part of the operational commander's staff.

—*Rules and Code of Conduct*: The JMC requires operating rules of procedure for decision-making, compliance and non-compliance, as well as relations with other actors, including international and non-governmental organizations, elements of the local population, and individual experts. It also requires a code of conduct for the parties covering such issues as media relations and public restraint.

—*Timing*: A JMC must be operational at the time of the signing of the major agreement. Loss of momentum is measured in days, and the window of opportunity lasts a few short weeks. To lose this moment may mean to undermine the JMC and the capacity to implement the agreements reached.

3. Joint Monitoring Committees

The number of monitoring committees will depend on the sectoral modalities in agreements reached to be implemented. It would be within the powers of the JMC to increase or decrease the number of committees as required.

The committees are charged with the elaboration of details for implementation with regards to original agreements reached, or additional determinations of the JMC, and in accordance with the campaign plan of the Mission. They are subordinate to the political master, which is the JMC, and make recommendations to it.

Each committee is chaired by the corresponding component chief of the international operation, or as directed by the operational commander.

The committees are composed of the parties under the international chair. The individuals from the parties participating in the committee, like the chair, must be the actual operational commander or civilian director with control over forces or offices that will have to implement the common understandings reached in the committee. They must be in a position to transmit orders directly to forces or offices under their responsibility, based on details determined in the committees and approved by the JMC. Representatives outside the chain of command cannot be accepted.

Simple rules of procedure and a code of conduct for the parties will need to be established.

To achieve harmonization across the committees when necessary, Task Forces for specific issues or particular actions may be established. They should only be created when ad hoc common meetings are insufficient, otherwise a proliferation of bodies is unwieldy and there is insufficient time for attendance at excessive numbers of meetings. They may be useful, however, when determining procedures that must be common across the committees and components. To achieve both vertical and horizontal harmonization, there should in any case be periodic cross-briefings with all committees, components, the operational commander and JMC members. Task Forces may need to include other actors in the AO, including international and non-governmental organizations, local officials and individual experts.

(i) *Joint Military Monitoring Committee (JMMC)* will address:

- security in the Jordan Valley
- early warning sites
- security routes in Palestinian territory
- anti-terrorism issues
- military overflights of territory

(ii) *Joint Civilian Police Committee (JCPC)* will address:

- law and order issues
- creation and training of a Palestinian police force

(iii) *Joint Border Control Committee (JBCC)* will address:

- delimitation and demarcation of the international border
- border crossings and modalities

(iv) *Joint Movement of Peoples Committee (JMPC)* will address:

- the question of Israeli settlers
- the question of repatriation of Palestinian diaspora
- conditions in and status of Palestinian refugee camps

(v) *Joint Local Administration Committee (JLAC)* will address:

- local transfers of power
- assessment and amelioration of local conditions in terms of basic services

(vi) *Joint Economic Development Committee (JEDC)* will address:

- development projects with cross-boundary implications
- assessment for implementation of a free-trade agreement

(vii) *Joint Land Dispute Resolution Committee (JLDRC)* will address:

- transitional procedures for land dispute resolution

(viii) *Joint Judicial Affairs Committee (JJAC)* will address:

- the transitional repealing and passage of new legislation by the parties
- establishment or reformation of courts and a penal system

Several areas are likely to be the result of extensive bilateral negotiations, including the status of civilian air space and the electromagnetic sphere, and a free-trade agreement. While conclusions in these areas will affect the Mission, a specific joint air space committee may not be necessary.

4. International Operational Executive

An international operational executive is composed of the Operational Commander and an Executive Committee composed of the military Force Commander and the civilian directors of each operational component. In combination, this is a functioning headquarters staff.

The JMC makes political decisions; the monitoring committees determine operational modalities which are transmitted down the parties' chains of command; and the executive heads the international operation with independent capacity to function jointly with the parties.

It is critical for the Operational Commander to be fully integrated with the JMC, and may even chair it. The position of the commander is a civilian position, whether it is filled with a civilian or formerly military individual with political acumen, and may be called a “Director-General”. The Operational Commander must:

- implement the decisions of the JMC, within the framework of the original agreements reached between the parties;
- ensure harmonization within the international operation, amongst the separate components, through meetings of the Executive Committee;

- ensure harmonization between the international operational components and corresponding monitoring committees, by designating the component chiefs as chairs of the committees
- ensure, in combination with the chair of the JMC, harmonization amongst the various monitoring committees, and between the monitoring committees and the JMC

The focus of the Operational Commander must be on transforming the conditions and status of the local population and exchanging control of territory, and not merely on the organization of the mission. A Deputy Operational Commander can be responsible for headquarters officials and their offices, including a chief of staff, chief administrative officer, chief financial officer, chief public affairs officer, chief information officer and chief political officer with secretariat support for the JMC and monitoring committees.

5. Ombudsman's Office

An independent Ombudsman's Office should be established separately from both the JMC and Operational Executive, though materially supported by the operational headquarters. Symbolically, it should be located away from the JMC and Executive. The purpose of the office is to hear specific grievances against the Mission, including damage it may cause to private property. It is not a judicial system in transition for all legal disputes, nor should it be politicized in terms of challenges to the effectiveness of the Mission. It should be open to any individual wishing to bring genuine cases against the Mission, including personal abuses of power or fiscal corruption within the international operation. The decision of the Ombudsman should be binding on the Operational Commander and component chiefs.

The scope of competence of the Office and its procedures for decision-making will need to be determined and approved by the JMC.

II. TACTICAL LEVEL

6. Operational Components

The Operational Components translate harmonized decisions at the operational level into tactical level action. They must function jointly and horizontally with the parties, and vertically at every level of civil administration.

- (i) *Military Force and Observers*: The multinational military force and observers are commanded by the Force Commander, under the authority of the civilian Operational Commander. The force will need to be capable of internal security

operations, in the manner of multinational security units (MSU) in the Balkans. The military capabilities will need to range from strategic considerations, such as the Jordan Valley trigger mechanism, to low-intensity policing.

(ii) *Civilian Police*: The CIVPOL component will need to patrol jointly with the parties, and participate in the range of policing functions, including reporting, investigating, searching, seizure and arrest. It will also help train and build capacity for a Palestinian police force. A police academy will be required, with external assistance for its establishment (such as ICITAP or equivalent).

(iii) *Border Control Unit*: The Border Control Unit will engage the expertise for the delimitation and demarcation of the border. It will also help the parties establish border crossings, with relevant procedures and modalities.

(iv) *Movement of Peoples Office*: The Movement of Peoples Office will help implement decisions regarding Israeli settlers in Palestinian territory. It will be responsible for repatriation of Palestinians as desired in the diaspora, including issues of relocation. It will also be responsible for relocation issues concerning Palestinians in refugee camps.

(v) *Civil Administration*: The Civil Administration component will be concerned with a functioning civil administration in the West Bank and Gaza, and a gradual and orderly transfer of power over local administration. This will include helping build capacity in the Palestinian Authority. It will need to conduct a skills audit, recruit international personnel to fill skills gaps in longer-term transition (in combination with international financial institutions, perhaps), and train a Palestinian civil service, affordable within the likely budget of a Palestinian state on day 25 after independence (when the first civil service salary will have to be paid). It will need to ensure that basic services are provided to every community. It may be responsible for reviewing administrative boundaries. District officers will need to ensure local administrators can function effectively.

(vi) *Development Planning Unit*: The Development Planning Unit should harmonize all development projects in the AO. This will mean avoiding overlap and ensuring comprehensive coverage. The Unit will have to work closely with development agencies and humanitarian organizations functioning in the area.

(vii) *Land and Property Office*: The Land and Property Office will need to ensure that an existing registry of titles and deeds to private property is secured for a new authority. This will need to be methodically transformed as the movement of peoples takes place. The Office will need to help establish land dispute resolution mechanisms, additional to court procedures, and standards for compensation. This Office will need to be well-staffed with well-qualified experts. Habitat claims

expertise in this area and could provide some necessary consultants. The Office will also need to work closely with the Movement of Peoples Office.

(viii) *Judicial Affairs Office*: The Judicial Affairs Office will need to identify clearly the existing law in the territory. It will need to consider how to transform this gradually. To dispose of the existing law too quickly will create a legal vacuum that will be impossible to fill in time to be functional for the Mission. Some laws may be repealed immediately. Some parts of international law or accepted standards (including policing and criminal law standards) may be used to fill some gaps. The Office will also have to ensure a dynamic constitution is in place, with a functioning legislature, active courts and humane penal system.

(ix) *Human Rights Office*: Separate from judicial affairs is the need for a Human Rights Office to monitor compliance of the parties and all other actors in the AO with international human rights instruments. Regular reports will be made and openly circulated, including for consideration by the JMC in the event of a need for redress.

(x) *Electoral Assistance Office*: This may or may not be needed depending upon the terms of final agreements reached and the capacity of the Palestinian Authority.

Each of the civilian offices comprises experts and should not be staffed by generalists. These offices may be subcontracted in whole or in part to, or composed of individuals from, relevant agencies of governments, international or non-governmental organizations, or private enterprises that can deliver the capacity. Individuals must be recruited on the basis of specific knowledge and experience, not level of seniority in any existing bureaucracy.

7. Joint Operations

The burden of operations will be on the parties, with direct international participation. The parties as members of the joint monitoring committees will transmit instructions down their chains of command, to communicate understanding and political acceptance of a general direction or course of action. The international chairs of the committees will similarly instruct their respective operational components. The international components and their counterpart units of the parties will then jointly implement the general direction or course of action on the ground. There will be variations in the balance of participation and which party may be the lead in any given case. For instance, in the event Jerusalem is regarded as an "Open City" with joint police patrols in the East and West, Israel will be in charge in the West and the PA in the East. Similar kinds of scenarios will exist throughout the Mission AO.

The capacity for joint functioning will be developed on the job, certainly. But manoeuvres, practice and training exercises should be fostered by the international operational component chiefs to achieve harmonization at the tactical level.

Some tactical tasks or issues of concern may require the involvement of other actors in the area, including international and non-governmental organizations. Component chiefs may at times establish Task Committees for specific purposes to widen the scope of actors participating in the accomplishment of a task.

III. LEGITIMACY AND EFFECTIVENESS

8. Permanent Status Agreement

The agreements reached between the parties will be the ultimate source of authority for an IMIM. Therefore the Mission is based on the consent of the two parties.

A common problem that has plagued peace missions in the past has been the break of continuity between negotiators of agreements and implementors of operations. The JMC is precisely intended to diminish this problem on an on-going basis. Additional to this, however, it might be advisable to prevent any time elapsing or space separating the agreement and the operation by attaching as an agreed annex to the agreement: (i) the operational elements and organigramme outline as part of a concept of operations; and perhaps even (ii) an adjustable draft campaign plan for the Mission. This would front-load the Mission with political will. The Paris Agreements underwriting the Cambodian mission were quite comprehensive, though they still required an operational plan to be developed.

Indeed, separate from the specifics of an agreement and annexes, it is ideal for the component heads and their counterparts amongst the parties to convene prior to deployment to game the draft campaign plan. The plan will change as a result of this, as it will inevitably in the course of the operation—hence the need for contingencies to be built into the plan. However, there will result a degree of harmonization between the operational officers that will accelerate effectiveness on deployment. Having thought through some of the puzzles of the operation, they will be prepared to handle them, or address new puzzles in the field.

9. United Nations

Additional to the Permanent Status Agreement, a UN resolution may be desired as approval of the process. In principle, this could come from either the Security Council or the General Assembly. However, the latter is out of fashion, and a Security Council

resolution has been preferred. Technically, though, the Security Council has under Article 24(1) "primary" not "exclusive" responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, and the International Court of Justice affirmed in the Expenses Case that the General Assembly can authorize peace missions, or in this case approve of them.

In the event of a Security Council resolution, the question arises as to whether the process should be approved under Chapter VI or VII of the Charter, or avoided altogether. Since military forces may be conducting security operations, there could be an argument for a Chapter VII approval. If the IMIM is not a UN mission, a resolution might avoid altogether any authorizing part of the Charter.

It is also possible to act without a UN resolution altogether. Though rejected in purist legal terms, the NATO bombing of Kosovo occurred on "humanitarian grounds" without UN Security Council approval (as envisioned under Chapter VIII). And an IMIM is definitely not on the order of a bombing campaign.

The further question arises of whether the IMIM should be a UN or non-UN mission. In this case, the decision should be made on the basis of whether or not a resolution might be vetoed in the Security Council: if there is insufficient support by both sides, as well as other member states, then there will not be the political will to make the mission work on the ground if created in some other way. Rather, the decision should be made on the basis of what will be effective and what will not. (The question of legitimacy is solved first by the underlying consent of the parties, and second by a UN resolution of approval.)

An entirely UN mission will not have the weight or ability to create a centre of gravity for the parties at every operational and tactical level necessary, in the manner that the US is greater than the sum of the parts in its coalition operations. (In Somalia, when the UN replaced the US, it was smaller than each part and the mission blew apart, the contingents then operating independently of one another.) For an IMIM to work, it will require the political glue provided by a political constellation centred in the JMC and transmitted through the monitoring committees and operational commander, executive committee, operational components and in the ultimate joint tactical operations.

In particular, the inefficiency and slow speed of deployment and functioning of UN missions (partly due to the financing debate in the General Assembly that follows a Security Council decision; partly due to a paralytic personnel system that delays contracts and therefore deployments endlessly; and partly due to poor organization on the ground) inevitably miss the window of opportunity in the short time after agreements are reached. By the time of deployment, not only has the reality on the ground changed, but the momentum created by the agreement in terms of the political will of the parties has slowed or stopped or even reversed.

Worse still, the UN will not deploy the quality of specialists required in the operational components. Much better candidates, or the best specialists from the UN system, are

available on the open market. The appointment of the operational commander and component chiefs would be plagued by inter-state politics and candidates would be chosen by nationality before any other quality.

None of this means that an IMIM needs to be monolithically a UN or non-UN mission. It is possible for multiple arrangements of organizations, though this is dangerous in terms of unity of command and effort. It is conceivable to have within a multinational framework, the UN adopting one part of the mission. If the UN assumed control of the military force under the operational commander, there would be the benefit of the blue flag flying and perhaps a Chapter VII mandate. However, if the remainder of the mission was of the highest quality, it would mean the military would be the weak link in the chain (which might not make that much difference if the political will was effectively harnessed). Alternatively, the UN could assume responsibility for the Movement of Peoples component, a task which it tends to do better than military security.

A UN effort, in part or in whole, would be subject to the UN system of financing. This is slow and unpredictable, invariably limiting the life of missions. However, it does mean a fixed source of funds.

10. Alternative Options

There are alternatives to UN missions.

NATO's experience in the Balkans, or more specifically the Office of the High Representative in Sarajevo pursuant to the Dayton Accords provides extensive experience in many of the kinds of issues to be addressed by an IMIM. A number of the individuals who have served in the Balkans would be fine candidates for participation in an IMIM. However, NATO is invariably concerned about out-of-area operations, which this case would be.

Similarly, the OSCE could perform many of the functions required in the IMIM, but would it assume responsibility as an organization for such a mission out of its area of concern?

This does not mean that individual member states in NATO or the OSCE would not be interested in participating in an IMIM.

One option that should be explored fully at this stage is an overall multinational mission with recruitment of the highest quality individuals for all parts of the mission from all relevant sources, whether international or non-governmental organizations, formerly serving UN staff, private experts, or independent contractors. After a decade of intensive peace operations, a cadre of candidates can be identified to staff what could be the

highest quality mission to date, tailored to the real needs of the ground situation and as required by the parties, and guaranteed by interested states.

Such a mission would have mixed elements. The composition of the JMC would be based on those states that could create the political centre of gravity to ensure at every level the implementation of agreements reached between the parties. The members of the monitoring committees would require the actual operational officers from the parties. The operational commander, ombudsman, component heads and their staff should be chosen on an individual basis as the best of their kind, independently contracted.

In order to achieve this kind of a mission, an independent funding mechanism will need to be established. An IMIM Trust Fund for the purpose could be established if there is the strategic interest to do so, in the manner of the Funds proposed by Saudi Arabia and others for Palestinian casualties and the Al-Aqsa mosque.

11. The Hebron Agreement

The TIPH outlined in the 1997 Hebron Agreement is not the model of the IMIM.

Despite coordinating mechanisms, the TIPH is not integrated with the parties sufficiently in joint operations. Nor does it have independent means at its disposal to challenge the parties. It is therefore caught in-between as a confidence-building fiction. It can help report on incidents but not investigate them. It is unlikely that it has the kind of information-gathering and analysis capacity it would ideally require. Therefore, as soon as its presence is challenged, it fails the test, the population loses confidence in it quickly, which undermines its very purpose.

Its fragility was further precarious because of the facts of the situation in which it was deployed. An inequitable partition of the town, with 450 settlers, .03% of the population, being given 20% of the commercial centre, while 120,000 Palestinians received 80% of effectively a periphery of the enclave. These are explosive conditions for 180 observers. It would similarly be dangerous for the Hebron Agreement to be considered a precedent for other settlers' areas. This would paralyze what would become a Palestinian "archipelago".

Furthermore, the TIPH is outside of an operational political framework, with no "top cover" in the event that the issues it raises are ignored by the parties. Without any means of redressing grievances of local individuals, it lacks credibility. By contrast, an IMIM will need to be able to make a positive difference in the daily lives of individuals or it will suffer the same fate.

In terms of concept of AO, though, it is important the paragraph 1 states that "In all its activities, the TIPH will relate to Hebron as one city." An IMIM will similarly need to

treat the AO in holistic terms, whatever the actual agreement on land distribution between the two sides

PART 2: SHORT TERM

It would be ideal if any immediate arrangement or international security operation deployed could transition, like a jig-saw puzzle piece clicking into place, to the overall IMIM. One way of doing this is to consider establishing an Emergency Military Monitoring Commission that could be absorbed by a later JMC. There could also be an emergency Joint Military Monitoring Committee that could become the IMIM's JMMC. A military Force Commander and military force and observers could become the military part of the IMIM.

There is a danger, however, with establishing some of these ingredients prematurely. They could become defined in such a way by the current conditions and realities that if they transitioned into an IMIM, they might distort the new mission. There is an argument for keeping the two entirely separate. But there is also an argument for building on the momentum of any current mission deployed for an eventual IMIM. Indeed, an immediate mission could play the role of an advance mission that tests some parts of the IMIM, whether the two will ultimately be operationally connected or not. Another option is for an immediate security mission to function as a discreet operation, that eventually functions in parallel with an IMIM without a military force, but with strong liaison to the continuing military presence.