Bashar's Game - What is Syria Up To?
by Eyal Zisser
(Updated April 2003)
Even those who long ago abandoned any expectations
of a fundamental transformation in Syrian policy under Bashar al-Assad have nevertheless been surprised by Assad's approach to the war in Iraq.
For many, this posture seems to invite a direct confrontation with the
United States of the sort that his father, Hafez
al-Assad, would never have risked.
Indeed, Bashar has consciously chosen to come out
against the Anglo-American war on Iraq and even sought to lead the Arab
camp opposed to the United States. In an interview in the Lebanese daily al-Safir a few days after the beginning of the war, Bashar insisted
that the war is part of larger and more sinister American plan to redraw
the map of the Middle East in the service of Israeli interests. He added
that Syria was liable to be the next American target in the region but
that it would not stand idly by. He also stressed that as long as Israel
exists, it constitutes a threat to Syria and to all the Arabs.
It is therefore not surprising that Syrian media have
recently become a platform for vicious anti-American propaganda, unrestrained
attacks on America's "evil and Satanic offensive," and adulation
for "the brave and admirable resistance" of the Iraqi people.
The "Syrian street" has added its voice with a series of huge
demonstrations in support of Iraq and against the American campaign.
Nevertheless, none of this is nearly as significant as the matter of
Bashar's willingness to assist the Iraqi war effort, which emerged with
great fanfare several days after the outbreak of hostilities. That happened
when senior American officials, especially Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld, accused Damascus of aiding Iraq in a way that could endanger
American forces. According to Rumsfeld, the Syrians transferred or allowed
the use of their territory to transfer military equipment, including
night vision goggles, to Iraq. According to reports from Israel, Syrian
had also permitted the Iraqis to conceal military equipment in Syria,
including even proscribed materials such as unconventional weapons or
surface-to-surface missiles. The Syrians, of course, quickly denied
such charges, dismissing them as Zionist propaganda aimed at driving a wedge between Syria and the United States
or, alternatively, as an American attempt to prepare the ground for
a possible American assault on Syria.
All this raises some obvious questions about Bashar's behavior. Is he
aware of the possible consequences of his actions and is he not concerned
that his policies might put Syria on a collision course with the United
States? Does he not have a true gasp of the situation because of unreliable
information or faulty judgment? And, finally, is he really in charge?
While there are no unequivocal answers to these questions, it is worth
recalling that there is nothing new in Bashar's behavior. Ever since
he took power following his father's death, Syrian policy with respect
to Iraq has constantly edged close to the threshold of American tolerance,
though without ever actually crossing it. For many months, Syria has
pushed for warmer relations with Iraq and aligned itself with Iraq in
the latter's political struggle with Washington. In return, Syria has
received 150,000-200,000 barrels of Iraqi oil per day, in clear contravention
of the sanctions on Iraq. Finally, there are persistent reports that
Syria has ignored the use of its territory to smuggle weapons into Iraq.
Syria's current posture is therefore fully consistent with its pre-war
policies, and any change in the rules of the game has come from the
American side. After all, for several months before the start of the
war, Washington had turned a blind eye to Bashar's actions or, at worst,
lodged some mild verbal protests. Only after the fighting began did
it choose to rebuke Bashar for acting in ways that had previously been
overlooked.
Still, it is worthwhile trying to assess Bashar's motives in adopting
such a blatantly provocative posture. In the first place, there is no
doubt that Bashar is acting under pressure. He senses that Syria could
become a target of future American wrath once the war in Iraq is over.
Moreover, he is acting out of anti-American instinct unmitigated by
calculations of strategic interest that might argue in favor of a more
cautious approach. Secondly, Bashar is determined to strengthen his
standing in the Syrian street and, by extension, the Arab street, and
he is therefore prepared to adopt a populist stance rather than act
contrary to prevailing moods. That may well suggest a lack of political
maturity, self-confidence and experience in a leader who has not yet
reached forty years of age.
That raises questions about where all this might lead. There are many
indications that Washington and Damascus may be on a collision course.
However, it is possible that Secretary Rumsfeld does not represent the
dominant trend in the Administration but only the hawkish school of
thought that believes that Syria ought to be a future target of U.S.
policy in the Middle East. Secretary of State Colin Powell, for example,
has been far less aggressive in referring to Syria. Indeed, he insists
that Damascus can choose which path it wants to pursue, i.e., that all
the options are still open.
In the past, Washington adopted an accommodating approach to Damascus
precisely because the Syrians themselves refrained from crossing any
"red lines." Every time their actions seemed about to provoke
some American reaction, they pulled back. In Bashar's own view, he has
not yet crossed such a line but has only persisted, since the outbreak
of war, in doing what he had been doing for many months before. It is
therefore likely that, having provoked a signal of serious American
concern, he will now display more caution. That, in any event, is what
his father would have done.
It is American indulgence that encouraged a show of
Syrian defiance. That defiance may well pay off for Bashar if it enhances
his popular standing in Syria and elsewhere while preserving the possibility
of a future reconciliation with Washington if the peace process in the
region is resumed after the war. But for that possibility to materialize,
George W. Bush must also follow in his father's footsteps. If he does
not, Bashar may pay a heavy price.
Published by TEL AVIV UNIVERSITY
The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies
& The Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies
through the generosity of Sari and Israel Roizman, Philadelphia
www.tau.ac.il./jcss/ www.dayan.org/
Sources: Tel Aviv University
- The Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies |