Soviet-Polish Non-Aggression Pact
(May 9, 1934)
The Ambassador in the Soviet Union to the Foreign
Ministry - analyzes Soviet policy in Eastern Europe.
A 1175 Moscow, May 9, 1934.
IV Ru. 2323. Received May 12.
POLITICAL REPORT
Subject: The extension of the Soviet-Polish nonaggression pact as the
concluding item of the Litvinov pacts with the Baltic States.
With reference to my telegraphic report of May 6.
On May 5 People's Commissar Litvinov and the Polish Ambassador, Lukasiewicz,
finally signed here the protocol which also extends the validity of
the Soviet-Polish nonaggression pact until December 31, 1945. Except
for minor differences, the protocol has the same content as those agreed
on by the Soviet Union with the Baltic States and Finland at the beginning
of April.
The extension of the Polish-Soviet nonaggression pact was already discussed
during the presence of Polish Foreign Minister Beck in Moscow. However,
the negotiations stretched out and came upon a serious obstacle when
Litvinov, who in the meantime had also undertaken a similar extension
of the nonaggression pacts with the Baltic States and Finland, complied
with Lithuanian wishes regarding the Vilna question in the extension
of the Lithuanian-Soviet nonaggression pact. It was agreed in that connection
that the documents forming the pact were also to remain in force until
the end of 1945, and among these were the notes exchanged in 1926 in
which the Soviet Union states that in spite of the violation of the
Lithuanian borders by Poland's marching into Vilna area the attitude
of the Soviet Union regarding the territorial sovereignty of Lithuania
as it was established by the Soviet-Lithuanian peace treaty of 1920
was not shaken.
The specific support for the Lithuanian standpoint in the Vilna question
was annoying to Poland, and the latter made the extension of the Polish-Soviet
nonaggression pact dependent on a satisfactory settlement of this point.
One need not go into the question of whether Litvinov used compliance
with the Lithuanian whishes merely as a maneuver in order to exercise
pressure on hesitant Poland, or whether there was an oversight in the
drawing up of the annexes or whether he really believed he would be
able to put this over. At any rate the extension of the pact with Poland
could not be accomplished without clearing up this question, and so
the Soviet Government agreed to state in the final protocol to the extension
protocol with reference to the Riga peace treaty "that the note
of People's Commissar Chicherin of September 28, 1926, to the Lithuanian
Government could not be interpreted in such a manner as though by this
note the Soviet Government intended to intervene in the settlement of
the territorial questions mentioned in the note."
With this statement the Soviet Government has for the third time renounced
interference in the Vilna question. The first time it had to state to
Poland in the Riga peace treaty of March 18, 1921, that the question
of the ownership of the areas contested between Poland and Lithuania
was exclusively the concern of Poland and Lithuania. The second renunciation
occurred in 1926, when the Polish Government at that time registered
a protest against the above-mentioned Soviet note to Lithuanian of September
28, 1926, and the Soviet Government answered to the effect that it had
in no way had the intention to place in doubt the provisions of the
Riga peace treaty by means of the note to Lithuania. Now it has once
more had to confirm this renunciation.
With the signing of the Polish-Soviet protocol the policy instituted
by Litvinov after his return from Washington and Rome of a further peace
guarantee in regard to the Baltic States comes, insofar as it can be
determined thus far, to a certain conclusion. As is known, it aimed
in the first place at guaranteeing together with Poland the independence
of the Baltic States by means of a declaration. After the failure of
this project Litvinov proceeded to the extension of the nonaggression
pacts with the Baltic States and at the same time tried to achieve,
in conjunction with Germany, the statement on the independence and integrity
of the Baltic States which had not been accomplished in cooperation
with Poland. This attempt likewise failed as a result of our rejection,
and thus the only outcome remaining is the extension of the nonaggression
pacts.
Now one might ask why this whole policy was really undertaken, since
we cannot really discern any concrete reason for it affecting the Soviet
Union. If we set aside Litvinov's vanity striving for new successes
and his hostility toward Germany, against which the spearhead of the
project is clearly directed, then the motivations are probably the same
as the main motive underlying the entire Soviet foreign policy: a demonstration
of the Soviet Union's love of peace and the imperialism of the capitalist
countries, specifically Germany, as well as actual fear. There is not
the slightest doubt, absurd as it may appear, that the latter, namely
fear of an aggressive policy of Germany, also plays a role in the present
case. Since time immemorial the Russians have believed Germany capable
of any accomplishment, and the Soviet people cannot be talked out of
the hysterical fear of alleged German plans to intervene in the Baltic
States and in the Ukraine based on the familiar German writings and
statements, and in particular anxiety arising from the appearance of
certain nationalist movements in Latvia and Estonia that the Baltic
States are to provide the assembly area against the Soviet Union for
a militant National Socialism.
However, the thought also occurs that the whole Litvinov action merely
had in mind the strained and uncertain situation of Lithuania between
Germany and Poland and was meant to spare Lithuania the possible fate
of becoming an object of agreement between the two big neighbors, or
at least to secure for the Soviet Union a right of a voice in this eventuality.
Should this actually have been the real purpose of the action, then
the renewed Soviet renunciation of interference in the Vilna question
should be accorded still greater significance and the result of the
action should be evaluated as an absolute failure.
However, the success is also not great if the action achieved only what
the separate démarches designated as the purpose. For the only
positive factor as opposed to the rejections by Poland and Germany is
the extension of the nonaggresssion pacts, which after all mean nothing
other than a renewed promise of the Soviet Government not to attack
the Baltic States. But perhaps Litvinov has still other plans in his
pocket of pursuing his project.
NADOLNY
Source: "Documents on German Foreign Policy," series C, Vol.
II p. 801.
Sources: Yad
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