Note: We are presenting raw data. To analyze the data, we encourage users to read the entire study and the methodology used. Results and reliability can be affected by such things as sample size, question wording, and question order. Context and timing may also influence responses; for example, if the survey is conducted during a war.
In your opinion, how has Israel's security situation on the Iranian front changed compared to the period prior to October 7? (INSS, May 18-20, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Improved greatly / Improved somewhat | 31% |
| No change | 20% |
| Worsened somewhat / Worsened greatly | 45% |
| DK/NA | 4% |
What is your assessment regarding the state of the campaign against Iran? (INSS, May 18-20, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Israel has already won / Israel will likely win | 41% |
| Israel will likely not win / Israel has already lost | 49% |
| DK/NA | 10% |
To what extent are you satisfied with the military achievements in Iran? (INSS, May 18-20, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| To a great or very great extent | 37% |
| To a moderate extent | 34% |
| To a small or very small extent | 25% |
| DK/NA | 4% |
To what extent are you satisfied with Israel's diplomatic achievements in the campaign against Iran? (INSS, May 18-20, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| To a great or very great extent | 22% |
| To a moderate extent | 25% |
| To a small or very small extent | 48% |
| DK/NA | 5% |
In light of President Trump’s repeated extensions of the ceasefire with Iran, how would you rate the likelihood of a return to widescale conflict? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 26–30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Very high likelihood | 19% | 15% | 18% |
| Fairly high likelihood | 45% | 37% | 44% |
| Fairly low likelihood | 23% | 30% | 24% |
| Very low likelihood / No likelihood at all | 5% | 7% | 6% |
| DK/NA | 8% | 11% | 8% |
If the war with Iran has indeed ended, to what extent do you think this serves Israel’s security interests? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 26–30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very large extent | 8% | 12% | 9% |
| To a fairly large extent | 18% | 37% | 21% |
| To a fairly small extent | 36% | 30% | 35% |
| To a very small extent / Not at all | 28% | 5% | 24% |
| DK/NA | 10% | 16% | 11% |
Assuming the fighting does not resume, did Operation “Lion’s Roar” advance Israel’s security interests? (Channel 12 News, April 23, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Advance | 47% |
| Did not advance | 40% |
| DK/NA | 3% |
Do you trust Trump to safeguard Israel’s interests in an agreement with Iran? (Channel 12 News, April 16, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Trust | 33% |
| Do not trust | 48% |
| DK/NA | 19% |
On a scale from 1 = very unhappy to 5 = very relieved, how did you feel when you heard about the ceasefire between the United States and Iran? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 9-12, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 = very unhappy | 16% | 9% | 15% |
| 2 | 22% | 3% | 19% |
| 3 = neither unhappy nor relieved | 34% | 16% | 31% |
| 4 | 12% | 13% | 12% |
| 5 = very relieved | 14% | 57% | 21% |
| DK/NA | 2% | 2% | 2% |
In your opinion, what is the likelihood that the agreement that may be reached between the United States and Iran will take Israel’s security into account to an appropriate degree? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 9-12, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Very high likelihood | 4% | 12% | 6% |
| Fairly high likelihood | 17% | 26% | 18% |
| Fairly low likelihood | 41% | 37% | 40% |
| Very low likelihood | 31% | 15% | 28% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 10% | 8% |
Is Israel’s strategic and security situation better or worse now than it was before Operation Roaring Lion? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 9-12, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Much better | 22% | 5% | 20% |
| Slightly better | 27% | 11% | 24% |
| The same | 23% | 26% | 24% |
| Slightly worse | 10% | 17% | 11% |
| Much worse | 13% | 32% | 17% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 9% | 4% |
On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, how would you rate each of the following for their management of Operation Roaring Lion? 5. The government (Israel Democracy Institute, April 9-12, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 = very poor | 26% | 43% | 29% |
| 2 | 14% | 24% | 15% |
| 3 | 17% | 14% | 17% |
| 4 | 18% | 3% | 16% |
| 5 = excellent | 20% | 7% | 18% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 9% | 5% |
On a scale from 1 = very poor to 5 = excellent, how would you rate each of the following for their management of Operation Roaring Lion? 6. The IDF (Israel Democracy Institute, April 9-12, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 = very poor | 1% | 15% | 3% |
| 2 | 1% | 8% | 2% |
| 3 | 4% | 23% | 7% |
| 4 | 17% | 17% | 17% |
| 5 = excellent | 75% | 18% | 65% |
| DK/NA | 2% | 19% | 6% |
In your opinion, should Israel continue the fighting in Lebanon against Hezbollah regardless of developments vis-à-vis Iran, even if this results in friction with the US administration? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 9-12, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certain it should continue | 50% | 11% | 44% |
| Think it should continue | 30% | 8% | 27% |
| Think it should not continue | 7% | 28% | 10% |
| Certain it should not continue | 4% | 38% | 10% |
| DK/NA | 9% | 15% | 9% |
What is your position regarding the ceasefire agreement recently reached with Iran? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly support | 4% | 45% | 12% |
| Somewhat support | 16% | 22% | 17% |
| Somewhat oppose | 38% | 18% | 34% |
| Strongly oppose | 32% | 10% | 27% |
| DK/NA | 11% | 6% | 10% |
To what extent are you satisfied with the military achievements in Iran? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 – To a very small extent | 11% | 20% | 13% |
| 2 | 13% | 13% | 13% |
| 3 | 28% | 38% | 30% |
| 4 | 31% | 9% | 26% |
| 5 – To a very great extent | 13% | 3% | 11% |
| DK/NA | 4% | 18% | 7% |
To what extent are you satisfied with Israel’s diplomatic achievements in the campaign against Iran? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 – To a very small extent | 28% | 26% | 28% |
| 2 | 17% | 20% | 18% |
| 3 | 23% | 29% | 24% |
| 4 | 17% | 6% | 15% |
| 5 – To a very great extent | 9% | 3% | 8% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 16% | 7% |
In your opinion, to what extent was Iran’s ballistic missile array damaged in the current campaign? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not damaged at all | 4% | 11% | 6% |
| Damaged to a small extent | 47% | 42% | 46% |
| Damaged to a great extent | 43% | 34% | 41% |
| Complete dismantling | 1% | 2% | 1% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 11% | 7% |
In your opinion, to what extent was Iran’s nuclear project damaged in the current campaign? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not damaged at all | 21% | 22% | 21% |
| Damaged to a small extent | 41% | 38% | 40% |
| Damaged to a great extent | 30% | 24% | 29% |
| Complete dismantling | 2% | 1% | 1% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 14% | 8% |
In your opinion, to what extent was the Ayatollah regime damaged in the current campaign? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not damaged at all | 19% | 22% | 19% |
| Damaged to a small extent | 45% | 37% | 44% |
| Damaged to a great extent | 31% | 27% | 30% |
| Complete regime collapse | 1% | 1% | 1% |
| DK/NA | 4% | 13% | 6% |
In your opinion, what is Israel’s current security situation compared to before Operation “Roaring Lion”? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Much improved | 11% | 0% | 9% |
| Somewhat improved | 30% | 8% | 25% |
| No change | 38% | 35% | 37% |
| Somewhat worsened | 14% | 27% | 17% |
| Much worsened | 5% | 25% | 9% |
| DK/NA | 2% | 5% | 3% |
Do you think Israel will need to resume the war against Iran in the coming year? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| No | 6% | 39% | 13% |
| Yes | 81% | 41% | 73% |
| DK/NA | 12% | 19% | 14% |
Do you think Israel’s war objectives will be achieved במסגרת the expected negotiations with Iran? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Fully achieved | 2% | 3% | 2% |
| Achieved to a great extent | 12% | 14% | 13% |
| Achieved to a small extent | 37% | 38% | 37% |
| Not achieved at all | 42% | 28% | 39% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 16% | 9% |
To what extent, in your assessment, will the current campaign in Lebanon enable long years of security calm? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very small extent | 19% | 20% | 20% |
| To a small extent | 45% | 34% | 43% |
| To a great extent | 22% | 26% | 23% |
| To a very great extent | 7% | 7% | 7% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 14% | 9% |
Which of the following statements do you agree with more regarding the campaign against Hezbollah? (INSS, April 9-10, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Continue the campaign against Hezbollah regardless of developments with Iran | 82% | 18% | 69% |
| Seek a ceasefire now as part of the ceasefire with Iran | 10% | 76% | 23% |
| DK/NA | 8% | 6% | 8% |
What is your position on the ceasefire? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Oppose | 65% |
| Not sure | 20% |
| Support | 15% |
Who conceded more in the ceasefire? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| United States | 70% |
| Iran | 9% |
| Both sides | 17% |
| No one | 4% |
What should Israel do regarding Iran? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Continue attacks | 40% |
| Respect ceasefire | 41% |
| Not sure | 19.0% |
Should the ceasefire include Lebanon? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| No | 61% |
| Not sure | 16% |
| Yes | 23% |
What is the likelihood of a U.S.–Iran agreement? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Impossible | 36% |
| Low chance | 43% |
| Moderate chance | 16% |
| High chance | 5% |
Is such an agreement good or bad for Israel’s security? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Very bad | 58% |
| Bad | 21% |
| Not sure | 16% |
| Fairly good | 4% |
| Very good | 1% |
Do you believe that Iran / Hezbollah were severely weakened? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Iran | Hezbollah | |
|---|---|---|
| Do not believe at all | 46% | 47% |
| Rather do not believe | 31% | 33% |
| Somewhat believe | 19% | 16% |
| Strongly believe | 5% | 4% |
Do you believe in claims that Iran is “very weak”? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Do not believe at all | 44% |
| Tend not to believe | 26% |
| Not sure | 18% |
| Tend to believe | 10% |
| Strongly believe | 2% |
What is the likelihood the threat will return? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Very low | 3% |
| Low | 6% |
| Medium | 16% |
| High | 34% |
| Very high | 40% |
What is your dominant emotion? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Despair | 37% |
| Confusion | 18% |
| Anger | 16% |
| Hope | 14% |
| Fear | 8% |
| Pride | 4% |
Are you optimistic of pessimistic? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Mostly pessimistic | 62% |
| Mostly optimistic | 38% |
What is your level of fatigue? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Not at all | 8% |
| Small extent | 14% |
| Moderate | 20% |
| Large | 25% |
| Very large | 33% |
What is the level of Impact on your daily life? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Not at all | 5% |
| Small | 16% |
| Moderate | 25% |
| Large | 29% |
| Very large | 25% |
How would you describe your expectations vs reality? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Much better | 6% |
| Slightly better | 7% |
| As expected | 24% |
| Worse | 32% |
| Much worse | 31% |
Would you have supported the war in hindsight? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 37% |
| No | 34% |
| Not sure | 29% |
What is your evaluation of the campaign? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Failure | 32% |
| Neither success nor failure | 30% |
| Partial success | 28% |
| Significant success | 10% |
What is the long-term impact on security? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Will weaken | 34% |
| No impact | 24% |
| Will strengthen | 42% |
What are the conditions for accepting a ceasefire? (Agam Institute / Hebrew University, April 9-10, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Long-term security arrangement | 70% |
| Weakening missile capabilities | 68% |
| Enforcement mechanism | 55% |
| International oversight | 54% |
| No conditions — oppose | 27% |
| Civil reconstruction for security oversight | 26% |
Who do you think won the war, Israel and the U.S. or Iran? (Channel 13 News, April 9, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Israel and the United States | 33% |
| Iran | 28% |
| DK/NA | 39% |
After the war, what do you think is Israel’s strategic situation? (Channel 13 News, April 9, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Improved | 37% |
| Worsened | 34% |
| Remained the same | 21% |
| DK/NA | 8% |
Do you support or oppose President Trump’s decision to agree to a ceasefire? (Channel 13 News, April 9, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Support | 32% |
| Oppose | 51% |
| Don’t know | 17% |
Post-War Evaluations (Scale: 1–10 average) (Channel 13 News, April 9, 2026)
| Average Score | |
|---|---|
| What is your sense of personal security after the war? | 5.36 |
| What grade would you give Prime Minister Netanyahu for his management of the campaign? | 5.56 |
To what extent are you satisfied with the handling of the home front overall throughout the campaign? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very small extent | 9% | 6% | 9% |
| To a small extent | 29% | 36% | 31% |
| To a great extent | 41% | 45% | 42% |
| To a very great extent | 17% | 6% | 15% |
| DK/NA | 3% | 7% | 4% |
In your opinion, to what extent will Iran's ballistic missile array be damaged in the current campaign? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will not be damaged at all | 2% | 6% | 3% |
| Will be damaged very little | 31% | 40% | 33% |
| Will be damaged to a great extent | 55% | 40% | 52% |
| Complete dismantling of the project | 8% | 3% | 7% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 10% | 6% |
In your opinion, to what extent will Iran’s nuclear threat be removed in the current campaign? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will not be damaged at all | 9% | 10% | 9% |
| Will be damaged very little | 36% | 34% | 36% |
| Will be damaged to a great extent | 38% | 43% | 39% |
| Complete dismantling of the project | 11% | 2% | 9% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 11% | 7% |
In your opinion, to what degree will the Ayatollah regime be damaged by the current campaign? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will not be damaged at all | 11% | 13% | 11% |
| Will be damaged very little | 37% | 36% | 37% |
| Will be damaged to a great extent | 33% | 34% | 33% |
| Full regime collapse | 12% | 3% | 10% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 13% | 8% |
With which of the following statements do you agree more regarding the campaign against Iran? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Efforts must be made to reach a ceasefire agreement as soon as possible | 6% | 69% | 19% |
| A ceasefire agreement should be pursued once the destruction of military capabilities has been maximized | 34% | 12% | 30% |
| The campaign must continue until the collapse of the Iranian regime | 54% | 13% | 46% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 6% | 6% |
To what extent do you believe the official reports about the operational achievements across the different arenas throughout the war? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Not at all | 4% | 13% | 6% |
| To a small extent | 31% | 49% | 35% |
| To a great extent | 45% | 31% | 42% |
| To a very great extent | 16% | 2% | 13% |
| DK/NA | 4% | 5% | 4% |
How long in your opinion will the home front be prepared to live in a state of war considering all of its consequences? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Up to two weeks | 12% | 13% | 12% |
| Up to a month | 26% | 21% | 25% |
| Up to two-three months | 34% | 35% | 34% |
| Up to a half a year | 9% | 16% | 10% |
| Up to a year | 5% | 1% | 5% |
| Over a year | 8% | 1% | 7% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 12% | 7% |
Do you think it is possible to disarm Hezbollah? (INSS, March 29-30, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| It is impossible to disarm Hezbollah | 39% | 58% | 43% |
| It is possible to disarm Hezbollah | 51% | 27% | 46% |
| DK/NA | 10% | 15% | 11% |
What is your position regarding the Israeli-American attack in Iran (Operation “Lion’s Roar”)? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly opposed | 1% | 34% | 8% |
| Somewhat opposed | 4% | 32% | 9% |
| Somewhat support | 22% | 15% | 21% |
| Strongly support | 69% | 11% | 57% |
| DK/NA | 3% | 9% | 4% |
In your opinion, to what degree will the Ayatollah regime be damaged by the current campaign? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will not be damaged at all | 2% | 11% | 4% |
| Will be damaged very little | 28% | 42% | 31% |
| Will be damaged to a great extent | 51% | 32% | 47% |
| Full regime collapse | 13% | 3% | 11% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 13% | 7% |
To what extent are you satisfied with the military achievements in Iran? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| 1 - To a very small extent | 2% | 15% | 5% |
| 2 | 3% | 20% | 7% |
| 3 | 22% | 28% | 23% |
| 4 | 37% | 13% | 32% |
| 5 - To a very great extent | 31% | 11% | 27% |
| DK/NA | 4% | 14% | 6% |
With which of the following statements do you agree more regarding the campaign against Iran? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Efforts must be made to reach a ceasefire agreement as soon as possible | 5% | 68% | 17% |
| A ceasefire agreement should be pursued once the destruction of military capabilities has been maximized | 25% | 14% | 22% |
| The campaign must continue until the collapse of the Iranian regime | 64% | 13% | 54% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 5% | 6% |
How long in your opinion will the home front be prepared to live in a state of war considering all of its consequences? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Up to two weeks | 14% | 11% | 13% |
| Up to a month | 34% | 30% | 33% |
| Up to two-three months | 28% | 22% | 27% |
| Up to half a year | 7% | 20% | 10% |
| Up to a year | 3% | 2% | 2% |
| Over a year | 9% | 3% | 8% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 12% | 7% |
To what extent, in your opinion, are the decisions made regarding the campaign in Iran based primarily on security considerations? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very small extent | 4% | 15% | 6% |
| To a small extent | 13% | 45% | 20% |
| To a great extent | 42% | 24% | 38% |
| To a very great extent | 37% | 7% | 31% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 9% | 5% |
To what extent, in your assessment, will the current campaign in Lebanon enable long years of security calm? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very small extent | 8% | 11% | 9% |
| To a small extent | 39% | 39% | 39% |
| To a great extent | 29% | 24% | 28% |
| To a very great extent | 15% | 7% | 13% |
| DK/NA | 10% | 19% | 11% |
What do you think is the desired end-state of the campaign against Hezbollah in Lebanon? (INSS, March 15-16, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A new security arrangement with Lebanon, under U.S. auspices, including a full withdrawal and transfer of security control to the Lebanese state | 20% | 59% | 28% |
| A new security arrangement with Lebanon, under U.S. auspices, including a temporary Israeli presence in several outposts in southern Lebanon | 27% | 14% | 24% |
| A permanent Israeli security zone in southern Lebanon | 45% | 13% | 39% |
| DK/NA | 8% | 13% | 9% |
Do you support or oppose Operation Roaring Lion (the joint military attack on Iran by the United States and Israel)? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 9-11, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly support | 68% | 10% | 58% |
| Somewhat support | 25% | 15% | 23% |
| Somewhat oppose | 3% | 21% | 6% |
| Strongly oppose | 1% | 45% | 8% |
| DK/NA | 4% | 10% | 5% |
On a personal level, to what extent do you feel protected from Iranian attacks? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 9-11, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very large extent | 20% | 1% | 16% |
| To a fairly large extent | 59% | 14% | 52% |
| To a fairly small extent | 17% | 40% | 21% |
| To a very small extent / Not at all | 3% | 41% | 10% |
| DK/NA | 1% | 4% | 2% |
To what extent are Israel's interests and the interests of the United States currently aligned, in the context of the operation in Iran? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 9-11, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Very strongly aligned | 36% | 23% | 34% |
| Fairly strongly aligned | 46% | 29% | 43% |
| Fairly weakly aligned | 7% | 16% | 9% |
| Very weakly or not at all aligned | 1% | 17% | 4% |
| DK/NA | 10% | 15% | 11% |
In your opinion, can destroying Iran's nuclear project be achieved? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 9-11, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certain it can | 24% | 8% | 21% |
| Think it can | 46% | 19% | 42% |
| Think it cannot | 19% | 40% | 22% |
| Certain it cannot | 4% | 21% | 7% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 13% | 8% |
In your opinion, can destroying Iran's ballistic missile threat be achieved? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 9-11, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certain it can | 24% | 9% | 22% |
| Think it can | 47% | 23% | 43% |
| Think it cannot | 20% | 32% | 22% |
| Certain it cannot | 4% | 28% | 8% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 9% | 5% |
In your opinion, can toppling the regime of the ayatollahs be achieved? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 9-11, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Certain it can | 18% | 5% | 16% |
| Think it can | 42% | 22% | 39% |
| Think it cannot | 24% | 32% | 25% |
| Certain it cannot | 7% | 25% | 10% |
| DK/NA | 9% | 17% | 10% |
How long do you think Operation Roaring Lion will continue? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 9-11, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Up to 2 weeks | 19% | 23% | 19% |
| 2 weeks to 1 month | 49% | 36% | 47% |
| 1-3 months | 19% | 24% | 20% |
| More than 3 months | 2% | 5% | 3% |
| DK/NA | 11% | 13% | 11% |
After the current confrontation, is cooperation between Israelis and the Iranian people likely? (Center for Jewish Impact, March 5-8, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Yes | 55% |
| No | 36% |
| DK/NA | 9% |
To what extent do you think it is likely or unlikely that, after the end of the current confrontation with Iran, relations and cooperation will develop between Israelis and the Iranian people? (Center for Jewish Impact, March 5-8, 2026)
| Total | |
|---|---|
| Very likely | 16% |
| Fairly likely | 39% |
| Not very likely | 27% |
| Not at all likely | 8% |
| DK/NA | 9% |
Do you support or oppose “Operation Roaring Lion” (the joint military attack of the U.S. and Israel on Iran)? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 2-3, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly support | 74% | 15% | 64% |
| Somewhat support | 19% | 11% | 18% |
| Somewhat oppose | 3% | 18% | 5% |
| Strongly oppose | 1% | 42% | 8% |
| DK/NA | 3% | 13% | 5% |
To what extent do you trust or not trust Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to manage the operation properly? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 2-3, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Very much | 43% | 5% | 37% |
| Quite a lot | 31% | 11% | 28% |
| Not so much | 12% | 25% | 14% |
| Not at all | 11% | 58% | 19% |
| DK/NA | 3% | 2% | 3% |
On a personal level, to what extent do you feel protected from Iranian attacks? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 2-3, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very large extent | 18% | 3% | 15% |
| To a fairly large extent | 57% | 12% | 49% |
| To a fairly small extent | 18% | 41% | 22% |
| To a very small extent / Not at all | 5% | 43% | 11% |
| DK/NA | 3% | 1% | 3% |
In your opinion, to what extent is the security of Israel one of President Trump’s main considerations? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 2-3, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| To a very large extent | 17% | 14% | 16% |
| To a fairly large extent | 47% | 29% | 44% |
| To a fairly small extent | 23% | 35% | 25% |
| To a very small extent | 5% | 17% | 7% |
| DK/NA | 8% | 5% | 8% |
In your opinion, how long should the operation continue? (Israel Democracy Institute, March 2-3, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Until the military objectives are achieved (elimination of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic capability) | 36% | 33% | 36% |
| Until the military objectives are achieved as well as the political objective of overthrowing the Ayatollah regime | 57% | 15% | 50% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 52% | 15% |
What is your position on the Israeli and American attacks on Iran ("Operation Roaring Lion")? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Strongly support | 73% | 11% | 60% |
| Somewhat support | 19% | 27% | 20% |
| Somewhat oppose | 4% | 22% | 7% |
| Strongly oppose | 1% | 27% | 6% |
| DK/NA | 3% | 13% | 7% |
Which of the following statements do you agree with more regarding the campaign against Iran? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| A ceasefire should be pursued as soon as possible | 3% | 61% | 15% |
| A ceasefire should be pursued after maximizing the damage to Iran’s military capabilities | 18% | 12% | 16% |
| The campaign should continue until the regime in Iran is overthrown | 74% | 18% | 63% |
| DK/NA | 5% | 9% | 6% |
In your opinion, how long will the home front be prepared to live in a state of war, considering all its consequences? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| General public | |
|---|---|
| A few more days | 0% |
| Up to two weeks | 25% |
| Up to a month | 37% |
| Up to two or three months | 16% |
| Up to half a year | 5% |
| Up to a year | 1% |
| More than a year | 7% |
| DK/NA | 9% |
In your opinion, to what extent will the current campaign harm the Ayatollah regime? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| It will lead to a complete collapse of the regime | 26% | 7% | 22% |
| It will harm it to a great extent | 50% | 37% | 47% |
| It will harm it to a small extent | 14% | 29% | 17% |
| It will not harm it | 2% | 9% | 4% |
| DK/NA | 8% | 18% | 10% |
How concerned are you about the possibility that the war with Iran will expand into a broader regional conflict? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Very concerned | 39% | 39% | 39% |
| Quite concerned | 12% | 41% | 18% |
| Not so concerned | 34% | 14% | 30% |
| Not concerned at all | 14% | 2% | 12% |
| DK/NA | 1% | 4% | 1% |
In your opinion, how much damage will the Israeli and American strikes cause to Iran’s nuclear program? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will not damage it at all | 2% | 7% | 5% |
| Will damage it very little | 20% | 28% | 22% |
| Will damage it to a great extent | 49% | 35% | 46% |
| Complete dismantling of the program | 19% | 6% | 17% |
| DK/NA | 10% | 24% | 10% |
In your opinion, how much damage will the strikes cause to Iran’s missile program? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will not damage it at all | 1% | 7% | 2% |
| Will damage it very little | 15% | 28% | 18% |
| Will damage it to a great extent | 61% | 48% | 59% |
| Complete dismantling of the program | 16% | 5% | 14% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 12% | 7% |
In your opinion, how much damage will the strikes cause to the stability of the Iranian regime? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Will not damage it at all | 2% | 9% | 3% |
| Will damage it very little | 14% | 29% | 17% |
| Will damage it to a great extent | 50% | 37% | 47% |
| Full regime collapse | 26% | 7% | 22% |
| DK/NA | 8% | 18% | 11% |
In your opinion, how long should the operation continue? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Until the military objectives are achieved (elimination of Iran’s nuclear and ballistic capability) | 36% | 33% | 36% |
| Until the military objectives are achieved as well as the political objective of overthrowing the Ayatollah regime | 57% | 15% | 50% |
| DK/NA | 7% | 52% | 14% |
Which of the following statements best describes your view of President Trump’s policy toward Israel during the war with Iran? (INSS, March 1-2, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General public | |
|---|---|---|---|
| Trump is committed to protecting Israel’s interests | 35% | 32% | 34% |
| Trump supports Israel only when it serves his interests | 49% | 30% | 45% |
| Trump is unpredictable and difficult to rely on | 13% | 29% | 16% |
| DK/NA | 3% | 9% | 5% |
In the event of an American attack against Iran, what do you think should be the extent of Israel’s involvement? (Israel Democracy Institute, January 25-29, 2026)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
| Direct military involvement from the outset, coordinated with the United States | 48% | 25% | 44% |
| Refrain from direct involvement, and respond militarily only in the event of an Iranian attack against Israel | 46% | 67% | 50% |
| DK | 6% | 8% | 6% |
In your opinion, what is the likelihood that during the coming year, a largescale military conflict will be renewed between Israel and Iran? (Israel Democracy Institute, November 30–December 3, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
| Very high likelihood | 30% | 15% | 28% |
| Fairly high likelihood | 45% | 25% | 42% |
| Fairly low likelihood | 17% | 23% | 18% |
| Very low likelihood / none at all | 3% | 25% | 7% |
| Don’t know | 5% | 11% | 5% |
In your opinion, what is the likelihood that during the coming year, a largescale military conflict will be renewed between Israel and the Houthis in Yemen? (Israel Democracy Institute, November 30–December 3, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
| Very high likelihood | 17% | 7% | 16% |
| Fairly high likelihood | 35% | 16% | 32% |
| Fairly low likelihood | 32% | 32% | 32% |
| Very low likelihood / none at all | 10% | 39% | 15% |
| Don’t know | 6% | 6% | 6% |
In your opinion, did Israel achieve its goals in the war against Iran? (Israel Democracy Institute, June 29 - July 2, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
It achieved all its goals | 7% | 15% | 8% |
It achieved most of its goals | 53% | 23% | 48% |
| It achieved only a few of its goals | 29% | 33% | 30% |
| It did not achieve its goals | 7% | 19% | 9% |
| DK | 4% | 10% | 5% |
Do you support or oppose Israel’s attack on Iran? (INSS, June 22, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Supportive | 88% | 16% | 73% |
I object | 5% | 68% | 18% |
| DK | 7% | 16% | 9% |
How satisfied are you with the defense establishment’s activity in Iran so far? (INSS, June 22, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
High | 86% | 22% | 73% |
Moderate | 6.5% | 31% | 11% |
| Low | 4.5% | 31% | 10% |
| DK | 3% | 16% | 6% |
To what extent are you concerned or not concerned about the development of the campaign between Israel and Iran? (INSS, June 22, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Very concerned | 22% | 57% | 29% |
Quite concenred | 45% | 25% | 41% |
| Not so concerned | 23% | 12% | 21% |
| Not concerned at all | 9% | 1% | 7% |
| DK | 1% | 5% | 2% |
In your opinion, to what extent is the Israeli home front prepared and ready to cope with the war against Iran? (INSS, June 22, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
To a very great extent | 16% | 8% | 14% |
To a great extent | 50% | 28% | 46% |
| Little | 26% | 33% | 27% |
| Very little | 5% | 18% | 8% |
| DK | 3% | 13% | 5% |
In your opinion, in addition to removal of the nuclear threat, should Israel also act to overthrow the Iranian regime? (INSS, June 22, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Yes, Israel should also act to overthrow the Iranian regime | 68% | 32% | 61% |
No, Israel should focus only on removing the nuclear threat | 24% | 42% | 28% |
| DK | 8% | 26% | 11% |
Do you support Israel carrying out military strikes on Iran’s nuclear facilities? (Agam Labs, June 15-16, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Yes, even without US support | 54% | 10% | 46% |
Yes, with US support | 40% | 6% | 34% |
| No, prefer diplomatic solutions | 4% | 73% | 17% |
| Not sure | 2% | 11% | 3% |
To what extent do you think the Israeli home front is prepared for a prolonged war against Iran? (Agam Labs, June 15-16, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
To a great extent | 23% | 4% | 20% |
To a moderate extent | 45% | 21% | 41% |
| To a small extent | 25% | 35% | 26% |
| Not at all | 7% | 40% | 13% |
On the night between Thursday and Friday, Israel launched an attack against military targets in Iran. In response, Iran launched hundreds of ballistic missiles and cruise missiles against targets in the Israeli homeland. What is your position on the Israeli attack? (Agam Labs, June 15-16, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Support the attack | 83% | 12% | 70% |
Oppose the attack | 12% | 20% | 14% |
| Unsure | 5% | 68% | 16% |
Do you think Israel can completely destroy the Iranian nuclear infrastructure and completely remove the military threat that Iran poses to Israel, without American military assistance? (Agam Labs, June 15-16, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Yes | 28% | 9% | 24% |
No | 27% | 54% | 32% |
| Unsure | 45% | 37% | 44% |
What should be the ultimate goal of Israel's action against Iran's nuclear program? (Agam Labs, June 15-16, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Totally destroy Iran's nuclear infrastructure and military capabilities – even at the cost of all-out war | 56% | 14% | 50% |
To pressure Iran to agree to a diplomatic agreement that would prevent it from | 44% | 86% | 50% |
Do you agree or disagree that Israel should carry out a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities even without American agreement? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 21-24, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Agree | 52% | 9% | 45% |
Disagree | 35% | 76% | 42% |
| DK | 13% | 15% | 13% |
Against the backdrop of talks between the United States and Iran on the Iranian nuclear program, to what extent do you think that Israel’s security will be one of President Trump’s main considerations during these talks? (Israel Democracy Institute, April 21-24, 2025)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
To a large extent | 46% | 42% | 45% |
To a small extent | 46% | 36% | 44% |
| DK | 8% | 23% | 11% |
In your opinion, was Israel’s response last week to the Iranian missile attack appropriately strong, too strong, or too weak? (Israel Democracy Institute, October 28-November 3, 2024)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Appropriately strong | 43% | 31% | 41% |
Too strong | 3% | 8% | 3% |
| Too weak | 43% | 46% | 44% |
| DK | 11% | 16% | 12% |
In your opinion, will a strong Israeli response to the attack from Iran, meaning an extensive military confrontation between Israel and Iran, serve Israel's interests? (INSS, October 10-13, 2024)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Certainly/I think so | 70% | 22% | 61% |
Certainly not/I don't think so | 19% | 54% | 26% |
| DK | 11% | 25% | 13% |
If there is an Israeli response to the attack from Iran, should it be such that Iran will not be obliged to attack Israel in return? (INSS, October 10-13, 2024)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Yes | 33% | 39% | 34% |
| No | 37% | 21% | 33% |
| DK | 30% | 40% | 32% |
To what extent are you concerned about the situation deteriorating to a war of attrition between Israel and Iran? (INSS, October 10-13, 2024)
| Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Concerned | 58% | 68% | 61% |
| Not concerned | 38% | 15% | 33% |
| DK | 4% | 19% | 17% |
Should Israel take diplomatic steps to prevent escalation into a direct war with Iran? (INSS, August 8-11, 2024)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
| Yes certainly/I think so | 54% | 53% | 53% |
I don't think so/Certainly not | 35% | 17% | 32% |
| DK | 11% | 31% | 15% |
Under the current circumstances, should Israel take direct military action against Iran? (INSS, August 8-11, 2024)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
| Yes certainly/I think so | 52% | 13% | 44% |
I don't think so/Certainly not | 33% | 59% | 39% |
| DK | 15% | 29% | 18% |
Israel-Iran tensions have turned into an almost direct war over the past decade. What is your stance on creating a path for dialogue and message exchange with Iran through third parties? (Mitvim Institute, August 2024)
| 2024 | |
| Support: Dialogue path could benefit Israel | 32% |
| Oppose: Dialogue path could harm Israel | 18% |
| Dialogue path will not make a significant difference | 36% |
| No opinion | 14% |
| Grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion) | Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total |
| Support: Dialogue path could benefit Israel | 34% | 59% | 38% |
| Oppose: Dialogue path could harm Israel | 21% | 19% | 20% |
| Dialogue path will not make a significant difference | 45% | 22% | 42% |
What strategy do you think Israel should adopt in response to Iran’s efforts to mount a combined attack from Lebanon (Hezbollah), Syria, Iraq, and Yemen (Houthis)? (Mitvim Institute, August 2024)
| 2024 | |
| Launch an independent military campaign against Iran and its proxies | 28% |
| Continue with the current limited fighting against Hezbollah and Houthis | 7% |
| Build a U.S.-led regional coalition to confront Iran diplomatically and militarily | 40% |
| Back international negotiations with Iran on curbing its regional activity and that of its proxies | 12% |
| No opinion | 13% |
| Grouped by sector (among those expressing an opinion) | Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total |
| Launch an independent military campaign against Iran and its proxies | 35% | 15% | 32% |
| Continue with the current limited fighting against Hezbollah and Houthis | 7% | 12% | 8% |
| Build a U.S.-led regional coalition to confront Iran diplomatically and militarily | 49% | 31% | 46% |
| Back international negotiations with Iran on curbing its regional activity and that of its proxies | 9% | 42% | 14% |
After the measured exchanges of fire between Israel and Iran, which of the two countries is now in a better strategic position in the region? (Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research at the Israel Democracy Institute, May 1-6, 2024)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
Israel | 46% | 23% | 43% |
Iran | 17% | 11% | 16% |
Their situation is identical | 21% | 46% | 25% |
| DK | 16% | 20% | 17% |
Iran is less than a year away from being able to develop a nuclear bomb. In light of this situation, what should Israel do? (Mitvim Foreign Policy Index, July 2023)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
| 2023 | 2023 | 2023 | |
Recognize a nuclear Iran as a fait accompli and focus on preparing Israel to deal with this reality | 12% | 36% | 16% |
Increase diplomatic cooperation with the international community and countries of the region in order to delay Iran’s nuclear efforts | 53% | 30% | 49% |
| An all-out Israeli attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, even if it leads to a large-scale retaliation against the Israeli home front | 28% | 7% | 25% |
| DK | 7% | 27% | 10% |
Agree that Israel should carry out a military strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities even without American agreement (note % of Jews is significantly higher than Arabs - 55%-17% in 2022)? (Israel Democracy Institute, September 18–20, 2022)
| 2019 | 2012 | 2021 | 2022 | |||
Agree | 32% | 23% | 50% | 49% | ||
Currently, it does not appear that a nuclear agreement will be signed soon between Western countries and Iran. In your estimation, to what extent have the Israeli government’s attempts to persuade the international community not to sign an agreement contributed to this outcome? (Israel Democracy Institute, September 18–20, 2022)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
| To a very large extent | 11% | 14% | 12% |
| To a large extent | 34% | 21% | 32% |
| To a small extent | 23% | 18% | 22% |
| Not at all | 8% | 13% | 8% |
| Don't know | 24% | 34% | 26% |
Iran’s nuclear project and its support for terrorism throughout the region continues. In light of this, where do you think Israel should focus its efforts in the face of Iranian threats? (Mitvim Institute, August 2022)
Israeli Jews | Arab Israelis | Total | |
| Independent military operation (covert or overt) against Iran | 35% | 11% | 31% |
| Supporting the international community’s efforts to renew and improve the nuclear agreement | 16% | 29% | 18% |
| Forming coalitions with other Middle Eastern countries threatened by Iran | 40% | 27% | 38% |
| No opinion | 10% | 33% | 13% |
To what extent, in your opinion, does Iran now constitute an existential danger to Israel? (%, entire sample) (Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research of the Israel Democracy Institute, November 29-December 1, 2021)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
| To a very great extent | 30% | 7% | 26% |
| To a great extent | 31% | 13% | 28% |
| To a medium extent | 24% | 23% | 24% |
| To a small extent | 6% | 17% | 8% |
| Not at all | 2% | 20% | 5% |
| Don't know | 8% | 20% | 9% |
Do you agree or disagree with the view that Israel should militarily attack Iran’s nuclear facilities even without American consent? (Viterbi Center for Public Opinion and Policy Research of the Israel Democracy Institute, November 29-December 1, 2021)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
| Strongly agree | 31% | 5% | 26% |
| Moderately agree | 27% | 13% | 25% |
| Don’t agree so much | 19% | 19% | 19% |
| Don’t agree at all | 6% | 42% | 13% |
| Don't know | 17% | 21% | 18A% |
Iran’s nuclear project and its support for terrorism throughout the region continues. In light of this, where do you think Israel should focus its efforts in the face of Iranian threats? (Mitvim Institute, September 2021)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | Total | |
| Independent military operation (covert or overt) against Iran | 35% | 6% | 31% |
| Supporting the international community’s efforts to renew and improve the nuclear agreement | 15% | 33% | 18% |
| Forming coalitions with other Middle Eastern countries threatened by Iran | 35% | 25% | 34% |
| No opinion | 15% | 36% | 18% |
Do you support or object to proactive IDF activity aimed at preventing an Iranian presence in Syria, even at the price of war? (INSS, National Security Index 2018-19)
Israeli Jews | |
| For | 73% |
| Against | 27% |
How should Israel react if Iran renews its nuclear activity? (INSS, National Security Index 2018-19)
Israeli Jews | |
| Pressure the U.S. to achieve a better deal | 20% |
| Military assault on Iran's nuclear facilities without coordinating with the U.S. | 10% |
| Military assault on Iran's nuclear facilities in coordination with the U.S. | 4i9% |
| Urge the U.S. to return to the existing nuclear deal | 7% |
| Work toward replacing the Iranian regime | 10% |
| Establish a diplomatic channel vis-a-vis Iran | 4% |
About two years after the signing of the nuclear deal between Iran and six world powers, do you think that the nuclear threat to Israel has...?
(Mitvim Israeli Foreign Policy Index, October 2017)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
| Decreased | 7% | 24% | 10% |
| Increased | 30% | 14% | 28% |
| Remained Unchanged | 53% | 46% | 52% |
| Don't know/decline to answer | 10% | 16% | 10% |
What, in your opinion, are the chances that in the coming year a war will break out between Israel and Iran?
(The Peace Index, June 2017)
Israeli Jews | Israeli Arabs | General Public | |
| Very low chances | 43.3% | 45.8% | 43.7% |
| Moderately low chances | 39.8% | 28.7% | 37.9% |
| Moderately high chances | 7.1% | 12.0% | 7.9% |
| Very high chances | 1.1% | 2.7% | 1.3% |
| Don't know/decline to answer | 8.7% | 10.8% | 9.1% |
“Do you Support or Oppose a Unilateral Israeli Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities?”*
Month | Year | Pollster | Support | Oppose |
November | 2013 | 46% | 38% | |
November | 2013 | 52% | 27% | |
October | 2013 | 66% | 22% | |
July | 2012 | 26% | 66% | |
April | 2012 | Jerusalem Post | 45% | 40% |
February | 2012 | 21% | 63% | |
April | 2009 | Maagar Mohot Institute | 75% | 15% |
March | 2009 | Truman Institute | 54% | 35% |
December | 2007 | Israel Radio | 21% | 67% |
February | 2007 | Peace Index | 49% | 45% |
November | 2006 | Maariv | 49% | 46% |
* - Not necessarily exact question wording
“Yes or No: A Nuclear-Armed Iran Constitutes an Existential Threat to Israel?”*
Month | Year | Pollster | YES | NO |
April | 2013 | 75% | 21% | |
April | 2012 | 74% | 22% | |
March | 2012 | 77% | 21% | |
November | 2007 | Haaretz | 74% | 19% |
February | 2007 | Peace Index | 82% | 18% |
November | 2006 | Maariv | 66% | 32% |
* - Not necessarily exact question wording
Do you believe that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu succeeded or failed with the steps he took to stop the Iranian nuclear program in recent years? (Mitvim Institute, October 2015)
Jewish Israelis | Arab Israelis | Total | |
| Succeeded | 19% | 17% | 19% |
| Failed | 55% | 80% | 58% |
| No opinion | 26% | 3% | 23% |
“Do you Support or Oppose an International Attack on Iran's Nuclear Facilities?”*
Month | Year | Pollster | Support | Oppose |
April | 2012 | Jerusalem Post | 72% | 14% |
February | 2012 | Peace Index | 62% | 34% |
December | 2011 | 43% | 41% | |
November | 2011 | 41% | 39% | |
April | 2008 | Maagar Mohot Institute | 35% | 51% |
August | 2006 | Maariv | 63% | 30% |
* - Not necessarily exact question wording
Do you believe Iran will halt its nuclear program following the interim agreement with the P5+1?
(New Wave Research, November 2013)
| Will Not Halt | 76.4% |
| Will Halt | 12.6% |
| Don't Know | 11% |
Should Israel support or oppose an agreement being developed with Iran?
(Israel Hayom, November 2013)
| Support | 16% |
| Oppose | 66% |
| Don't Know | 18% |
According to media reports, Israel's senior security echelon, including the Chief of Staff and the heads of the Mossad and the Israel Security Agency, currently oppose an Israeli attack on Iran. Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak, however, say that sanctions on Iran are not helping and it is necessary to act before Iran attains nuclear weapons capability. On this issue, on whose judgment do you rely more? (Peace Index, July 2012)
Israeli Jews | |
| That of the PM and DM | 27.8% |
| That of the senior security echelon | 57.1% |
| That of both to the same degree | 1.6% |
| That of neither of them | 4.7% |
| Don't know/decline to answer | 8.8% |
Some claim that Netanyahu and Barak’s statements that Israel will attack Iran by itself if it has no other choice are just a bluff aimed at pressuring the Americans to act more resolutely against the Iranian threat. Others claim that their statements reflect their real intention—to attack Iran. With which claim do you agree more? (Peace Index, July 2012)
Israeli Jews | |
| That this is a bluff aimed at getting the Americans to act more resolutely | 56.7% |
| That the statements reflect a real intention to attack | 30.0% |
| Don't know/decline to answer | 13.3% |
In his most recent visit, U.S. Defense Secretary Leon Panetta claimed that the sanctions on Iran are starting to have an effect and promised that “Iran will never have nuclear weapons.” Do you think Israel can or cannot rely on Panetta’s promise? (Peace Index, July 2012)
Israeli Jews | |
| I'm sure it can | 3.2% |
| I think it can | 19.2% |
| I think it can't | 34.7% |
| I am sure it can't | 35.3% |
| Don't know/decline to answer | 7.6% |
Some claim that apparently, it will be impossible to prevent Iran from nuclearizing in the long term, and therefore Israel should come to terms with this and devise a defense strategy based on the assumption that it is not the only nuclear state in the region. Do you agree or not agree with this approach? (Peace Index, July 2012)
Israeli Jews | |
| I don't agree at all | 20.3% |
| I moderately disagree | 15.1% |
| I moderately agree | 43.9% |
| I strongly agree | 16.1% |
| Don't know/decline to answer | 4.6% |
Does the forming of a national unity government advance the struggle of Israel against the Iranian nuclear program? (TNS for Maariv, May 8, 2012)
| Yes | 44.9% |
| No | 39.5% |
| Don't know | 15.6% |
Would the price Israel would have to pay for living with the threat of an Iranian bomb be greater than the price it would pay for attacking Iran's nuclear facilities? (JCPA, March 26, 2012)
| Yes - the price Israel would have to pay for living with an Iranian bomb would be greater than the price it would pay for attacking Iran's nuclear facilities | 65% |
| No - the price Israel would have to pay for living with an Iranian bomb would NOT be greater than the price it would pay for attacking Iran's nuclear facilities | 27% |
Only military action could stop Iran's nuclear program? (JCPA, March 26, 2012)
| Agree | 60% |
| Disagree | 37% |
Do you agree or disagree with the statement that the Israeli home front will suffer equally whether Israel attacks Iran or the United States does? (JCPA, March 26, 2012)
| Agree | 63% |
| Disagree | 29% |
Do you think that the Israel Defense Forces could significantly damage Iran's nuclear program? (JCPA, March 26, 2012)
| Yes | 64% |
| No | 29% |
Do you agree with the statement that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, it will use them against Israel? (JCPA, March 26, 2012)
| Yes | 61% |
| No | 34% |
Do you think that if Iran develops nuclear weapons, the Palestinians and Hizbullah will grow more belligerent toward Israel? (JCPA, March 26, 2012)
| Yes | 75% |
| No | 21% |
Assuming that Iran is both able and intending to produce nuclear weapons, and assuming that Israel, according to various sources, also has nuclear weapons, what in your opinion are the chances that once Iran has nuclear weapons, it will use them against Israel? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Arabs | |
| Very high chances | 18.9% | 17.3% | 27.8% |
| Moderately high chances | 32.3% | 34.0% | 22.2% |
| Moderately low chances | 29.4% | 29.3% | 30.0% |
| Very low chances | 13.6% | 12.8% | 17.8% |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 5.9% | 6.5% | 2.2% |
In your opinion, will the sanctions now being imposed by Western countries cause or not cause Iran to stop its development of nuclear weapons? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Arabs | |
| I'm sure they will | 5.8% | 2.9% | 22.2% |
| I think they will | 17.6% | 17.6% | 17.8% |
| I think they won't | 41.1% | 44.7% | 21.1% |
| I'm sure they won't | 33.2% | 32.4% | 37.8% |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 2.3% | 2.5% | 1.1% |
In your opinion what are the chances that Israel will carry out a strike soon, even without cooperation with the United States? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012; August 8, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Jews (July) | Arabs | |
| Very high chances | 8.1% | 6.4% | 4.9% | 17.8% |
| Moderately high chances | 26.4% | 15.5% | 28.2% | 12.2% |
| Moderately low chances | 36.8% | 39.1% | 41.9% | 23.3% |
| Very low chances | 19.2% | 15.5% | 13.7% | 40.0% |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 9.5% | 10.1% | 11.3% | 6.7% |
In your assessment, what are the chances that such an attack, conducted without U.S. cooperation, would succeed in stopping Iran's nuclearization for a substantial period of time? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012; August 8, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Jews (July) | Arabs | |
| Very high chances | 16.7% | 16.3% | 19.6% | 18.9% |
| Moderately high chances | 35.3% | 36.8% | 34.7% | 26.7% |
| Moderately low chances | 27.4% | 27.3% | 26.5% | 27.8% |
| Very low chances | 13.5% | 11.5% | 9.0% | 24.4% |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 7.1% | 8.0% | 10.1% | 2.2% |
If an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is carried out with U.S. cooperation, what, in your assessment, are the chances that such an attack would succeed in stopping Iran’s nuclearization for a substantial time? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012; August 8, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Jews (July) | Arabs | |
| Very high chances | 7.5% | 5.7% | 4.6% | 17.8% |
| Moderately high chances | 17.6% | 17.1% | 14.8% | 20.0% |
| Moderately low chances | 43.2% | 43.8% | 47.4% | 40.0% |
| Very low chances | 26.7% | 28.4% | 28.3% | 16.7% |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 5.1% | 5.0% | 4.9% | 5.6% |
Defense Minister Barak recently said that in case of an attack on Iran, if Israeli citizens obey instructions and remain in their homes, Iran’s retaliatory strikes will probably cause only about 500 casualties. In your eyes, is this prediction about casualties more or less accurate, or will there be more or fewer casualties than this number? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Arabs | |
| Barak's estimate of 500 casualties is more or less accurate | 11.5% | 12.7% | 4.4% |
| The number of casualties will be lower | 13.6% | 11.7% | 24.4% |
| The number of casualties will be higher | 59.6% | 60.5% | 54.4% |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 15.4% | 15.1% | 16.7% |
If the number of Israeli casualties is in the thousands, and assuming that the objective of a successful strike on Iran’s nuclear facilities is achieved, in your opinion, would Israel's national resilience be able to withstand this or not? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Arabs | |
| I'm sure it wouldn't | 11.7% | 8.9% | 27.8% |
| I think it wouldn't | 25.9% | 23.7% | 38.9% |
| I think it would | 35.1% | 38.8% | 14.4% |
| I'm sure it would | 19.4% | 20.1% | 15.6 |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 7.8% | 8.5% | 3.3% |
The media recently reported that in his upcoming meeting with President Obama, President Peres will express opposition to an Israeli attack on Iran. In your opinion, it is or is it not appropriate for Peres to take a public stand on this issue as President of Israel? (Peace Index, February 29, 2012)
General Public | Jews | Arabs | |
| I'm sure it's appropriate | 19.6% | 16.2% | 38.9% |
| I think it's appropriate | 32.4% | 32.4% | 32.2% |
| I think it's inappropriate | 23.8% | 23.7% | 24.4% |
| I'm sure it's inappropriate | 21.9% | 25.0% | 4.4% |
| I don't know/ Refuse to answer | 2.3% | 2.7% | -- |
There has been increased talk of a military strike by Israel against Iran's nuclear facilities, even though the United States, the UK and Germany have advised against it. What do you think Israel should do? (Brookings, February 26, 2012)
All Israelis | Israeli Jews only | |
| Strike Iran's nuclear facilities, even without the support of the US | 19% | 22% |
| Strike only if Israel gains at least American support | 42% | 43% |
| Do not strike | 34% | 32% |
What do you believe the likely outcome would be if Israel strikes Iran? (Brookings, February 26, 2012)
All Israelis | Israeli Jews only | |
| It would delay Iran's ability to develop nuclear weapons by 1-2 years | 9% | 10% |
| It would delay Iran's capabilities by 3-5 years | 22% | 25% |
| It would delay Iran's capabilities by more than 5 years | 22% | 19% |
| It would accelerate Iran's nuclear program | 11% | 12% |
| It would have no effect on Iran's nuclear program | 19% | 21% |
Given America's recommendation that Israel not strike Iran, what do you believe the U.S. government's reaction would be if Israel strikes anyway? (Brookings, February 26, 2012)
All Israelis | Israeli Jews only | |
| It would join the war on Israel's behalf | 27% | 28% |
| It would support Israel diplomatically, but not provide military assistance | 39% | 37% |
| It would stay neutral | 14% | 16% |
| It would punish Israel by reducing its current support to Israel | 15% | 16% |
In your estimation, how long would an armed conflict with Iran last if Israel strikes its nuclear facilities? (Brookings, February 26, 2012)
All Israelis | Israeli Jews only | |
| Days | 18% | 20% |
| Weeks | 19% | 20% |
| Months | 29% | 29% |
| Years | 22% | 21% |
If Israel strikes Iran's nuclear facilities, in your view, how would this affect the Iranian government? (Brookings, February 26, 2012)
All Israelis | Israeli Jews only | |
| It would be strengthened | 44% | 38% |
| It would have no effect | 4% | 4% |
| It would be weakened | 45% | 49% |
If Israel strikes, what do you think Hezbollah would do? (Brookings, February 26, 2012)
All Israelis | Israeli Jews only | |
| Hezbollah would join Iran in retaliation | 68% | 74% |
| Hezbollah would only retaliate if Israel strikes them, too | 27% | 23% |
Attitudes among Jewish Israelis: (Peace Index, December 14, 2011)
| the proclaimed efforts of Western states to prevent Iran from attaining nuclear capability are not real and genuine | 52% |
| Israel should come to terms with the fact that Iran will ultimately have nuclear weapons, and should develop a security strategy based on the assumption that Israel will not be the only nuclear state in the region | 61% |
Which would be better: for both Israel and Iran to have nuclear weapons, or for neither to have nuclear weapons? (World Public Opinion, December 1, 2011)
| neither | 65% |
| both | 19% |
Do you think that sanctions by the West will prevent Iran from making nuclear weapons? (Israel Hayom, November 22, 2011)
| Yes | 41.3% |
| No | 48.6% |
| Don't know | 10% |
Are you confident in the decisions made in the Iranian matter by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Barak? (Haaretz, November 2, 2011)
| Yes | 52% |
| No | 37% |
| Don't know/no reply | 11% |
Should there be public discussion of the attack or does this cause damage? (Haaretz, November 2, 2011)
| Causes damage | 51% |
| Important to have discussion | 39% |
| Don't know | 10% |
What are the chances that attacking Iran will cause a war against Hezbollah and Hamas? (Haaretz, November 2, 2011)
| High | 59% |
| Moderate | 21% |
| Low | 7% |
| No chance | 5% |
| Don't know | 8% |
If Iran gets an atomic bomb will you consider leaving Israel? (Haaretz, November 2, 2011)
| Yes | 11% |
| No | 84% |
| Don't know | 5% |
The following percent of Israelis... (Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, May 22, 2009)
| would consider leaving the country if Iran obtained a nuclear weapon. | 23% |
| believe Iran will obtain an atomic bomb. | 81% |
| does not believe that the current American policy of engagement will persuade Iran to change its course | 74% |
| believe that Israel should wait for the results of US engagement before pursuing alternative paths. | 49% |
| support an immediate Israeli strike on Iran’s nuclear sites. | 51% |
The following percent of Israelis, based on self-identified political and religious alignment and age, are fearful of Iran acquiring a nuclear weapon (Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, May 22, 2009)
| Left wing | 80% |
| Right wing | 67% |
| Centrist | 88% |
| Secular | 88% |
| Ultra-Orthodox Haredim | 67% |
| Aged 42 and older | 89% |
| Aged younger than 42 | 61% |
The following percent of Israelis, based on age, would immigrate should Iran acquire a nuclear weapon (Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, May 22, 2009)
| Aged 42 and older | 89% |
| Aged younger than 42 | 64% |
The following percent of Israelis, based on self-identified religious and political and gender orientations, favor attacking Iran (Center for Iranian Studies at Tel Aviv University, May 22, 2009)
| Men | 61% |
| Women | 47% |
| Secular | 51% |
| National Religious | 62% |
| Haredi | 60% |
| Left wing | 38% |
| Right wing | 63% |
Do you count on the USA and on the Europeans to succeed in stopping the nuclear program of Iran by peaceful means and via UN Security Council resolutions? (Maariv, November 24, 2006)
| Yes | 24% |
| No | 75% |
Do you think that in the end, even if it is a matter of taking a number of years, the Iranians will succeed in their efforts to get nuclear weapons? (Maariv, November 24, 2006)
| Yes | 70% |
| No | 18% |
If Iran succeeds in attaining military nuclear capability, will you consider leaving the country? (Maariv, November 24, 2006)
| Won't leave the county under any circumstances | 70% |
| Would consider leaving but probably stay | 20% |
| Might leave | 7% |
Should Israel attack Iran even if it expects an Iranian response that will cost dearly in losses, and the resulting postponement in the Iranian nuclear program will be for only a short period? (Maariv, November 24, 2006)
| Attack | 45% |
| Don't | 49% |
If it turns out that all the international diplomatic efforts fail, should Israel attack the Iranian nuclear facilities even alone and without international support? (Maariv, November 9, 2006)
| Yes | 49% |
| No | 46% |
Do you count on the United States and on the Europeans to succeed in stopping the nuclear program of Iran by peaceful means and via United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions? (Maariv, November 9, 2006)
| Yes | 24% |
| No | 75% |
Do you count on PM Ehud Olmert's handling of the nuclear threat and the conflict with Iran? (Israel Radio's “Another Matter,” September 15, 2006)
| Yes | 20% |
| No | 55% |
| Other | 25% |