Text of the Peel Commission Report
(July 1937)
LEAGUE OF NATIONS
MANDATES PALESTINE REPORT
of the
PALESTINE ROYAL
COMMISSION
presented by the Secretary
of State for the Colonies to the United Kingdom Parliament by Command of His Britannic
Majesty
(July 1937)
Distributed at the request
of the United Kingdom Government.
Series of League of Nations Publications
VI. A. MANDATES
1937. VI A. 5
OFFICIAL COMMUNIQUE IN 9/37
PALESTINE
Royal Commission
----------
SUMMARY OF REPORT
SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE PALESTINE ROYAL
COMMISSION.
The Members of the Palestine Royal Commission
were :-
Rt. Hon. EARL PEEL, G.C.S.I., G.B.E. (Chairman).
Rt. Hon. Sir HORACE RUMBOLD, Bart., G.C.B.,
G.C.M.G., M.V.O. (Vice-Chairman).
Sir LAURIE HAMMOND, K.C.S.I., C.B.E.
Sir MORRIS CARTER, C.B.E.
Sir HAROLD MORRIS, M.B.E., K.C.
Professor REGINALD COUPLAND, C.I.E.
Mr. J. M. MARTIN was Secretary.
_________
The Commission was appointed in August, 1936,
with the following terms of reference :-
To ascertain the underlying causes of the
disturbances which broke out in Palestine
in the middle of April; to enquire into
the manner in which the Mandate for Palestine
is being implemented in relation to the
obligations of the Mandatory towards the
Arabs and the Jews respectively; and to
ascertain whether, upon a proper construction
of the terms of the Mandate, either the
Arabs or the Jews have any legitimate grievances
on account of the way in which the Mandate
has been or is being implemented; and if
the Commission is satisfied that any such
grievances are well-founded, to make recommendation;
for their removal and for the prevention
of their recurrence.
The following is a summary of the Commission's
Report: -
SUMMARY
_______
PART I: THE PROBLEM
Chapter I. -The Historical
Background
A brief account of ancient Jewish times in Palestine,
of the Arab conquest and occupation, of the
dispersion of the Jews and the development of
the Jewish Problem, and the growth and meaning
of Zionism.
Chapter II. -The War and
the Mandate
In order to obtain Arab support in the War,
the British Government promised the Sharif of
Mecca in 1915 that, in the event of an Allied
victory, the greater part of the Arab provinces
of the Turkish Empire would become independent.
The Arabs understood that Palestine would be
included in the sphere of independence.
In order to obtain the support of World Jewry,
the British Government in 1917 issued the Balfour
Declaration. The Jews understood that, if the
experiment of establishing a Jewish National
Home succeeded and a sufficient number of Jews
went to Palestine, the National Home might develop
in course of time into a Jewish State.
At the end of the War, the Mandate System was
accepted by the Allied and Associated Powers
as the vehicle for the execution of the policy
of the Balfour Declaration, and, after a period
of delay, the Mandate for Palestine was approved
by the League of Nations and the United States.
The Mandate itself is mainly concerned with
specific obligations of equal weight--positive
obligations as to the establishment of the National
Home, negative obligations as to safeguarding
the rights of the Arabs. The Mandate also involves
the general obligation, implicit in every Mandate,
to fulfil the primary purpose of the Mandate
System as expressed in the first paragraph of
Article 22 of the Covenant.
This means that the well-being and development"
of the people concerned are the first charge
on the Mandatory, and implies that they will
in due course be enabled to stand by themselves.
The association of the policy of the Balfour
Declaration with the Mandate System implied
the belief that Arab hostility to the former
would presently be overcome, owing to the economic
advantages which Jewish immigration was expected
to bring to Palestine as a whole.
Chapter III. - Palestine
from 1920 to 1936
During the first years of the Civil Administration,
which was set up in 1920, a beginning was made
on the one hand with the provision of public
services, which mainly affected the Arab majority
of the population. and on the other hand with
the establishment of the Jewish National Home.
There were outbreaks of disorder in 1920 and
1921, but in 1925 it was thought that the prospects
of ultimate harmony between the Arabs and the
Jews seemed so favourable that the forces for
maintaining order were substantially reduced.
These hopes proved unfounded because, although
Palestine as a whole became more prosperous,
the causes of the outbreaks of 1920 and 1921,
namely, the demand of the Arabs for national
independence and their antagonism to the National
Home, remained unmodified and were indeed accentuated
by the "external factors," namely,
the pressure of the Jews of Europe on Palestine
and the development of Arab nationalism in neighbouring
countries.
These same causes brought about the outbreaks
of 1929 and 1933. By 1936 the external factors
had been intensified by--
(1) the sufferings of the Jews in Germany and
Poland, resulting in a great increase of Jewish
immigration into Palestine; and
(2) the prospect of Syria and the Lebanon soon
obtaining the same independence as Iraq and
Saudi Arabia. Egypt was also on the eve of independence.
Chapter IV. - The Disturbances
of 1936
These disturbances (which are briefly summarized)
were similar in character to the four previous
outbreaks, although more serious and prolonged.
As in 1933, it was not only the Jews who were
attacked, but the Palestine Government. A new
feature was the part played by the Rulers of
the neighbouring Arab States in bringing about
the end of the strike.
The underlying causes of the disturbances of
1936 were--
(1) The desire of the Arabs for national independence;
(2) their hatred and fear of the establishment
of the Jewish National Home.
These two causes were the same as those of all
the previous outbreaks and have always been
inextricably linked together. Of several subsidiary
factors, the more important were--
(1) the advance of Arab nationalism outside
Palestine;
(2) the increased immigration of Jews since
1933;
(3) the opportunity enjoyed by the Jews for
influencing public opinion in Britain;
(4) Arab distrust in the sincerity of the British
Government;
(5) Arab alarm at the continued Jewish purchase
of land;
(6) the general uncertainty as to the ultimate
intentions of the Mandatory Power.
Chapter V. - The Present
Situation
The Jewish National Home is no longer an experiment.
The growth of its population has been accompanied
by political, social and economic developments
along the lines laid down at the outset. The
chief novelty is the urban and industrial development.
The contrast between the modern democratic and
primarily European character of the National
Home and that of the Arab world around it is
striking. The temper of the Home is strongly
nationalist. There can be no question of fusion
or assimilation between Jewish and Arab cultures.
The National Home cannot be half-national.
Crown Colony government is not suitable for
such a highly educated, democratic community
as the National Home and fosters an unhealthy
irresponsibility.
The National Home is bent on forcing the pace
of its development, not only because of the
desire of the Jews to escape from Europe, but
because of anxiety as to the future in Palestine.
The Arab population shows a remarkable increase
since 1920, and it has had some share in the
increased prosperity of Palestine. Many Arab
landowners have benefited from the sale of land
and the profitable investment of the purchase
money. The fellaheen are better off on
the whole than they were in 1920. This Arab
progress has been partly due to the import of
Jewish capital into Palestine and other factors
associated with the growth of the National Home.
In particular, the Arabs have benefited from
social services which could not have been provided
on the existing scale without the revenue obtained
from the Jews.
Such economic advantage, however, as the Arabs
have gained from Jewish immigration will decrease
if the political breach between the races continues
to widen.
Arab nationalism is as intense a force as Jewish.
The Arab leaders' demand for national self-government
and the shutting down of the Jewish National
Home has remained unchanged since 1929. Like
Jewish nationalism, Arab nationalism is stimulated
by the educational system and by the growth
of the Youth Movement. It has also been greatly
encouraged by the recent Anglo-Egyptian and
Franco-Syrian Treaties.
The gulf between the races is thus already wide
and will continue to widen if the present Mandate
is maintained.
The position of the Palestine Government between
the two antagonistic communities is unenviable.
There are two rival bodies -- the Arab Higher
Committee allied with the Supreme Moslem Council
on the one hand, and the Jewish Agency allied
with the Va'ad Leumi on the other -- who make
a stronger appeal to the natural loyalty of
the Arab and the Jews than does the Government
of Palestine. The sincere attempts of the Government
to treat the two races impartially have not
improved the relations between them. Nor has
the policy of conciliating Arab opposition been
successful. The events of last year proved that
conciliation is useless.
The evidence submitted by the Arab and Jewish
leaders respectively was directly conflicting
and gave no hope of compromise.
The only solution of tile problem put forward
by the Arab Higher Committee was the immediate
establishment of all independent Arab Government,
which would deal with the 400,000 Jews now in
Palestine as it thought fit. To that it is replied
that belief in British good faith would not
be strengthened anywhere in the world if the
National Home were now surrendered to Arab rule.
The Jewish Agency and the Va'ad Leumi asserted
that the problem would be solved if the Mandate
were firmly applied in full accordance with
Jewish claims: thus there should be no new restriction
on immigration nor anything to prevent the Jewish
population becoming in course of time a majority
in Palestine. To that it is replied that such
a policy could only be maintained by force and
that neither British public opinion nor that
of World Jewry is likely to commit itself to
the recurrent use of force unless it is convinced
that there is no other means by which justice
can be done.
_________
PART II: THE OPERATION
OF THE MANDATE
The Commission exhaustively considered what
might be done in one field after another in
execution of the Mandate to improve the prospects
of peace. The results of this enquiry are embodied
in Part II of the Report. The problems confronting
the various branches of tile Mandatory Administration
are described, and the grievances of the Arabs
and Jews under each head discussed. The principal
findings of the Commission are as follows:--
Chapter VI. - Administration
The Palestinian officers in the Government Service
work well in normal times, but in times of trouble
they are unreliable. There should be no hesitation
in dispensing with the services of those whose
loyalty or impartiality is uncertain.
As regards British officers, the cadre is too
small to admit of a Civil Service for Palestine
alone and the Administration must continue to
draw on the Colonial Service, but the ordinary
period of service in Palestine should be not
less than seven years. Officers should be carefully
selected and given a preliminary course of instruction.
The Commission recognise the difficulties of
the British Administration, driven from the
first to work at high pressure with no opportunity
for calm reflection. There is over-centralization
and insufficient liaison between Headquarters
Departments and the District Administration.
The grievances and claims of the Arabs and Jews
as regards the Courts cannot be reconciled and
reflect the racial antagonism pervading the
whole Administration. The difficulty of providing
a judicial system suitable to the needs of the
mixed peoples of Palestine is enhanced by the
existence of three official languages, three
weekly days of rest, three sets of official
holidays and three systems of law. As regards
Jewish suspicions as to the conduct of criminal
prosecutions, the Commission point to the difficulties
of the Legal Department in a land where perjury
is common and evidence in many cases, particularly
in times of crisis, unobtainable, and conclude
that the animosity between the two races, particularly
in times of crisis, has shown its influence
to the detriment of the work of a British Senior
Government Department. The appointment of a
British Senior Government Advocate is recommended.
The Jaffa-Haifa road should be completed as
speedily as possible.
Further expert enquiry is necessary before deciding
whether a second deep-water port is required.
It would be best to build such a port, if at
all, at the junction of Jaffa and Tel Aviv,
equally accessible from each.
There is no branch of the Administration with
which the Jewish Agency does not concern itself
but the Agency is not open to criticism on this
ground. Article 4 of the Mandate entitles it
to advise and co-operate with the Government
in almost anything that may affect the interests
of the Jewish population. It constitutes a kind
of parallel government existing side by side
with the Mandatory Government and its privileged
position intensifies Arab antagonism.
The Arab Higher Committee was to a large extent
responsible for maintaining and protecting the
strike last year. The Mufti of Jerusalem as
President must bear his due share of responsibility.
It is unfortunate that since 1929 no action
has been practicable to regulate the question
of elections for the Supreme Moslem Council
and the position of its President. The functions
which the Mufti has collected in his person
and his use of them have led to the development
of an Arab imperium in imperio. He may
be described as the head of a third parallel
government. The Commission discuss a proposal
for an enlarged Arab Agency, consisting of representatives
of neighbouring Arab countries as well as of
the Arabs in Palestine, to balance the Jewish
Agency. If the present Mandate system continues
some such scheme will have to be considered.
Chapter VII. - Public Security
Although expenditure on public security rose
from £265,000 in 1923 to over £862,000 in 1935-36
(and £2,230,000 in 1936-37, the year of the
disturbance) it is evident that the elementary
duty of providing public security has not been
discharged. Should disorders break out again
of such a nature as to require the intervention
of the Military, there should be no hesitation
in enforcing martial law throughout the country
under undivided military control. In such an
event disarmament should be enforced and an
effective frontier organisation established
for stopping smuggling, illegal immigration
and gun running. In the absence of disarmament
the supernumerary police for the defence of
Jewish Settlements should be continued as a
disciplined force.
The collection of intelligence was unsatisfactory
during the strike. The majority of Palestinian
officers in the Criminal investigation Department
are thoroughly devoted and loyal, but the junior
ranks, like the majority of the District police,
though useful in times of peace, are unreliable
in time of trouble. It would be highly dangerous
to expose the Arab police of Palestine to another
strain of the same kind as that which they endured
last summer.
In "mixed" areas British District
Officers should be appointed.
Central and local police reserves are necessary.
A large mobile mounted force is also essential,
whether in the form of a Gendarmerie or by increasing
the British Mounted Police.
After the 1929 disturbances, though 27 capital
sentences were confirmed, only three murderers
suffered the extreme penalty. In 1936 there
were 260 reported cases of murder, 67 convictions
and no death sentences. The prompt and adequate
punishment of crime is a vital factor in the
maintenance of law and order.
Collective fines totalling over £60,000 were
imposed during the years 1929-36: only £18,000
has been collected up to date. If collective
fines are to have a deterrent effect they should
be limited to a sum that can be realized, and
a body of punitive police should be quartered
on the town or village until the fine has been
paid.
The penalties provided by the Press ordinance
and the action taken under it are insufficient.
An Ordinance should be adopted providing for
a cash deposit which can be confiscated and
for imprisonment as well as payment of a fine;
also, in case of a repetition of the offence,
for forfeiture of the press.
Police barracks and married quarters are urgently
necessary in certain towns.
The entire cost of the measures proposed could
not be met from the revenues of Palestine. Grants-in-aid
from His Majesty's Government in the United
Kingdom would be required on a generous scale.
The immediate effect of these measures would
be to wider, the gulf that separates the Arab
from the Jew, with repercussions spreading far
beyond the borders of Palestine.
Chapter VIII. - Financial
and Fiscal Questions
Until recent years the public finances allowed
no great scope for development in the social
services. The accumulation of a considerable
surplus was a feature of the four years beginning
1932, and there were grounds for a conservative
attitude towards this development. The conclusion
that the existence of a large surplus reflects
undue parsimony is not borne out by close analysis,
since the entire surplus is found to be so heavily
mortgaged that it is little more than a reasonable
provision for existing commitments.
If the inward flow of capital, which is the
most singular feature of the economy of Palestine,
were to be arrested, there is no reason why
the removal of exceptional advantages should
result in penury, though there might be some
reduction in the standard of living until the
new economy was established. In the event of
a prolonged period of economic stagnation the
danger of an exodus of capital cannot be altogether
excluded.
It is not possible in the absence of adequate
statistics to measure the truth of the Arab
complaint that industrial protection chiefly
benefits the Jews and that its burdens are chiefly
borne by the Arabs. It is hoped that the new
Department of Statistics may soon enquire into
the incidence of taxation and that new duties
will be considered in relation to the whole
burden of taxation and not merely as affecting
the particular industry.
There is no question as to the need of increasing
the export trade and finding markets for the
ever increasing citrus output. After examining
various possible expedients for overcoming the
difficulties which result from the non-discrimination
in tariff policy required by Article 18 of the
Mandate, the Commission conclude that the provisions
of Article 18 are out of date. Without an amendment
of that Article Palestine must continue to suffer
from the restrictions which hamper international
trade, and negotiations should be opened without
delay to put the trade of Palestine on a fairer
basis.
Chapter IX. - The Land
A summary of land legislation enacted during
the Civil Administration shows the efforts made
to fulfil the Mandatory obligation in this matter.
The Commission point to serious difficulties
in connection with the legislation proposed
by the Palestine Government for the protection
of small owners. The Palestine Order in Council
and, if necessary, the Mandate should be amended
to permit of legislation empowering the High
Commissioner to prohibit the transfer of land
in any stated area to Jews, so that the obligation
to safeguard the right and position of the Arabs
may be carried out. Until survey and settlement
are complete, the Commission would welcome the
prohibition of the sale of isolated and comparatively
small plots of land to Jews. They would prefer
larger schemes for the rearrangement of proprietorship
under Government supervision. They favour the
proposal for the creation of special Public
Utility Companies to undertake such development
schemes subject to certain conditions.
An expert Committee should be appointed to draw
up a Land Code.
Recommendations are made with a view to the
expediting of settlement (the need for which
is paramount) and to the improvement of settlement
procedure.
The present system of Land Courts is contributory
to delay. Until survey and settlement are complete
there should be two or three Land Courts separate
from the District Courts and each under a single
British Judge.
Up till now the Arab cultivator has benefited
on the whole both from the work of the British
Administration and the presence of Jews in the
country, but the greatest care must now be exercised
to see that in the event of further sales of
land by Arabs to Jews the rights of any Arab
tenants or cultivators are preserved. Thus,
alienation of land should only be allowed where
it is possible to replace extensive by intensive
cultivation. In the hill districts there can
be no expectation of finding accommodation for
any large increase in the rural population.
At present, and for many years to come, the
Mandatory Power should not attempt to facilitate
the close settlement of the Jews in the hill
districts generally.
The shortage of land is due less to purchase
by Jews than to the increase in the Arab population.
The Arab claims that the Jews have obtained
too large a proportion of good land cannot be
maintained. Much of the land now carrying orange
groves was sand dunes or swamps and uncultivated
when it was bought.
Legislation vesting surface water in the High
Commissioner is essential. An increase in staff
and equipment for exploratory investigations
with a view to increasing irrigation is recommended.
The scheme for the development of the Huleh
district is commended.
The Commission fully realize the desirability
of afforestation on a large scale of a long
term forest policy, but, having regard to their
conclusion as to the scarcity of land in the
hills for the agricultural population, they
cannot recommend a policy involving expropriation
of cultivators on a large scale until other
cultivable land or suitable employment on the
land can be found for them. In the aggregate,
however, a large amount of land is fit for afforestation
but not for cultivation, and the Commission
endorse a policy of afforestation of steep hillsides
to prevent erosion the prevention of grazing
on land fit for afforestation, and, where practicable,
the establishment of village forests for the
benefit of neighbouring cultivators.
Chapter X. - Immigration
The problem of immigration has been aggravated
by three factors:-- (1) the drastic restrictions
imposed on immigration in the United States,
(2) the advent of the National Socialist Government
in Germany, and (3) the increasing economic
pressure on the Jews in Poland.
The continuous impact of a highly intelligent
and enterprising race backed by large financial
resources on a comparatively poor, indigenous
community, on a different cultural level, may
produce in time serious reactions. The principle
of economic absorptive capacity, meaning that
considerations of economic capacity and these
alone should determine immigration, is at present
inadequate and ignores factors in the situation
which wise statesmanship cannot disregard. Political,
social and psychological factors should be taken
into account. His Majesty's Government should
lay down a political high level of Jewish immigration.
This high level should be fixed for the next
five years at 12,000 per annum. The High Commissioner
should be given discretion to admit immigrants
up to this maximum figure, but subject always
to the economic absorptive capacity of the country.
Among other alterations in the immigration regulations
the Commission recommend that the Administration
should have direct control over the immigrants
coming in under Category A(i) (persons with
£1,000 capital), and any person who desires
to enter Palestine under this category should
convince the Immigration authority not only
that he is in possession of £1,000, but also
that there is room in Palestine for additional
members in the profession, trade or business
which he proposes to pursue.
The definition of dependency should be revised
so as to fall under two heads, (1) near relatives
who, dependency being presumed, would have a
right to come in, and (2) other relatives, in
respect of whom the Immigration authority would
have to be satisfied that they can be maintained
by the immigrant or permanent resident concerned,
as long as they remain dependent for maintenance.
The final allocation of immigration certificates
as determined by the Jewish Agency should be
submitted by the High Commissioner for approval.
Greater use should be made of the machinery
of the District Administration in making enquiries
in connection with the preparation of the half-yearly
Labour Schedules. The housing situation is an
economic consideration to which greater regard
should be given when considering absorptive
capacity.
In so far as immigration has been the major
factor in bringing the Jewish National Home
to its present stage of development, the Mandatory
has fully implemented this obligation to facilitate
the establishment of a National Home for the
Jewish people in Palestine, as in evidenced
by the existence of a Jewish population of 400,000
persons. But this does not mean that the National
Rome should be crystallized at its present size.
The Commission cannot accept the view that the
Mandatory, facilitated the establishment of
a National Home, would be justified in shutting
its doors. Its economic life depends to a large
extent on further immigration and a large amount
of capital has been invested in it on the assumption
that immigration would continue.
Restrictions on Jewish immigration will not
solve the Palestine problem. The National Home
seems already too big to the Arabs and, whatever
its size, it bars the to their attainment of
national independence.
Chapter XI. -Trans-Jordan
The articles of the Mandate concerning the National
Home do not apply to Trans-Jordan and the possibility
of enlarging the National Home by Jewish immigration
into Trans-Jordan rests on the assumption of
concord between Arabs and Jews. Arab antagonism
to Jewish immigration is at least as bitter
in Trans-Jordan as it is in Palestine. The Government
of Trans-Jordan would refuse to encourage Jewish
immigration in the teeth of popular resistance.
Chapter XII. - Health
The Jewish grievances are summed up as complaints
that not enough money has been spent, by the
Mandatory Government to assist the medical services
established by the Jews from their own resources.
What is given to one service must be taken from
another, and it is not always remembered that
Palestine, despite the economic development
of the National Home is still a relatively poor
country. The whole question illustrates the
difficulty of providing services in one State
for two distinct communities with two very different
standards of living.
Chapter XIII. - Public
Works and Services
If it be assumed that the distribution of posts
as between the two races should be proportional
to the size of their respective populations,
the Government have fairly maintained this proportion
in the Civil Service generally, although the
rapid expansion of the Jewish community has
made this extremely difficult.
In Palestine, where there are different rates
of pay for Arab and Jewish unskilled labourers,
and also frequent fluctuations in wage rates,
it is practically impossible to maintain employment
on public works on any fixed proportion between
the races.
The Commission make no recommendation with regard
to the employment of Jews and non-Jews in Government
Departments and on public works and services.
They refer to the difficulties created by the
antagonism between the two races, the differences
in their standard of living and rates of wages
and the additional complication of three different
Holy Days, and state that they are satisfied
that the Government have taken a broad view
in dealing with the situation and that there
is no foundation for the suggestion that the
Government attitude towards the employment of
Jews is unsympathetic.
Chapter XIV. - The Christians
The religious stake of the Christians in the
Holy Places is just as great as that of the
Jews or Moslems. The Christians of the world
cannot be indifferent to the justice and well-being
of their co-religionists in the Holy Land.
A memorandum setting out the grievances of the
Arab Orthodox Community and complaining of the laissez-faire attitude of the Government
was received too late for examination in detail,
but it is pointed out that the Financial Commission
appointed under the Orthodox Patriarchate Ordinance
of 1928 has carried out an effective reform
of the Patriarchate's finances and that the
reorganization of the internal affairs of the
Patriarchate, including the establishment of
a Mixed Council, has been discussed between
the Government, the Patriarchate and the Laity
and is at present under consideration by the
Government.
The Commission refer to the question of Sunday
work by Christian officials resulting from the
strict observance of the Jewish Sabbath, and
are disposed to agree with the view that the
existing state of affairs throws too much work
on Christians officials and impairs the spiritual
influence of the Christian Church.
In political matters the Christian Arabs have
thrown in their lot with their Moslem brethren.
Chapter XV. - Nationality
Law and Acquisition of Palestinian
Citizenship
As regards the grievances of the Arabs (stated
to number about 40,000) who left Palestine before
the War intending eventually to return but have
been unable to obtain Palestinian citizenship,
the Commission suggest that at least those who
are able to establish all an unbroken personal
connection with Palestine and who are prepared
to give a definite formal assurance of their
intention to return, should be admitted to Palestinian
citizenship.
As regards Jews, the existing legislation implements
the obligation of the Mandate on this subject.
The Jews have not availed themselves readily
of the opportunity afforded them of becoming
Palestinian citizens, and this is accounted
for by the fact that their chief interest is
in the Jewish Community itself. Allegiance to
Palestine and to the Government are minor considerations
to many of them.
The Commission do not agree with those who criticise
the restriction of the municipal franchise to
Palestinian citizens. It is most desirable that
all persons who intend to reside permanently
in the country should become Palestinian citizens,
and this qualification for voting is a direct
inducement, to them to do so.
Chapter XVI. - Education
It seems unfortunate that the Administration
has been unable to do more for education. It
is not only the intrinsic value of education
that should be considered. Any efforts to raise
the material standards of life among the fellaheen can only be successful if they have received
sufficient mental training to profit from technical
instruction. Considering, the inadequacy of
the existing provision for Arab education, the
Administration should regard its claims on the
revenue as second in importance only to those
of public security.
Worse than the insufficiency of Arab schools,
however is the nationalist character of the
education provided in the schools of both communities
and for that the Commission can see no remedy
at all. The ideal system of education would
be a single bi-national system for both races.
But that is virtually impossible under the Mandate,
which prescribes the right of each community
to maintain its own schools for the education
of its own members in its own language."
The existing Arab and Jewish school systems
are definitely widening and will continue to
widen the gulf between the two races.
Wherever practicable, e.g. in new technical
or trade schools, mixed education should be
promoted.
As regards the Jews' claim for a larger grant
for their system of education, the Commission
consider that, until much more has been spent
on the development of Arab education, so as
to place it on a level with that of the Jews,
it is unjustifiable to increase the grant to
the latter, however desirable it might be in
other circumstances. The extent to which the
Jews have taxed themselves for education is
one of the best features of the National Home;
and such "self-help" deserves all
support; but it should not be given by altering
the present proportion between the grant to
the Jews and the amount spent on the Arabs;
it should result from an increase in the total
expenditure on education.
The contrast between the Arab and Jewish systems
of education is most striking at the top. The
Jews have a university of high quality. The
Arabs have none and the young intelligenzia of the country are unable to complete their
education without the cost and inconvenience
of going abroad. In any further discussion of
the project of a British University in the Near
East the possibility should be carefully considered
of locating it in the neighbourhood of Jerusalem
or Haifa.
Chapter XVII. - Local Government
The present system of rural self-government
(through local Councils) falls short (1) in
a lack of flexibility, (2) in undue centralization.
An attempt should be made to strengthen those
few local councils which still exist in the
Arab rural areas, but the Commission do not
favour an attempt at present to revivify councils
which have broken down or to create new ones
unless there is a genuine demand for them. There
can be little really effective extension of
village self-government until the provision
of primary education has had more time to take
effect.
The deficiencies of the present system of municipal
government are (1) a lack of initiative on the
part of the more backward municipalities, and
(2) the limitations set to initiative on the
part of the more progressive municipalities
by an Ordinance which subjects them all to the
same measure of Government control and centralized
administration. The limitation of power and
responsibility largely accounts for the lack
of interest shown by the townspeople in most
municipal councils.
Tel Aviv has unique problems of its own caused
by its phenomenal growth during the last five
years. The objectives which the people of Tel
Aviv have set before them in the way of social
services are in themselves admirable, and the
ratepayers have shown a commendable readiness
to bear high rates for their realization. The
town has been faced with, and to a considerable
extent surmounted, exceptional difficulties
without seriously impairing its financial position.
The more important local councils and all the
municipalities should be reclassified by means
of a new Ordinance into groups according to
their respective size and importance. The degree
of power and independence could then be varied
to suit each class. For the first class of municipality
the powers provided under the existing Ordinance
are inadequate and should be extended.
The services of an expert authority on local
government should be obtained to assist in drafting
the new Ordinance and in improving and co-ordinating
the relations between Government and the municipalities,
particularly in the larger towns, with special
reference to the need of removing the causes
of the present delay in approving municipal
budgets.
The need of Tel Aviv for a substantial loan
should be promptly and sympathetically reconsidered.
The normal constitutional relationship between
the central and local authorities is impossible
in Palestine.
Chapter XVIII. - Self-governing
Institutions
Such hopes as may have been entertained in 1922
of any quick advance towards self-government
have become less tenable. The bar to it--Arab
antagonism to the National Home--so far from
weakening, has grown stronger.
The Jewish leaders might acquiesce in the establishment
of a Legislative Council on the basis of parity,
but the Commission are convinced that parity
is not a practicable solution of the problem.
It is difficult to believe that so artificial
a device would operate effectively or last long,
and in any case the Arab leaders would not accept
it.
The Commission do not recommend that any attempt
be made to revive the proposal of a Legislative
Council, but since it is desirable that the
Government should have some regular and effective
means of sounding public opinion on its policy,
the Commission would welcome an enlargement
of the Advisory Council by the addition of Unofficial
Members, who might be in a majority and might
be elected, who could make representations by
way of resolution, but who would not be empowered
to pass or reject the budget or other legislative
measures. Again, the Arabs are unlikely to accept
such a proposal.
The Arabs of Palestine, it has been admitted,
are as fit to govern themselves as the Arabs
of Iraq or Syria. The Jews of Palestine are
as fit to govern themselves as any organized
and educated community in Europe. Yet, associated
as they are under the Mandate, self-government
is impracticable for both peoples. The Mandate
cannot be fully implemented nor can it honourably
terminate in the independence of an undivided
Palestine unless the conflict between Arab and
Jew can be composed.
Chapter XIX. - Conclusion
and Recommendations
The Commission recapitulate the conclusions
set out in this part of the Report, and summarize
the Arab and Jewish grievances and their own
recommendations for the removal of such as are
legitimate. They add, however, that these are
not the recommendations which their terms of
reference require. They will not, that is to
say, remove the grievances nor prevent their
recurrence. They are the best palliatives the
Commission can devise for the disease from which
Palestine is suffering, but they are only palliatives.
They cannot cure the trouble. The disease is
so deep-rooted that in the Commissioners' firm
conviction the only hope of a cure lies in a
surgical operation.
PART III: THE POSSIBILITY
OF A LASTING SETTLEMENT
Chapter XX. - The Force
of Circumstances
The problem of Palestine is briefly restated.
Under the stress of the World War the British
Government made promises to Arabs and Jews in
order to obtain their support. On the strength
of those promises both parties formed certain
expectations.
The application to Palestine of the Mandate
System in general and of the specific Mandate
in particular implies the belief that the obligations
thus undertaken towards the Arabs and the Jews
respectively would prove in course of time to
be mutually compatible owing to the conciliatory
effect on the Palestinian Arabs of the material
prosperity which Jewish immigration would bring
in Palestine as a whole. That belief has not
been justified, and there seems to be no hope
of its being justified in the future.
But the British people cannot on that account
repudiate their obligations, and, apart from
obligations, the existing circumstances in Palestine
would still require the most strenuous efforts
on the part of the Government which is responsible
for the welfare of the country.
The existing circumstances are summarized as
follows.
An irrepressible conflict has arisen between
two national communities within the narrow bounds
of one small country. There is no common ground
between them. Their national aspirations are
incompatible. The Arabs desire to revive the
traditions of the Arab golden age. The Jews
desire to show what they can achieve when restored
to the land in which the Jewish nation was born.
Neither of the two national ideals permits of
combination in the service of a single State.
The conflict has grown steadily more bitter
since 1920 and the process will continue. Conditions
inside Palestine especially the systems of education,
are strengthening the national sentiment of
the two peoples. The bigger and more prosperous
they grow the greater will be their political
ambitions, and the conflict is aggravated by
the uncertainty of the future. Who in the end
will govern Palestine?" it is asked. Meanwhile,
the external factors will continue to operate
with increasing force. On the one hand in less
than three years' time Syria and the Lebanon
will attain their national sovereignty, and
the claim of the Palestinian Arabs to share
in the freedom of all Asiatic Arabia will thus
be fortified. On the other hand the hardships
and anxieties of the Jews in Europe are not
likely to grow less and the appeal to the good
faith and humanity of the British people will
lose none of its force.
Meanwhile, the Government of Palestine, which
is at present an unsuitable form for governing
educated Arabs and democratic Jews, cannot develop
into a system of self-government as it has elsewhere,
because there is no such system which could
ensure justice both to the Arabs and to the
Jews. Government therefore remains unrepresentative
and unable to dispel the conflicting grievances
of the two dissatisfied and irresponsible communities
it governs.
In these circumstances peace can only be maintained
in Palestine under the Mandate by repression.
This means the maintenance of security services
at so high a cost that the services directed
to "the well-being and development"
of the population cannot be expanded and may
even have to be curtailed. The moral objections
to repression are self-evident. Nor need the
undesirable reactions of it on opinion outside
Palestine be emphasized. Moreover, repression
will not solve the problem. It will exacerbate
the quarrel. It will not help towards the establishment
of a single self-governing Palestine. It is
not easy to pursue the dark path of repression
without seeing daylight at the end of it.
The British people will not flinch from the
task of continuing to govern Palestine under
the Mandate if they are in honour bound to do
so, but they would be justified in asking if
there is no other way in which their duty can
be done.
Nor would Britain wish to repudiate her obligations.
The trouble is that they have proved irreconcilable,
and this conflict is the more unfortunate because
each of the obligations taken separately accords
with British sentiment and British interest.
The development of self-government in the Arab
world on the one hand is in accordance with
British principles, and British public opinion
is wholly sympathetic with Arab aspirations
towards a new age of unity and prosperity in
the Arab world. British interest similarly has
always been bound up with the peace of the Middle
East and British statesmanship can show an almost
unbroken record of friendship with the Arabs.
There is a strong British tradition, on the
other hand, of friendship with the Jewish people,
and it is in the British interest to retain
as far as may be the confidence of the Jewish
people.
The continuance of the present system means
the gradual alienation of two peoples who are
traditionally the friends of Britain.
The problem cannot be solved by giving either
the Arabs or the Jews all they want. The answer
to the question which of them in the end will
govern Palestine must be Neither. No fair-minded
statesman can think it right either that 400,000
Jews, whose entry into Palestine has been facilitated
by he British Government and approved by the
League of Nations, should be handed over to
Arab rule, or that, if the Jews should become
a majority, a million Arabs should be handed
over to their rule. But while neither race can
fairly rule all Palestine, each race might justly
rule part of it.
The idea of Partition has doubtless been thought
of before as a solution of the problem, but
it has probably been discarded as being impracticable.
The difficulties are certainly very great, but
when they are closely examined they do not seem
so insuperable as the difficulties inherent
in the continuance of the Mandate or in any
other alternative arrangement. Partition offers
a chance of ultimate peace. No other plan does.
Chapter XXI. - Cantonisation
The political division of Palestine could be
effected in a less thorough manner than by Partition.
It could be divided like Federal States into
provinces and cantons, which would be self-governing
in such matters as immigration and land sales
as well as social services. The Mandatory Government
would remain as a central or federal government
controlling such matters as foreign relations,
defence, customs and the like.
Cantonisation is attractive at first sight because
it seems to solve the three major problems of
land, immigration and self-government, but there
are obvious weaknesses in it. First, the working
of federal systems depends on sufficient community
of interest or tradition to maintain harmony
between the Central Government and the cantons.
In Palestine both Arabs and Jews would regard
the Central Government as an alien and interfering
body. Secondly, the financial relations between
the Central Government and the cantons would
revive the existing quarrel between Arabs and
Jews as to the distribution of a surplus of
federal revenue or as to the contributions of
the cantons towards a federal deficit. Unrestricted
Jewish immigration into the Jewish canton might
lead to a demand for the expansion of federal
services at the expense of the Arab canton.
Thirdly, the costly task of maintaining law
and order would still rest mainly on the Central
Government. Fourthly, Cantonisation like Partition
cannot avoid leaving a minority of each race
in the area controlled by the other. The solution
of this problem requires such bold measures
as can only be contemplated if there is a prospect
of final peace. Partition opens up such a prospect.
Cantonisation does not. Lastly, Cantonisation
does not settle the question of national self-government.
Neither the Arabs nor the Jews would feel their
political aspirations were satisfied with purely
cantonal self-government.
Cantonisation, in sum, presents most, if not
all, of the difficulties presented by Partition
without Partition's one supreme advantage--the
possibilities it offers of eventual peace.
Chapter XXII. - A Plan
of Partition
While the Commission would not be expected to
embark oil the further protracted inquiry which
would be needed for working out a scheme of
Partition in full detail, it would be idle to
put forward the principle of Partition and not
to give it any concrete shape. Clearly it must
be shown that an actual plan can be devised
which meets the main requirements of the case.
1. A Treaty System
The Mandate for Palestine should terminate and
be replaced by a Treaty System in accordance
with the precedent set in Iraq and Syria.
A new Mandate for the Holy Places should be
instituted to fulfil the purposes defined in
Section 2 below.
Treaties of alliance should be negotiated by
the Mandatory with the Government of Trans-Jordan
and representatives of the Arabs of Palestine
on the one hand and with the Zionist Organisation
on the other. These Treaties would declare that,
within as short a period as may be convenient,
two sovereign independent States would be established--the
one an Arab State consisting of Trans-Jordan
united with that part of Palestine which lies
to the cast and south of a frontier such as
we suggest in Section 3 below; the other a Jewish
State consisting of that part of Palestine which
lies to the north and west of that frontier.
The Mandatory would undertake to support any
requests for admission to the League of Nations
which the Governments of the Arab and the Jewish
States might make.
The Treaties would include strict guarantees
for the protection of minorities in each State,
and the financial and other provisions to which
reference will be made in subsequent Sections.
Military conventions would be attached to the
Treaties, dealing with the maintenance of naval,
military and air forces, the upkeep and use
of ports, roads and railways, the security of
the oil pipe line and so forth.
2. The Holy Places
The Partition of Palestine is subject to the
overriding necessity of keeping the sanctity
of Jerusalem and Bethlehem inviolate and of
ensuring free and safe access to them for all
the world. That, in the fullest sense of the
mandatory phrase, is "a sacred trust of
civilization"--a trust on behalf not merely
of the peoples of Palestine but of multitudes
in other lands to whom those places, one or
both, are Holy Places.
A new Mandate, therefore, should be framed with
the execution of this trust as its primary purpose.
An enclave should be demarcated extending from
a point north of Jerusalem to a point south
of Bethlehem, and access to the sea should be
provided by a corridor extending to the north
of the main road and to the south of the railway,
including the towns Lydda and Ramle, and terminating
at Jaffa.
The protection of the Holy Places is a permanent
trust, unique in its character and purpose,
and not contemplated by Article 22 of the Covenant
of the League of Nations. In order to avoid
misunderstanding, it might frankly be stated
that this trust will only terminate if and when
the League of Nations and the United States
desire it to do so, and that, while it would
be the trustee's duty to promote the well-being
and development of the local population concerned,
it is not intended that in course of time they
should stand by themselves as a wholly self-governing
community.
Guarantees as to the rights of the Holy Places
and free access thereto (as provided in Article
13 of the existing Mandate), as to transit across
the mandated area, and as to non-discrimination
in fiscal, economic and other matters should
be maintained in accordance with the principles
of the Mandate System. But the policy of the
Balfour Declaration would not apply; and no
question would arise of balancing Arab against
Jewish claims or vice versa. All the
inhabitants of the territory would stand on
an equal footing. The only official language"
would be that of the Mandatory Administration.
Good and just government without regard for
sectional interests would be its basic principle.
It would accord with Christian sentiment in
the world at large if Nazareth and the Sea of
Galilee (Lake Tiberias) were also covered by
this Mandate. The Mandatory should be entrusted
with the administration of Nazareth and with
full powers to safeguard the sanctity of the
waters and shores of Lake Tiberias.
The Mandatory should similarly be charged with
the protection of religious endowments and of
such buildings, monuments and places in the
Arab and Jewish States as are sacred to the
Jews and the Arabs respectively.
For the upkeep of the Mandatory Government,
a certain revenue should be obtainable, especially
from the large and growing urban population
in its charge, both by way of customs duties
and by direct taxation; but it might prove insufficient
for the normal cost of the administration. In
that event, it is suggested that, in all the
circumstances, Parliament would be willing to
vote the money needed to make good the deficit.
3. The Frontier
The natural principle for the Partition of Palestine
is to separate land and settled from the areas
in which the Jews have acquired land and settled
from those which are who are wholly or mainly
occupied by Arabs. This offers a fair and practicable
basis for Partition, provided that in accordance
with the spirit of British obligations, (1)
a reasonable allowance is made within the boundaries
of the Jewish State for the growth of population
and colonization, and (2) reasonable compensation
is given to the Arab State for the loss of land
and revenue.
Any proposal for Partition would be futile if
it gave no indication, however rough, as to
how the most vital question in the whole matter
might be determined, i.e., the frontier. As
a solution of the problem, which seems both
practicable and just, a rough line is proposed
below. A Frontier Commission should be appointed
to demarcate the precise frontier.
Starting from Ras an Naqura, it follows the
existing northern and eastern frontier of Palestine
to Lake Tiberias and crosses the Lake to the
outflow of the River Jordan, whence it continues
down the river to a point a little north of
Beisan. It then cuts across the Beisan Plain
and runs along the southern edge of the Valley
of Jezreel and across the Plain of Esdraelon
to a point near Megiddo, whence it crosses the
Carmel ridge in the neighbourhood of the Megiddo
road. Having thus reached the Maritime Plain,
the line runs southwards down its eastern edge,
curving west to avoid Tulkarm, until it reaches
the Jerusalem-Jaffa corridor near Lydda. South
of the Corridor it continues down the edge of
the Plain to a point about 10 miles south of
Rehovot, when it turns west to the sea.
The observations and recommendations are made
with regard to the proposed frontier and to
questions arising from it:--
(i) No frontier can be drawn which separates
all Arabs and Arab-owned land from all Jews
and Jewish-owned land.
(ii) The Jews have purchased substantial
blocks of land in the Gaza Plain and near
Beersheba and obtained options for the purchase
of other blocks in this area. The proposed
frontier would prevent the utilization of
those lands for the southward expansion
of the Jewish National Home. On the other
hand, the Jewish lands in Galilee, and in
particular the Huleh basin (which offers
a notable opportunity for development and
colonization), would be in the Jewish Area.
(iii) The proposed frontier necessitates
the inclusion in the Jewish Area of the
Galilee highlands between Safad and the
Plain of Acre. This is the part of Palestine
in which the Jews have retained a foothold
almost if not entirely without a break from
the beginning of the Diaspora to the present
day, and the sentiment of all Jewry is deeply
attached to the "holy cities"
of Safad and Tiberias. Until quite recently,
moreover the Jews in Galilee have lived
on friendly terms with their Arab neighbours;
and throughout the series of disturbances
the fellaheen of Galilee have shown
themselves less amenable to political incitement
than those of Samaria and Judaea where the
centres of Arab nationalism are located.
At the "mixed" towns of Tiberias,
Safad, Haifa, and Acre there have been varying
degrees of friction since the "disturbances"
of last year. It would greatly promote the
successful operation of Partition in its
early stages, and in particular help to
ensure the execution of the Treaty guarantees
for the protection of minorities, if those
four towns were kept for a period under
Mandatory administration.
(iv) Jaffa is an essentially Arab town and
should form part of the Arab State. The
question of its communication with the latter
presents no difficulty, since transit through
the Jaffa-Jerusalem Corridor would be open
to all. The Corridor, on the other hand,
requires its own access to the sea, and
for this purpose a narrow belt of land should
be acquired and cleared on the north and
south sides of the town.
(v) While the Mediterranean would be accessible
to the Arab State at Jaffa and at Gaza,
in the interests of Arab trade and industry
the Arab State should also have access for
commercial purposes to Haifa, the only existing
deep-water port on the coast. The Jewish
Treaty should therefore provide for the
free transit of goods in bond between the
Arab State and Haifa.
The Arab Treaty, similarly, should provide
for the free transit of goods in bond over
the railway between the Jewish State and
the Egyptian frontier.
The same principle applies to the question
of access for commercial purposes to the
Red Sea. The use of that exit to the East
might prove in course of time of great advantage
to both Arab and Jewish trade and industry,
and, having regard to those possibilities,
an enclave on the north-west coast of the
Gulf of Aqaba should be retained under Mandatory
administration, and the Arab Treaty should
provide for the free transit of goods between
the Jewish State and this enclave.
The Treaties should provide for similar
facilities for the transit of goods between
the Mandated Area and Haifa, the frontier
and the Gulf of Aqaba.
4. Inter-State Subvention
The Jews contribute more per capita to
the revenues of Palestine than the Arabs, and
the Government has thereby been enabled to maintain
public services for the Arabs at a higher level
than would otherwise have been possible. Partition
would mean, on the one hand, that the Arab Area
would no longer profit from the taxable capacity
of the Jewish Area. On the other hand, (1) the
Jews would acquire a new right of sovereignty
in the Jewish Area; (2) that Area, as we have
defined it, would be larger than the existing
area of Jewish land and settlement; (3) the
Jews would be freed from their present liability
for helping to promote the welfare of Arabs
outside that Area. It is suggested, therefore,
that the Jewish State should pay a subvention
to the Arab State when Partition comes into
effect. There have been recent precedents for
equitable financial arrangements of this kind
in those connected with the separation of Sind
from Bombay and of Burma from the Indian Empire,
and in accordance with those precedents a Finance
Commission should be appointed to consider and
report as to what the amount of the subvention
should be.
The Finance Commission should also, consider
and report on the proportion in which the Public
Debt of Palestine, which now amounts to about
£4,500,000, should be divided between the Arab
and the Jewish States, and other financial questions.
The Commission should also deal with telegraph
and telephone systems in the event of Partition.
5. British Subvention
The Inter-State Subvention would adjust the
financial balance in Palestine; but the plan
involves the inclusion of Trans-Jordan in the
Arab State. The taxable capacity of Trans-Jordan
is very low and its revenues have never sufficed
to meet the cost of its administration. From
1921 to the present day it has received grants-in-aid
from the United Kingdom, which have amounted
to a total sum of £1,253,000 or an average of
about £78,000 a year. Grants have also been
made towards the cost of the Trans-Jordan Frontier
Force, and loans to the amount of £60, 000 have
been provided for earthquake-relief and the
distribution of seed.
The Mandate for Trans-Jordan ought not to be
relinquished without securing, as far as possible,
that the standard of administration should not
fall too low through lack of funds to maintain
it; and in this matter the British people might
fairly be asked to do their part in facilitating
a settlement. The continuance of the present
Mandate would almost inevitably involve a recurrent
and increasing charge on the British Treasury.
If peace can be promoted by Partition, money
spent on helping to bring it about and making
it more effective for its purpose would surely
be well spent. And apart from any such considerations
the British people would, it is believed, agree
to a capital payment in lieu of their present
annual liability with a view to honouring their
obligations and making peace in Palestine.
In the event of the Treaty system coming into
force, Parliament should be asked to make a
grant of £2,000,000 to the Arab State.
6. Tariffs and Ports
The Arab and Jewish States, being sovereign
independent States, would determine their own
tariffs. Subject to the terms of the Mandate,
the same would apply to the Mandatory Government.
The tariff-policies of the Arab and Jewish States
are likely to conflict, and it would greatly
ease the position and promote the interests
of both the Arab and Jewish States if they could
agree to impose identical customs-duties on
as many articles as possible, and if the Mandatory
Government, likewise, could assimilate its customs-duties
as far as might be with those of one or both
of the two States.
It should be an essential part of the proposed
Treaty System that a commercial convention should
be concluded with a view to establishing a common
tariff over the widest possible range of imported
articles and to facilitating the freest possible
interchange of goods between the three territories
concerned.
7. Nationality
All persons domiciled in the Mandated Area (including
Haifa, Acre, Tiberias, Safad and the enclave
on the Gulf of Aqaba, as long as they remain
under Mandatory administration) who now possess
the status of British protected persons would
retain it; but apart from this all Palestinians
would become the nationals of the States in
which they are domiciled.
8. Civil Services
it seems probable that, in the event of Partition,
the services of the Arab and Jewish officials
in the pre-existing Mandatory Administration
would to a large extent be required by the Governments
of the Arab and Jewish States respectively,
whereas the number of British officials would
be substantially reduced. The rights of all
of them, including rights to pensions or gratuities,
must be fully honoured in accordance with Article
28 of the existing Mandate. This matter should
be dealt with by the Finance Commission.
9. Industrial Concessions
In the event of Partition agreements entered
into by the Government of Palestine for the
development and security of industries (e.g.,
the agreement with the Palestine Potash Company)
should be taken over and carried out by the
Governments of the Arab and Jewish States. Guarantees
to that effect should be given in the Treaties.
The security of the Electric Power Station at
Jisr el Majami should be similarly guaranteed.
10. Exchange of Land and
Population
If Partition is to be effective in promoting
a final settlement it must mean more than drawing
a frontier and establishing two States. Sooner
or later there should be a transfer of land
and, as far as possible, an exchange of population.
The Treaties should provide that, if Arab owners
of land in the Jewish State or Jewish owners
of land in the Arab State should wish to sell
their land and any plantations or crops thereon,
the Government of the State concerned should
be responsible for the purchase of such land,
plantations and crops at a price to be fixed,
if requires, by the Mandatory Administration.
For this purpose a loan should, if required,
be guaranteed for a reasonable amount.
The political aspect of the land problem is
still more important. Owing to the fact that
there has been no census since 1931 it is impossible
to calculate with any precision the distribution
of population between the Arab and Jewish areas;
but, according to an approximate estimate, in
the area allocated to the Jewish State (excluding
the urban districts to be retained for a period
under Mandatory Administration) there are now
about 225,000 Arabs. In the area allocated to
the Arab State there are only about 1,250 Jews;
but there are about 125,000 Jews as against
85,000 Arabs in Jerusalem and Haifa. The existence
of these minorities clearly constitutes the
most serious hindrance to the smooth and successful
operation of Partition. If the settlement is
to be clean and final, the question must be
boldly faced and firmly dealt with. It calls
for the highest statesmanship on the part of
all concerned.
A precedent is afforded by the exchange effected
between the Greek and Turkish populations on
the morrow of the Greco-Turkish War of 1922.
A convention was signed by the Greek and Turkish
Governments, providing that, under the supervision
of the League of Nations, Greek nationals of
the Orthodox religion living in Turkey should
be compulsorily removed to Greece, and Turkish
nationals of the Moslem religion living in Greece
to Turkey. The numbers involved were high--no
less than some 1,300,000 Greeks and some 400,000
Turks. But so vigorously and effectively was
the task accomplished that within about eighteen
months from the spring of 1923 the whole exchange
was completed. The courage of the Greek and
Turkish statesmen concerned has been justified
by the result. Before the operation the Greek
and Turkish minorities had been a constant irritant.
Now Greco-Turkish relations are friendlier than
they have ever been before.
In Northern Greece a surplus of cultivable land
was available or could rapidly be made available
for the settlement of the Greeks evacuated from
Turkey. In Palestine there is at present no
such surplus. Room exists or could soon be provided
within the proposed boundaries of the Jewish
State for the Jews now living in the Arab area.
It is the far greater number of Arab who constitute
the major problem; and, while some of them could
be re-settled on the land vacated by the Jews,
far more land would be required for the re-settlement
of all of them. Such information as is available
justifies the hope that the execution of large-scale
plans for irrigation, water-storage, and development
in Trans-Jordan, Beersheba and the Jordan Valley
would make provision for a much larger population
than exists there at the present time.
Those areas, therefore, should be surveyed and
an estimate made of the practical possibilities
of irrigation and development as quickly as
possible. If, as a result, it is clear that
a substantial amount of land could be made available
for the re-settlement of Arabs living in the
Jewish area, the most strenuous efforts should
be made to obtain an agreement for the transfer
of land and population. In view of the present
antagonism between the races and of the manifest
advantage to both of them for reducing the opportunities
of future friction to the utmost, it is to be
hoped that the Arab and the Jewish leaders might
show the same high statesmanship as that of
the Turks and the Greeks and make the same bold
decision for the sake of peace.
The cost of the proposed irrigation and development
scheme would be heavier than the Arab State
could be expected to bear. Here again the British
people it is suggested, would be willing to
help to bring about a settlement; and if an
arrangement could be made for the transfer,
voluntary or otherwise, of land and population,
Parliament should be asked to make a grant to
meet the cost of the aforesaid scheme.
If it should be agreed to terminate the Mandate
and establish a Treaty System on a basis of
Partition, there would be a period of transition
before the new regime came into force, and during
this period the existing Mandate would continue
to be the governing instrument of the Palestine
Administration. But the recommendations made
in Part II of the Report as to what should be
done tinder the existing Mandate presupposed
its continuance for an indefinite time and would
not apply to so changed a situation as the prospect
of Partition would bring about.
The following are recommendations for the period
of transition:--
(1) Land.--Steps should be taken
to prohibit the purchase of land by Jews
within the Arab Area (i.e., the area of
the projected Arab State) or by Arabs within
the Jewish Area (i.e., the area of the projected
Jewish State).
The settlement of the plain-lands of the
Jewish Area should be completed within two
years.
(2) Immigration.--Instead of the
political "high-level" there should
be a territorial restriction on Jewish immigration.
No Jewish immigration into the Arab Area
should be permitted. Since it would therefore
not affect the Arab Area and since the Jewish
State would soon become responsible for
its results, the volume of Jewish immigration
should be determined by the economic absorptive
capacity of Palestine less the Arab Area.
(3) Trade.--Negotiations should be
opened without delay to secure the amendment
of Article 18 of the Mandate and to place
the external trade of Palestine upon a fairer
basis.
(4) Advisory Council.--The Advisory
Council should, if possible, be enlarged
by the nomination of Arab and Jewish representatives;
but, if either party refused to serve, the
Council should continue as at present.
(5) Local Government.--The municipal
system should be reformed on expert advice.
(6) Education.--A vigorous effort
should be made to increase the number of
Arab schools. The "mixed schools"
situated in the area to be administered
under the new Mandate should be given every
support, and the possibility of a British
University should be considered, since those
institutions might play an important part
after Partition in helping to bring about
an ultimate reconciliation of the races.
Chapter X. - Conclusion
Considering the attitude which both the Arab
and the Jewish representatives adopted in giving
evidence, the Commission think it improbable
that either party will be satisfied at first
sight with the proposals submitted for the adjustment
of their rival claims. For Partition means that
neither will get all it wants. It means that
the Arabs must acquiesce in the exclusion from
their sovereignty of a piece of territory, long
occupied and once ruled by them. It means that
the Jews must be content with less than the
Land of Israel they once ruled and have hoped
to rule again. But it seems possible that on
reflection both parties will come to realize
that the drawbacks of Partition are outweighed
by its advantages. For, if it offers neither
party all it wants, it offers each what it wants
most, namely freedom and security.
The advantages to the Arabs of Partition on
the lines we have proposed may be summarized
as follows:--
(i) They obtain their national independence
and can co-operate on an equal footing with
the Arabs of the neighbouring countries
in the cause of Arab unity and progress.
(ii) They are finally delivered from the
fear of being swamped by the Jews, and from
the possibility of ultimate subjection to
Jewish rule.
(iii) In particular, the final limitation
of the Jewish National Home within a fixed
frontier and the enactment of a new Mandate
for the protection of the Holy Places, solemnly
guaranteed by the League of Nations, removes
all anxiety lest the Holy Places should
ever come under Jewish control.
(iv) As a set-off to the loss of territory
the Arabs regard as theirs, the Arab State
will receive a subvention from the Jewish
State. It will also, in view of the backwardness
of Trans-Jordan, obtain a grant of £2,000,000
from the British Treasury; and, if an agreement
can be reached as to the exchange of land
and population, a further grant will be
made for the conversion, as far as may prove
possible, of uncultivable land in the Arab
State into productive land from which the
cultivators and the State alike will profit.
The advantages of Partition to the Jews may
be summarized as follows:--
(i) Partition secures the establishment
of the Jewish National Home and relieves
it from the possibility of its being subjected
in the future to Arab rule.
(ii) Partition enables the Jews in the fullest
sense to call their National Home their
own; for it converts it into a Jewish State.
Its citizens will be able to admit as many
Jews into it as they themselves believe
can be absorbed. They will attain the primary
objective of Zionism--a Jewish nation, planted
in Palestine, giving its nationals the same
status in the world as other nations give
theirs. They will cease at last to live
a minority life.
To both Arabs and Jews Partition offers a
prospect--and there is none in any other policy--of
obtaining the inestimable boon of peace. It
is surely worth some sacrifice on both sides
if the quarrel which the Mandate started could
he ended with its termination. It is not a
natural or old-standing feud. The Arabs throughout
their history have not only been free from
anti-Jewish sentiment but have also shown
that the spirit of compromise is deeply rooted
in their life. Considering what the possibility
of finding a refuge in Palestine means to
man thousands of suffering Jews, is the loss
occasioned by Partition, great as it would
be, more than Arab generosity can bear? In
this, as in so much else connected with Palestine,
it is not only the peoples of that country
who have to be considered. The Jewish Problem
is not the least of the many problems which
are disturbing international relations at
this critical time and obstructing the path
to peace and prosperity. If the Arabs at some
sacrifice could help to solve that problem,
they would earn the gratitude not of the Jews
alone but of all the Western World.
There was a time when Arab statesmen were
willing to concede little Palestine to the
Jews, provided that the rest of Arab Asia
were free. That condition was not fulfilled
then, but it is on the eve of fulfilment now.
In less than three years' time all the wide
Arab area outside Palestine between the Mediterranean
and the Indian Ocean will be independent,
and, if Partition is adopted, the greater
part of Palestine will be independent too.
As to the British people, they are bound
to honour to the utmost of their power the
obligations they undertook in the exigencies
of war towards the Arabs and the Jews. When
those obligations were incorporated in the
Mandate, they did not fully realize the difficulties
of the task it laid on them. They have tried
to overcome them, not always with success.
The difficulties have steadily become greater
till now they seem almost insuperable. Partition
offers a possibility of finding a way through
them, a possibility of obtaining a final solution
of the problem which does justice to the rights
and aspirations of both the Arabs and the
Jews and discharges the obligations undertaken
towards them twenty years ago to the fullest
extent that is practicable in the circumstances
of the present time.
Sources: UNISPAL |