Netanyahu’s Testimony
The Morning of October 7 Timeline
Contradictions
Backlash: “A Fabricated Defense”
Lapid’s Timeline of Warnings
Netanyahu’s Testimony
On February 5, 2026, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu published his full 55-page response to the State Comptroller’s investigation into the October 7, 2023, Hamas attacks. In the document, he attributes the failure to prevent the massacre to security leaders and political opponents while framing his own role in a favorable light and distancing himself from personal accountability.
Netanyahu traces the “roots of the strategic breakdown” to events that occurred when he was not in power:
- The 2000 Lebanon Withdrawal & 2005 Gaza Disengagement: He argues these events fundamentally compromised Israel’s intelligence and defensive advantages.
- Deterrence Assessments: He claims that the security bodies (IDF and Shin Bet) consistently assessed that Hamas was “deterred” and recommended maintaining a policy of containment rather than escalation.
The document includes specific quotes to portray Netanyahu as more aggressive than his generals:
- Meeting with Bar on July 31, 2023: Netanyahu cites a meeting with Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar, where Bar described rising daily threat warnings. Netanyahu claims his response was, “You need to kill someone,” while Bar allegedly preferred a “covert warning” to Yahya Sinwar.
- The 2016 Stance: He includes a 2016 discussion where then-Shin Bet chief Nadav Argaman reportedly stated that killing Sinwar or Deif would not collapse Hamas. This directly contradicts Argaman’s 2024 interview, where he claimed it was he who pushed for assassinations and was blocked by Netanyahu.
- 2021-2023 Discussion of Assassinations: Netanyahu claims he repeatedly raised the option of killing Hamas leaders in these years, but was consistently blocked by former IDF Chief Aviv Kochavi and the Shin Bet. Reports have subsequently surfaced indicating that Netanyahu turned down 11 chances to kill Sinwar in the months before October 7.
The Morning of October 7 Timeline
Netanyahu provides a minute-by-minute breakdown to argue he was sidelined by the security echelon:
- 6:29 a.m.: Netanyahu receives his first notification via a WhatsApp message from his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Avi Gil.
- 6:44 a.m.: During a follow-up call, Netanyahu claims he asked if there was an opportunity to eliminate Hamas leadership “from Sinwar southward” and whether a full reserve call-up was needed.
- Intelligence “Blackout”: He emphasizes that a Shin Bet situational assessment concluded at 5:15 a.m.—just over an hour before the attack—stated the “chance of a broad campaign is low” and notably did not include instructions to update the Prime Minister’s Office.
Contradictions
Immediately after Netanyahu released his testimony, conflicting information was provided by other decision-makers. His own actions and statements also contradicted much of his narrative.
For example, as early as 2009, Netanyahu pledged to topple Hamas, yet over the years, he consistently declared that Israeli operations had achieved “significant deterrence.” After major Gaza conflicts in 2013, 2014, 2016, and 2021, he publicly insisted Hamas had suffered unprecedented blows, been set back for years, and learned the lesson. He repeatedly argued Israel had “changed the equation,” portraying Hamas as restrained because it feared Israel’s response.
In his 2022 autobiography, Netanyahu wrote that Hamas was “effectively deterred” and explained he avoided an all-out war because he wanted to focus on Iran. Even months before October 7, in May 2023, he told Likud colleagues Hamas had fired virtually no rockets because it was deterred, crediting Israeli strikes with delivering Hamas its “hardest blow.”
Most damagingly, Netanyahu told the comptroller that the belief that “Hamas is deterred” was not his directive but a unified intelligence assessment. Yet a handwritten note he left behind in June 2023, reportedly titled “Directive,” instructed the security establishment: “Gaza — stability through strength,” undermining his claim that the deterrence framework was imposed on him rather than advanced by him.
Another report indicated that Netanyahu met the security chiefs six days before October 7, instructing them to maintain economic incentives for Hamas to avoid escalation and to “act with moderation to cool down the fronts.” The security officials recommended assassinating Hamas leaders, but Netanyahu only approved this if conflict erupted, instead directing focus to the West Bank leadership. His priorities were advancing normalization with Saudi Arabia and preventing escalation with Gaza.
Netanyahu omitted the October 1 meeting from his report to the state comptroller, instead quoting other cabinet sessions to cast himself as pushing aggressive anti-Hamas policies and to shift blame onto security chiefs and rivals for supporting accommodation. Senior defense officials told Channel 12 that this selective quotation distorted their remarks and damaged relations between the political and defense leadership. The leaked October 1 summary directly challenges Netanyahu’s narrative, revealing he upheld the status quo he now faults others for.
Taken together, Netanyahu’s record reveals a contradiction: for years, he publicly promoted the idea that Hamas was contained and deterred, but after October 7, he shifted responsibility to the intelligence and defense services, distancing himself from a policy and narrative he repeatedly endorsed.
Backlash: “A Fabricated Defense”
The release triggered a wave of “fierce denunciations” from those mentioned in the protocols:
- Gadi Eisenkot: In a formal letter to the State Comptroller, Eisenkot accused Netanyahu of submitting a “fabricated defense” adapted from confidential minutes to serve his personal needs in an election year. “The situation in which one of the main responsible parties, if not the main and foremost one, can publish misleading and false statements and gain an advantage over all the other witnesses, is an unacceptable situation,” wrote Eisenkot, who, since leaving the Knesset, has formed his own political party.
- Yoav Gallant: The former Defense Minister called Netanyahu “a liar” regarding the 9 a.m. reserve call-up, stating, “The decision... was made by me at 9 a.m... and Netanyahu repeated my order later on.” He also contradicted Netanyahu’s claim that a delay in the IDF entering Rafah in early 2024 was due to the fear of the IDF leadership, when in reality it was because the IDF had been replenishing its supplies after allocating ammunition for potential conflict in the north. “After the huge failure on October 7, when the IDF and Shin Bet, led by the chief of staff and the Shin Bet chief, were courageously fighting back, when they were at the front, Netanyahu stabbed them in the back and stirred up all the government ministers against them and presented it all to the public,” Gallant charged.
- Naftali Bennett: While Netanyahu’s document quotes Bennett in 2014 saying, “I never talked about ‘conquering Gaza,’” critics point to Netanyahu’s own 2022 memoir (Bibi: My Story), where he wrote that Bennett was the one aggressively pushing for a full-scale ground invasion.
Lapid’s Timeline of Warnings
Opposition Leader Yair Lapid provided a detailed timeline of the specific warnings he and security officials allegedly gave to the Prime Minister in the months preceding the October 7 attack.
According to Lapid’s testimony to the independent civilian commission of inquiry, these warnings were “strategic and unequivocal,” focusing on the erosion of Israeli deterrence.
- July 24, 2023: Lapid testified that on the day the Knesset passed the controversial “reasonableness” law, Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar gave Netanyahu a direct, urgent warning. Lapid stated that Bar warned of “a violent, multi-front conflict” and emphasized that Israel’s enemies saw the internal national rift as a moment of extreme vulnerability.
- August 21, 2023: Lapid attended a security update with Netanyahu and his military secretary, Maj. Gen. Avi Gil. During this meeting, Gil reportedly warned that Iran and terror groups in Lebanon, the West Bank, and Gaza “all identified weakness, an internal divide, tensions, and a loss of preparedness in the army.” Lapid noted that during this briefing, Netanyahu appeared “bored and indifferent to the issue” and did not comment on the dire intelligence.
- September 18, 2023: Less than three weeks before the attack, Lapid reviewed highly classified intelligence at the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee. He described the material as “unequivocal,” stating: “Israeli deterrence has eroded dramatically; our enemies think they have a rare opportunity to harm us.” He told the inquiry that the intelligence showed Israel was at the “greatest level of danger.”
- September 20, 2023: Following the classified briefing, Lapid held a press conference to warn the Israeli public. He stated:
Ahead of Yom Kippur, I am compelled to warn the citizens of Israel: We are drawing close to a multi-front confrontation. According to the security establishment, the number of alerts... is unprecedented.” He further charged that Netanyahu had “lost control of his ministers,” specifically citing Smotrich and Ben Gvir for fueling the flames of a “violent conflagration.”
Lapid argued that Netanyahu’s primary failure was not a lack of tactical intelligence on the morning of October 7, but a long-term “failed conception” of conflict management.
- On Hamas: Lapid accused Netanyahu of intentionally keeping Hamas afloat for years (through policies like the Qatari cash transfers) to weaken the Palestinian Authority and prevent a two-state solution.
- On Responsibility: Lapid summarized that while there was no “tactical alert” (a specific time and place) for the breach, there were “repeated strategic warnings of an eruption of violence and the loss of deterrence” which the Prime Minister chose to ignore for political reasons.
Sources: Lazar Berman, “Placing blame elsewhere, Netanyahu shares his answers to state comptroller’s Oct. 7 probe,” Times of Israel, (February 6, 2026).
“Netanyahu Releases 55-Page Response on October 7, Points to Intelligence Assessments and Gaza Disengagement,” Media Line, (February 6, 2026).
“Netanyahu releases answers to 7 October probe, blaming rivals,” The New Arab, (February 6, 2026).
Steve Linde, “After comptroller’s Oct. 7 probe, Netanyahu calls for national inquiry,” JNS, (February 6, 2026).
“In letter to state comptroller, Eisenkot blasts Netanyahu’s ‘fabricated,’ ‘manipulative,’ answers to Oct. 7 probe,” Times of Israel, (February 6, 2026).
Sam Sokol, “Gallant: Netanyahu is a ‘liar’ who undermined security chiefs, has built false narrative of Oct. 7” Times of Israel, (February 7, 2026).
Nina Fox, “14 years of ‘Hamas is deterred’: how Netanyahu framed the terror group in government and opposition,” Ynet, (February 10, 2026).