

Public Attitudes in Israel Toward the Campaign Against Iran and Ceasefire Negotiations

The first post-ceasefire survey indicates a deeply disillusioned and skeptical Israeli public, rejecting the ceasefire, perceiving it as an American concession, questioning official narratives, and expecting the conflict to resume despite widespread fatigue.

The study was conducted by Dr. Nimrod Nir (Agam Institute and the Hebrew University of Jerusalem) on April 9–10, 2026, among a sample of 1,312 Israelis (1,084 Jews, 228 Arabs), with a margin of error of $\pm 3.2\%$ at a 99% confidence level. The sample is representative of the Israeli population in terms of gender, age, geographic distribution, and voting patterns in the 25th Knesset elections (and among Jewish respondents, also religiosity and ethnic origin). Most respondents also participated in a survey conducted at the onset of the campaign, allowing for analysis of change over time.

"The findings point to despair and pessimism as dominant sentiments, alongside high levels of fatigue and a clear expectation that the conflict is far from over. This is accompanied by growing distrust in the information the public receives from leadership and increasing concern about national security."

Key Findings

- Only 10% believe the campaign so far constitutes a significant success, compared to 32% who view it as a failure.
- 70% believe the ceasefire reflects an American concession to Iran, and two-thirds oppose it.
- Nearly 80% believe a U.S.–Iran agreement is unlikely or impossible — and a similar share believe such an agreement would endanger Israel's security.
- The public does not believe claims that Iran and Hezbollah have been significantly weakened. Fewer than a quarter believe Iran would need years to recover, and fewer than one-fifth believe this about Hezbollah. 44% do not believe Iran is on the verge of collapse.
- Over 70% believe the public is not receiving a full and reliable picture of the war.
- Public sentiment has reversed from optimism to pessimism since the start of the campaign.
- 58% report significant fatigue; more than half report major disruption to daily life.
- Over 60% say reality is worse than expected.
- Fewer than 40% would have supported the campaign had they known how it would unfold.
- Netanyahu's standing has declined since the beginning of the campaign.

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Survey Results

Position on the ceasefire

Response Percent

Oppose 64.8

Not sure 19.7

Support 15.4

Two-thirds oppose the ceasefire.

Who conceded more in the ceasefire?

Response Percent

United States 69.7

Iran 9.0

Both sides 16.9

No one 4.4

70% see the ceasefire as an American concession.

What should Israel do regarding Iran?

Response Percent

Continue attacks 39.5

Not sure 19.0

Respect the ceasefire 41.4

The public is divided.

Should the ceasefire include Lebanon?

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Response Percent

No	61.4
Not sure	15.9
Yes	22.7

Strong opposition to expanding ceasefire to Lebanon.

Likelihood of a U.S.–Iran agreement

Response	Percent
Impossible	35.7
Low chance	43.5
Moderate chance	15.8
High chance	5.0

Is such an agreement good or bad for Israel's security?

Response	Percent
Very bad	57.4
Bad	21.1
Not sure	16.1
Fairly good	4.1
Very good	1.3

The agreement is widely perceived as harmful.

Belief that Iran / Hezbollah were severely weakened

Response	Iran	Hezbollah
Do not believe at all	46.0	47.4
Rather do not believe	31.1	33.1
Somewhat believe	18.3	15.7
Strongly believe	4.7	3.9

Belief in claims that Iran is “very weak”

Response	Percent
Do not believe at all	44.2
Tend not to believe	26.3
Not sure	17.7
Tend to believe	9.9
Strongly believe	2.0

Impact of past failed claims on trust

Response	Percent
No impact	12.1
Slight impact	10.8
Moderate impact	19.5
Large impact	24.5
Very large impact	33.1

Does the public receive reliable information?

Response	Percent
Not at all	34.6
Not really	36.4
Partially	25.3
Fully	3.7

Likelihood the threat will return

Response	Percent
Very low	3.3
Low	6.1
Medium	16.3
High	33.9
Very high	40.4

Public Sentiment

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Dominant emotion

Emotion Percent

Despair	36.8
Confusion	18.1
Anger	15.6
Hope	14.2
Fear	7.9
Pride	4.3

Optimism vs pessimism

Response Percent

Mostly pessimistic	62.2
Mostly optimistic	37.8

Fatigue

Response Percent

Not at all	8.4
Small extent	13.6
Moderate	19.6
Large	25.5
Very large	32.9

Impact on daily life

Response Percent

Not at all	4.9
Small	16.5
Moderate	24.6
Large	28.5
Very large	25.5

Expectations vs reality

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Response	Percent
Much better	5.7
Slightly better	7.4
As expected	23.9
Worse	32.1
Much worse	30.8

Would you have supported the war in hindsight?

Response	Percent
No	33.9
Not sure	28.7
Yes	37.4

Ratings of leadership (summary)

More than half rate Netanyahu and the Defense Minister as poor or very poor, while the Chief of Staff receives relatively higher ratings.

Evaluation of the campaign

Response	Percent
Failure	32.1
Neither success nor failure	29.5
Partial success	28.4
Significant success	10.0

Long-term impact on security

Response	Percent
Will weaken	33.7
No impact	24.1
Will strengthen	42.2

Conditions for accepting a ceasefire

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Condition	Percent
Long-term security arrangement	69.8
Weakening missile capabilities	68.0
Enforcement mechanism	54.6
International oversight	54.3
No conditions — oppose	27.4
Civil reconstruction for security oversight	25.9

Preferred Prime Minister (change over time)

Candidate Start Now

Netanyahu	40.4	34.2
Bennett	24.0	25.8
Other	35.6	40.0
Eisenkot	10.5	13.9
Lapid	5.6	5.5

Netanyahu's standing has declined compared to the beginning of the campaign.