Letter from Dr. Bunche to the President of the Security Council
(July 21, 1949)
In this letter, the day after the Israel-Syria armistice
agreement was signed, the Acting Mediator summarised the negotiations
and suggested general lines of action that the Council might
now consider it appropriate to take:
Report on the Present Status of the Armistice Negotiations
and the Truce in Palestine
I have the honour, in pursuance of the resolution of the
Security Council of 15 July 1948, to submit a report to the
Security Council on the armistice negotiations between the
Arab States and Israel which have been undertaken in response
to the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948
(S/1080), and on the present status of the Palestine truce.
I. The Armistice Negotiations
1. The Security Council resolution of 16 November 1948 (S/1080)
called upon the parties directly involved in the conflict
in Palestine to seek agreement forthwith by direct negotiations
or by negotiations through the Acting Mediator on Palestine,
with a view to the immediate establishment of an armistice.
The armistice would include "the delineation of permanent
armistice demarcation lines beyond which the armed forces
of the respective parties shall not move", and "such
withdrawal and reduction of their armed forces as will ensure
the maintenance of the armistice during the transition to
permanent peace in Palestine". The armistice would thus
be the next step toward peace beyond the truce regime. In
effect, the armistice would liquidate the military phase
of the armed conflict in Palestine.
2. The Provisional Government of Israel promptly communicated
its willingness to enter into the armistice negotiations
called for, but the Arab States were slower in responding
to the Security Council's call. Egypt, Lebanon and Transjordan,
in December 1948, communicated their acceptance of the resolution
in principle but were not immediately prepared to undertake
the negotiations called for. It was not, therefore, until
January 1949 that the first negotiations, involving Egypt
and Israel, could be got underway.
3. As previously reported to the Security Council, armistice
agreements have now been concluded between Egypt and Israel
(S/1264), Lebanon and Israel (S/1296), Israel and Transjordan
(S/1302), and Israel and Syria (S/1353). The agreement between
Israel and Transjordan also covered the front held by Iraqi
forces, and therefore made unnecessary any separate negotiations
between Iraq and Israel. Since such Saudi Arabian forces
as were involved in the Palestine conflict served under Egyptian
command, they were covered by the terms of the Egyptian-Israeli
agreement. Yemen has had no forces in the conflict and therefore
no agreement involving Yemen has been necessary. As a result
of these agreements, an armistice now applies to all of the
fighting fronts in Palestine and by the terms of the agreements
the military phase of the Palestine conflict is ended. Thus,
the Security Council's resolution of 16 November 1948 has
been fulfilled by the parties to the Palestine dispute.
4. The armistice agreements provide for a definitive end
to the fighting in Palestine. Each agreement incorporates
what amounts to a non-aggression pact between the parties,
and provides for withdrawal and reduction of forces. The
agreements have all been negotiated at the governmental level
and signed for and on behalf of their respective Governments
by delegations carrying credentials in good order. They are
agreements voluntarily entered into by the parties, and any
breach of their terms would involve a most serious act of
bad faith.
5. The negotiations leading to these agreements were, in
each case, tortuous and difficult. But they demonstrate that
once the parties could be brought together, they could, with
United Nations assistance, be led to reasonable and honourable
agreement. That these agreements have been obtained is due
to the intensive and determined effort exerted by the United
Nations, and its firm resolve that this dispute should be
settled by peaceful means. The fruits of this effort have
been successively the four weeks' truce, the imposed truce
of 15 July 1948, and now the four armistice agreements. Negotiations
looking toward the formal peace settlement are being conducted
by the United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission.
6. The voice of the United Nations has weighed heavily in
all of the negotiations concerning the truce and armistice
agreements. The Secretary-General of the United Nations has
given full and invaluable support and has intervened effectively
in the numerous crises. In these agreements the parties have
negotiated as equals. The armed forces of both sides remain
intact and largely unimpaired by the earlier fighting. Throughout
the negotiations, the parties showed understandable reluctance
to assume responsibility before the United Nations and world
opinion for causing their collapse or failure. In each instance,
the parties came to the negotiations with a sincere desire
to achieve agreement but with firm ideas as to the basis
for such agreement. In the final analysis, agreement was
possible only because they were willing to accept considerably
less than their original demands. The statesmanship and the
spirit of conciliation shown by the Governments and their
delegations in each case made final agreement possible. The
agreements have proved effective in practice and I see no
reason why they should not continue to do so. The fighting
in Palestine has ended.
II. The Truce
1. The conflict which broke out in Palestine in May 1948,
and which constituted a threat to the peace, was checked
by means of a United Nations-sponsored truce. On 11 June
1948, the four weeks' truce called for in the Security Council
resolution of 29 May 1948 (S/801) became effective, and it
endured until 9 July 1948. This was a negotiated truce, voluntarily
accepted by the Arab States and the Provisional Government
of Israel. At the time this four weeks' truce went into effect,
the conflict in Palestine was general and gaining in momentum.
The truce which stopped the fighting and which checked the
momentum of the conflict so effectively that it was never
again to be resumed on a general scale was due primarily
to the herculean efforts of the United Nations Mediator on
Palestine, the late Count Folke Bernadotte. In seven days
of negotiation of unparalleled intensity, in Tel Aviv and
the capitals of the Arab States, Count Bernadotte succeeded
in gaining the acceptance of all parties for the conditions
of the truce which lie had formulated and for its effective
date of 11 July. This original four weeks' truce was the
turning-point in the Palestine conflict.
2. The four weeks' truce, by and large, was effective. There
were a number of serious violations, but the general warfare
was checked and the fighting fronts became more or less stabilised.
When the Arab States rejected Count Bernadotte's appeal to
prolong it beyond the four-week period, on the grounds that
the truce had worked to the advantage of the Israelis, Count
Bernadotte appealed in person to the Security Council to
impose a truce. This was done in the Security Council resolution
of 15 July 1948, ordering the disputing parties to refrain
from further resort to force. All of the parties involved
in the conflict informed the Security Council that they would
abide by its decision. The resolution of 15 July constitutes
all injunction which still remains in force. The imposed
truce became effective on 18 July 1948, a date fixed by the
Mediator.
3. The imposed truce was effectively applied until mid-October.
There were local violations but none which involved serious
fighting until the clash in the Negev which began on 14 October
1948. In the Negev and subsequently in Galilee, military
activity under the truce led to important changes in the
military situation which the Truce Supervision Organization
could not rectify.
4. Prior to the October fighting in the Negev, Count Bernadotte
and I, after his death, had warned that the truce in Palestine
could not be maintained indefinitely without the probability
of serious fighting occurring and consequent military advantage
accruing to one side or the other. It was apparent as early
as September 1948 that an indefinite truce, under which the
fighting forces would remain arrayed against each other in
close proximity, would become increasingly uneasy and insecure,
and that the Truce Supervision Organization would not be
able to control the increasing violations unless the United
Nations would take most severe measures against those guilty
of violations.
5. The United Nations experience with the truce in Palestine
indicated that an imposed truce could be effectively applied
and supervised for a period of four or five months at the
most, but should then be superseded by a further step toward
permanent peace. Although the truce imposed by the Security
Council on 15 July 1948 was of indefinite duration and included
a permanent injunction against resort to force in the Palestine
dispute, both sides came to regard the truce as a mere interruption
of hostilities, a phase in the fighting, rather than a definite
end to the armed conflict. In maintaining the status quo,
the truce inevitably perpetuated some conditions which after
a period of months became so intolerable as to induce one
side or the other to undertake corrective measures even at
the expense of openly defying the truce.
6. When Count Bernadotte was called upon to supervise the
four weeks' truce in the Security Council resolution of 29
May 1948, he had at his disposal in Cairo and Tel Aviv only
seven members of the United Nations Secretariat, including
secretaries. He had to recruit military and civilian personnel
and fashion an efficient Truce Supervision Organization virtually
overnight. On 11 June 1948, when the four weeks' truce became
effective, the first military observers arrived in Cairo.
Until they could be briefed and sent into the field, members
of the Secretariat had to function as observers and several
of them displayed singular courage in traversing no-man's
land to bring local commanders together and in stopping local
incidents of fighting. Members of the mission, military and
civilian alike, have served the United Nations with great
loyalty and ability.
7. The military observers from Belgium, France and the United
States of America, and the Swedish officers who served with
Count Bernadotte, deserve great credit for the courageous
service they have rendered and continue to render to the
cause of peace in Palestine. It has been a completely new
experience for all of them, but they caught the spirit of
the effort quickly and have served the United Nations with
great devotion, even at the expense of their lives. The Governments
which have made these unarmed men available are due full
appreciation from the United Nations.
8. The United Nations effort in Palestine has been costly
in casualties as well as in monetary expenditure. Ten members
of the Organization, including the Mediator, have lost their
lives over a period of fourteen months, and twice that many
have been wounded. Some of these lives have been lost under
conditions which would appear fully to justify the United
Nations in holding the Governments concerned liable for the
deaths. In some instances, as in the case of Count Bernadotte
himself, had adequate protection been given, the deaths could
have been avoided. Despite the casualties, however, bearing
in mind the necessity for freedom of movement if truce supervision
is to be effective, I firmly believe that the principle adhered
to in Palestine by Count Bernadotte, and by me after his
death, has been sound. In the absence of any protective United
Nations force, that principle has been to leave it to the
discretion of the local authorities to determine how much
or how little protection is needed by the United Nations
personnel, since it is the responsibility of the local authorities
to protect that personnel. Thus, neither Count Bernadotte
nor I have ever asked any local authority for protection,
nor did we ever refuse it when the local authority provided
it.
9. Neither the Truce Supervision nor the Mediation operations
could have functioned effectively had the United Nations
not provided independent systems of communication and transportation.
These involved great expenditure but they were indispensable
to the work of the mission and often meant the difference
between success or failure in negotiations, and indeed, life
or death for the Mission's personnel.
III. Conclusions
1. The practical application of the Security Council's truce
in Palestine has now been superseded by effective armistice
agreements voluntarily negotiated by the parties in the transition
from truce to permanent peace. Since all of these agreements
are self-enforcing and establish the necessary machinery
for their supervision, with the assistance of the United
Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision and United
Nations observers at his command, it would seem unnecessary
longer to impose upon the States concerned the restrictive
conditions of the Security Council truce. The Security Council
resolution of 15 July 1948 imposed not only a truce and the
conditions relating thereto, but ordered the Governments
and authorities concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the
Charter of the United Nations, to desist from further military
action.
2. In view of the existing state of affairs in Palestine,
the Security Council might consider it advisable to review
the situation in the light of the new conditions and to take
appropriate action. Such action might declare it unnecessary
to prolong the truce provided for in the Security Council
resolution of 15 July 1948. It might, at the same time, reaffirm
the order in that resolution to the Governments and authorities
concerned, pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United
Nations, to desist from further military action, and might
also call upon the parties to the dispute to continue to
observe an unconditional cease-fire. Action along some such
lines would be consistent with the realities of the present
situation and would at the same time fully safeguard the
basic objective of the Security Council that fighting in
Palestine shall not be resumed.
3. In conclusion, I would respectfully call to the attention
of the Security Council my communication to the Council of
17 January 1949 (S/1215). In my view, the action which the
Council might now properly take should also provide, in accordance
with the resolution of the General Assembly of 11 December
1948 (S/807), for the termination or the transfer to the
United Nations Palestine Conciliation Commission of such
functions as now remain to the position of Mediator under
Security Council resolutions. With the armistice agreements
concluded, there is no longer any useful function to be performed
by the Mediator. Any further activity by me would inevitably
impinge upon the work of the Palestine Conciliation Commission.
This could create only confusion and duplication of effort
and would serve no useful purpose whatsoever. Under the terms
of the several armistice agreements, I have no responsibility
for their implementation or supervision, since this responsibility,
by mutual agreement, is assumed by the parties themselves.
With the truce obsolete, the armistice agreements concluded,
and the Palestine Conciliation Commission conducting peace
negotiations, the mission of the Mediator has been fulfilled.
I am happy to have had this great opportunity to serve the
United Nations and the cause of peace in Palestine and in
this, my final report, wish to thank the Security Council
for the indispensable support which it has given to me in
my efforts to discharge the responsibilities entrusted to
me.
4. Finally, it is clear to me that the success or failure
of any mediation or conciliation effort in a situation such
as that presented by Palestine must depend very largely upon
the measure of support afforded by the United Nations. If
the voice of the United Nations is strong and clear, it can
be the decisive factor in the mediatory effort to resolve
the conflict. The most effective instrument at the disposal
of a mediator or conciliator is the assurance of prompt and
vigorous support and action by the United Nations.
5. I have taken the liberty of attaching to this report,
as an annex, a memorandum suggesting the general lines of
the action which the Security Council might now consider
it appropriate to take.
(Signed) Ralph J. Bunche
Acting Mediator
Annex
The Security Council,
Having noted with satisfaction the several armistice
agreements concluded by means of negotiations between the
parties involved in the conflict in Palestine in pursuance
of its resolution of 16 November 1948 (S/1080),
Expresses the hope that the Governments and authorities
concerned, having undertaken by means of the negotiations
now being conducted by the Palestine Conciliation Commission,
to fulfil the request of the General Assembly in its resolution
of 11 December 1948 to extend the scope of the armistice
negotiations and to seek agreement by negotiations concluded
either with the Conciliation Commission or directly, will
at an early date achieve agreement on the final settlement
of all questions outstanding between them;
Declares that the armistice agreements, as an important
step in the transition from truce to permanent peace in Palestine,
render unnecessary the prolongation of the truce as provided
in the resolution of the Security Council of 15 July 1948
(S/902);
Reaffirms the order set forth in its resolution of
15 July 1948 to the Governments and authorities concerned,
pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter of the United Nations,
to desist from further military action, and calls upon them
to continue to observe an unconditional cease-fire;
Requests the Conciliation Commission, with the assistance
of the United Nations Chief of Staff of the Truce Supervision
Organization, to undertake the observance of the cease-fire
in Palestine, and terminates all remaining functions of the
United Nations Mediator on Palestine under Security Council
resolutions;
Requests the Secretary-General to continue in existence
such of the present Truce Supervision Organization as the
Conciliation Commission, in consultation with the Chief of
Staff, may require in maintaining the cease-fire, and as
may be necessary in assisting the parties to the armistice
agreements in the supervision of the application and observance
of the terms of those agreements.
Sources: Israeli
Ministry of Foreign Affairs |