U.S. Coordinating Position with British

The Secretary of State to the Acting Secretary of State

top secret

Paris, May 31, 1949—7 p. m.

2202. Webb from Acheson. Bevin Conv Four. Bevin discussed Palestine question with me this morning. He referred to their conversations in New York with Bunche who had agreed they could supply small arms but said he could not go further pending conclusion Syria and Israeli armistice. Bunche had prepared draft for SC but not yet ready to submit it. Bevin chiefly concerned situation arising from Israeli claims to territory both sides upper Jordan which would give them complete control of all water resources. UK hopes for four-party agreement on water development permitting settlement 100,000 refugees and leaving adequate water for Israel. He suggested we secure help of Bank and perhaps Conciliation Commission to study common use of water under joint auspices. Bevin further amplified previous arguments regarding defense arrangements with Egypt and other countries. He emphasized they must have an agreement with Egypt if trouble comes. He had settled the question of water resources and was making progress on Sudan and Ethiopia. UK has sent Slim¹ and Egyptians have appointed three of their best people to discuss plans. Bevin thinks if he now lets Egyptians have such arms for training as he can properly send under Bunche’s ruling, he could stall for a couple months before supplying other arms but would need to give some assurance further action within that time. Bevin thinks much depends on settling Syrian and Israeli difficulty. He is asking Schuman² to use his influence with Syria. UK ready to spend considerable sterling various refugee projects.

I told Bevin in very strict confidence that we had given stiff note to Israel and were awaiting their formal reply. I stressed necessity for avoiding any reference to our note. I emphasized our belief very important British avoid raising issue by sending arms while outcome this step of ours is awaiting.

Bevin considered this very helpful and then raised Transjordan question. Wright reported Transjordan received recent note from Israel maintaining demands for Syrian withdrawal, asserting Conciliation Commission had failed and requesting direct negotiations in Jerusalem between Transjordan and Israel parallel to Lausanne discussions. Abdullah told British he was defenseless but would be accused by other Arabs of going behind their backs if he agreed to Jerusalem talks. Bevin had not previously received this information but commented UK should tell him not to enter Jerusalem talks. If Israelis attack Arab Legion it would be serious new matter for UN. In such case Bevin would feel bound to release the munitions held at Amman and expressed hope US would agree he should do so although he would not release it unless Israelis first attack. Bevin added Abdullah has also asked their advice whether they should now incorporate Palestine territories which he is administering. Bevin would like to have them do this so their treaty would apply to these territories also. Wright said their legal people believed they could argue treaty applies now without incorporation on basis de facto administration. Bevin specifically requested our views on question Transjordan incorporation of territories and I told him I would secure word for him as soon as possible.³ Bevin expressed sympathetic understanding US political problem in face of domestic pressures and strong desire to avoid any break in our common front. I answered affirmatively Wright’s specific question whether we agreed they could go as far as Bundle’s authorization re shipment of arms.

1. Field Marshal Sir William J. Slim, Chief of the British Imperial General Staff.
2. Robert Schuman, French Foreign Minister.
3. In Telac 32, May 31, 4 p. m., to Secretary Acheson at Paris, the Department had speculated that Mr. Bevin might “inquire re US attitude on disposition central part of Pal now occupied by Transjordan troops. Dept’s policy on this is to favor incorporation area in Transjordan. Suggest Bevin be so informed.” (740.00119 Council/5–3049) Presumably, this telegram reached Secretary Acheson too late to be used in his conversation with Mr. Bevin

Source: U.S. State Department