Secretary Rogers' speech to the General Assembly outlined a number of points which Israel felt ought to be negotiated between itself and Egypt. It was also felt that the Secretary had thus limited Israel's freedom in negotiations. In reply to correspondents' questions following Secretary Rogers'speech, the Prime Minister made the following statement:
We are still studying Secretary Rogers' speech, as well as the import of his talk with Foreign Minister Eban. Likewise, I do not see fit to enter into a public discussion on the discussions which have taken place between us and the US Government or on the evolution and changes which have occurred in the US State Department's approach to the subject of the partial settlement.
I feel obliged to say, however, that to my mind this speech - most regrettably did not contribute to the promotion of the special settlement for the opening of the Suez Canal. Moreover, this speech could be interpreted by Egypt's rulers as encouragement to persist in their intransigent positions.
I shall confine myself to a few comments: As will be recalled, the Government of Israel expressed its readiness to reach an agreement with the Egyptians on the opening of the Suez Canal even before peace has been achieved, because Israel has a vital interest in the creation of an atmosphere and conditions conducive to progress in negotiations for peace. The primary condition for the attainment of an agreement on non-resumption of hostilities is the observance of a cease-fire unlimited in time. With the cease-fire being observed, discussions on the comprehensive settlement can naturally be held and make progress.
In contrast to Israel's position, Egypt adopted a negative position regarding an agreement on non-resumption of hostilities. Egypt is opposed to an agreement on a cease-fire unlimited in time. Instead of supporting the demand for a cease-fire of unlimited duration, the Secretary of State, in his address to the General Assembly, permitted himself to make pronouncements which might have the effect of releasing the Egyptians from responding to Israel's justified demand concerning cessation of hostilities.
True, Mr. Rogers noted that a cease-fire for a short period is not realistic. For some reason, however, he saw fit to determine that a commitment to a cease-fire of unlimited duration could not be realized in the framework of an interim settlement. It cannot be said that with such words the Secretary of State rendered a service to the prospects of the interim settlement. The rulers of Egypt can find in these words of his support for their stubborn resistance to the demand for a cease-fire of unlimited duration.
In agreeing to a settlement on the opening of the Canal, Israel aspired to the disengagement of the armies and the prevention of war. We stated that under certain conditions we should also be prepared to ask the Knesset to approve a withdrawal of the Israel Defence Forces a certain distance from the Canal line. A primary condition for this is that no Egyptian Forces shall cross to the east bank of the Canal. In contrast to Israel's position, President Sadat has repeatedly declared that Egyptian forces would cross the Canal.
While the Secretary of State did admit that Israel and Egypt differed on this point, he stipulated that the prospects of a compromise were not negative. I would be happy to learn that Egypt is prepared to agree to the Israeli position, namely, that in the framework of the partial settlement, Egyptian forces would not cross to the east bank of the Canal. But as far as we know, there has been no change in the Egyptian stand. Under the circumstances, these remarks of the Secretary of State arouse concern, since they are liable to give rise to false hopes on the part on Egyptian leaders that Israel might be expected to agree to a crossing of Egyptian forces to the east bank of the Canal, whereas Israel's opposition to this in unchanged.
The preparedness of the Israel Government to propose to the Knesset a certain withdrawal of forces from the cease-fire lines in the Suez Canal sector prior to peace was and still is conditional - inter alia - upon the non-crossing of Egyptian forces to the east bank of the Canal within the framework of a partial settlement.
At the beginning of February, when the proposal for a separate settlement for the opening of the Canal was raised, the talks under the auspices of Ambassador Jarring were still in progress. The Israel Government announced its readiness to reach an agreement with Egypt on the opening of the Canal, under the assumption that such an agreement would not bring about a cessation of the Jarring talks, yet would not be bound by them. We stressed the need to ensure that the agreement to be reached on the opening of the Canal should not be affected by any fluctuations in the Jarring talks. We assumed that a partial agreement on the opening of the Canal might foster progress in the talks on the comprehensive settlement. Such an agreement, however, must be mutual and self-sustaining. At the same time, we emphasized that the point to which the IDF would withdraw in the framework of a partial settlement would not be considered a final line, and that when a peace agreement is reached our forces would withdraw to the permanent and agreed border which would derive its validity from the peace treaty.
Ever since the issue was placed on the agenda, we stressed that the settlement for the opening of the Canal should not be linked to any commitments regarding additional phases of withdrawal prior to peace.
It soon transpired that in contrast to our position, Sadat views neither the opening of the Canal nor normalization of life in the Canal zone to be the prime consideration, laying stress rather on an Israeli commitment to implement his version of Security Council Resolution 242 - namely, total withdrawal to the former border. The demand for such a prior commitment on Israel's part also brought about the suspension of the Jarring talks, which were conducted within the framework of Security Council Resolution 242.
We had hoped that the Secretary of State would continue in the efforts to convince the Egyptian leaders of the value of a settlement for opening the Canal as a selfsustaining agreement, without binding it to conditions and discussions connected with the comprehensive settlement. Unfortunately, he gave Egypt the opportunity to interpret his remarks as confirmation of their position, which links an agreement on the opening of the Canal with an Israeli commitment to implement the Security Council Resolution according to their version.
The positions taken by the Egyptian Government contradict the primary purpose of an agreement for the opening of the Canal. Instead of a cessation of hostilities - a cease-fire with no time limit - Egypt postulates a short-term cease-fire, following which hostilities might be resumed. Instead of disengagement of forces, it postulates confrontation of forces by the crossing of its forces to the east bank of the Canal, and instead of talks without prior conditions on the peace settlement, it hopes to impose a distorted interpretation of the Security Council Resolution and poses a condition of a prior Israeli commitment for total withdrawal.
An intense political effort is required in order to effect a change in this intransigent Eygptian position. We appreciate Rogers' initiative, which helped in achieving a ceasefire in August of last year. Likewise, one must appreciate his statement that in the framework of an interim settlement it is impossible to solve problems relating to a comprehensive settlement. However, he erred greatly in some positions he expressed in his recent address. I fear that by determining such positions, Mr. Rogers made it difficult for himself to render the good services he had no doubt intended.
We are convinced that the US can play a positive role in achieving the desired settlement. Our discussions with the US Government on this issue are still in progress, and in the course of these talks we will persist in our efforts to clarify our position to the US Government.