Targeting Oil Exports
Sanctioning the “Shadow Fleet”
Trump Offers to Negotiate
Ramping Up the Pressure
Smuggling Networks in Iraq
Interdiction At Sea
Targeting Oil Exports
On February 4, 2025, President Donald Trump restored his “maximum pressure” campaign on Iran. Two days later, consistent with his intent to drive Iranian oil exports to zero, the U.S. Treasury imposed new sanctions on individuals and companies in countries including China, India, and the United Arab Emirates involved in shipping Iranian oil to China. In his first term, Trump’s sanctions reduced Iranian oil revenue to near zero, but lax enforcement by the Biden administration allowed Tehran to earn $54 billion in 2022 and $53 billion in 2023 from oil sales to China.
“We will use all tools at our disposal to hold the regime accountable for its destabilizing activities and pursuit of nuclear weapons that threaten the civilized world,” said State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce.
Trump also directed his UN ambassador to work with allies to “complete the snapback of international sanctions and restrictions on Iran” that had been lifted when Iran signed the nuclear agreement in 2015.
Sanctioning the “Shadow Fleet”
The administration took quick action against Iran’s “shadow fleet” of tankers that “operate outside of jurisdictional port limits with non-sanctioned vessels to transport petroleum to foreign customers, obfuscating the oil’s Iranian origin.” The Treasury and State Departments imposed “sanctions on over 30 persons and vessels in multiple jurisdictions for their role in brokering the sale and transportation of Iranian petroleum-related products.”
“Iran continues to rely on a shadowy network of vessels, shippers, and brokers to facilitate its oil sales and fund its destabilizing activities,” said Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent. “The United States will use all our available tools to target all aspects of Iran’s oil supply chain, and anyone who deals in Iranian oil exposes themselves to significant sanctions risk.”
Two days later, the Treasury Department sanctioned six entities based in Hong Kong and China that operate as front companies and facilitate the purchase and shipment of key components for the benefit of suppliers for Iran’s UAV and ballistic missile programs.
Trump Offers to Negotiate
Trump sent a personal letter to Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei on March 5, 2025, proposing nuclear negotiations. The letter urged Iran to engage in talks to prevent the country from acquiring nuclear weapons. Trump emphasized that he prefers diplomacy over military action, stating that he does not want to harm Iran and describing its people as “great people.” He framed the situation as urgent, warning that “the time is happening now… something’s going to happen one way or the other.” He presented a dual approach: Iran could either be confronted militarily or through a negotiated deal, but he expressed a clear preference for achieving a peaceful agreement.
In public comments and interviews, Trump stressed the high stakes, asserting that while he hoped for a diplomatic resolution, the alternative—military action—remained on the table. His outreach signaled both a willingness to negotiate and an insistence that Iran’s nuclear ambitions would not be allowed to proceed unchecked. Iran, however, was unwilling to discuss any limitations on its nuclear program, which it insisted was for peaceful purposes.
Ramping Up the Pressure
Treasury announced sanctions against the Foxtrot Network, a Sweden-based transnational criminal organization involved in illicit drug trafficking and violence, and its leader, Rawa Majid. The sanctions were imposed on March 12, 2025, because the Foxtrot Network, under Majid’s leadership, attacked the Israeli Embassy in Stockholm in January 2024 on behalf of the Government of Iran.
The following day, the United States imposed sanctions on three maritime entities—PT. BINTANG SAMU, DRA UTAMA, SHIPLOAD MARITIME PTE. LTD., and PT. GIANIRA ADHINUSA SENATAMA—for their roles in facilitating ship-to-ship transfers of Iranian crude oil near Nipa, Indonesia, on December 25, 2024. That same day, Treasury sanctioned the Iranian Minister of Petroleum and several entities in multiple jurisdictions, including China and India, for their ownership or operation of vessels that have delivered Iranian oil to China or lifted Iranian oil from storage in Dalian, PRC.
On March 20, Treasury sanctioned a “teapot” oil refinery and its chief executive officer for purchasing and refining hundreds of millions of dollars worth of Iranian crude oil, including from vessels linked to the Houthis, and the Iranian Ministry of Defense of Armed Forces Logistics (MODAFL). Sanctions were also imposed on 19 entities and vessels responsible for shipping millions of barrels of Iranian oil, comprising part of Iran’s “shadow fleet” of tankers.
“Teapot refinery purchases of Iranian oil provide the primary economic lifeline for the Iranian regime,” said Treasury Secretary Bessent.
On April 1, the U.S. unsealed a criminal complaint against Iranian nationals Hossein Akbari and Reza Amidi, along with the Iranian company Rah Roshd, for conspiring to procure U.S. parts for Iranian drones, providing material support to the IRGC (a designated foreign terrorist organization), and engaging in money laundering. Akbari, Rah Roshd’s CEO, and Amidi, its commercial manager, used front companies and falsified identities to evade U.S. sanctions and acquire American-made components for UAVs like the Mohajer-6, some of which were found in Iranian drones used by Russia in Ukraine. The defendants also conspired to provide military support to the IRGC, including drone parts and infrastructure, while laundering money through shell companies in the UAE and China. The U.S. Treasury simultaneously imposed sanctions on entities linked to Iran’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) program. The Justice Department reaffirmed its commitment to disrupting illicit supply chains that bolster Iran’s military capabilities.
On the same day, the U.S. issued fresh Iran-related sanctions targeting six entities and two individuals based in Iran, China, and the United Arab Emirates.
Five entities and one individual based in Iran were sanctioned on April 9 for their support of key entities that manage and oversee Iran’s nuclear program. “The Iranian regime’s reckless pursuit of nuclear weapons remains a grave threat to the United States and a menace to regional stability and global security,” said Treasury Secretary Bessent. “Treasury will continue to leverage our tools and authorities to disrupt any attempt by Iran to advance its nuclear program and its broader destabilizing agenda.”
A day later, sanctions were imposed on “United Arab Emirates (UAE)-based Indian national Jugwinder Singh Brar (Brar), who owns multiple shipping companies that boast a fleet of nearly 30 vessels, many of which operate as part of Iran’s “shadow fleet.” OFAC [Office of Foreign Assets Control] is also designating two UAE- and two India-based entities that own and operate Brar’s vessels that have transported Iranian oil on behalf of the National Iranian Oil Company (NIOC) and the Iranian military.”
In its continued targeting of the Iranian oil industry, the Treasury sanctioned the China-based independent “teapot” refinery, Shandong Shengxing Chemical Co., Ltd., for its role in purchasing more than $1 billion in Iranian crude oil. Several shipping companies were also sanctioned for participating in the shadow fleet of tankers that conduct ship-to-ship transfers to obfuscate Iran’s petroleum shipments to China. Also sanctioned was the “Iranian national and liquified petroleum gas (LPG) magnate Seyed Asadoollah Emamjomeh and his corporate network, which is collectively responsible for shipping hundreds of millions of dollars’ worth of Iranian LPG and crude oil to foreign markets.”
The administration also aimed at Iran’s missile program by sanctioning six entities and six individuals based in Iran and China for their role in a network procuring ballistic missile propellant ingredients on behalf of the IRGC. “Iran’s aggressive development of missiles and other weapons capabilities imperils the safety of the United States and our partners,” said Treasury Secretary Bessent. “It also destabilizes the Middle East, and violates the global agreements intended to prevent the proliferation of these technologies. To achieve peace through strength, Treasury will continue to take all available measures to deprive Iran’s access to resources necessary to advance its missile program.”
OFAC escalated its pressure campaign against Iran’s oil exports by sanctioning China-based Hebei Xinhai Chemical Group Co., Ltd. on May 8 —a key “teapot” refinery—and three port terminal operators in Shandong Province for facilitating Iranian oil sales worth hundreds of millions of dollars. This marks OFAC’s first designation of terminal operators in the region and its third against teapot refineries. The action targets a broad network—including companies, vessels, and captains—tied to Iran’s “shadow fleet,” which covertly ships oil to China using deceptive maritime practices like ship-to-ship transfers. Sanctions were imposed under Executive Orders 13846 and 13902, with the designated entities and individuals now subject to asset freezes and a prohibition on dealings with U.S. persons. The effort is part of the broader U.S. campaign to choke off revenue supporting Iran’s destabilizing activities.
Later that month, the U.S. Department of the Treasury updated its sanctions list related to Iran and non-proliferation, adding two Iranian nationals—Sayyed Mohammad Reza Seddighi Saber and Ahmad Haghighat Talab—as well as the Iranian technology company FUYA PARS, also known as “IDEAL VACUUM.” All entities were designated for activities related to weapons proliferation and Iran-related investments and are subject to secondary sanctions. The following day, OFAC updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list by designating Iranian national Mohammad Khorasani Niasari and 17 entities across Singapore, Hong Kong, China, Seychelles, and Liberia for their connections to Iran-based Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company. These entities, many of which are involved in international trade, shipping, and energy sectors, were designated under Executive Order 13224 for supporting terrorism financing. Two vessels—the BALU (Cameroon-flagged) and the ROC (Panama-flagged)—were also selected for their links to the sanctioned companies. All listings carry secondary sanctions risk under U.S. counterterrorism authorities. The following day, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sanctions on six individuals and twelve entities linked to Iran’s efforts to manufacture critical ballistic missile components domestically. These sanctions target organizations supporting the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), particularly those involved in the production of carbon fibers used in intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
In June 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a wide-ranging set of new sanctions targeting terror financing and weapons proliferation networks linked to Iran and the Houthis (“Ansarallah”) in Yemen. The updated list includes dozens of individuals, companies, and vessels involved in smuggling oil, fuel, military equipment, and advanced technology, often in coordination with Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The network spans multiple countries, including China, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Singapore, the Marshall Islands, Seychelles, Yemen, and Iran itself. Several designations were also updated or removed from the sanctions list.
The following month, the U.S. Treasury added new individuals, companies, and vessels to its sanctions list for links to terrorism, particularly Hezbollah and Iran. Several Lebanese nationals were designated for their roles in supporting Hezbollah’s financial arm, Al-Qard al-Hassan. Numerous international firms were sanctioned for helping Iran evade sanctions, primarily through oil shipping. At the same time, a few names related to narcotics trafficking were removed. Those listed now face severe U.S. financial restrictions and secondary sanctions.
In July 2025, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed sweeping new sanctions on dozens of individuals, companies, and vessels accused of helping Iran circumvent sanctions on its oil sector. The targeted network spans multiple countries—including the United Arab Emirates, India, Singapore, Switzerland, Turkey, China, and the Marshall Islands—and is believed to have facilitated the transport, financing, and concealment of illicit Iranian oil shipments. According to U.S. authorities, the operation involved a complex web of front companies, ship reflagging, false documentation, and international intermediaries, all aimed at sustaining Iran’s oil revenues despite ongoing sanctions.
The following month, OFAC designated seven Iranian individuals and 12 affiliated entities for supporting Iran’s financial and technological infrastructure. The sanctioned entities include Cyrus Offshore Bank, RUNC Exchange System Company, FANAP Holding (linked to Pasargad Bank), and subsidiaries in digital payments, communications, and software development. All designations were made under Executive Order 13902 and are subject to secondary sanctions, exposing non-U.S. individuals or institutions doing business with them to potential penalties. The move aims to disrupt Iran’s access to international financial networks and limit its ability to fund destabilizing activities.
Later, the Trump administration announced new sanctions on two Chinese companies importing Iranian oil, as part of its “maximum pressure” campaign against Tehran. The State Department designated operators at Dongjiakou Port in Shandong Province and Yangshan Port near Shanghai, accusing them of handling tens of millions of barrels of Iranian crude since late 2024 through sanctioned vessels tied to Iran’s state oil company. The sanctions freeze U.S.-linked assets, block transactions, and mandate reporting to OFAC, with Washington stressing the goal is not punishment but forcing Iran to curb its funding of terrorism and nuclear activities.
In October 2025, OFAC announced sweeping new sanctions targeting Iran’s energy export network, describing the move as an effort to dismantle key components of the regime’s revenue machine. The designations include dozens of companies and individuals across India, China, Turkey, the UAE, Singapore, Hong Kong, and the Marshall Islands, as well as more than 30 vessels allegedly transporting Iranian oil, gas, and petrochemicals. Many sanctioned entities were linked to the Persian Gulf Petrochemical Industry Commercial Company and other state-backed firms that help Tehran evade international restrictions. The Treasury said the measures aim to block property and financial interests of those facilitating Iran’s energy trade under Executive Orders 13846 and 13902.
The following month, OFAC announced new sanctions targeting a vast network of Iranian individuals and international entities accused of supporting Iran’s weapons and defense industries. The update added dozens of Iranian nationals, many based in Isfahan and Yazd, as well as companies operating in Turkey, China, Germany, and the United Arab Emirates, to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. Among the entities designated are the Iran Aircraft Manufacturing Industrial Company (HESA) and several affiliated firms linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). These sanctions were imposed under Executive Orders 13224 and 13886, addressing terrorism financing and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. According to OFAC, the measures aim to disrupt Iran’s export and procurement networks for missile and drone technology across Asia and the Middle East.
The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued a wide-ranging sanctions update later that month, adding dozens of individuals, companies, vessels, and aircraft to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List for involvement in Iran-related oil smuggling networks, terrorism financing, and support for entities such as Mahan Air, Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars, and other IRGC-linked fronts. The update targets actors across Iran, the UAE, Singapore, India, Europe, and Africa, and designates associated maritime fleets and logistics firms. OFAC simultaneously removed several individuals linked to outdated Balkans and terrorism cases and updated listings for multiple organizations, some of which are now explicitly categorized as Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs).
In December 2025, the U.S. Treasury Department announced a broad new round of Iran-related sanctions targeting an extensive global network involved in the regime’s oil, petroleum, and maritime sectors. The measures designate dozens of shipping companies, ship management firms, commercial facilitators, and vessels across multiple jurisdictions, accusing them of helping Iran export oil and petroleum products in violation of U.S. sanctions. According to the Treasury, the network relied on opaque ownership structures, frequent changes to vessel names and flags, and front companies to evade enforcement and generate revenue for Tehran. While issuing limited licenses to allow safety, environmental, and cargo offloading activities in specific cases, U.S. officials emphasized that the action is intended to significantly disrupt Iran’s sanctions-evasion mechanisms and curtail a key source of funding for the regime.
In the same month, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new Iran-related sanctions, with the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) adding eight shipping and energy companies to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List, along with nine oil and LPG tankers linked to those entities, for their alleged involvement in activities aimed at circumventing U.S. sanctions on Iran. The designated companies are based in countries including India, Oman, the Marshall Islands, Seychelles, Liberia, and the United Arab Emirates. At the same time, OFAC issued a new general license authorizing limited safety- and environment-related transactions and the offloading of cargo involving vessels that were blocked on January 23, 2026.
Later that month, the U.S. Treasury Department announced new sanctions against senior Iranian regime officials, including commanders in the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and law enforcement forces, citing their role in violent repression, corruption, and serious human rights abuses. Several provincial IRGC commanders and intelligence officials were added to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, exposing them to asset freezes, travel restrictions, and secondary sanctions on entities that engage with them. In addition, the Treasury sanctioned two UK-based cryptocurrency exchanges accused of facilitating financial activity linked to the IRGC, underscoring Washington’s efforts to disrupt both the security and financial networks supporting the Iranian regime.
On February 6, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury, through the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), announced a major update to its Iran-related sanctions, adding numerous individuals, companies, and vessels to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. According to U.S. authorities, the newly designated actors were involved in networks that helped Iran evade sanctions and sustain commercial activity, particularly in the energy and maritime sectors. The designations include entities and individuals based in Turkey, India, China, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, the Marshall Islands, and other jurisdictions, as well as a significant number of oil and gas tankers operating under foreign flags. All designations were made pursuant to Executive Order 13846, which authorizes the blocking of property and prohibits transactions with U.S. persons, and form part of Washington’s broader strategy to increase economic pressure on Iran and limit its ability to export oil and generate revenue.
On the same day, Trump issued an executive order reaffirming that Iran’s actions continue to constitute a national emergency threatening U.S. national security, foreign policy, and the economy, building on a series of Iran-related emergency declarations and sanctions dating back to 1995. To strengthen pressure on Tehran, the order authorizes the imposition of additional ad valorem tariffs, potentially around 25%, on goods imported into the United States from any foreign country that directly or indirectly purchases or acquires goods or services from Iran. The U.S. will identify such countries, and, in coordination with other agencies, will determine whether and to what extent tariffs should be applied, subject to presidential approval. The order allows for modification in response to retaliation or changed circumstances, mandates ongoing monitoring and recommendations by senior officials, delegates broad implementation authority to relevant agencies, and defines key terms related to Iran and indirect trade.
Later that month, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new Iran-related sanctions, adding four Iranian nationals linked to Qods Aviation Industries, along with multiple companies and vessels, to the Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. The designations target individuals and entities in Iran, Turkey, the United Arab Emirates, Panama, the Marshall Islands, and other jurisdictions, many of which were identified as supporting procurement, shipping, or financial networks tied to Iran’s defense and non-proliferation activities. Several entities were made subject to secondary sanctions, and numerous oil and LPG tankers were also designated, reflecting a continued U.S. effort to disrupt maritime and commercial channels used to facilitate Iran’s military-industrial and sanctions-evasion operations.
The U.S. Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control issued General License U on March 20, 2026, temporarily authorizing transactions related to the sale, delivery, and offloading of Iranian-origin crude oil and petroleum products that were already loaded onto vessels before that date. The authorization remains in effect until April 19, 2026, and covers necessary operational activities such as docking, crew safety, repairs, and related maritime services, including imports into the United States. However, the license excludes transactions involving certain sanctioned jurisdictions, such as North Korea, Cuba, and specific regions of Ukraine, and does not override other existing sanctions frameworks.
On April 15, 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced new sanctions targeting an Iranian regime-linked oil smuggling network, adding multiple individuals, companies, and vessels to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. The network, tied in part to senior regime figure Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani and operatives linked to Hezbollah, operated through a complex system of front companies and maritime assets across jurisdictions including the United Arab Emirates, India, Turkey, and Europe. The Treasury warned that these entities facilitated the evasion of existing sanctions and could expose foreign financial institutions to secondary sanctions. The action is part of the broader “Economic Fury” campaign aimed at disrupting Iran’s illicit oil trade and limiting the regime’s revenue streams.
Two days later, the U.S. Treasury imposed sanctions on seven Iraqi militia commanders tied to Iran-backed groups, including Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq, Harakat al-Nujaba, and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada, for involvement in attacks on U.S. personnel and interests in Iraq. The Treasury stated these militias receive Iranian support and undermine Iraq’s sovereignty. Secretary Scott Bessent said the United States “will not allow” such groups to threaten American lives. The sanctions, issued under Executive Order 13224, freeze U.S.-based assets and prohibit transactions, with potential secondary sanctions for foreign entities assisting them.
Days after that, the U.S. Treasury imposed new sanctions targeting Iranian missile and UAV procurement networks, adding several individuals, companies, and aircraft to the SDN list. The designations focus on actors linked to entities like Mahan Air and procurement front companies across Iran, the UAE, and Turkey, aiming to disrupt Iran’s defense supply chains and related financial networks.
Following that, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a new round of sanctions under “Economic Fury,” targeting a global network facilitating Iran’s oil exports, including the China-based Hengli Petrochemical refinery and approximately 40 vessels and firms linked to Iran’s “shadow fleet.” According to the Treasury, these measures are intended to disrupt a key revenue stream sustaining Iran’s regional activities. Secretary of the Treasury Scott Bessent stated that “Economic Fury is imposing a financial stranglehold on the Iranian regime, hampering its aggression in the Middle East, and helping to curtail its nuclear ambitions,” adding that the United States will continue to “constrict the network of vessels, intermediaries, and buyers Iran relies on” and warning that those involved in such activities risk exposure to U.S. sanctions.
Later that month, the U.S. Department of the Treasury imposed a new round of Iran-related sanctions targeting numerous individuals and companies based in Iran, Hong Kong, the United Kingdom, and the United Arab Emirates for allegedly facilitating Iranian commercial and oil-related networks. The Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) also issued a new alert warning about the “sanctions risk” of dealing with independent “teapot” oil refineries. It updated its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list. Several designated entities and individuals were identified as subject to secondary sanctions, potentially exposing foreign businesses that interact with them to U.S. penalties.
In May 2026, the U.S. Department of the Treasury announced a new round of Iran-related sanctions on May 1, 2026, targeting individuals, companies, and vessels allegedly involved in Iranian oil trading and sanctions evasion networks. The measures, issued by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), added multiple entities and business people based in Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, China, and the United Kingdom to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, along with the Panama-flagged oil tanker NEW FUSION. Treasury also issued an Iran-related alert warning about “sanctions risks” tied to Iranian demands concerning passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and released a general license authorizing the wind-down of certain transactions involving newly sanctioned parties.
The following week, the U.S. Treasury Department expanded Iran-related sanctions by adding several Iraq-based individuals and companies to OFAC’s sanctions list. The designations targeted figures and businesses linked to the notice to Iranian-backed militia networks in Iraq, including Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Kata’ib Sayyid al-Shuhada. The listed companies operated in sectors such as energy, oil services, maritime transport, and contracting, suggesting that Washington was seeking to disrupt not only militia operatives but also the commercial infrastructure allegedly supporting Iran’s regional influence.
The following day, OFAC announced new Iran-related sanctions under the “Economic Fury” campaign, targeting both Iranian entities and the foreign networks that help sustain Tehran’s weapons and UAV programs. The action focused on procurement channels spanning China, Hong Kong, Belarus, the United Arab Emirates, and other jurisdictions, including individuals and companies linked to Iran’s Center for Innovation and Technology Cooperation, Pishgam Electronic Safeh Company, and Iran’s Ministry of Defense Export Center. OFAC also updated designations tied to China’s Chang Guang Satellite Technology and other entities connected to Iran-related arms authorities, underscoring that the sanctions are aimed not only at Iran directly, but also at the international suppliers, intermediaries, and front companies that enable its military programs.
The following week, OFAC announced new counterterrorism and Iran-related sanctions targeting three Iranian individuals and nine entities linked mainly to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, with all listed parties added to the SDN list and marked as subject to secondary sanctions. The designations include Mohammadreza Ashrafi Ghehi, Samad Fathi Salami, and Ahmad Mohammadi Zadeh, each linked to the IRGC, alongside companies based in the UAE, Hong Kong, Oman, and elsewhere, including Atic Energy FZE, Blanca Goods Wholesaler, several Hong Kong trading firms, Ocean Allianz Shipping, Zeus Logistics Group, and Universal Fortune Trading, which was linked to the National Iranian Oil Company. The action appears aimed at disrupting Iran’s external commercial, shipping, and procurement networks that support the IRGC and Iran’s sanctioned energy apparatus.
On May 19, 2026, the U.S. Treasury Department expanded sanctions targeting Iran’s shadow banking and shipping networks, adding individuals, companies, and vessels linked to Tehran’s sanctions-evasion system. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Iran’s “shadow banking system facilitates the illicit transfer of funding for terrorist purposes,” and warned financial institutions to monitor how Tehran manipulates the international financial system. The designations included Amin Exchange-linked figures and multiple shipping firms and tankers, including Quantum Star, Bright Gold, Midas, Tejas, and Vaslati. Bessent also urged European allies to better enforce Iran sanctions by closing Iranian bank branches and confiscating property held by firms tied to the regime.
Two days later, the U.S. Treasury’s OFAC designated Iranian ambassador-designate Mohammad Reza Raouf Sheibani as linked to Hezbollah, under U.S. counterterrorism authorities. The entry identifies Sheibani as operating in Lebanon and Iran, notes the risk of secondary sanctions under Executive Order 13224 as amended, and includes additional program tags related to the IRGC.
On May 27, 2026, the U.S. imposed new Iran-related sanctions by adding the Persian Gulf Strait Authority to the Treasury Department’s Specially Designated Nationals list. The Iranian-created body is responsible for managing requests for passage through the Strait of Hormuz, and OFAC identified it as linked to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps, exposing entities that deal with it to potential sanctions.
The following day, the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) expanded its Iran-related sanctions by adding one individual, multiple companies, and eight vessels to its Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List. The new designations target shipping, trading, and energy-linked networks operating through jurisdictions including India, Hong Kong, Singapore, Qatar, Liberia, the Marshall Islands, the United Arab Emirates, and China. Several entities were designated under Executive Order 13846 for blocking property connected to Iran. In contrast, others were identified as carrying secondary sanctions risk under Executive Order 13224 due to links with Sepehr Energy Jahan Nama Pars Company. The vessels added include crude oil, LPG, chemical, and product tankers such as FLORA, GAS NORA, HAUNCAYO, ILL GAP, MAYMEI, RCELEBRA, THEA, and YONGAN OCEAN. The action reflects continued U.S. efforts to disrupt Iran’s use of international shipping and front companies to evade sanctions and sustain its energy trade.
The Treasury Department announced new sanctions under its “Economic Fury” campaign on May 29, 2026, against an Iran-based procurement network accused of impersonating and defrauding U.S. companies to obtain restricted technology for Iran’s Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics and other sanctioned end users. OFAC said the network, led by Ali Majd Sepehr and his company Sorena Hushmand Samaneh, used front companies and intermediaries in Iran, the UAE, and Italy to acquire U.S.-origin cybersecurity, encryption, computer hardware, spectrum analyzers, and other sensitive goods, then re-export them to Iran. The action also fit into the Trump administration’s broader “maximum pressure” effort, including sanctions on Iranian oil trade, shadow banking, digital assets, and vessels tied to illicit commerce, while warning foreign companies and financial institutions of possible secondary sanctions.
The following month, the U.S. Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) issued new Iran-related sanctions, adding several Iranian individuals linked to the cryptocurrency platform Nobitex, as well as Iranian crypto exchanges Nobitex, Bitpin, Ramzinex, and Wallex, to its Specially Designated Nationals list. OFAC also listed two individuals connected to the Democratic Republic of the Congo and issued a new Iran-related sanctions FAQ.
Smuggling Networks in Iraq
In September 2025, OFAC intensified sanctions targeting Iranian oil smuggling networks in Iraq. The measures added Iraqi-born Waleed Khaled Hameed al-Samarra’i—who also holds Saint Kitts and Nevis nationality—to the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, along with several front companies in the UAE and Marshall Islands, including Babylon Navigation DMCC and Galaxy Oil FZ LLC. OFAC also sanctioned multiple affiliated shipping firms and a Liberia-flagged oil and chemical tanker fleet. The designations aim to disrupt Tehran’s use of maritime companies and vessels to evade sanctions and finance its oil trade.
Later that month, OFAC announced new sanctions targeting a financial network supporting Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) and Qods Force. The designations include Iranian nationals such as Arash Estaki Alivand and Alireza Derakhshan, as well as numerous front companies registered in the United Arab Emirates, Hong Kong, and Sharjah. Alpa Trading FZCO, Alliance First Trading LLC, and Everest International LLC were accused of using digital currencies such as Ethereum and TRON to move funds and help Iran evade international sanctions. The Treasury warned that individuals or businesses engaging with the listed entities risk secondary sanctions.
On September 23, 2025, it announced new sanctions targeting entities tied to Iran’s oil shipping and financial networks. Several tankers flagged in Gabon, Panama, and Palau—linked to companies like Etihad Engineering and Marine Services, Ravi Lines, Mahadev Maritime, and Xante Line—were designated under Executive Orders 13846 and 13902 for facilitating Iran’s petroleum trade. Hong Kong–based firms such as Finesse Global Trading and Peace Worth Shipping were blacklisted for ties to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps–Qods Force and other sanctioned Iranian actors. A Dubai-based front company, Milavous Group Ltd., was also sanctioned for its links to senior Iranian official Mohammad Hossein Shamkhani. These measures freeze assets under U.S. jurisdiction, prohibit Americans from dealing with the named entities, and expose third-country actors to secondary sanctions risks, aiming to disrupt Iran’s ability to fund its destabilizing regional activities.
Interdiction At Sea
In November 2025, U.S. special operations forces intercepted a ship in the Indian Ocean carrying military-related cargo from China to Iran, seizing the shipment before allowing the vessel to continue. The interdiction, conducted hundreds of miles off Sri Lanka, followed intelligence tracking of the shipment and aimed to prevent Iran from rebuilding its military capabilities.
The previously undisclosed operation was part of a Pentagon effort to disrupt Iran’s covert military procurement after U.S. and Israeli strikes damaged its nuclear and missile facilities in June. It marked the first known U.S. interception in recent years of China-origin military cargo bound for Iran.
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“Treasury Targets Iran’s Efforts to Domestically Manufacture Key Ballistic Missile Components,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (May 14, 2025).
“Non-Proliferation Designations; Iran-related and Counter Terrorism Designations, Designation Updates, and Designation Removal,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (June 20, 2025).
“Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations; Counter Narcotics Designations Removals,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (July 3, 2025).
“Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (July 30, 2025).
“Iran-related Designations; Specially Designated Nationals List Update,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (August 7, 2025).
“Sanctions on Iran’s Oil Network to Further Impose Maximum Pressure on Iran,” U.S. Department of State, (August 21, 2025).
“Iran-related Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (September 2, 2025).
“Treasury Targets Financial Network Supporting Iran’s Military,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (September 16, 2025).
“Counter-Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (September 23, 2025).
“Iran-related Designations; Russia-related Designation Removal,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (October 9, 2025).
“Counter Terrorism Designations; Burma-related Designations; Cyber-related Designations; Non-Proliferation Designations and Designation Updates; Iran-related Designation Update,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (November 12, 2025).
“Iran-related Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations, Updates, and Removals; Balkans-related Designation Removal,” U.S. Department of the Treasury, (November 20, 2025).
Benoit Faucon and Lara Seligman, “U.S. Forces Raid Ship, Seize Cargo Headed to Iran From China,” Wall Street Journal, (December 12, 2025).
“Iran-related Designations; International Criminal Court-related Designations; Russia-related Designations Removals; Foreign Sanctions Evaders Determination Removal; Issuance of Iran-related and International Criminal Court-related General Licenses,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (December 18, 2025).
@WhiteHouse, (January 12, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (January 15, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (January 23, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations; Non-Proliferation Designation Update and Designation Removal,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (January 30, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (February 6, 2026).
“Addressing Threats To The United States By The Government Of Iran,” White House, (February 6, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations; Non-Proliferation Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (February 25, 2026).
“Authorizing the Delivery and Sale of Crude Oil and Petroleum Products of Iranian-Origin Loaded on Vessels as of March 20, 2026,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (March 20, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations; Counter Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (April 15, 2026).
“Economic Fury Targets Iran-Backed Iraqi Militia Commanders,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (April 17, 2026).
“Counter Terrorism Designations; Non-Proliferation Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (April 21, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations; Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designation Update; Issuance of Iran-related General License,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (April 24, 2026).
“Counter Terrorism Designation; Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Frequently Asked Question; Publication of Iran-related OFAC Alert,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (April 28, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related General License and Frequently Asked Question; Publication of Iran-related OFAC Alert,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 1, 2026).
“Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designations; Cuba Designation and Designations Updates; Issuance of Cuba-related General License and Frequently Asked Questions,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 7, 2026).
“Non-Proliferation and Iran-related Designations and Designations Updates,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 8, 2026).
“Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 11, 2026).
“Counter Terrorism Designations; Iran-related Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 19, 2026).
“Counter Terrorism Designations,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 21, 2026).
“Iran-related Designation; Counter Terrorism Designation,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 27, 2026).
“Iran-related Designations; Issuance of Russia-related General License and Amended Frequently Asked Questions,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 28, 2026).
“Economic Fury Targets Iranian Network Defrauding U.S. Firms to Supply Tehran’s Military,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (May 29, 2026).
“Counter Terrorism and Iran-related Designations; Democratic Republic of the Congo-related Designations; Issuance of Iran-related Frequently Asked Question,” U.S. Department of Treasury, (June 2, 2026).