by Mitchell Bard
It is always instructive to study
history when analyzing current events in the Middle
East. For U.S. policy,
it is particularly useful to look at documents released
by the State Department, the most recent of which concern
the years 1967-1968. Besides getting a behind-the-scenes
look at American diplomacy, it is possible to find fascinating
insights into the thinking of the major players in the
region.
One thing that is crystal clear in reading the State
Department records is how antagonistic most officials
were toward Israel. While this may come as no great
surprise, the documents bolster the conventional wisdom.
For example, a key member of the National Security Council
staff saw President Johnson's decision not to run for
reelection as a great opportunity to "bring pressure
on Israel and begin re-balancing our position toward
the Arabs. No successor will have such freedom to create
public doubt that Israel can count on us in a Soviet-backed
effort to get Arab territory back, curtail our support
in the UN, tamper with tax exemptions for Israel bonds,
or whatever else might occur to us."
The Arabs have always been good at
playing on State Department fears that they might turn
off the oil spigot or join in an anti-American alliance.
Thus, for example, Jordan's King
Hussein threatened in February 1968 to purchase
arms from the Soviet Union if the United States didn't
"meet his legitimate defensive arms requirements."
A number of points reverberate today.
For example, in 1968, Israel was the target of numerous terrorist attacks, especially from Jordan,
and launched several retaliatory strikes. This was typical
of the State Department's response: "We are aware
of problems that terrorism and shelling of civilian
centers cause for GOI [Government of Israel]. To avoid
jeopardizing peacemaking efforts, however, we are urging
parties to exercise utmost restraint. Latest Israeli
air operation strikes us as dangerous over reaction."
Interestingly, that same document
from December 5, 1968, also contained a reference to
observers that suggests an Israeli willingness to accept
them. Then Ambassador Yitzhak
Rabin explained that Israel "could not tolerate
shelling of civilian settlements" and that "unless
cease fire was observed by Jordanians, Iraqis and Fedayeen
there would be further incidents." He is quoted
as adding that "while Israel had never requested
UN observers on cease fire line with Jordan, it was
GOJ [Government of Jordan] not Israel which had refused
to accept them." When asked if Israel would accept
observers, Rabin said Israel didn't believe "UN
observers could bring tranquility" but had accepted
them on the Syrian and Egyptian cease fire lines.
Contrary to the myth that Israel never
wanted to relinquish the West
Bank, there is a December 11, 1968, telegram in
which Israel laid out the following proposal: "no
Arab army should be west of Jordan River. Jordan would
get back 90 percent of population and 85 percent of
territory on West Bank. Only 17,000 Arabs would be left
in the territory which Israel required. Re Jerusalem,
it must remain united and capital of Israel. Good progress
had been made with Vatican re Christian Holy Places
and Israel would be glad to give sovereignty (sic) over
Christian Holy Places to appropriate bodies. Any agreed
sovereign (sic) for Moslem Holy Places would be agreeable
to Israel but Jordan was nearest and second best choice."
That document also mentions discussions
Israel had with Palestinians about a possible West Bank
state. Abba Eban said Israel wasn't optimistic and didn't like the idea
of a buffer state. He also said "most Palestinians
wish to be with whoever is in charge of East Bank."
On the subject of the Arab states'
interest in peace, there is an April 8, 1968, telegram
from the Embassy in Jordan relating that Egyptian President
Nasser said the peace process led by UN representative Gunnar Jarring wouldn't
succeed and that "only military solution was feasible
and that UAR military was therefore preparing for that
solution." Nasser said six other Arab
states (Algeria, Syria, Sudan, Kuwait, South Yemen
and Saudi Arabia) also opposed a political settlement.
In an aside, King Hussein told the U.S. ambassador,
"Your friend [Saudi King] Faisal is more opposed
than anyone to peaceful settlement."
Perhaps the most important decision
made in 1968 was one the State Department opposed, and
consistently tried to make conditional on a variety
of Israeli actions, and that was the sale
of Phantom jets. Assistant Secretary of Defense
Paul Warnke explained in a November 4 document the significance
of President Johnson's decision to make the sale: "We
will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to
Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's
security situation and involving more directly the security
of the United States." In fact, this was the largest
arms sale to Israel, the first time the U.S. sold Israel
a weapon that was not counterbalanced by a sale to the
Arabs, and marked the beginning of the policy of insuring
that Israel maintains a qualitative edge over its neighbors.
What is perhaps most striking about reading these 33-34
year-old documents is how little has changed. The quality
of the U.S.-Israel relationship has certainly improved,
but that is largely despite the State Department, rather
than because of it. If there are any mysteries about
the reasons for the statements and policies emanating
from Foggy Bottom, they can be quickly cleared up by
perusing Volume XX of the Foreign
Relations of the United States.
Sources: Mitchel Bard is the Executive Director of the American-Israeli Cooperative Enterprise |