Egyptian Strategy in the War of Attrition
by Muhammad Hassanain Haykal
Haykal was a confidant of Anwar
Sadat and the editor of the semi-official Egyptian newspaper Al-Ahram.
..To my mind there is one chief method which cannot
be ignored or avoided in tipping the balance of fear and assurance in
the Arab-Israeli conflict in
favour of the Arabs. This
course, which meets all the requirements and necessities and is in harmony
with logic and nature this main course to tip the balance in our favour,
or merely precisely to adjust it, is: to inflict a clear defeat on the Israeli Army in battle, in one military battle
I should like to be more specific because there is
no room under present conditions for irresponsible talk. I would make
the following points: (1) I am not speaking about the enemy's defeat
in the war, but his defeat in a battle. There is still a long way to
go before the enemy can he defeated in the war. The possibilities for
this are still not within sight. But the enemy's defeat in one battle
presupposes capabilities which could be available at an early stage
in the long period before the end of the war. (2) I am not speaking
of a battle on the scale of that of 5th June 1967-a
5th June in reverse, with the Arabs taking the initiative and Israel
taken by surprise. Most likely 5th June will not he repeated either
in form or in effect. In the coming battle neither we nor the enemy
will be taken by surprise ... I am speaking about a limited battle which
would result in a clear victory for the Arabs and a clear defeat for
Israel naturally within the limits of that battle. (3) The requirements
and necessities I am speaking about, and which will impose the military
battle, do not include any marked consideration for the so-called revenge
for injured Arab dignity....
To these three reservations regarding the battle,
which I consider necessary and vital, I should like to add more, in
the hope that they swill give a clearer picture of what I am saying
( I ) The current artillery exchanges along the Egyptian
front arc not the battle I am thinking of---the battle that I feel the
requirements and necessities arc imposing. What I am envisaging is far
greater and broader. The artillery exchanges are important. indeed very
important, but they are not the battle which can achieve the aim of
inflicting a clear defeat on the Israeli Army. (2) Neither are the activities
of the resistance organisations at their present level the battle I
am thinking of or the battle imposed by the requirements and possibilities....
(3) In simple and general terms the battle I am speaking about ... is
one in which the Arab forces might, for example, destroy two or three
Israeli Army divisions, annihilate between 10,000 and 20,000 Israeli
soldiers, and force the Israeli Army to retreat from the positions it
occupies to other positions, even if only a few kilometres back.
I am speaking, then. about a battle and not the war:
about a battle that is limited as battles naturally are; about a real
battle. however. resulting in a clear defeat for the Israeli Army. Such
a limited battle would have unlimited effects on the war....
l. It would destroy a myth which Israel is trying
to implant in the minds-the myth that the Israeli Army is invincible.
Myths have great psychological effect....
2. The Israeli Army is the backbone of Israeli society.
We can say that the greatest achievement placed on record by the Arab
resistance against Zionism-an
achievement resulting from the simple act of refusal-has been to dispel
the Zionist dreams. Because of the Arab refusal. Israel has become a military stronghold and Israeli society has become the
society of a besieged stronghold-a military garrison society....
3. Such a battle would reveal to the Israeli citizens
a truth which would destroy the effects of the battles of June 1967.
In the aftermath of these battles, Israeli society began to believe
in the Israeli Army's ability to protect it. Once this belief is destroyed
or shaken, once Israeli society begins to doubt its Army's ability to
protect it, a series of reactions may set in with unpredictable consequences.
4. Furthermore, such a battle would shake the influence
of the ruling military establishment. The establishment has the whip
hand in direciting and implementing Israeli policy on the excuse of
acting as Israel's sole protector and guardian of Zionist plans.
5. Such a battle would destroy the philosophy of Israeli
strategy, which affirms the possibility of "imposing peace"
on the Arabs. Imposing peace is in fact, a false expression which actually
means "waging war."
6. Such a battle and its consequences would cause
the U.S.A. to change its policy towards
the Middle East crisis in particular, and towards the Middle East after
the crisis in general. There arc two clear features of U-S. policy.
One which concerns the Middle East crisis, is that the U.S.A. is not
in a hung to help in finding a solution to the crisis. No matter how
serious or complicated the situation may become. the U.S.A. will continue
to move slowly as long as Israel is militarily in a stronger position.
This situation would surely change once the Israel position of strength
was shaken.
The other phenomenon concerns the Middle East after
its present crisis. It is that the U.S.A. sees in Israel an instrument
for attaining its aims in the area. No matter how far the Arabs go in
their revolt against the U.S. influence and how much they defy this
influence, the U.S. aims are guaranteed as long as Israel remains capable
of intimidating the Arabs. If Israel's ability to intimidate becomes
doubtful, U.S. policy will have to seek another course. Israel has proved
to the U.S.A. that for the time being it is more useful to it than the
Arabs. Although all the U.S. interests in the Middle East lie with the
Arabs, the U.S.A. continues to support Israel. The strange contradiction
in the Middle East at present is that the U.S.A. is protecting its interests
in the Arab world by supporting Israel. Israel is thus the gun pointed
at the Arabs, the gun which the U.S.A. is brandishing to attain its
aims and protect its interests....
After all this, the question remains: is such a battle
possible?
The answer is: I do not claim military experience,
yet I say that there is no doubt or suspicion as to the possibilities
of such a battle which could inflict defeat on the Israeli Army. My
belief is based on the following considerations:
1. The only myths in the Israeli system are those
fabricated by bold and daring propaganda or by great imagination. Israeli
society is not a straw as some believe, nor a rock as others imagine....
Israeli society cannot live independently. It is a society which cannot
produce any genuine economic or political force. What matters most is
the intrinsic force and not the apparent force, which is deceptive in
most cases. Myths that are based on apparent force are bound to be dispelled
by experience, especially if met by a capable force.
2. Israel has lost its once-in-a-lifetime opportunity.
After 5th June 1967 its myth acquired all the elements it needed. Yet
Israel could not attain its goal of turning the end of the battle into
the end of the war. Arab steadfastness proved that the battle has ended
but the war will continue. Thus Israel has lost its opportunity.
3. In any future battle, the Israeli Army would fight
under conditions different from those in all previous battles. The Israeli
Army would not he able to advance easily from its present positions
along the Jordan river, the Suez Canal and the Golan Heights without
finding itself passing through densely populated Arab areas. with the
danger that these would absorb all its striking forces, exhaust it and
make it easy to pounce on the Israeli Army's scattered remains one by
one. With the exception of the Air Force effort, the Isriaeli Army would
have to fight a sustained battle or a defensive battle, whereas it is
accustomed to fighting offensive battles with its characteristic tactics
of indirect approach and fast oulflanking, movements. The Israeli lines
of communication between the bases and the fronts have become long and
arduous, especially in times of operations. As a result of the long
lines of communication it would he impossible for the Israeli Army to
nurse quickly on the Arab fronts as it did in the past when it was able
to strike on one front and then switch its forces by its short lines
of communication to strike at another Arab front... .
4. In any future battle the Israeli Army would face
Arab armies with different standards of fire power and its use, different
command structures benefiting from past experience, and a higher morale,
as the Arab forces would be aware of fighting for the heart of their
homeland and not only for its borders.
At the beginning of my article I said that a battle
ending in a clear defeat for the Israeli Army should he the chief method
of tipping the balance of fear and assurance.... I did not say it is
the only method because there are other secondary methods.... I will
give the following examples in this respect:
1. Our acceptance of the Security Council resolution
on the Middle East-the resolution which international society has endorsed-is
a valuable step, particularly since Israel has rejected the resolution
and thereby defied the whole of international society. Despite Israel's
daily proclaimed disrespect for the international organisation, the
question is not so simple. I mean that the Israeli citizens' awareness
of being at odds with the entire world will undoubtedly influence their
mood, and so affect the balance of fear and assurance in the Arab-Israeli
conflict.
2. The Soviet Union's support for the Arabs and its
continued help to them in rebuilding their military forces after the
tragedy of June 1967 will undoubtedly affect the feelings of the Israeli
people in the balance of fear and assurance.
3. France's
stand cannot fail to affect the balance of fear and assurance for the
Israeli inhabitants who realise that the greater part of their military
power in 1967 came from France and that-from 1954 to 1964 at least France
was an ally of Israel joined by special ties.
4. The current four-power talks in New York arouse
Israel's suspicions, to say the least, because they indicate clearly
that the Middle East crisis cannot for long remain confined to the Middle
East and that it might lead to a nuclear confrontation between the great
Powers. The talks may produce a solution to the problem which-to put
it at its lowest-will fail to give Israel everything it feels to be
within its reach. Irrespective of their results and what the Arabs think
of these results, the talks will play their part in affecting the balance
of fear and assurance in the Israeli people's feelings.
Sources: Walter Laqueur and Barry Rubin, ed, The
Israel-Arab Reader, (New York, NY: Penguin Books, 2001 |