Summary of Eshkol Reply To Kennedy
Letter
(November 9, 1963)
This is a memorandum from Department
of State Executive Secretary Read to the
President's Special Assistant for National
Security Affairs, McGeorge Bundy, summarizing Israeli
Prime Minister Eshkol's letter on Israeli
security concerns.
The enclosed letter from Israeli Prime Minister Eshkol is a reply to the
President's letter of October 3, 1963. The main points are:
1. Appreciation for the United States commitment to deter or halt any
aggression on Israel;
2. Need to strengthen this commitment in view of the evolving situation
in the Near East;
3. Need to keep pace with U.A.R. missile progress to maintain deterrent
against aggression;
4. Imbalance between Israeli and U.A.R. armored and naval forces;
5. Financial burden of maintaining a deterrent balance exceeds the
capacity of small states such as Israel;
6. Hope that Israeli appraisal of arms balance to be given November
12 in Washington will receive earnest and positive consideration.
The thrust of the letter is that in the absence of a formal U.S. security
guarantee, Israel must seek alternative means to assure its security
in the face of U.A.R. missile and sophisticated weapon development and
its conventional arms build up. Mr. Eshkol concluded that Israel will
not possess the necessary capacity in the near future to deter aggressive
U.A.R. moves without considerable help in obtaining ground-to-ground
missiles, tanks and increased naval power.
The Eshkol letter clearly is designed to set the tone of the November
12 U.S.-Israeli talks on U.A.R. missilery proposed by the Secretary
to Mrs. Meir as a result of their meeting September 30. On November
12 the Israeli Deputy Chief of Staff and Deputy Chief of Military Intelligence
will give Israel's appraisal of U.A.R. military capabilities. We understand
they intend to concentrate on the urgent need for secret U.S.-Israeli
staff consultations and on making the November 12 talks the base for
future discussions.
The care and thoroughness that has characterized Israel's preparations
for the November 12 talks, beginning with Foreign Minister Meir's meeting
with the President December 27, 1962 and ending with Prime Minister
Eshkol's letter, suggested that Israel all along may have discounted
the possibility of obtaining a U.S. security guarantee and even now
entertains little hope of obtaining missiles from the United States.
Israel, however, may want to have our refusal in hand for public use
in justifying open collaboration with the French or in explaining some
new development in its existing missile or nuclear development programs.
In the November 12 talks we hope through open and frank responses to
convince the Israeli representatives of our sympathetic interest in
their security concerns and of our genuine desire to help Israel to
the best of our ability. We will press the view that U.S. ability to
deter aggression against Israel makes less imperative the need for Israel
to maintain clear military superiority over the U.A.R. in all fields
and underlines the futility of large expenditures of time, effort and
money on a spiralling arms race. We will stress that Israel's acquisition
of missiles could result in a Soviet supply of missiles to the U.A.R.
and that a missile race increases the chance of a missile exchange in
which Israel as a small, compact target would inevitably suffer most.
Consistent with the President's letter of October 3, we wish to avoid
moving toward 1) joint contingency planning, 2) further periodic military
consultations, 3) sales of missiles and sophisticated weapons or 4)
sales of heavy, offensive conventional weapons.
The Department prefers to defer a reply to Prime Minister Eshkol's
letter pending the conclusion of the November 12 talks and the receipt
of the further communications he said he would send regarding Israel's
security concerns.
Marion A. Baldwin
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |