Lessons From the Annapolis Conference
(Updated January 2008)
Perhaps the most important outcome of
the Annapolis
conference was the demonstration
that the United States is still the most
important player in Middle East affairs.
Though commentators have suggested American
prestige and influence have been damaged
by the war in Iraq, more than 40 countries
answered President
Bush’s invitation to the peace conference. No other country
could have assembled so many nations to
discuss peace in the Middle East. And it
is the United States that is expected to
follow up the meeting with continued diplomacy.
The obstacles to peace remain unchanged:
Arab refusal to recognize Israel as a Jewish
state, the unwillingness and inability
of the Palestinians to halt violent attacks
against Israel.
Israel has offered risky concessions on
a number of core issues, including acceptance
of the establishment of a Palestinian state,
withdrawal to the 1967
armistice line with
modifications, reaching some compromise
on the sovereignty of Jerusalem, acceptance
of the return of Palestinian
refugees to
a Palestinian state and the dismantling
of a significant number of settlements.
The Palestinians, however,
have not modified their intransigent positions
on borders, Jerusalem, refugees or settlements.
They still insist on Israel’s withdrawal
to the 1967 lines, a division of Jerusalem,
recognition of a right for refugees to “return” to
Israel and the dismantling of all settlements.
International meetings are not conducive
to negotiations or reaching agreements
between Israel and the Arabs. No breakthroughs
were achieved and no agreements signed
at Annapolis.
Bringing Arab delegates together, especially
the intransigent Syrians, insured the Palestinians
would be unable to offer concessions that
would make them look weak to their peers.
The format, therefore, hurt rather than
aided the bilateral talks.
The meeting gave some international support
for the talks between Prime Minister Ehud
Olmert and President Mahmoud
Abbas. They
were already negotiating so it did little
beyond encourage them to continue talking.
The conference breathed
life into the moribund road
map as the United States
made a commitment to monitor compliance
with its requirements. It is not clear,
however, that a return to the same formula
that has proved unworkable for the last
three years will help advance the peace
process. Moreover, the decision to refocus
on the road
map undercut prospects for
new initiatives or a breakthrough in negotiations.
Participants recognized the importance
of improving the economic situation in
the territories and gave momentum to efforts
to raise international aid for the Palestinians.
Most Arab states have
made progress since their rejection of
negotiations, recognition and peace with
Israel at Khartoum 40 years ago. Israel
has peace with Egypt and Jordan and
has developed some mostly quiet economic
relations with the Gulf and North African
states.
Saudi
Arabia’s participation was
hailed by some as an important coup,
but the Saudis missed
an opportunity to break the psychological
barrier when the foreign minister refused
to shake hands with the Israeli foreign
minister. If anything, Saudi obstructionism
remains one of the principal obstacles
to normalization of relations between
Israel and other Arab states inclined
to improve ties. No progress toward normalization
was made at the conference and no groundwork
was laid for doing so in the future.
Arab states, including
those that do not recognize Israel, were
willing to participate in the conference
in part because of the recognition that
they shared with Israel a concern about
a hostile and expansionist Iran.
The conference, however, did not make any
effort to create a consensus on policy
toward Iran and the subsequent publication
of the National
Intelligence Estimate undermined
the faith of Israel and the Arab states
in America’s commitment to prevent
Iran from threatening their interests.
By mobilizing support around the Israeli-Palestinian
track, some pressure was placed on Syria to engage in negotiations to avoid being
left out, but Damascus has still done little
to suggest any interest in peace with Israel.
President Bashar
Assad almost immediately
repeated Syria’s longstanding position
that Israel must completely withdraw from
the Golan
Heights before it will consider
any change in its relations with Israel.
The ongoing negotiations
between Abbas and Olmert raise some hope
that progress toward a Palestinian-Israeli
agreement can be achieved in the coming
months, but it is clear the Annapolis conference
was a failure in moving Israel
any closer to peace with the Arab states
or the Palestinians.
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