Iraq
(1999)
Section I. Freedom of Religion
The Constitution provides for freedom of religion;
however, the Government severely limits this right in practice. Islam is
the official state religion.
The Government's registration requirements for religious
organizations are unknown.
The Ministry of Endowments and Religious Affairs
monitors places of worship, appoints the clergy, approves the building and
repair of all places of worship, and approves the publication of all
religious literature.
While a precise statistical breakdown is impossible
because of likely inaccuracies in the latest census (1997), according to
conservative estimates, over 95 percent of the population are Muslim. The
(predominantly Arab) Shi'a Muslims constitute a 60 to 65 percent majority,
while Sunni Muslims make up 30 to 35 percent (approximately 18 to 20
percent are Sunni Kurds, 12 to 15 percent are Sunni Arabs, and the rest are
Sunni Turkomans). The remaining approximately 5 percent consist of
Christians (Assyrians, Chaldeans, Roman Catholics, and Armenians), Yazidis,
and a small number of Jews.
The Shi'a, predominantly in the south, are present in
large numbers in Baghdad and have communities in most parts of the country.
Sunnis form the majority in the center of the country and in the north.
Christians are concentrated in the north and in Baghdad. Yazidis are
located in the north.
New political parties must be based in Baghdad and are
prohibited from having any ethnic or religious character. The Government
does not recognize political organizations that have been formed by Shi'a
Muslims or Assyrian Christians. These groups continued to attract support
despite their illegal status. There are religious qualifications for
government office; candidates for the National Assembly, for example,
"must believe in God."
Although Shi'a Arabs are the largest religious group,
Sunni Arabs traditionally have dominated economic and political life. Arabs
holding Sunni religious beliefs are at a distinct advantage in all areas of
secular endeavor: civil, political, military, economic, etc. Although there
is a political factor, the government's repression of the Shi'a appears
basically religiously motivated. Shi'a and Sunni Arabs are not ethnically
distinct. Shi'a Arabs supported an independent Iraq alongside their Sunni
brethren since the 1920 Revolt, many joined the Ba'ath Party, and Shi'a
formed the backbone of the Iraqi Army in the 1980 to 1988 Iran-Iraq War.
The Government--dominated by a repressive one-party
apparatus controlled by Saddam Hussein and members of his extended
family--has for decades conducted a brutal campaign of murder, summary
execution, and protracted arbitrary arrest against the religious leaders
and followers of the majority Shi'a Muslim population and has sought to
undermine the identity of minority Christian (Assyrian and Chaldean) and
Yazidi groups.
There was no change in the status of respect for
religious freedom during the period covered by this report.
Despite supposed legal protection of religious equality,
the regime has repressed severely the Shi'a clergy and those who follow the
Shi'a faith. Forces from the Intelligence Service (Mukhabarat), General
Security (Amn al-Amm), the Military Bureau, Saddam's Commandos (Fedayeeen
Saddam), and the Ba'ath Party have murdered senior Shi'a clerics,
desecrated Shi'a mosques and holy sites (particularly in the aftermath of
the 1991 civil uprising), arrested tens of thousands of Shi'a, interfered
with Shi'a religious education, and prevented Shi'a adherents from
performing their religious rites. Security agents reportedly are stationed
at all the major Shi'a mosques and shrines and search, harass, and
arbitrarily arrest worshipers.
The following government restrictions on religious
rights remained in effect throughout the period covered by this report:
restrictions and outright bans on communal Friday prayer by Shi'a;
restrictions on Shi'a mosque libraries loaning books; a ban on the
broadcast of Shi'a programs on government-controlled radio or television; a
ban on the publication of Shi'a books, including prayer books and guides; a
ban on funeral processions other than those organized by the Government; a
ban on other Shi'a funeral observances such as gatherings for Koran
reading; and the prohibition of certain processions and public meetings
commemorating Shi'a holy days. Shi'a groups report capturing documents from
the security services during the 1991 uprising that listed thousands of
forbidden Shi'a religious writings. Since 1991 security forces have been
encamped in the shrine to Imam Ali in Najaf, one of Shi'a Islam's holiest
sites, and at the Shi'a theological schools of Najaf. As far as is known,
security forces to be encamped there. In June 1999, several Shi'a
opposition groups reported that the Government had instituted a new program
in the predominantly Shi'a districts of Baghdad using food ration cards to
restrict where individuals could pray. The ration cards, part of the U.N.
oil-for-food program, reportedly are checked when the bearer enters a
mosque and are printed with a notice of severe penalties for those who
attempt to pray at an unauthorized location. Shi'a expatriates reporting
this new policy believe it is aimed not only at preventing unauthorized
religious gatherings of Shi'a but at stopping Shi'a adherents from
attending Friday prayers in Sunni mosques, an expedient many pious Shi'a
have turned to since their own mosques remain closed.
Shi'a groups reported numerous instances of religious
scholars--particularly in the internationally renowned Shi'a academic
center of Najaf--being subjected to arrest, assault, and harassment during
the period covered by this report. This follows years of Government
manipulation of the Najaf theological schools. As reported by Amnesty
International in the late 1970's and early 1980's, the Government
systematically deported tens of thousands of Shi'a (both Arabs and Kurds)
to Iran, claiming erroneously that they were of Persian descent. According
to Shi'a sources, religious scholars and Shi'a merchants who supported the
schools financially were prime targets for deportation. In the 1980's,
during the Iran-Iraq war, it was widely reported that the Government
expelled and denied visas to thousands of foreign scholars wishing to study
at Najaf. After the 1991 popular uprising, the Government relaxed some
restrictions on Shi'a attending the schools, perhaps hoping this would
deflect popular revulsion over arrests and executions of religious leaders.
Instead the revival of the schools appears to have exceeded greatly the
Government's expectations, helping to bring traditional Shi'a piety into
even greater contrast with the depredations of the regime. This led to a
redoubled Government crackdown on the Shi'a religious establishment.
These restrictions have played a divisive role in
society, leading to the alienation of many Shi'a adherents from society and
to protests against the regime. The apparently systematic campaign by the
Government to eliminate the senior Shi'a religious leadership (the
Mirjaiyat) through murder, disappearances, and summary execution
accelerated during the period covered by this report. There were four
attempts at killing high-level Shi'a clerics, culminating in the death of
Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Sadiq as-Sadr, the country's senior Shi'a
religious leader. Some of the more prominent incidents of this nature since
Saddam Hussein became President of Iraq are:
Ayatollah Sayyid Mohammad Baqir as Sadr, who was
executed along with his sister in 1980; Ayatollah Mohammed Sadeq al-Qazwini,
who was arrested in 1980 and whose whereabouts remain unknown; Sayyid Mehdi
al Hakim, the eldest son Grand Ayatollah Mohsin al Hakim, who was killed in
Khartoum in 1981; Ayatollah Abul Sahib Al Hakim and 16 members of his
family, who were killed in 1983; Ayatollah Qasim Shubar, who was arrested
in 1979 and whose whereabouts remain unknown; Ayatollah Nasrallah al
Mustanbat, who was killed in the mid-80s; Ayatollahs Ala'ad-din Bahr al-Aloom
and Aiz ad-Din Bahr al-Aloom and over a dozen members of their family, who
were arrested by security agents in 1991 and still are missing; Ayatollah
Sheikh Mohammad Taqi al Jawahary, who was arrested in the 1980's and whose
whereabouts remain unknown; Grand Ayatollah Abul Qasim Al-Khoei, age 93 and
formerly the senior Shi'a clergyman, who died under house arrest in 1992
after intensive interrogation (a total of 108 of al-Khoei's associates
arrested with him still have not been accounted for, and the Government
continued to harass and threaten members of his family); Ayatollah Mohammad
Taqi Al-Khoei, who died in what appeared to be a staged car accident in
1994; and Grand Ayatollah Sayyid Ali as Seistani, who survived an attempt
on his life in 1996.
Since January 1998, the killings of three
internationally respected Shi'a clerics (and an attempt on the life of a
fourth) have been widely attributed to Government agents by international
human rights activists, other governments, and Shi'a clergy in Iran and
Lebanon. Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Murtada al-Borojourdi, age 69, was killed
in April 1998. Grand Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi, age 68, was
killed in July 1998. Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al Hussaini escaped an attempt
on his life in January 1999. Grand Ayatollah Mohammad as-Sadr, age 66, was
killed in February 1999.
U.N. Human Rights Commission Special Rapporteur for Iraq
Max Van Der Stoel sent a letter to the Government expressing his concern
that the killings might be part of an organized attack by the Government
against the independent leadership of the Shi'a community. The Government
has not responded to Van Der Stoel's inquiries.
On April 22, 1998, Grand Ayatollah Murtadha Ali Mohammad
al-Borojourdi and two of his followers were shot and killed near the Imam
Ali Mosque in Najaf while returning home after morning prayers. The killing
was widely attributed by Shi'a religious leaders outside Iraq to the
Government because of the assaults and harassment he had suffered in recent
years. Security forces reportedly beat al-Borojourdi in 1996. Subsequently,
a hand grenade was thrown at him. In 1997 government agents reportedly
threatened to kill him if he did not cease leading prayers and giving
sermons at the Imam Ali Mosque, an order with which he refused to comply.
On June 1, 1998, Ayatollah Sheikh Mirza Ali al-Gharawi,
his son, and son-in-law were shot on the road from Karbala to Najaf. A
month before these killings, Shi'a sources reported that al-Gharawi had
been harassed by government officials and, similar to al-Borojourdi, warned
to cease leading communal prayers.
The Government's initial claims regarding these two
killings-- that forces from outside Iraq perpetrated the attacks--and its
subsequent assertion that a gang led by Shi'a religious students killed the
clerics to rob them, were criticized by Shi'a authorities outside of the
country as transparent lies. They criticized the Government's subsequent
executions of eight of these men. In the aftermath of the killings, the
Government stepped up repressive activities in the south and in other
predominantly Shi'a areas to prevent mourning observances and popular
demonstrations. As part of this campaign, two Shi'a scholars in Baghdad,
Sheikh Hussain Suwai'dawi and Sheikh Ali al-Fraijawi, reportedly were
executed in July 1998.
On January 7, 1999, Ayatollah Sheikh Bashir al-Hussaini
(also known as al-Najafi and al-Bakistani), a high-ranking scholar and
teacher in Najaf, escaped an attempt on his life when a hand grenade was
thrown into his home. At the time, al-Hussaini was teaching a class in
Islamic jurisprudence to students gathered during the Ramadan fast. Three
of his pupils were killed and al-Hussaini was injured.
On February 19, 1999, Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Sadiq as-Sadr,
the most senior Shi'a religious leader in Iraq, was killed in downtown
Najaf when the car he was riding in was boxed in by two other cars and hit
by machine gun fire. Two of his sons also were killed in the attack. As-Sadr's
death was widely attributed to the Government, as he was killed immediately
after leading Friday prayers despite an order not to do so issued by
Central Euphrates Region Military Governor and Revolutionary Command
Council member Mohammad Hamza al Zubeidi.
As-Sadr reportedly expected to die and had led the
Friday prayers wearing a funeral shroud. In the months leading up to his
death, Shi'a sources report that security agents detained as-Sadr several
times, arrested his deputy, blockaded his house, and prevented him from
leading prayers. Government agents pretending to be religious students
allegedly came to study under him in order to keep tabs on him. President
Saddam Hussein reportedly made blunt reference in his speeches to as-Sadr's
cousin--Grand Ayatollah Mohammad Baqir as-Sadr, executed in 1980--as al-Maqbur,
"the buried one." In the aftermath of the killing, the Government
delayed a public announcement of his death for 24 hours, allegedly
pressured his family and followers not to hold a funeral, and reportedly
executed as-Sadr's deputy. As-Sadr's writings (including pamphlets on
devotion and prayer) and videotaped sermons were banned and seized.
Unconfirmed reports from Shi'a sources in Najaf indicate
that several teams of security officers were immediately on the scene after
the shooting to collect as-Sadr's body and rush it away, a circumstance
that they believe points to government foreknowledge of the attack. These
same sources also claim to have learned the identities of four of the five
members of a special security death squad that allegedly were assembled
from around the country to carry out the killing. They allege that Security
Major Mohammad Ghanim of Tikrit, Security Major Ahmad abd al-Khalaf of
Basra, and Security Major Akram Said Umar of Baghdad were involved, as was
one "Hajj Aziz."
Although a funeral for al-Sadr was prohibited,
spontaneous gatherings of mourners took place in the days after his death.
Some of these, particularly those outside major mosques in the cities, grew
to be quite large. Government security forces used excessive force in
breaking up these illegal religious gatherings. In the impoverished Shi'a
Thawra district of Baghdad, a crowd of tens of thousands of persons was
attacked by security forces using automatic weapons and armored vehicles,
resulting in the death of perhaps 25 mourners killed (although estimates
range up to 400) including, according to one report, the imam of the al-Thawra
mosque. Fifty persons reportedly were seriously wounded and about 250
persons were arrested, including 15 religious scholars. At around the same
time, in the Shu'la district of Baghdad, 22 persons reportedly were killed.
Afterwards more than 600 Shi'a residents of al-Thawra may have been
arrested arbitrarily in security sweeps.
Outside Baghdad illegal assemblies of Shi'a took place
in most of the major cities of the south in reaction to the as-Sadr
killing. Ali Hassan al-Majid, the military "supergovernor" for
southern Iraq, reportedly declared martial law throughout the region.
Twenty-two persons reportedly were killed in the Suq as-Shuyukh area of
Nasiriyah on February 20, 1999 when security forces attempted to break up a
gathering of mourners. When the crowds could not be quelled directly, the
army reportedly surrounded the city and shelled its center; 17 more persons
reportedly were killed. Expatriate citizens from Nasiriyah subsequently
learned that 10 to 20 armored personnel carriers then entered the city,
sealed off the marketplace, and stampeded the crowd, resulting in further
injuries and deaths.
Other Shi'a sources report that on the same day the city
of Najaf also was surrounded by government troops. Sparked by the news of
as-Sadr's death and government suppression of mourning activities,
demonstrations took place in Karbala and Basra. Several Shi'a sources
report that in Amara Sheikh Ali as-Sahalani, the imam of the Majar al-Kabir
mosque, allegedly was shot and killed along with other mourners; the angry
crowd then reportedly seized control of the city for a short while. Nine
demonstrators reportedly were executed in Ramadi. To prevent them from
leading religious gatherings, the chief Shi'a clerics of Basra and
Nasiriyah reportedly were arrested. These government actions ultimately
silenced the mourners and protesters, and the disturbances had ended by
late February 1999.
In Najaf in early April 1999, 15 persons reportedly were
wounded and hundreds were arrested while commemorating the 40-day
anniversary of as-Sadr's death, a traditional Islamic religious observance.
Later in April, the Government executed four Shi'a men for the as-Sadr
slaying after a closed trial. Shi'a religious authorities and opposition
groups objected to the trial process and contend that the four executed men
were innocent. At least one of the four, Sheikh Abdul Hassan Abbas Kufi, a
prayer leader in Najaf, was reportedly in prison at the time of the
killing. The Shi'a press reported in January 1999 that he had been arrested
on December 24, 1998. The three others executed with Kufi were Islamic
scholar Ahmad Mustapha Hassan Ardabily, Ali Kathim Mahjan, and Haider Ali
Hussain. The condition of Ali al-Musawi, another Shia cleric accused of
complicity in as-Sadr's death, was unknown.
In the aftermath of as-Sadr's killing the Shi'a
religious community is in a precarious state. Of the three generally
acknowledged senior Shi'a clerics, Grand Ayatollah Ali as-Seistani is
forbidden to lead prayers and remains home bound in Najaf as a result of
attempts on his life; Ayatollah Mohammed Sayeed al-Hakim is forbidden to
lead prayers at the shrine of Imam Ali in Najaf; and the status of
Ayatollah Hussein Bahr al-Aloom in Kufa is not known. Many scholars at the
Shi'a religious schools in Najaf have reportedly been arrested as have many
of as-Sadr's religious appointees throughout the country. These
restrictions will make it difficult, if not impossible, for a new Shi'a
leadership to emerge naturally. Normally after the mourning period for a
very senior cleric like as-Sadr, the Shi'a faithful--particularly the
scholars--would begin to learn more about the surviving senior clerics by
attending their lectures and prayer sessions, reading their religious
analyses and decisions under Islamic law, etc. Gradually, in a
traditionally informal and discreet process, a consensus would form
regarding who would lead the religious community. According to several
knowledgeable Shi'a observers outside Iraq, there is no way this process
can take place under the present circumstances.
The as-Sadr killing intensified Shi'a anger at the
ruling Sunni minority and led to more severe government repression of the
Shi'a and bolder actions by the Shi'a resistance against the
regime--including grenade and rocket attacks on security headquarters,
Ba'ath Party offices, and presidential residences in Baghdad and small arms
attacks in many parts of the capital. For example, the al Amin, Nuwab ad-Dubbat,
and al Nafth districts of Baghdad reportedly remained in heightened state
of alert every Friday since February.
The security and military crackdown against the Shi'a,
however, had been building for some time. During the period covered by this
report, Shi'a and opposition sources with close ties to individuals in the
south, such as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI)
and the Dawa organization, report that regular armed forces, the Republican
Guard, Saddam's Commandos, and ad hoc formations of Ba'ath Party members
have conducted deliberate ground sweeps and artillery attacks against Shi'a
civilians and large-scale burning operations in the southern marshes.
According to these Shi'a sources, in January 1998, Shi'a
villages near Sayed Yoshi lake in Nasiriyah province were surrounded by
government troops and bombarded with heavy artillery and mortars, the 14th
Division bombarded fishermen in the Am an-Ni'aj marsh in Amara province,
and scores of villagers in the Am al Ghizlan area of Amara province were
arrested and their crops burned. In February 1999, the Government cut off
food rations and attacked the al-Fuhood district of Nasiriyah province and
the Hamyan, al Azair, and Nahr al-Iz districts of Amara province, with
dozens of Shi'a civilians reportedly killed and hundreds arrested. In March
1999, the 11th Division bombarded many areas in Nasiriyah, and Ba'ath Party
militia followed with sweeps against the Amarya tribe, which included
incidents of looting. In May 1999, the Government launched a mass arrest
campaign in the al-Alam, ad-Dawara, and Nahr al-Iz areas. In June 1999,
"Saddam's Commandos" attacked villages between Qala'at Salih and
al-Kahla in Amara province and arrested and tortured a Shi'a businessman in
Amara as a pretext for confiscating his savings.
Reports of military operations against Shi'a civilians
increased notably in the summer of 1998, after the killings of Ayatollahs
Ali al Gharawi and Sheikh al Borojourdi. In July 1998, security services
resumed arrest sweeps in the Thawra district of Baghdad, rounding up young
men, assaulting residents, and looting money and personal property. In
August 1998, the Third Army Corps, in conjunction with Ba'ath Party
officials led by Abdul Baqi as-Sa'doon, conducted large-scale operations
against settlements of the al Juwaisid, ar-Rahma, al-Bu Salim, and Asakira
tribes in Nasiriyah province; most of the inhabitants, including women,
children, and the elderly, were forced to flee after dozens were wounded in
heavy artillery bombardments.
In September 1998, security forces launched an attack on
an-Nibron village in the Rifa'ee district; the troops burned houses,
confiscated land, and arrested entire families. This was only a precursor
to further large-scale assaults against the Shi'a that month. According to
reports received by the Iraq Foundation, an estimated 20,000 persons
reportedly were detained arbitrarily and trucked to tent-camp holding
facilities in the desert region of Rifa'ee about 60 miles north of the
marshes in the south.
In October 1998, government troops reportedly attacked
villages in the Fuhood and I'gaga districts of Nasiriyah province. In
November 1998, security forces, the Third and Fourth Army Corps, and Ba'ath
Party militia staged a 5-day assault, including heavy artillery
bombardment, in the Bani Malik area and the al Suwaib district of Basra
province, and widespread areas of Nasiriyah and Amara provinces, nearly to
the Iranian border. Hundreds of persons reportedly were killed in late
November 1998 in Amara as part of a security sweep personally directed by
Qusay Hussein, Saddam's son and his Principal Deputy on the State Council.
In December 1998, commandos arrested 39 persons in the aftermath of an
alleged attempt in Karbala to kill Revolutionary Command Council Vice
President Izzat ad-Douri. Some sources in the opposition claimed that the
attempt on ad-Douri's life was staged in order to justify the crackdown.
Others indicate that the 39 persons arrested were executed summarily.
On January 14, 1999, according to a report from SCIRI,
security officials reportedly arrested Sheikh Awas, imam of the Nasiriyah
city mosque. The next day, when Awas did not appear to lead the Friday
prayers, his deputy went to the Nasiriyah security directorate to plead for
his release. Soon afterward hundreds of Shi'a congregation members
reportedly marched on the security directorate to demand that Awas be
released immediately to them. Security forces allegedly opened fire on the
unarmed crowd with automatic weapons and also threw hand grenades. Five
persons were killed, 11 were wounded, and 300 were arrested. The security
services subsequently banned Friday prayer in Nasiriyah.
The security forces have used the symbolism of religious
holidays to underscore the impunity with which they operate. In January
1999, for example, 27 members of the elite "Saddam's Commandos"
reportedly were executed in Amara for conspiring with the Shi'a-based
opposition forces. Their bodies reportedly were delivered to their families
on Eid al Fitr, one of the most important holidays of the Islamic year.
On February 15, 1999, troops of the 11th division
reportedly attacked the Asakir tribe in the south of Nasiriyah province. In
March 1999, the Iraq Communist Party and Iraqi Shi'a groups reported
large-scale protests in Basra when government authorities forbade Shi'a
Friday prayer. According to these reports, security forces under orders
from Ali Hassan al-Magid attacked the marchers resulting in many deaths.
Seventy Shi'a men allegedly were detained in the Abu Sakhair region of
Basra; 100 in the Hayaniyh district; 40 in the Dor a-Fdubat area, and 85 in
the Jumhuriya district.
On April 16, 1999, dozens of unarmed protesters (some
reports indicate hundreds) allegedly were killed in street gatherings in
the Thawra district of Baghdad, after the security services prohibited
Shi'a congregants from attending Friday prayers. After the closure
announcement, a large unarmed crowd reportedly gathered at the entrance of
the Hikmat mosque in the Jawadir section of Thawra, which was guarded by
Ba'ath Party members. At the same time, a smaller group--in which some
individuals were armed--gathered in the Sharkat neighborhood nearby. When
shooting erupted between security forces and the Sharkat group around noon,
the Ba'ath Party members fired on the unarmed group at the Hikmat mosque.
Afterwards regime forces reportedly opened fire on another crowd that had
formed outside the Abbas mosque near the Thawra Children's Hospital.
In April 1999, thousands of Shi'a men reportedly were
arrested in security sweeps in Basra. From May 19 to May 27, 1999, the al
Fatah al-Mubaeen forces of the Special Republican Guards and Ba'ath Party
militia under the command of Aziz Salih al-Noman reportedly conducted
operations in the Jazirah region of Kut, Amarah, and Nasiriyah provinces.
The local resistance reports that it repelled the attack. On June 5, 1999,
the village of al-Maeil in Meisah province reportedly was attacked and 15
houses were destroyed.
The scale and severity of the sweeps and attacks against
Shi'a appear to be increasing in severity. The Human Rights Organization in
Iraq (HROI) reported that 1,093 persons were arrested in June 1999 in
Basrah alone. The Iraqi National Congress reports that tanks from the
Hammourabi Republican Guard division attacked the towns of Rumaitha and
Khudur on June 26, after residents protested the systematic misdistribution
of food and medicine to the detriment of the Shi'a. Fourteen villagers were
killed, over a hundred arrested, and 40 homes were destroyed. On June 29,
1999, SCIRI reported that 160 homes in the Abul Khaseeb district near Basra
reportedly were destroyed. In June the bodies of executed family members
who had been arrested in the March 1999 protests were returned; in some
instances, all the male children from a family reportedly were arrested and
killed, even though not all had taken part in the protests.
Probably connected to this outright destruction of
villages was the practice of the security services to force large numbers
of Shi'a inhabitants of the southern marshes to relocate to major southern
cities and to areas along the Iranian border. Special Rapporteur van Der
Stoel described this practice in his February 1999 report, adding that many
other persons have been transferred to detention centers and prisons in
central Iraq, primarily in Baghdad.
The military also continued its water-diversion and
other projects in the south. The Government's claim that the drainage is
part of a land reclamation plan to increase the acreage of arable land and
spur agricultural production was given little credence. Hundreds of square
kilometers have been burned in military operations. The U.N. Special
Rapporteur has noted the devastating impact draining the marshes has had on
the culture of the Shi'a marsh Arabs. SCIRI claims to have captured
Government documents that detail the destructive intent of the water
diversion program and its connection to "strategic security
operations," economic blockade, and "withdrawal of food supply
agencies."
In addition, the regime's diversion of supplies in the
south limited the Shi'a population's access to food, medicine, drinking
water, and transportation. According to the U.N. Special Rapporteur and
opposition sources, thousands of persons in Nasiriyah and Basra provinces
were denied rations that should have been supplied under the U.N.
oil-for-food program. In these provinces and in Amarah province, access to
food allegedly is used to reward regime supporters and silence opponents.
Shi'a groups report that, due to this policy, the humanitarian condition of
Shi'a in the south continued to suffer despite a significant expansion of
the oil-for-food program.
The Government reportedly also continued to move
forcibly Shi'a populations from the south to the north to replace Kurds,
Turkomen, and Assyrians who in turn have been expelled forcibly from major
cities. However, much of the rich farmland surrounding the cities appears
to have been re-deeded not to Shi'a from the south but to absentee
landlords who support the Saddam Hussein regime.
The Government continued to hold numerous religious
detainees and prisoners.
The Government reportedly continued to target Shi'a
Muslim clergy and their followers for arbitrary arrest and imprisonment.
While Shi'a are not the only group targeted in this way (others--Kurds and
secular regime opponents--are targeted for ethnic and political reasons),
the Shi'a are the primary group targeted based on their religion. In view
of these discriminatory arrests and the demographic predominance of the
Shi'a in the general population, they likely constitute the majority of the
prison population as well.
While no firm statistics are available and international
monitors are refused entry into the prisons, observers estimate the number
of security detainees to be in the tens of thousands, a large figure given
the country's population of 20 to 23 million. Some individuals have been
held for decades. Others who have remained unaccounted for since their
arrests may have died or been executed secretly years ago. This makes it
impossible to produce an accurate listing of religious detainees held in
the prisons. The Government continued summarily to execute its perceived
opponents and Shi'a leaders. Those few citizens able to protest the arrests
and executions have persisted in attempts at documentation. Opposition
groups, including SCIRI, have provided detailed accounts of summary
executions, including the names of hundreds of persons killed.
Certain prisons are well known for their routine
mistreatment of prisoners. The Radwaniyah detention center is a former
prisoner-of-war facility near Baghdad and reportedly the site of torture as
well as mass executions. This prison was the principal detention center for
persons arrested following the civil uprisings of 1991, mostly Shi'a from
southern Iraq. Human Rights Watch and others have estimated that Radwaniyah
holds more than 5,000 detainees. Abu Ghraib prison west of Baghdad may hold
as many as 15,000 persons, many of whom reportedly are subjected to
torture. Ar-Rashidiya prison, on the Tigris River north of Taji, reportedly
has torture chambers. The U.N. Special Rapporteur continued to receive
reports that persons arrested are subjected routinely to mistreatment
including prolonged interrogations accompanied by torture, beatings, and
various deprivations.
In March the Shi'a opposition reported that 60 citizens
from al-Nasiriyah province were executed. In April 100 detainees from
Radwaniyah prison reportedly were taken to Ramadi province where they were
buried alive in a pit. In May opposition sources released the names of 38
individuals who were executed.
In November 1998, more than 150 detainees in the
southern city of Amara reportedly were ordered killed by Qusay Hussein
(Saddam Hussein's son). A possible 39 more reportedly were killed in
December 1998 in the city of Karbala.
On March 21, 1999, Ali Hassan al-Magid reportedly
ordered the executions of 180 detainees from the Sabkhat area of Baghdad.
Two days later, 56 more reportedly were killed at al-Magid's command. In
most of these and other instances of mass executions, Shi'a expatriates
report that families have been forbidden from conducting funeral services
for the deceased. Some reports indicate that families must sign a written
declaration that they will not conduct mourning ceremonies before bodies
are released.
The Special Rapporteur received a report in May 1998
indicating that hundreds of Fayli (Shi'a) Kurds who had disappeared in the
early 1980's during the Iran-Iraq war still were being held incommunicado
at the Abu Ghraib prison. According to the report, these persons have been
detained for 17 to 18 years in extremely harsh conditions without specific
charges or trials. The report alleged that many of these detainees had been
used as experimental subjects in Iraq's outlawed chemical and biological
weapons programs.
In a 1997 report, Amnesty International documented the
repeated failure by the Government to respond to requests for information
about persons who have disappeared, many of whom were Shi'a. The report
detailed unresolved cases dating from the early 1980's through the
mid-1990's, particularly the disappearances of Aziz as-Sayyid Jassem,
Sayyid Muhammad Sadeq, Muhammad Ridha al-Qazwini, Mazin Abd al-Munim as-Samarra'i,
the six al-Hashimi brothers, the four ash-Sheibani brothers, and numerous
persons of Iranian descent or of the Shi'a branch of Islam.
The Government consistently politicizes and interferes
with religious pilgrimages, both of Iraqi Muslims who wish to make the Hajj
to Mecca and Medina and of Iraqi and non-Iraqi Muslim pilgrims who wish to
travel to holy sites in Iraq.
The Government has used Iraqi pilgrims who wish to make
the Hajj to Mecca--a religious duty of all Muslims who can undertake it--as
pawns in a test of wills with the United Nations. In 1998 the U.N.
Sanctions Committee offered to disburse vouchers for travel and expenses to
pilgrims making the Hajj, but the Government rejected this offer. In 1999
the Sanctions Committee offered to disburse funds to cover Hajj-related
expenses via a neutral third party. The Government again rejected the
opportunity. In both years the Government insisted that these funds would
be accepted only if they were paid in cash to the central bank in violation
of U.N. sanctions. As a result, in both 1998 and 1999, no Iraqi pilgrims
were able to take advantage of the available funds. According to press
reports, only 4,000 Iraqi pilgrims made the Hajj in 1999, despite the
availability of 22,000 spaces.
In 1999 the Government flew several planeloads of
elderly Hajj pilgrims unannounced to Saudi Arabia. Simple approval
procedures established by the U.N. Sanctions Committee allow flights for
religious and humanitarian purposes to originate from and return to Iraq,
provided that advance notification is given to regional air controllers and
coalition military aircraft about such flights. The Government chose to
ignore these safety procedures and sent the Hajj flights without any
notification.
Twice each year--on the 10th day of the Muslim month of
Muharram and forty days later in the month of Safar--Shi'a pilgrims from
throughout the country and around the world seek to commemorate the death
of the Imam Hussein in the city of Karbala. The Government has for several
decades interfered with these "Ashura" commemorations, preventing
processions on foot into the city. In both 1998 and 1999, violent incidents
were reported between Iraqi pilgrims and Ba'ath party members and security
forces enforcing the ban, though nothing to equal the clashes of 1977 when
thousands were arrested and hundreds killed. Some devout Shi'a, wishing to
avoid confrontation, have tried to select other significant days in the
Muslim calendar for their pilgrimage. In 1998 Ayatollah as-Sadr announced
that the 15th of Sha'baan--the anniversary of the birth of the Twelfth Imam
(which fell in November that year)--would be an appropriate date for
pilgrimage to Karbala, but the Government reportedly prevented pilgrims
from entering the city. Shi'a expatriates report that groups as small as 10
to 20 pilgrims attempting to make their way into the city at other times
have been arrested. Shi'a sources report that Ba'ath Party militia forces
clashed with Shi'a pilgrims attempting to commemorate Ashura in May 1998.
The interference reportedly was especially severe at Karbala, Basra, and
the al-Thawra district of Baghdad.
In past years, the Government has denied visas to many
foreign pilgrims for the Ashura. In 1999 it seemed intent on profiteering
from them. Shi'a pilgrims reported being charged $900 for bus passage and
food from Damascus to Karbala, a trip that would normally cost about $150.
The Government had reportedly tacked on a $600 surcharge for foreign
pilgrims in addition to the $100 visa fee and a requirement to exchange $50
into Iraqi dinars.
The Special Rapporteur and others reported that the
Government has engaged in various abuses against the country's 350,000
Assyrian and Chaldean Christians, especially in terms of forced movements
from northern areas and repression of political rights.
Assyrians and Chaldeans are considered by many to be a
distinct ethnic group as well as the descendants of some of the earliest
Christian communities, but the Constitution does not provide for an
Assyrian or Chaldean identity. These communities speak a distinct language
(Syriac), preserve two important traditions of Christianity in the east,
and have a rich cultural and historical heritage that they trace back over
2,000 years. Although these groups do not define themselves as Arabs, the
Government, without any historical basis, defines Assyrians and Chaldeans
as such, evidently to encourage them to identify with the Sunni-Arab
dominated regime.
Assyrian religious organizations have complained that
the Government applies apostasy laws in a discriminatory fashion, since
Islam is the official religion of the state. Assyrians are permitted to
convert to Islam, whereas Muslims are forbidden from converting to
Christianity.
Most Assyrians live in the northern governorates, and
the Government often has suspected them of "collaborating" with
Iraqi Kurds. In the north, Kurdish groups often refer to Assyrians as
Kurdish Christians. Military forces destroyed numerous Assyrian churches
during the 1988 Anfal Campaign and reportedly tortured and executed many
Assyrians. Both major Kurdish political parties have indicated that the
Government occasionally targets Assyrians as well as ethnic Kurds and
Turkomen in expulsions from Kirkuk, where it is seeking to Arabize the
city.
The Government does not permit education in languages
other than Arabic and Kurdish. Public instruction in Syriac, which was
announced under a 1972 decree, has never been implemented. Thus, in areas
under government control, Assyrian and Chaldean children are not permitted
to attend classes in Syriac. In northern areas under Iraqi Kurdish control,
classes in Syriac have been permitted since the 1991 uprising against the
Government. By October 1998, the first groups of students were ready to
begin secondary school in Syriac in the north, but some Assyrian sources
reported that regional Iraqi Kurdish authorities refused to allow the
classes to begin. Details of this practice (e.g., the number of students
prepared to start secondary courses in Syriac and the towns where they were
located) were not available, and Kurdish regional authorities denied
engaging in this practice. There were no reports of elementary school
instruction in Syriac being hindered in northern Iraq.
The Constitution does not provide for a Yazidi identity.
The Yazidis are a syncretistic religious group (or a set of several groups)
whose worship centers on the Peacock Angel and a series of avatars. Many
Yazidis consider themselves to be ethnically Kurdish, though some would
define themselves as both religiously and ethnically distinct from Muslim
Kurds. However, the Government, without any historical basis, has defined
the Yazidis as Arabs.
There is evidence that the Government has compelled this
re-identification to encourage Yazidis to join in domestic military action
against Muslim Kurds. Captured government documents included in the 1998
Human Rights Watch report "Bureaucracy of Repression, the Iraqi
Government in Its Own Words" describe special all-Yazidi military
detachments formed during the 1988-89 Anfal campaign to "pursue and
attack" Muslim Kurds.
However, the Government does not hesitate to impose the
same repressive measures on Yazidis as on other groups. For example, 33
members of the Yazidi community of Mosul, arrested in July 1996, still are
unaccounted for.
There are no Shari'a (Islamic law) courts as such. Civil
courts are empowered to administer Islamic law in cases involving personal
status, such as divorce and inheritance.
There were no reports of the forced religious conversion
of minor U.S. citizens who had been abducted or illegally removed from the
United States, or of the Government's refusal to allow such citizens to be
returned to the United States.
On June 19, 1999, the Assyrian International News Agency
(AINA) reported that the partially decomposed body of Helena Aloun Sawa, a
21-year-old Assyrian woman missing since early May, had been discovered by
a shepherd in a shallow grave near Dohuk dam. Her family reportedly
suspected that she had been raped. Sawa had been a housekeeper for
Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) Political Bureau member Izzeddin al-Barwari.
Reporting that the KDP had offered no assistance in searching for Sawa and
that al-Barwari had intimidated the family into not pursuing an
investigation, AINA concluded that the murder "resembles a
well-established pattern" of complicity by Kurdish authorities in
attacks against Assyrian Christians in northern Iraq. It reported that Sawa
had been coerced into working for al-Barwari to restore to her family a KDP
pension that had been suspended arbitrarily. The pension had been awarded
because of the recognition of Sawa's father as a KDP martyr after he was
killed in the uprising against the Iraqi regime in 1991.
However, on June 21, 1999, a spokesperson for the
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) announced that the Dohuk police
Homicide Division and the Dohuk General Security Department were
investigating the Sawa murder. A subsequent KRG statement indicated that
there did not appear to be a "political or racial" motive. The
KRG noted that the al-Barwari family had reported last seeing Sawa when she
left Dohuk on her way to a vacation at her family village in the Nerwa O
Rakan area, and that al-Barwari had been in Damascus, Syria at the time.
Nevertheless, al-Barwari was suspended from official KDP duties pending the
conclusion of the investigation. At the end of June, KDP President Massoud
Barzani decided to appoint a three-member commission to further investigate
the killing.
Section II. Societal Attitudes
The country's cultural, religious, and linguistic
diversity is not reflected in its political and economic structure. Various
segments of the Sunni Arab community, which itself constitutes a minority
of the population, effectively have controlled the Government since
independence in 1932.
Shi'a Arabs, the religious majority of the population,
have long been economically, politically, and socially disadvantaged. Like
the Sunni Kurds and other ethnic and religious groups in the north, the
Shi'a Arabs of the south have been targeted for particular discrimination
and abuse by the Government, ostensibly because of their opposition to the
Government.
Assyrian groups reported several instances of mob
violence by Muslims against Christians in the north in recent years.
Assyrians continue to fear attacks by the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), a
Turkish-based terrorist organization operating against indigenous Kurds in
northern Iraq. The Christians often feel caught in the middle of
intra-Kurdish fighting. In December 1997, six Assyrians died in an attack
near Dohuk by the PKK. Some Assyrian villagers have reported being
pressured to leave the countryside for the cities as part of a campaign by
indigenous Kurdish forces to deny the PKK access to possible food supplies.
Many Assyrian groups reported a series of bombings in
Irbil in late 1998 and early 1999. On December 9, 1998, Nasreen Shaba and
her 3-year-old daughter Larsa Toma were killed when a bomb exploded on the
doorstep of their home in the Tterawa section of the city. Later the same
month, bombs exploded at the front door of Salman Toma Khoshaba in the al-Iskan
area and in front of a convent in the al-Mal'ab area. On January 6, 1999, a
bomb exploded at the door of Father Zomaya Yusip in the 7th-of-Nisan area.
No one was killed in these three subsequent incidents. Although the
bombings have not been linked to any particular faction or group, Assyrians
fear that they are part of a terror campaign designed to intimidate them
into leaving northern Iraq. The Assyrian Democratic Movement, the Assyrian
Patriotic Party, and other groups have criticized the investigation into
these incidents conducted by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). Thus
far there have been no arrests.
Section III. U.S. Government Policy
The United States has no diplomatic relations with Iraq
and thus cannot raise directly with the Government the problems of severe
restrictions on religious freedom and other human rights abuses. However,
the U.S. Government makes its position clear in public statements and in
diplomatic contacts with other states.
The President regularly discusses the problems
experienced by Shi'a, Christian, and other religious groups in his periodic
reports to Congress on Iraq. The Assistant Secretary of State for Near
Eastern Affairs, in testimony before Congress on Iraq, has highlighted the
situation of persons in the south. The State Department spokesperson issued
statements criticizing the deaths of Ayatollahs al-Gharawi, al-Borojourdi,
as-Sadr, and the attempt on the life of Ayatollah al-Hussaini. The Voice of
America has broadcast several editorials dealing with the human rights
abuses committed against religious groups by the Iraqi Government.
It is the policy of the United States to encourage a
change of regime in Iraq. Through the State Department's Office of the
Special Coordinator for the Transition of Iraq, the United States is in
frequent contact with Iraqi democratic opposition groups, including
religiously oriented Shi'a, Sunni, and Christian groups. All of the groups
designated as eligible for assistance under the Iraq Liberation Act have
indicated their strong support for religious freedom and tolerance.
In March 1999, for the seventh consecutive year, the
United States joined other members of the United Nations Human Rights
Commission (UNHRC), to call on the U.N. Secretary General to send human
rights monitors to "help in the independent verification of reports on
the human rights situation in Iraq." However, the Iraqi Government
continued to ignore these calls. As in the past, it did not allow the U.N.
Special Rapporteur to visit nor did it respond to his requests for
information. It continued to defy calls from various U.N. bodies to allow
the Special Rapporteur to visit the southern marshes and other regions.
Denied entry to Iraq, the Special Rapporteur based his reports on the
Government's human rights abuses on interviews with recent émigrés from
Iraq, interviews with opposition groups with contacts in Iraq, and other
interviews, as well as on published reports.
Sources: U.S. State Department - Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor |