by Mitchell Bard
The
Accidental Empire focuses on the period
from 1967 until 1977 when the Labor
Party was still the dominant
political faction in Israel.
It is during this period that the first
Jewish communities were established in
the territories, but before the great expansion
that began following the Likud’s victory
in 1977. Gershom Gorenberg is a journalist,
not a political scientist, so the narrative
is stronger when it comes to description
than analysis. Gorenberg is also not a
neutral observer who set out to examine
the evidence to see where it led. He started
the project with a clear axe to grind as
a vocal opponent of settlements and this
influences his narrative.
The principal contribution of his research
is to demonstrate that Israeli leaders did
not have an agenda for “colonizing” the territories.
Nevertheless, like Jimmy
Carter does in his
more recent book, Gorenberg suggests otherwise
on the basis of the definition of colonialism
he provides from British scholar Stephen
Howe. In fact, Howe’s definition proves
the opposite. According to Howe, colonialism
is a system “of rule by one group over
another, where the first claims the right...to
exercise exclusive sovereignty over the second
and to shape its destiny.” Israel,
however, never has suggested it has sovereignty
over the Palestinian people. Israel has laid
legitimate historical claims to the land,
but always expected the Palestinian people’s
destiny to be shaped by either their leaders
or those of the surrounding Arab countries.
Gorenberg says settlements were
established, as his title implies, accidentally,
because of the weakness of Labor
Party leaders.
They were not products of democratic policy
making with a clear vision or purpose. Hebron is a good example. He says “more than
deciding on settlement, the government drifted
into permitting it.” Even the idea
that the settlements contributed to Israeli
security, he shows were ex post facto rationalizations.
For the Jews who moved to the territories,
the issue was simple: this was the Land of
Israel. They were the ones who drove the
government’s policy. Labor officials
went along because they believed they were
sending a message that Israel would not be
cowed by the UN vote equating Zionism
with racism. They also could not reconcile removing “patriots
settling the land” when the Labor
Zionists had done the same thing
during the pioneering period before Israel
was established. Moreover, as the poet Nathan
Alterman said, no nation in history ever
gave up its homeland (Alterman later said
reasons of state may require unfair compromise).
Gorenberg blames Prime Minister Yitzhak
Rabin for not having the courage in 1975 to act
against the settlers.
A major flaw is that Gorenberg presents
history in a vacuum. Israel is portrayed
as taking unilateral actions in the territories
and the Arabs have no relevance. He says,
for example, that Golda
Meir and her coterie
saw no Palestinians, but he is just as myopic
and leaves the unspoken impression throughout
the book that the only obstacle to peace
are those darn settlements.
He rushes through the Oslo period in one page in the Epilogue, suggesting
that both sides were at fault for the agreement’s
failure. He ignores, however, that the Oslo agreements did not call for an end to settlements,
but they did call for an end to terror. Israel
nevertheless kept giving up land, but did
not get peace in return.
The book describes the method by which the
first settlements were established in excruciating
detail. This gives the descriptions authenticity,
but also makes the book mind numbing at points.
One valuable part of the book is the explanation
of the psychological factors that influence
the conflict. For example, he correctly notes
how Israelis were euphoric after the victory
in 1967, but the “prewar fear of impending
annihilation did not vanish.” In an
earlier section he describes the reaction
of a Palestinian who saw an Israeli soldier
on the street after the victory in 1948.
The Israeli was about the same age and had
trained as a soldier and fought while the
Palestinian had been doing marching exercises. “I
felt more ashamed than I had ever felt in
my life,” the Palestinian says. “I
felt my manhood compromised.”
The history is interesting for those who
associate settlements with the right-wing
in Israel. In fact, it was mainstream Labor
Party thinking that the land could be settled.
Consider this quotation from Shimon
Peres: “I
don’t understand why it’s okay
to settle in the [Jordan] Rift and not in
the Samaria mountains....I don’t understand
why settling in the Golan
Heights is considered
something left wing and settling at Ofrah
next to Jerusalem is a right wing act.”
It is not until the next
to last page of the book that Gorenberg acknowledges
that the Arabs played a role in the settlement
issue. “Whatever the intent of the
Khartoum decisions, their bellicose language
convinced Israel’s government that
peace was out of reach. Direct negotiations,
recognition, and peace – what Khartoum
rejected – were precisely the tools
that Arab leaders had in their hands to sway
Israeli opinion. Waiting to use them allowed
and encouraged the growth of the settlements.” Not
only did these Arab attitudes encourage settlement
growth, but the converse was also true; that
is, the expansion of settlements ultimately
stimulated the Palestinians to engage in
negotiations at Oslo. The Palestinians were
afraid that if they waited much longer, so
many Jews would be in the West
Bank, no land
would be left for a state. Even now, however,
the Palestinians could have a state in more
than 90% of the West
Bank and 100% of Gaza if they were to choose negotiations over
violence.
Gorenberg is right about the need for Israel
to refocus on building the state rather than
settlements. The disengagement from Gaza was the first step. Unfortunately, that experience,
coupled with the aftermath of the unilateral
withdrawal from Lebanon, has convinced most
Israelis that settlements are irrelevant
to relations with the Arabs, and that any
exchange of land with the Palestinians will
bring terror rather than peace.
Sources: Mitchell Bard is the AICE Executive Director |