Iraq
(2001)
The Interim Constitution provides for individual
freedom of religion, provided that it does not violate "morality
and public order;" however, the Government severely
limits freedom of religion in practice, represses the Shi'a
religious leadership, and seeks to exploit religious differences
for political purposes. Islam is the official state religion.
There was no change in the status of respect
for religious freedom during the period covered by this report.
Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group, Sunni
Arabs traditionally have dominated economic and political
life. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct advantage in all areas
of secular life. The Government also severely restricts or
bans outright many Shi'a religious practices. The Government
for decades has conducted a brutal campaign of murder, summary
execution, arbitrary arrest, and protracted detention against
the religious leaders and followers of the majority Shi'a
Muslim population and has sought to undermine the identity
of minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and Yazidi
groups. The regime systematically has killed senior Shi'a
clerics, desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites, interfered
with Shi'a religious education, and prevented Shi'a adherents
from performing their religious rites.
Shi'a Arabs, the religious majority of
the population, have long been disadvantaged economically,
politically, and socially. Christians in the country report
being victimized by intra-Kurdish fighting.
The United States has no diplomatic relations
with Iraq and thus is unable to raise directly with the Government
the problems of severe restrictions on religious freedom
and other human rights abuses. However, the U.S. Government
makes its position clear in public statements and in diplomatic
contacts with other states.
In 1999 and 2000, the Secretary of State
designated Iraq a country of particular concern under the
International Religious Freedom Act for particularly severe
violations of religious freedom.
Section I. Religious Demography
While a precise statistical breakdown is
impossible to ascertain because of likely inaccuracies in
the latest census (conducted in 1997), according to best
estimates, 97 percent of the population of 22 million persons
are Muslim. Shi'a Muslims--predominantly Arab, but also including
Turkoman, Faili Kurds, and other groups--constitute a 60
to 65 percent majority. Sunni Muslims make up 32 to 37 percent
of the population (approximately 18 to 20 percent are Sunni
Kurds, 12 to 15 percent Sunni Arabs, and the remainder are
Sunni Turkomen). The remaining approximately 3 percent of
the overall population consist of Christians (Assyrians,
Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis, Mandaeans,
and a small number of Jews.
The Shi'a, though predominantly located
in the south, also are present in large numbers in Baghdad
and have communities in most parts of the country. Sunnis
form the majority in the center of the country and in the
north.
Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not ethnically
distinct. Shi'a Arabs have supported an independent Iraq
alongside their Sunni brethren since the 1920 Revolt; many
Shi'a joined the Ba'ath Party and the Shi'a formed the backbone
of the Iraqi Army in the 1980-88 Iran-Iraq War.
Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered
by many to be distinct ethnic groups as well as the descendants
of some of the earliest Christian communities. These communities
speak a distinct language (Syriac). Although these groups
do not define themselves as Arabs, the Government defines
Assyrians and Chaldeans as such, evidently to encourage them
to identify with the Sunni-Arab dominated regime. Christians
are concentrated in the north and in Baghdad.
The Yazidis are a syncretistic religious
group (or a set of several groups). Many Yazidis consider
themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, though some would define
themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from
Muslim Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical
basis, has defined the Yazidis as Arabs. Yazidis predominately
reside in the north of the country.
Section II. Status of Religious Freedom
Legal/Policy Framework
The Interim Constitution provides for freedom
of religion; however, the Government severely restricts this
right in practice. Islam is the official state religion.
The Constitution does not provide for the recognition of
Assyrians, Chaldeans, or Yazidis.
The Government's registration requirements
for religious organizations are unknown. New political parties
must be based in Baghdad and are prohibited from having any
ethnic or religious character. The Government does not recognize
political organizations that have been formed by Shi'a Muslims
or Assyrian Christians. These groups continued to attract
support despite their illegal status. There are religious
qualifications for government office; candidates for the
National Assembly, for example, "must believe in God."
There are no Shari'a (Islamic law) courts
as such. Civil courts are empowered to administer Islamic
law in cases involving personal status, such as divorce and
inheritance.
Restrictions on Religious Freedom
Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious
group, Sunni Arabs traditionally have dominated economic
and political life. Sunni Arabs are at a distinct advantage
in all areas of secular life, be it civil, political, military,
or economic.
The Ministry of Endowments and Religious
Affairs monitors places of worship, appoints the clergy,
approves the building and repair of all places of worship,
and approves the publication of all religious literature.
The following government restrictions on
religious rights remained in effect throughout the period
covered by this report: restrictions and outright bans on
communal Friday prayer by Shi'a; restrictions on Shi'a mosque
libraries loaning books; a ban on the broadcast of Shi'a
programs on government-controlled radio or television; a
ban on the publication of Shi'a books, including prayer books
and guides; a ban on many funeral processions other than
those organized by the Government; a ban on other Shi'a funeral
observances such as gatherings for Koran reading; and the
prohibition of certain processions and public meetings commemorating
Shi'a holy days.
Shi'a groups report capturing documents
from the security services during the 1991 uprising that
listed thousands of forbidden Shi'a religious writings. Since
1991 security forces have been encamped in the shrine to
Imam Ali in Najaf, one of Shi'a Islam's holiest sites, and
at the city's Shi'a theological schools. The shrine was closed
for "repairs" for approximately 2 years after the
1991 uprising. The adjoining al-Khathra mosque, which also
was closed in 1994, has remained closed since. The closure
coincided with the death of Ayatollah Sayed Mohammed Taqi
al-Khoei who was killed in what observers believe was a staged
car accident; before his death, Ayatollah al-Khoei led prayers
in the al-Khathra mosque.
During the period covered by this report,
the U.N. Special Rapporteur reported that, according to Shi'a
religious dignitaries in Iran, the Government continues to
arrest Shi'a religious figures, disrupt Shi'a religious ceremonies--sometimes
with armed force--and places restrictions on practices by
most Shi'a religious leaders. As a consequence, the number
of religious scholars, students, and other dignitaries in
the seminaries reportedly has declined.
In June 1999, several Shi'a opposition
groups reported that the Government had instituted a program
in the predominantly Shi'a districts of Baghdad that uses
food ration cards to restrict where individuals may pray.
The ration cards, part of the U.N. oil-for-food program,
reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a mosque and
are printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who
attempt to pray at an unauthorized location. Shi'a expatriates
who reported this policy believe that it is aimed not only
at preventing unauthorized religious gatherings of Shi'a,
but at stopping Shi'a adherents from attending Friday prayers
in Sunni mosques, a practice that many pious Shi'a have turned
to because their own mosques remain closed.
The Government consistently politicizes
and interferes with religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi
Muslims who wish to make the Hajj to Mecca and Medina and
of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who travel to holy
sites within the country. For example, in 1998 the U.N. Sanctions
Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel and expenses
to pilgrims making the Hajj; however, the Government rejected
this offer. In 1999 the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse
funds to cover Hajj-related expenses via a neutral third
party; the Government again rejected the offer. Following
the December 1999 passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1284, the Sanctions Committee again sought to devise a protocol
to facilitate the payment for individuals making the journey.
The Sanctions Committee proposed to issue $250 in cash and
$1,750 in travelers checks to each individual pilgrim to
be distributed at the U.N. office in Baghdad in the presence
of both U.N. and Iraqi officials. The Government again declined
and, consequently, no Iraqi pilgrims were able to take advantage
of the available funds or, in 2000, of the permitted flights.
Twice each year--on the 10th day of the
Muslim month of Muharram and 40 days later in the month of
Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from throughout the country and around
the world seek to commemorate the death of the Imam Hussein
in the city of Karbala. In past years, the Government has
denied visas to many foreign pilgrims for the Ashura. For
example, in 1999 the Government reportedly charged foreign
Shi'a pilgrims $900 for bus passage and food from Damascus
to Karbala, a trip that normally would cost about $150.
The Government does not permit education
in languages other than Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction
in Syriac, which was announced under a 1972 decree, never
was implemented. Thus, in areas under government control,
Assyrian and Chaldean children are not permitted to attend
classes in Syriac.
In northern areas under Iraqi Kurdish control,
classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising
against the Government. By October 1998, the first groups
of students were ready to begin secondary school in Syriac
in the north, but some Assyrian sources reported that regional
Iraqi Kurdish authorities refused to allow the classes to
begin. Details of this practice (for example, the number
of students prepared to start secondary courses in Syriac
and the towns where they were located) were not available,
and Kurdish regional authorities denied engaging in this
practice. There were no reports of elementary school instruction
in Syriac being hindered in the north of the country.
Assyrian religious organizations have claimed
that the Government applies apostasy laws in a discriminatory
fashion. Assyrians are permitted to convert to Islam, whereas
Muslims are forbidden to convert to Christianity.
Abuses of Religious Freedom
The Government for decades has conducted
a brutal campaign of murder, summary execution, and protracted
arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders and followers
of the majority Shi'a Muslim population and has sought to
undermine the identity of minority Christian (Assyrian and
Chaldean) and Yazidi groups.
Despite supposed legal protection of religious
equality, the regime has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy
and those who follow the Shi'a faith. Forces from the Intelligence
Service (Mukhabarat), General Security (Amn al-Amm), the
Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeen Saddam), and
the Ba'ath Party have killed senior Shi'a clerics, desecrated
Shi'a mosques and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath
of the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of
Shi'a, interfered with Shi'a religious education, prevented
Shi'a adherents from performing their religious rites, and
fired upon or arrested Shi'a who sought to take part in their
religious processions. Security agents reportedly are stationed
at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and search, harass,
and arbitrarily arrest worshipers.
Shi'a groups reported numerous instances
of religious scholars--particularly in the internationally
renowned Shi'a academic center of Najaf--being subjected
to arrest, assault, and harassment during the period covered
by this report. This follows years of government manipulation
of the Najaf theological schools. As reported by Amnesty
International in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Government
systematically deported tens of thousands of Shi'a (both
Arabs and Kurds) to Iran, claiming falsely that they were
of Persian descent. According to Shi'a sources, religious
scholars and Shi'a merchants who supported the schools financially
were prime targets for deportation. In the 1980's, during
the Iran-Iraq war, it was reported widely that the Government
expelled and denied visas to thousands of foreign scholars
who wished to study at Najaf. After the 1991 popular uprising,
the Government relaxed some restrictions on Shi'a attending
the schools; however, this easing of restrictions was followed
by an increased government repression of the Shi'a religious
establishment, including the requirement that speeches by
imams in mosques be based upon government-provided material
that attacked fundamentalist trends.
Since the 1980's, the Government reportedly
has attempted to eliminate the senior Shi'a religious leadership
(the Mirjaiyat) through killings, disappearances, and summary
executions.
Since January 1998, the killings of three
internationally respected clerics and an attempt on the life
of a fourth have been attributed widely to government agents
by international human rights activists, other governments,
and Shi'a clergy in Iran and Lebanon. Grand Ayatollah Sheikh
Murtada al-Borojourdi, age 69, was killed in April 1998.
Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi, age 68, was
killed in July 1998. Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al Hussaini
escaped an attempt on his life in January 1999. Grand Ayatollah
Mohammad al-Sadr, age 66, was killed in February 1999. Former
U.N. Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur for Iraq,
Max Van Der Stoel, sent a letter in 1999 to the Government
expressing his concern that the killings might be part of
an organized attack by the Government against the independent
leadership of the Shi'a community. The Government has not
responded to Van Der Stoel's inquiries.
In the aftermath of these killings, the
Government increased repressive activities in the south and
in other predominantly Shi'a areas to prevent mourning observances
and popular demonstrations. As part of this campaign, two
Shi'a scholars in Baghdad, Sheikh Hussain Suwai'dawi, and
Sheikh Ali al-Fraijawi, reportedly were executed in July
1998.
In April 1999, the Government executed
four Shi'a men for the al-Sadr slaying after a closed trial.
Shi'a religious authorities and opposition groups objected
to the trial process and contend that the four executed men
were innocent. At least one of the four, Sheikh Abdul Hassan
Abbas Kufi, a prayer leader in Najaf, reportedly was in prison
at the time of the killing. The Shi'a press reported in January
1999 that he had been arrested on December 24, 1998. The
three others executed with Kufi were Islamic scholar Ahmad
Mustapha Hassan Ardabily, Ali Kathim Mahjan, and Haider Ali
Hussain. The status of Ali al-Musawi, another Shi'a cleric
accused of complicity in al-Sadr's death, still is unknown.
According to a report submitted to the Special Rapporteur
in September 1999, another of al-Sadr's sons, Sayyid Muqtada
al-Sadr, was arrested along with a large number of theological
students who had studied under the Ayatollah. Nineteen followers
of al-Sadr reportedly were executed toward the end of 1999,
including Sheikh Muhammad al-Numani, Friday imam Sheikh Abd-al-Razzaq
al-Rabi'i, assistant Friday imam Kazim al-Safi, and students
from a religious seminary in Najaf.
Although a funeral for al-Sadr was prohibited,
spontaneous gatherings of mourners took place in the days
after his death. Government security forces used excessive
force in breaking up these illegal religious gatherings.
Throughout the country, security forces used automatic weapons
and armored vehicles to break up demonstrations, killing,
injuring, and arresting hundreds of protesters.
Authorities have targeted suspected supporters
of al-Sadr since he was killed in 1999. In February 2000,
30 Najaf religious school students, who were arrested after
al-Sadr's death, reportedly were executed. In March 2000,
scores of Shi'a who fled the country in 1999 and early 2000
told Human Rights Watch that they had been interrogated repeatedly
and, in some cases, detained and tortured. Some were relatives
of al-Sadr's students who had been arrested after the killing,
and others were relatives of other prominent clerics. In
May 2000, according to Human Rights Watch, at least six religious
students in Najaf who were arrested after al-Sadr's killing
were sentenced to death, including Shaikh Salim Jassem al-Abbudi,
Shaikh Nasser al-Saa'idi and Sa'ad al-Nuri. Two clerics,
Abdulsattar Abed-Ibrahim al-Mausawi and Ahmad al-Hashemi,
reportedly were executed in May 2000 after 6 months' detention.
The Government accused them of attempting to discredit the
President after they blamed Saddam Hussein for the al-Sadr's
killing. In late 1999 and early 2000, approximately 4,000
Shi'a families were expelled from Baghdad and sent to southern
and western Iraq in reprisal for the disturbances that took
place after al-Sadr's death.
Authorities took forceful preemptive measures
well ahead of the first anniversary of al-Sadr's killing.
Military units were deployed around shrines, mosques, and
other religious institutions 2 months before the February
anniversary. The Government closed mosques except during
prayer time, and the turnout on the holy day of Ashura in
April 2001 consequently was many times lower than it had
been in the past. In late May 2001, the Ba'ath party reportedly
issued orders prohibiting the ritual walking pilgrimage from
Najaf to Karbala, a procession marking the end of the 40-day
mourning period for Imam Husayn. Travelers reported that
security troops opened fire on pilgrims who attempted the
pilgrimage.
In the aftermath of the al-Sadr killing
and subsequent repression, the Shi'a religious community
remains in a precarious state. Of the three generally acknowledged
senior Shi'a clerics, Ayatollah Ali as-Sistani is forbidden
to lead prayers and remains under virtual house arrest in
Najaf as a result of attempts on his life; Ayatollah Mohammed
Sayeed al-Hakim is forbidden to lead prayers at the shrine
of Imam Ali in Najaf (or in the adjoining al-Khathra mosque,
which has remained closed since 1994); and the status of
Ayatollah Hussein Bahr al-Aloom, who was arrested in 1991,
reportedly died under questionable circumstances in June
2001. Many scholars at the Shi'a religious schools in Najaf
reportedly have been arrested, as have many of al-Sadr's
religious appointees throughout the country. These restrictions
and abuses had an adverse affect on the development of a
new set of Shi'a leaders.
The al-Sadr killing intensified Shi'a anger
at the ruling Sunni minority and led to more severe government
repression of the Shi'a. The Shi'a resistance also launched
bolder actions against the regime--including grenade and
rocket attacks on security headquarters, Ba'ath Party offices,
and presidential residences in Baghdad, as well as small
arms attacks in many parts of the capital. For example, the
al-Amin, Nuwab ad-Dubbat, and al-Nafth districts of Baghdad
reportedly have remained in a heightened state of alert every
Friday since al-Sadr's death.
Reports of military operations against
Shi'a civilians also increased notably in the summer of 1998
after the killings of Ayatollahs Ali al-Gharawi and Sheikh
al-Borojourdi. In numerous incidents during 1998, security
forces injured and summarily executed Shi'a civilians, burned
Shi'a homes, confiscated land belonging to Shi'a, and arbitrarily
arrested and detained scores of Shi'a.
In January 1999, according to a report
from the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq
(SCIRI) , security officials reportedly arrested Sheikh Awas,
imam of the Nasiriyah city mosque. Shortly after the arrest
of Sheikh Awas, hundreds of Shi'a congregation members reportedly
marched on the security directorate to demand that Awas be
released immediately to them. Security forces allegedly opened
fire on the unarmed crowd with automatic weapons and threw
hand grenades. Five persons were killed, 11 were wounded,
and 300 were arrested. The security services subsequently
banned Friday prayer in Nasiriyah.
The Human Rights Organization in Iraq (HROI)
reported that 1,093 Shi'a were arrested in June 1999 in Basrah
alone. The Iraqi National Congress reports that tanks from
the Hammourabi Republican Guard division attacked the towns
of Rumaitha and Khudur in June 1999 after residents protested
the systematic misdistribution of food and medicine to the
detriment of the Shi'a. Fourteen villagers were killed, over
100 persons were arrested, and 40 homes were destroyed. In
June 1999, SCIRI reported that 160 homes in the Abul Khaseeb
district near Basra were destroyed.
In several incidents in 1999, security
forces killed and injured Shi'a congregants who gathered
to protest closures of various Shi'a mosques.
The Government for several decades has
interfered with Ashura holiday commemorations, including
interference with the ritual walking pilgrimage to Karbala
to mark the end of the 40-day mourning period.
In May 2000, the Government issued orders
prohibiting the walking pilgrimage to Karbala. The Government
reportedly deployed more than 15,000 Republican Guard troops
armed with light weapons and in civilian clothes on the main
roads leading into both cities to enforce the prohibition.
Travelers later reported that security troops opened fire
on pilgrims who attempted the walk from Najaf to Karbala
as part of the 40th day ritual. Shi'a expatriates report
that groups as small as 10 to 20 pilgrims attempting to make
their way into the city at other times also have been arrested.
The United Nations Special Rapporteur on
Human Rights in Iraq reported during the period covered by
this report that he interviewed the brother of a Shi'a Arab
who allegedly was arrested in 1998 for carrying in his car
Islamic books and other religious papers. The individual
reportedly was executed 5 months later, along with 70 other
persons, on charges of belonging to the Shi'a movement. His
family reportedly learned of the execution when government
authorities delivered his body to them.
Security forces also have forced Shi'a
inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major
southern cities and to areas along the Iranian border. Former
Special Rapporteur van Der Stoel described this practice
in his February 1999 report, adding that many other persons
have been transferred to detention centers and prisons in
central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad. The Government reportedly
also continued to move forcibly Shi'a populations from the
south to the north to replace Kurds, Turkomen, and Assyrians,
who had been expelled forcibly from major cities.
The military also continued its water-diversion
and other projects in the south. The Government's claim that
the drainage is part of a land reclamation plan to increase
the acreage of arable land and spur agricultural production
is given little credence. Hundreds of square miles have been
burned in military operations. The former U.N. Special Rapporteur
noted the devastating impact that draining the marshes has
had on the culture of the Shi'a marsh Arabs. SCIRI claims
to have captured government documents that detail the destructive
intent of the water diversion program and its connection
to "strategic security operations," economic blockade,
and "withdrawal of food supply agencies."
The Government's diversion of supplies
in the south limited the Shi'a population's access to food,
medicine, drinking water, and transportation. According to
the former U.N. Special Rapporteur and opposition sources,
thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces were
denied rations that should have been supplied under the U.N.
oil-for-food program. In these provinces and in Amarah province,
access to food allegedly is used to reward regime supporters
and silence opponents. Shi'a groups report that, due to this
policy, the humanitarian condition of Shi'a in the south
continued to suffer despite a significant expansion of the
oil-for-food program.
While no firm statistics are available
regarding the number of religious detainees, observers estimate
the total number of security detainees to be in the tens
of thousands or more, including numerous religious detainees
and prisoners. Some individuals have been held for decades.
Others who have remained unaccounted for since their arrests
may have died or been executed secretly years ago. The Government
reportedly continued to target Shi'a Muslim clergy and their
followers for arbitrary arrest and imprisonment. While Shi'a
are not the only group targeted in this way (others, including
Kurds and secular regime opponents, are targeted for ethnic
and political reasons), the Shi'a are the primary group targeted
based on their religion. It is likely that Shi'a Muslims
constitute the majority of the prison population in the country.
It is difficult to produce an accurate
list of persons in prison for their religious beliefs; however,
there are some well-known cases of arrest and disappearance
on these grounds. For example, in 1991 Iraqi authorities
arrested 108 Shi'a clerics and students, including 95-year-old
Grand Ayatollah Abu Gharib al-Qassem al-Khoei, 10 of his
family members, and 8 of his aides. Ayatollah al-Khoei subsequently
was released; however, he was held under house arrest until
his death in 1992. The Government also released another person
(a foreign national) who was arrested in 1991; however, the
fate of the other 106 persons is unknown. In 1992 the Government
denied that it knew anything about the whereabouts of the
missing persons; however, many observers reportedly witnessed
their arrests. Over the years, hundreds of thousands of persons
have disappeared, and their whereabouts remain unknown. The
majority of those targeted have been Shi'a Muslims and Kurds.
The former Special Rapporteur and others
have reported that the Government has engaged in various
abuses against the country's 350,000 Assyrian and Chaldean
Christians, especially in terms of forced movements from
northern areas and repression of political rights.
Most Assyrians live in the northern governorates,
and the Government often has suspected them of "collaborating"
with Iraqi Kurds. In the north, Kurdish groups often refer
to Assyrians as Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed
numerous Assyrian churches during the 1988 Anfal Campaign
and reportedly executed and tortured many Assyrians. Both
major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the Government
occasionally targets Assyrians as well as ethnic Kurds and
Turkomen for expulsion from Kirkuk, where it is seeking to
Arabize the city.
There is evidence that the Government in
the past compelled Yazidis to join in domestic military action
against Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included
in a 1998 Human Rights Watch report describe special all-Yazidi
military detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign
to "pursue and attack" Muslim Kurds. The Government
also has targeted the Yazidis in the past. For example, 33
members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, arrested in July
1996, still are unaccounted for.
Although few Jews remain in the country,
government officials frequently make anti-Semitic statements.
For example, during the period covered by this report, a
Ba'th Party official stated that "lowly Jews" were
"descendants of monkeys and pigs and worshipers of the
infidel tyrant."
Forced Religious Conversion
There were no reports of forced religious
conversion, including of minor U.S. citizens who had been
abducted or illegally removed from the United States, or
of the Government's refusal to allow such citizens to be
returned to the United States.
Section III. Societal Attitudes
The country's cultural, religious, and
linguistic diversity is not reflected in its political and
economic structure. Various segments of the Sunni Arab community,
which itself constitutes a minority of the population, effectively
have controlled the Government since independence in 1932.
Shi'a Arabs, the religious majority of
the population, have long been disadvantaged economically,
politically, and socially.
Assyrian groups reported several instances
of mob violence by Muslims against Christians in the north
in recent years. Assyrians continue to fear attacks by the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a Turkish-based terrorist
organization operating against indigenous Kurds in the north
of the country. Christians in the country report being victimized
by intra-Kurdish fighting. Some Assyrian villagers have reported
being pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as
part of a campaign by indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the
PKK access to possible food supplies.
Section IV. U.S. Government Policy
The United States has no diplomatic relations
with Iraq and thus is not able to raise directly with the
Government the problems of severe restrictions on religious
freedom and other human rights abuses. However, the U.S.
Government makes its position clear in public statements
and in diplomatic contacts with other states.
During the period covered by this report,
the President regularly discussed the problems experienced
by Shi'a, Christian, and other religious groups in his periodic
reports to Congress on Iraq. The Assistant Secretary of State
for Near Eastern Affairs, in testimony before Congress on
Iraq, highlighted the situation of persons in the south.
In a number of speeches delivered during the period covered
by this report, the Ambassador-at-Large for War Crimes Issues
articulated the regime's crimes against humanity directed
at the Shi'a population. The State Department spokesperson
issued statements criticizing the deaths of Ayatollahs
al-Gharawi, al-Borojourdi, al-Sadr, and
the attempt on the life of Ayatollah al-Hussaini. The Voice
of America broadcast several editorials dealing with the
human rights abuses committed against religious groups by
the Government.
It is the policy of the United States to
encourage a change of regime in Iraq. The United States government
is in frequent contact with opposition groups, including
religiously oriented Shi'a, Sunni, and Christian groups.
All of the groups designated as eligible for assistance under
the Iraq Liberation Act have indicated their strong support
for religious freedom and tolerance.
In March 2001, for the ninth consecutive
year, the United States joined other members of the U.N.
Human Rights Commission (UNHRC) to call on the U.N. Secretary
General to send human rights monitors to "help in the
independent verification of reports on the human rights situation
in Iraq." However, the Government continued to ignore
these calls. As in the past, it did not allow the U.N. Special
Rapporteur to visit, nor did it respond to his requests for
information. Denied entry to the country, the Special Rapporteur
has based his reports on the Government's human rights abuses
on interviews with recent émigrés from the
country, interviews with opposition groups with contacts
in the country, and other interviews, as well as on published
reports.
In 1999 and 2000, then-Secretary of State
Albright designated Iraq a country of particular concern
under the International Religious Freedom Act for particularly
severe violations of religious freedom.
Sources: U.S. State Department - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor |