The Israeli Commando Assault on Green Island
(July 1969)
During the War
of Attrition beginning in 1969, the declared Egyptian intention was
to wear Israel down by constant, small-scale attacks on Israeli
positions along the Suez Canal. On July 10, 1969, Egyptian commandos
made their way across the Suez Canal in dinghies and mounted a bloody
attack on the Israeli position at Mezach on the East Bank of the Suez
Canal. Seven Israelis were killed and five were wounded, and others
were taken back to Egypt as prisoners.
Many of the Israeli soldiers serving along the Canal
were reservists, concerned about their wives, children and jobs in
Israel. They just wanted to be able to get home safely. Morale
nose-dived. The Egyptian raid merited a sharp response.
The IDF gave the responsibility of retaliation to Flotilla 13, an elite unit of
Israeli naval commandos. The "'IDF General Staff demanded…a
response that would strike at the soul of Egyptian morale as the
assault on Mezach had caused Israeli servicemen posted along the canal
to be engulfed by fear and apprehension." The Israelis decided
that Egypt's most fortified position in the Suez Canal zone - Green
Island - would have to be assaulted.
Green Island was a "piece of protruding stone
and concrete" and the Egyptians considered it an "impregnable
fortress and symbol of Egyptian military prowess", and it was
there that the Egyptians felt safest.
Green Island was located at the southern end of the
Suez Canal. It was "built by the British during the Second World
War to protect its ultrastrategic waterway from air and sea attack by
Axis forces." It was a large and imposing facility that measured
more than 450 feet long and more than 240 feet wide. It was built on
"a bed of stable corals and made out of reinforced
concrete…" which consisted of a "one-storey building with a
large courtyard. At the end of the island, a concrete bridge jutted out
into the water toward a circular five-meter high tower supporting a
radar site and two heavy anti-aircraft machine guns." A wall
reinforced with thick rows of barbed wire was built at the water's
edge, meant to deter "any intruder attacking by sea." In the
roof heavy machine guns were emplaced, and there were over a dozen
machine gun nests. Israeli Intelligence estimated that there were about
100 Egyptian soldiers stationed on the island, including the elite as-Saiqa
commandos. It was a formidable defensive position with a dominating
command of the surrounding waters.
The obvious nature of Green Island as a target for
Israeli commandos was not lost on the Israelis themselves. In April
1969, several months before the Egyptian attack on the Israeli
[position at Mezach on the East Bank of the Suez Canal, a four-man
Israeli reconnaissance team had scouted out Green Island.
Shmuel Almog, the Flotilla 13 commander who would be
leading the operation, felt that 40 men would be needed to assault the
island. But Flotilla 13 had only 30 men, mainly due to Almog's
extraordinarily demanding training standards. More men from other units
would have to be called in, and they were - from Sayeret
Matkal, another elite commando unit. This unit was commanded by
Menachem Digli. Brigadier-General Rafael
Eitan, today one of the most famed Israeli generals second perhaps
only to Ariel Sharon, was then
the "chief paratroop and infantry officer responsible for all
commando strikes." He gave Almog only one week "to draw up
his plans…train his men, and execute the operation."
Shmuel Almog had reconnoitered the area several
times himself, and he knew that there was only one way Green Island
could be approached - and that was underwater. Any above-water approach
was doomed to fail, as the Egyptians had carefully covered all
approaches to the island, and they were well-entrenched.
One possibility that was not raised in the
literature I looked at for this operation was the option of bombing
Green Island from the air and thus putting Green island off the map.
But this was the War of Attrition, not an open war, and evidently
Israel did not want to escalate the situation to one more serious than
it already was. In addition, the Egyptians had proven themselves to be
dangerous foes by their naval commando raid on Mezach. The Israelis
wanted to show that their own commandos would go one better, and that
their combined naval/land operations were deadly and could strike fear
and demoralization into the Egyptians even more than the Egyptians had
caused the Israelis along the canal.
The commandos would not be able to swim to their
targets either - the shadows and slight ripples in the sea might give
them away. The only option for the first wave of the assault, which
would be led by Flotilla 13, would be to swim underwater at a depth
safe enough to avoid detection for several hours - all the while
equipped with heavy weaponry and ammunition. They would then emerge
"literally under the noses of the Egyptians at the base of their
target." As Shmuel Katz writes: "The violent transformation
from stealth intruder to heavily armed attacker would have to be
fantastic."
The Sayeret Matkal men were not trained for
underwater operations, so they would have to remain safely away from
the target until the Flotilla 13 unit had arrived on the beach. Only
when the Flotilla 13 unit had secured the beachhead would the Sayeret
Matkal, moored 1500 meters away, be called in. In that period, the
20-30 Flotilla 13 commandos would be alone against the Egyptian force
in the imposing fortress. And in that period, they would have to cut a
passage through the 3-layer barbed wire defenses for the Sayeret Matkal
force which would come after them.
The naval commandos had to hope, too, that their
weapons, ammunition, grenades, and other equipment would be operational
once they emerged from the depths. Most of them decided to carry an
AK-47 rather than the Israeli-made Uzi, in that the AK-47 was known to
work better after having been submerged under water.
Training was intense. Intelligence gathering went on
apace as well, with small units going out to the outskirts of Green
Island to check out Egyptian defenses. They found that the Egyptians
were at a high level of alert. "Sentries, carrying AK-47's and
flashlights, combed the waters in search of Israeli frogmen."
The night before the task force headed out to Green
Island, they trained and reviewed their roles. They made sure, as best
they could, "that every single inch of Green Island was etched in
the back of their minds as unforgettable fact." Nerves were on
razor's edge.
The Flotilla 13 unit left its base on the East Bank
of the Suez Canal at 7:45 p.m. on July19. Each commando was equipped
with his personal weapon, ammunition reserves, grenades, first-aid
equipment, canteen and a flashlight, flippers, oxygen tanks, mask and
life preserver.
At 8:30 p.m. the Sayeret Matkal back-up force set
out in 12 rubber and motorized dinghies (called Zodiacs). By 10:30 they
were 1 mile from Green Island.
By 1:30 a.m. the naval commandos still hadn't
reached their target. They were still swimming at a brisk pace towards
the island. They still, however, had the element of surprise.
At 15 meters from the island the flotilla leader
noticed two armed Egyptian sentries. He ordered his men underwater
again and told them to remove their diving gear.
Five minutes later, with their equipment safely
taken care of, twenty figures emerged from the water and pointed their
AK-47's and Uzis at the sentries. While some of the commandos began
cutting through the barbed wire, an Egyptian sentry began walking
towards them. An Israeli commando dropped him, which alarmed another
Egyptian soldier, who lobbed a grenade at them.
Three Israelis were wounded and the island was
engulfed in battle. As the Egyptians raced out of their barracks the
Israeli commandos began cutting them down at close quarters. They
hurled smoke grenades at the Egyptian machine-gun nests to temporarily
block their vision.
When the Israeli commandos set out for Green Island
there was concern about the functioning of their weapons and ammunition
after having been submerged underwater for several hours. These were
well-founded concerns. Much of their weaponry and ammunition was not
operable. Even a squad leader's radio did not work.
The Sayeret Matkal was supposed to advance with the
first rounds of fire from the Flotilla 13 naval unit, but the Sayeret
Matkal did not come as planned. Without waiting the naval commandos
raced forward. Some of them ascended the wall and fired what weapons
and lobbed what grenades worked. Many Israeli commandos were wounded
but advanced in spite of that. As they did not know if the back-up
force of Sayeret Matkal were going to get there in time or not, the
commandos on shore were attacking Egyptian bunkers "reserved for
the Sayeret." The Egyptians defended their positions staunchly
after the surprise of the attack wore off. A number of Israeli
commandos were killed in the assault. The Egyptians refused to
surrender, holding their positions until they were wiped out.
After only 17 minutes, the 20-man Flotilla 13 unit
had taken over much of the island. It was only then that the Sayeret
Matkal unit arrived on the island. About half of the naval commandos
were already wounded - including First Lieutenant Ami Ayalon, who is
now a leader in the Israeli Intelligence community. He received the
Yellow Ribbon, the IDF's medal issued to soldiers "'who display
the 'ultimate heroism against enemy fire…'" Only three IDF
soldiers - including Ayalon - have received this medal. All have been
from Flotilla 13.
The official version cites: "On the night of
July 19-20, in the battle for Green Island, First Lieutenant Amichai
'Ami' Ayalon was the deputy commander of a band of operators in the
assault. At the time of the attack, he tossed a grenade at the radar
position, and during the assault moved ahead of his soldiers to lead
the attack. When he climbed on the roof of one position, he suffered
shrapnel wound to the forehead, but still managed to hurl a grenade,
even though it failed to explode. Under heavy fire, he continued his
advance along with First Sergeant Zalman Rot, and wiped out a machine
gun nest. He later hooked up with another operator, and wiped out two
more enemy positions. Leading the attack against a gun position, a
grenade blast seriously wounded him…though he continued to fire his
weapon at enemy positions; another enemy grenade detonated near him,
this time wounding him in the hand and neck. Severely wounded and
bleeding profusely, he managed to continue his attack and only after
the mission was complete did he inform his superiors of his wounds and
evacuate himself."
Ilan Egozi was another Flotilla 13 operator who was
decorated for bravery for his part in the assault on Green Island. His
citation recounted: "On the night of July 19-20, 1969, in the
battle for Green Island, First Lieutenant Egozi was the commander of
the squad responsible for breaking through the position's defenses.
While cutting through the fence, he discovered Egyptian soldiers
looking around the rooftop of their position, illuminating the area
with their flashlights. Fearing discovery, he opened fire and ordered
his men to attack." He was seriously wounded but continued to
carry on the operation, and "was the last on the boat to evacuate
his position."
Egozi, as a former POW in Egyptian hands was not
supposed to have even been there at all. If he was captured, as a
former POW attacking his former captors, according to the Geneva
Convention the Egyptians did not have to guarantee his safety.
The Israeli force continued to assault the fortress.
They controlled the upper section of the island, but they realized that
to destroy the whole structure they would need to wipe out the
"stiff resistance emanating from the courtyard below." They
had to engage in room-to-room combat in order to that. "The system
was simple and effective. Commandos would line up along the hallway,
stand with their backs against the wall, and then toss a fragmentation
grenade inside the enclosed space. What was not killed by the grenade's
blast was terminated by the commandos spraying the smoking aftermath
with dedicated blasts of machine-gun and automatic weapons fire."
Many of the Israeli commandos were wounded by then
themselves, and some were killed. The Zodiac boats were filling up with
wounded men. The soldiers in condition to battle continued to try to
take over the island until an unexpected development occurred.
"The Egyptians, realizing that Green Island was under attack and
probably, considering past Israeli commando raids, overrun, ordered it
shelled. Dozens of Egyptian artillery batteries on the West Bank of the
Gulf of Suez let loose deadly bursts of 130 mm shells onto the island,
and wounded Egyptian defenders. The shelling was an 'obvious'
indication that it was time to get off the island quickly." While
the shells first fell harmlessly into the sea, they soon increased in
accuracy, until the shells began to fall on the island and near the
Zodiacs as well.
At 2:15 on the morning of July 20, Shmuel Almog and
Menachem Digli ordered the evacuation of their forces. The Israeli
units had occupied 2/3 of the island. They eliminated remaining
Egyptian forces and those who tried to escape. And while Egyptian units
from the West Bank were shelling Green Island, three Israeli officers
were preparing an explosive charge that would blow up Green Island to
an extent that they would never have to return.
The Flotilla 13/Sayeret Matkal units evacuated the
island. There were six dead and fourteen wounded. They were loaded
first onto the boats and then the others got on themselves.
It was a difficult journey back to Israeli positions
in Sinai as Egyptian shells sliced through the water dangerously close
to the boat, and sometimes ripping them apart. Helicopters were called
in to take out the wounded, and the Zodiac boats only made it back to
the Sinai by dawn.
Green Island remained a highly classified operation
for twenty-five years. The Israeli commandos wiped out about 80 of the
Egyptian soldiers there, almost the entire garrison. "It put the
entire Egyptian military on notice. Many positions, from the most
secured radar and communications facilities embedded under hundreds of
feet of rock and granite to Egyptian Army HQ in Cairo, could be
assaulted and taken out." Egyptian units all along the canal
"were heard firing into the night - shooting at shadows, shooting
at what could be Israel's next Green Island."
The Flotilla 13 and Sayeret Matkal units were highly
feted by the Israeli military brass. They were given many other chances
to prove themselves, as the War of Attrition lasted throughout 1969 and
into 1970. But none of the operations were as renowned for their daring
and their success as the assault on Green Island - perhaps no other
operations were until Flotilla 13 and the Sayeret Matkal participated
in destroying PLO headquarters
in Beirut in "Operation
Spring of Youth" in 1973.
Sources: The
Pedagogic Center, The Department for Jewish Zionist Education, The Jewish
Agency for Israel, (c) 1992-2005, Director: Dr. Motti Friedman,
Webmaster: Esther Carciente. This material may not be republished without
the permission of the copyright owner. |