The Pro-Israel & Pro-Arab Lobbies
by Mitchell Bard
(Updated July 2012)
Reference is often made to the "Jewish lobby" in an effort
to describe Jewish political influence in the United States. This term
is both vague and inadequate. While it is true that American Jews are
sometimes represented by lobbyists, such direct efforts to influence
policy-makers are but a small part of the lobbys ability to shape
policy.
Organized groups do attempt to directly affect
legislation. One of these, the American-Israel Public Affairs
Committee (AIPAC) is a registered lobby. Other groups do not generally
engage in direct lobbying (e.g., Bnai B’rith and Hadassah), but
do disseminate information and encourage their members to become
involved in the political process. They also sometimes lobby on
specific issues. Though they have rarely influenced policy, Christian
groups have also frequently weighed in on Israel's behalf and several
pro-Israel organizations are comprised entirely of non-Jews. These
organizations comprise the formal lobby.
U.S. Middle East policy is further shaped by Jewish
voting behavior and American public opinion. These indirect means of
influence are the informal lobby.
The formal and informal components tend to
intersect at several points so the distinction is not always
clear-cut. Together, however, they form the Israeli (or pro-Israel)
lobby. This is a more accurate label than "Jewish lobby"
because a large proportion of the lobby is made up of non-Jews. This
term also reflects the lobbys objective. The Israeli lobby can then
be defined as those formal and informal actors that directly and
indirectly influence American policy to support Israel.
The Israeli lobby does not have the field to
itself. On any given issue, it may be opposed by a variety of interest
groups unrelated to the Middle East (e.g., conservative groups that
have nothing against Israel, but oppose foreign aid on principle), but
its main rival is the Arab lobby, which similarly consists of those
formal and informal actors that attempt to influence U.S. foreign
policy to support the interests of the Arab states in the Middle East.
- The
Informal Israeli Lobby
- The
Informal Arab Lobby
- Campaign
Donations
- Public
Opinion
- The
Formal Israeli Lobby
- The
Arab Lobby
- Contrasts
- Measuring
Influence
The
Informal Israeli Lobby
American Jews recognize the importance of support
for Israel because of the dire consequences that could follow from the
alternative. Despite the fact that Israel is often referred to now as
the fourth most powerful country in the world, the perceived threat to
Israel is not military defeat, it is annihilation. At the same time,
American Jews are frightened of what might happen in the United States
if they do not have political power.
As a result, Jews have devoted
themselves to politics with almost religious
fervor. This is reflected by the fact that
Jews have the highest percentage voter turnout of any ethnic group. The Jewish vote also matters because the population is concentrated in key states. Though the Jewish population in
the United States is only about six million
(about 2.3% of the total U.S. population),
the 10 states with the highest concentration of Jews are worth 244 of the 270 electoral votes needed to elect
the president. If you add the non-Jews shown
by opinion polls to be as pro-Israel as
Jews, it is clear Israel has the support
of one of the largest veto groups in the
country.
The political activism of Jews forces congressmen with
presidential ambitions to consider what a mixed voting record on Israel-related
issues may mean in the political future. There are no benefits to candidates
taking an openly anti-Israel stance and considerable costs in both loss
of campaign contributions and votes from Jews and non-Jews alike. Potential
candidates therefore have an incentive to be pro-Israel; this reinforces
support for Israel in Congress. Actual candidates must be particularly
sensitive to the concerns of Jewish voters; it follows that the successful
candidate's foreign policy will be influenced, although not bound, by
the promises that had to be made during the campaign.
One way that lobbyists attempt
to educate politicians is by taking them
to Israel on study missions. Once officials
have direct exposure to the country, its
leaders, geography, and security dilemmas,
they typically return more sympathetic to
Israel. Politicians also sometimes travel
to Israel specifically to demonstrate to
the lobby their interest in Israel. Thus,
for example, George W. Bush made his one
and only trip to Israel before deciding to
run for President in what was widely viewed
as an effort to win pro-Israel voters' support.
While there, he also was educated and was
particularly influenced by a helicopter tour
given to him by a man he would later work
with as a fellow head of state — Ariel
Sharon. In 2005 alone, more than 100
members of Congress visited Israel, some
multiple times.1
Jewish congressmen are naturally
expected to be supportive of Israel and,
with the exception of occasional odd votes,
this is true. Historically, however, few
Jews have held elective office or primary
positions of power, even though they have
always been politically active. In the past
decade, however, this has gradually begun
to change. Today, Jews occupy more positions
of influence than ever before. For example,
in the 109th
Congress, 11 Senators are Jewish
(11 percent) while Jewish members comprise
almost 6 percent of the House.
Bill Clinton
nominated two Supreme Court Justices,
both Jewish. He had several Jewish Cabinet
members, including National Security Adviser
Sandy Berger and Agriculture Secretary Dan
Glickman, and dozens of Jews held other key
Administration posts. Bastions of bureaucratic
opposition, and sometimes outright anti-Semitism,
such as the CIA and State Department now
employ Jews at the highest levels. For
almost a decade, a Jew (Dennis Ross) was
America's principal Mideast negotiator and
Clinton appointed the first Jewish Ambassador
to Israel (Martin Indyk). The George
W. Bush Administration also has included
many Jews in high-profile subcabinet
positions.
The
Informal Arab Lobby
The disproportionate influence of the American Jewish population
is in direct contrast with the electoral involvement of Arab-Americans.
There are approximately 1.2 million Arabs
in the United States, and roughly 38 percent of them are Lebanese,
primarily Christians, who tend to be unsympathetic to the Arab lobby's
goals. This reflects another major problem for the Arab lobby -- inter-Arab
disunity. This disunity is reinforced by the general discord of the
Arab world, which has twenty-one states with competing interests. The
Arab lobby is thus precluded from representing "the Arabs."
Only about 70,000 Palestinians
(6 percent of all Arab-Americans) live in
the United States, but their views have received
disproportionate attention because of their
political activism. Similarly, a great deal
of attention has focused on the allegedly
growing political strength of Muslims
in the United States,
but fewer than one-fourth of all Arab-Americans
are Muslims according to the Arab-American
Institute.2
About half of the Arab population is concentrated in
five states — California, Florida, Michigan, New Jersey, and New
York — that are all key to the electoral college. Still, the Arab
population is dwarfed by that of the Jews in every one of these states
except Michigan.
Jewish
and Arab Populations in Key States3
State |
|
Percentage of Total State Population
|
|
|
Percentage of Total State Population
|
NY |
120,370 |
.63% |
1,635,020 |
8.4% |
CA |
190,890 |
.56% |
1,219,740 |
3.3% |
FL |
77,461 |
.48% |
638,235 |
3.7% |
NJ |
71,770 |
.85% |
504,450 |
5.5% |
MI |
115,284 |
1.16% |
87,270 |
.90% |
Campaign
Donations
Political campaign contributions are also
considered an important means of influence; typically, Jews have been
major benefactors. It is difficult to assess the impact of campaign
giving on legislative outcomes, particularly with regard to
Israel-related issues, where support or opposition may be a
consequence of non-monetary factors. In addition, one does not know if
a candidate is pro-Israel because of receiving a contribution, or
receives a donation as a result of taking a position in support of
Israel. In the past, Jewish contributions were less structured and
targeted than other interest groups, but this has changed dramatically
as Israel-related political action committees (PACs) have
proliferated.
Initially, the Jewish community feared that
post-Watergate election campaign financing reforms would reduce their
influence, but the evidence so far suggests the opposite. If anything,
the changes have stimulated greater political activism in the Jewish
community.
The first pro-Israel PAC
was formed in 1978, but there was little
activity until 1982 when thirty-three pro-Israel
PACs contributed $1.87 million to congressional
candidates. Like other PACs, most of this
money was given to incumbents and, because
of the long association of Jews with the
Democratic party, nearly 80 percent went
to Democrats. The number of PACs more than
doubled in 1984 as did their contributions.
It was estimated that more than seventy
pro-Israel PACs spent a little more than
$4 million in 1984. By 1988, the figure was
nearly $5 million. In 2008, pro-Israel PACs
gave a little more than $3 million to candidates,
and individuals contributed nearly $11 million
more. According to the Center for Responsive
Politics, pro-Israel
interests have contributed more than $100 million
in individual, PAC, and soft money contributions
to national-level candidates and national
party committees since 1990, but even these contributions
are dwarfed by those of labor unions, lawyers,
doctors, and trade associations. In fact,
out of 80
“industries,” the pro-Israel
contributors rank only 40th.
On the Arab lobby side,
only three PACs spent a trivial sum through
1988. Between 1990 and 2010, Arab
and Muslim PACs combined contributed a total of less than
$900,000.
The lobby took a more active and visible role than
ever before in the 1984 election. The most obvious manifestation of
this came in the congressional race involving seventy-six-year-old Maryland
Democrat Clarence Long. Long, chairman of the House Appropriations subcommittee
on Foreign Operations and a driving force behind increasing aid to Israel,
was targeted by the Arab lobby: "to serve notice to members of
Congress that the Arab lobby is ready and able to make life uncomfortable
for Israel's friends on Capitol Hill."
Like the visible campaign undertaken in 1982 by the
Israeli lobby to defeat pro-Arab Congressman Paul Findley of Illinois,
the Arab lobby claimed victory when Long was defeated. As was the case
in the Findley campaign, where the Congressman's district suffered
from a high unemployment rate, and had been gerrymandered to his
disadvantage, the reasons for Long's defeat were rooted in politics
unrelated to the Middle East. In Long's case, redistricting took away
a large percentage of his constituency and, after a narrow victory in
1982, he became a high priority target of the Republican National
Committee.
In Jesse Jackson the Arab lobby found, for the
first time, a presidential candidate receptive to their interests.
Jackson had a long record of support for the Arab cause and was
particularly outspoken in support of Palestinian rights, having met
with Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat
when it was considered politically taboo. As a result of his stands,
Jackson received substantial financial support from members of the
Arab lobby. The divisions of the lobby were again apparent, however,
when the president of the American Lebanese League said Jackson turns
his constituents off: "He seems interested in the welfare of Arab
countries but not Lebanon or the United States."
Overall, the comparative impact of the two lobbies
on elections was probably best summed up by Harry Truman in his
frequently repeated statement to Paul Porter, a Washington attorney
appointed as the ambassador to the Arab-Israeli peace talks in Geneva
in 1948: "I won't tell you what to do or how to vote, but I will
only say this. In all of my political experience I don't ever recall
the Arab vote swinging a close election."
Public
Opinion
The absence of a large voting bloc requires the
Arab lobby to develop sympathies among the general public if it is to
use public
opinion or the electoral process as a means of influencing
U.S. policy. The lobby has tried to support sympathetic American
groups, such as Third World organizations, and cultivate friendships
in the academic and business realms, but, as opinion polls have
consistently shown, there is relatively little popular support for the
Arab cause.
Since 1967, polls have
found that sympathy for Israel varied between 32 and 64 percent,
averaging 46 percent, while sympathy for the Arabs has oscillated
between 1 and 30 percent and averaged only 12 percent. In the last
several years, support for the Arabs has increased slightly, but this
has not affected sympathies toward Israel.
Not only has the Arab lobby been unable to increase
its standing significantly with the public, it has also failed to
convince the American people that the Israeli lobby controls U.S.
Middle East policy. In fact, polls indicate the public sees the Arab
lobby as more of a threat than the Israeli lobby. For example, in a
poll conducted several weeks after the Senate vote on the sale of
AWACS to Saudi Arabia, 53 percent of the public agreed Israel has
"too much influence" on American foreign policy, but only 11
percent felt the same way about American Jews. By contrast, 64 percent
said Saudi Arabia had too much influence, and 70 percent believed oil
companies were too influential. A March 1983 poll asking which groups
have "too much" political influence found that only 10
percent of those asked said "Jews." Business corporations
and unions were considered too powerful by more than 40 percent of the
respondents, with Arab interests next at 24 percent.
Thus, the Arab lobby's problem is twofold; it
suffers from a very negative image and Israel enjoys a very positive
image. This has gradually begun to change. To combat negative Arab
stereotypes, former Senator James Abourezk founded the American Arab
Anti-Discrimination Committee (ADC) in 1980. The ADC is modeled after
the Anti-Defamation League, but is considerably smaller and weaker.
The
Formal Israeli Lobby
The organization that directly lobbies
the U.S. government on behalf of the Israeli lobby
is AIPAC. The lobby, originally called the American Zionist Committee
for Public Affairs, was founded in 1951 by I.L. (Sy)
Kenen to appeal directly to Congress for legislation
to provide aid to Israel to circumvent State Department
opposition. As recently as the late 1960s, the organization
now considered the most powerful foreign policy lobby
in Washington was essentially a one-man operation
run by Kenen. In the late 1970s, AIPAC still had
only a handful of staff based in Washington. Today,
it has more than 100 employees with seven regional
offices and a budget of more than $40 million and
lobbies the Executive Branch as well as the Legislative.
Because of its name, AIPAC is sometimes mistakenly
thought to be a political action committee (PAC), but
the organization does not rate, endorse or finance
candidates.
AIPAC was not the first domestic lobby to concern
itself with foreign affairs, but it is regarded as the most powerful.
In 1998 and 1999, for example, Fortune Magazine named AIPAC the
second most powerful lobby in Washington after the American
Association for Retired Persons (AARP). The lobby strives to remain
nonpartisan and thereby keeps friends in both parties. By framing the
issues in terms of the national interest, AIPAC can attract broader
support than would ever be possible if it was perceived to represent
only the interests of Israel. This does not mean AIPAC does not have a
close relationship with Israeli officials, it does, albeit
unofficially. Even so, the lobby some times comes into conflict with
the Israeli government. One of the most blatant examples occurred when
AIPACs Executive Director Thomas Dine was quoted on the front page
of the New York Times as saying the 1982 Reagan peace plan had
some good points (and many bad ones) after the Israeli government had
rejected the plan in toto. Despite such disagreements, the Israeli
lobby tends to reflect Israeli government policy fairly closely.
Though its influence is limited primarily to issues where Congress has
a say, in particular, economic matters, the organization also serves
as a watchdog to deter anti-Israel policies from being adopted.
Lobbyists usually roam the halls of Congress trying
to get the attention of legislators so they can explain their
positions. AIPAC has the luxury of being able to call its allies in
Congress to pass along information, and then leaves much of the work
of writing bills and gathering cosponsors to the legislative staffs.
The lobbyists themselves are mostly Capitol Hill veterans who know how
to operate the levers of power.
Since it does not use stereotypical lobbying
tactics, the Israeli lobby depends on the network it has developed to
galvanize the Jewish community to take some form of political action.
The network consists of at least seventy-five different organizations,
which in one way or another support Israel. Most cannot legally engage
in lobbing, but are represented on the Board of Directors of AIPAC, so
they are able to provide input into the lobby's decision-making
process. Equally important is the bureaucratic machinery of these
organizations, which enables them to disseminate information to their
members and facilitate a rapid response to legislative activity.
A second coordinating body is the Conference of
Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations. It is composed of
leaders of 55 different organizations and is responsible for
formulating and articulating the "Jewish position" on most
foreign policy matters. The conference allows the lobby to speak with
one voice in a way its opponents cannot. The conference is the main
contact between the Jewish community and the executive branch, while
AIPAC tends to be the conduit with the legislative branch.
Even with the Jewish population concentrated in key
states, there is still only a total of about six million Jews;
therefore, the Israeli lobby is dependent on the support of non-Jewish
groups and actively works to form coalitions with broad segments of
American society. The lobby has successfully built coalitions
consisting of unions, entertainers, clergymen, scholars, and black
leaders. The coalitions allow the lobby to demonstrate a broad public
consensus for a pro-Israel policy.
The
Arab Lobby
The Arab lobby in the United States is at least as
old, perhaps older than the Israeli lobby. It is composed of what I.L.
Kenen called the petro-diplomatic complex consisting of the oil
industry, missionaries, and diplomats. According to Kenen, there was
no need for a formal Arab lobby because the petro-diplomatic complex
did the Arabs' work for them.
One of the earliest activities of the
petro-diplomatic complex began in 1951 when King Saud of Saudi Arabia
asked U.S. diplomats to finance a pro-Arab lobby to counter the
American Zionist Committee for Public Affairs (later the American
Israel Public Affairs Committee -AIPAC). The Arab lobby became an
official, active, and visible spokesman for the Arab cause in the wake
of the oil embargo. "The day of the Arab-American is here,"
boasted National Association of Arab-Americans (NAAA) founder Richard
Shadyac, "the reason is oil."
From the beginning, the Arab lobby has faced not
only a disadvantage in electoral politics but also in organization.
There are several politically oriented groups, but many of these are
one man operations with little financial or popular support. Americans
for Justice in the Middle East was formed by a group of Americans at
the American University in Beirut after the 1967 war to combat
"Zionism's virulent thirty-year campaign of hate and
vindictiveness." Two Anti-Zionist Jews are also active supporters
of the Arab lobby. Elmer Berger runs American Jewish Alternatives to
Zionism and Alfred Lilienthal publishes his own newsletter Middle East
Perspectives.
There are a number of larger and more
representative groups, including the aforementioned NAAA and ADC, the
Middle East Research and Information Project; the Middle East Affairs
Council, Americans for Near East Refugee Aid, the Arab American
Institute and the American Palestine Committee. Typically, these
organizations have boards of directors composed of prominent retired
government officials. Board members have included former Ambassador to
Jordan, L. Dean Brown, Herman Eilts, former Ambassador to Syria and
Egypt; Parker T. Hart, former Ambassador to Saudi Arabia and several
others.
The formal Arab lobby is the National Association
of Arab-Americans (NAAA), a registered domestic lobby founded in 1972
by Richard Shadyac. The NAAA was consciously patterned after its
counterpart, the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC).
Shadyac believed the power and wealth of the Arab countries stemming
from their oil reserves, would allow the Arab lobby to take advantage
of the political process in the same way the Jews have been thought
to. Like AIPAC, the NAAA makes its case on the basis of U.S. national
interests, arguing a pro-Israel policy harms those interests. Aid to
Israel is criticized as a waste of taxpayers' money, and the potential
benefits of a closer relationship with the Arab states is emphasized.
The highlight of the NAAA's early efforts was a
meeting between President Ford and twelve NAAA officials in 1975.
Since then, the NAAA has participated in meetings with each president
and obtained access to top government officials. In 1977, for example,
after Sadat's historic visit to Jerusalem, the Arab lobby made its
displeasure over United States support for the initiative known to
President Carter, who wrote in his diary: "They [Arab-Americans]
have given all the staff, Brzezinski, Warren Christopher, and others,
a hard time. Although the lobby's concerns began to reach the highest
levels of government, there were no perceptible changes in United
States policy."
It is not only Arab-Americans who have made the
lobby's case; the Arab lobby, like the Israeli lobby, has successfully
built coalitions with other interest groups. As noted earlier, the
pedro-diplomatic complex was the lobby until 1972, when the NAAA was
formed. Even today, arguably, it is the most influential component of
the lobby. Nevertheless, most of the nation's major corporations have
not supported the Arab lobby. In fact, prior to the AWACS sale, oil
companies were about the only corporations willing to openly identify
with Arab interests. The reason is that most corporations prefer to
stay out of foreign policy debates; moreover, corporations may feel
constrained by the implicit threat of some form of retaliation by the
Israeli lobby.
The major oil companies feel no such constraints.
Exxon, Standard Oil of California (SoCal), Mobil, and Texaco have long
sought to manipulate public opinion and foreign policy on the Middle
East. These companies as a group comprise the Arabian American Oil
Company (ARAMCO). Participation in the public relations campaign
amounted to the price of doing business in the oil-producing nations.
The campaign began after the 1967
War when ARAMCO established a fund to help present the Arab side
of the conflict. In May 1970, ARAMCO representatives met with
Assistant Secretary of State Joseph Sisco and warned him American
military sales to Israel would hurt U.S.-Arab relations and jeopardize
U.S. oil supplies. The former chairman of ARAMCO testified before
Congress that the United States' pro-Israel policies were harming U.S.
business interests. In 1972, at Kuwait's urging, Gulf Oil joined the
campaign, providing $50,000 to create a public relations firm to
promote the Arab side.
The campaign took on greater urgency in 1973 after
Frank Jungers, then Chairman of the Board of ARAMCO, met with Saudi
King Faisal, and was pressured to take a more active role in creating
a sympathetic attitude toward the Arab nations. In June, a month after
the Jungers meeting, Mobil published its first advertisement/editorial
in the New York Times. In July, SoCal's chairman sent out a letter to
the company's 40,000 employees and 262,000 stockholders asking them to
pressure Washington to support "the aspirations of the Arab
people." The chairman of Texaco called for a reassessment of U.S.
Middle East policy. When the October
1973 War broke out, the chairmen of the ARAMCO partners sent a
memorandum to the White House warning against increasing military aid
to Israel. Since 1973, ARAMCO has maintained its public relations
campaign and become involved in occasional legislative fights, such as
the AWACS sale, but, on the whole, the campaign has had no observable
impact on U.S. policy.
Other companies outside the oil industry are
involved in the Arab lobby, the most well-known being the
international engineering firm Bechtel, but the Arab and Israeli
lobbies have had virtually no confrontations since the AWACS fight in
1981, in part because the Israeli lobby hasn't opposed any major arms
sales or other economic investments in the region that threatened U.S.
corporate interests.
A relatively ignored component of the "Arab
lobby" is found among the Christian community, most notably, the
National Council of Churches (NCC). The NCC is composed of thirty-two
Protestant denominations, including virtually all major church bodies.
The Council has taken consistently anti-Israel stands, and its 1980
policy statement on the Middle East called for the creation of a PLO
state. Besides passing anti-Israel resolutions, the NCC puts on
seminars, radio shows, and conferences. From 1972 to 1977, it
published the ARAMCO financed SWASIA (Southwest Asia) newsletter. When
SWASIA ceased publication, the NCC established an Islamic desk to
"enable American Christians to understand Arab Christian and
Muslim attitudes." The relationship between the NCC and other
Arab lobby organizations is primarily informal, with NCC leaders
serving on many of their boards.
Contrasts
At least two major differences
distinguish the Arab and Israeli lobbies.
First, the Arab lobby almost always lobbies
negatively; i.e., against pro-Israel legislation
rather than for pro-Arab legislation. In
2004, for example, members of Congress were
graded on a number of issues, including:
opposition to the war with Iraq;
opposition to resolutions that condemned terrorism inflicted on Israel,
that supported President
Bush's letter supporting Israel, that called for a halt
to Saudi support for terrorism and Syrian
accountability, and that supported Israel's
construction of a security
fence; opposition
to a letter calling for the Palestinians
to meet certain obligations; and a resolution
expressing sympathy for an American woman
who was accidentally killed protesting Israeli
house demolitions.4
The other major difference between the two lobbies
is the use of paid foreign agents by the Arab lobby. Pro-Arab U.S. government
officials can look forward to lucrative positions as lobbyists, spokesmen,
and consultants for the Arab cause. For example, the outspoken critic
of the Israeli lobby, former Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
J. William Fulbright, was hired by the Saudis and the United Arab Emirates.
It was the Saudis' agent, Fred Dutton, a former Assistant Secretary
for Legislative Affairs and special assistant to President Kennedy,
who spearheaded the AWACS campaign and reputedly conceived the "Reagan
vs. Begin" angle. Other top officials who have provided their services
to the Arab lobby include: Clark Clifford, President Johnson's Defense
Secretary; Richard Kleindienst, President Nixon's Attorney General;
and William Rogers, Nixon's Secretary of State.
Overall, the Israeli lobby is effective because it
enjoys advantages in every area considered relevant to interest group
influence. It has (a) a large and vocal membership; (b) members who
enjoy high status and legitimacy; (c) a high degree of electoral
participation (voting and financing); (d) effective leadership; (e) a
high degree of access to decision-makers; and (f) public support.
Moreover, for reasons at least partly attributable to the lobby's
efforts, the lobby's primary objective a U.S. commitment to Israel
has been accepted as a national interest.
Measuring
Influence
Most articles and research on the Middle East
interest groups are based on anecdotes, case studies or casual
observation. They either vaguely conclude the Israeli lobby has some
influence some of the time or (usually in the case of works by authors
hostile to Israel) assert the Israeli lobby is a powerful and
dangerous influence that controls U.S. policy.
In a more rigorous study of 782 policy decisions
made from 1945 to 1984, I found the Israeli lobby won; that is,
achieved its policy objective, 60 percent of the time. The most
important variable was the president's position. When the president
supported the lobby, it won 95 percent of the time. At first glance it
appears the lobby was only successful because its objectives coincided
with those of the president, but the lobby's influence was
demonstrated by the fact that it still won 27 percent of the cases
when the president opposed its position.
One of the most surprising results, particularly in
light of conventional wisdom and evidence presented in case studies,
was that the president's position was not significantly affected by
the electoral cycle. Although candidates may appear to pander to
Jewish voters, the data indicate the electoral cycle does not affect
influence success.
Lobby success also varied depending on the policy
at issue. The lobby was very successful in overcoming presidential
opposition on economic issues, but rarely able to defeat the president
on security and political issues. The lobby was more successful on
economic issues because most of those were decided in Congress where
pro-Israel congressman frequently fought for increased aid levels for
Israel, earmarked funds for Israel and adopted amendments to aid bills
that were endorsed by the Israeli lobby.
The lobby's lack of success on political issues was most likely
a result of the fact that most of these cases were decided in the executive
branch where lobby influence is relatively weak. The outcome might also
be explained by the tradition of congressional deference to the president
on matters of security and diplomacy.
Sources: 1JTA, January 13, 2006).
2Alex Ionides, "Getting
Their House Together," Egypt
Today, (November 2003).
3U.S.
Census Bureau (2000); Jewish Demography Project.
4Shirl McArthur, “Five
Senators, 29 Representatives Included in 108th Congress' 'Hall of Shame,'” Washington Report on Middle East Affairs, (November 2004), pp.
36-37.
Mitchell G. Bard. The
Complete Idiot's Guide to Middle East Conflict. 4th
Edition. NY: Alpha Books, 2008;
The
Water's Edge And Beyond. NJ: Transaction
Publishers, 1991;
Center
for Responsive Politics |