Background & Overview
by David Shyovitz
The Camp
David summit took place from July 11-24, 2000, at the
presidential retreat in Camp David, MD. Attending were President
Bill Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak, and PA Chairman Yasser
Arafat. The intention of the gathering was, ostensibly,
to negotiate a final settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict in accordance with the 1993
Oslo agreement. The parties were unable to come to an
agreement, however, and a wave of Palestinian violence soon
engulfed Israel. Another round of talks was subsequently
held at the White House from December 19-23, 2000, again
aimed at negotiating a final settlement. Because both Clinton’s
and Barak’s terms in office were ending, a final settlement,
and not merely an interim agreement, was seen as vital. Nonetheless,
the White House negotiations also ended unsuccessfully.
While then-president Clinton made clear that Barak
had been prepared to make peace, apologists for Arafat insisted that
the only offer made by Barak was a fragmented state divided into four
“cantons,” none of them connected with the Gaza Strip; that Arafat eventually
accepted a settlement offer, which was withdrawn when Ariel
Sharon was elected Prime Minister; and that this final offer was
not a serious one, and was never put on paper by the U.S. or Israel.
These myths, in varying forms, have become the backbone of the Palestinian
revisionist account, supported most vocally by New
York Times journalist Deborah Sontag, U.S. negotiator Robert Malley
(and co-author Hussein Agha, and the Palestinian
Authority itself.
The firsthand accounts of other officials, however,
have confirmed the conventional wisdom, and cast doubt on the revisionist
assertions. These politicians include Ambassador Dennis
Ross, the chief negotiator for the U.S.; Shlomo
Ben-Ami, Israel’s chief negotiator; and President Clinton and Prime
Minister Barak themselves.
At Camp David, Ross has said, there was no comprehensive
final settlement offered. The Israeli and American negotiators put forth
ideas regarding borders, Jerusalem, and land transfers.
One of those was a Palestinian state comprised of four cantons. Arafat
rejected these suggestions, but did not raise a single idea himself.
Ben-Ami, who kept meticulous diaries of the proceedings, said that Clinton exploded at the Palestinians over
their refusal to make a counteroffer. “‘A summit's purpose,’ Clinton
said, ‘is to have discussions that are based on sincere intentions and
you, the Palestinians, did not come to this summit with sincere intentions.’
Then he got up and left the room.”
According to Ben-Ami, Israel
tried to find a solution for Jerusalem that
would be
“a division in practice...that didn't
look like a division;”
that is, Israel was willing to compromise
on the issue, but needed a face-saving formula.
The Palestinians, however, had no interest
in helping the Israelis; to the contrary,
they wanted to humiliate them.” Nevertheless,
Ben-Ami said Israel dropped its refusal
to divide Jerusalem and accepted “full Palestinian
sovereignty” on the Temple
Mount and asked the Palestinians only to recognize
the site was also sacred to Jews.
Arafat’s only contribution was the assertion
that, in reality, no Jewish
Temple ever existed on the Temple
Mount, only an obelisk; the real Temple existed in Nablus,
he said. Not only did he not make any accommodation to Israel,
Ross said, “he denied the core of the Jewish faith.” This stunning remark illustrated how Arafat
had become caught up in the mythology he had created and
indicated to the Americans that he was incapable of the psychological
leap necessary — the one Anwar Sadat had made —
to achieve peace. As a result, President Clinton’s press
conference following the summit laid most of the blame for
the outcome on Arafat.
Malley and Aghan, in an article that came to define
the revisionist view, attributed tactical errors to the Israelis and
Americans as well as the Palestinians. Those errors included the neglect
of several interim agreements and land transfers by Barak, who was too
caught up in the search for a permanent agreement. As a result of those
errors, Malley and Agha claimed, Arafat came to view Camp David as “a
trap,” and to distrust both Barak and Clinton. Backed into a corner,
and afraid of losing whatever gains he had already made, he reverted
to passivity.
But Ross, the head of the negotiating team
of which Malley was a member, has countered that Malley’s
defense of Arafat ignores the larger context of the negotiations:
[Malley’s] account of
“the tragedy of errors” of
Camp David — though
correct in many aspects—is
glaring in its omission of Chairman Arafat's
mistakes. One is left with the impression
that only Barak did not fulfill commitments.
But that is both wrong and unfair, particularly
given Arafat's poor record on compliance…
Did Prime Minister Barak make mistakes
in his tactics, his negotiating priorities,
and his treatment of Arafat? Absolutely.
Did the American side make mistakes in
its packaging and presentation of ideas?
Absolutely. Are Prime Minister Barak and
President Clinton responsible for the
failure to conclude a deal? Absolutely
not. Both Barak and Clinton were prepared
to do what was necessary to reach agreement.
Both were up to the challenge. Neither
shied away from the risks inherent in
confronting history and mythology. Can
one say the same about Arafat? Unfortunately,
not — and his behavior at Camp David and
afterward cannot be explained only by
his suspicions that a trap was being
set for him.
Malley and Agha acknowledged
that ”Barak was eager
for a deal, wanted it achieved during Clinton’s
term in office, and had surrounded himself
with some of Israel's most peace-minded politicians.
As early as July 1999, during their first
meeting, Barak had outlined to Clinton his
vision of a comprehensive peace.“ They
also reported that Clinton was furious with
Arafat and told him, ”If the Israelis
can make compromises and you can't I should
go home. You have been here fourteen days
and said no to everything.“
Abu Mazen,
one of the lead Palestinian negotiators, said even before the summit
the Palestinians ”made clear to the Americans that the Palestinian
side is unable to make concessions on anything.“ He also maintained
the whole process was some sort of trap.
Following the summit’s failure, Arafat asked for another
meeting, and, in preparation, established a channel of communication
between his own negotiators and Israel’s. In September 2000, according
to Ross, Arafat knew that the U.S. was preparing to present its ideas
on the new conference, and thus ordered the new intifada. The U.S. asked
Arafat to prevent violence following Sharon’s Temple Mount visit, and
“he didn’t raise a finger.”
Nonetheless, the three leaders met at the White House
in December and a final settlement proposal was offered. The U.S.
plan offered by Clinton and endorsed by Barak would have given the
Palestinians 97 percent of the West
Bank (either 96 percent of the West Bank and 1 percent from Israel
proper or 94 percent from the West Bank and 3 percent from Israel proper),
with no cantons, and full control of the Gaza
Strip, with a land-link between the two; Israel would have withdrawn
from 63 settlements as a
result. In exchange for the three percent annexation of the West Bank,
Israel would increase the size of the Gaza territory by roughly a third.
Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would become the capital of the new state, and refugees would have the
right of return to the Palestinian state, and would receive reparations
from a $30 billion international fund collected to compensate them.
The Palestinians would maintain control over their holy places, and
would be given desalinization plants to ensure them adequate water.
The only concessions Arafat had to make was Israeli sovereignty over
the parts of the Western Wall religiously significant to Jews (i.e., not the entire Temple Mount), and three early warning stations
in the Jordan valley, which Israel would withdraw from after six years.
The offer, it is true, was never written
down. The reason for this, according to Ross, was the recognition
by both the U.S. and Israel of Arafat’s fundamental negotiating
tactic of using all concessions as a starting point for future
negotiations. Afraid that the leader might once again revert
to violence, and expect future settlement offers to be based
on the generous concessions offered to him now, President
Clinton gave him no written version. Instead, he read it
to the Palestinian delegation at dictation speed, “to be
sure that it couldn’t be a floor for [future] negotiations...
It couldn’t be a ceiling. It was the roof.” The Palestinian
negotiators wanted to accept the deal, and Arafat initially
said that he would accept it as well. But, on January 2,
“he added reservations that basically meant he rejected every
single one of the things he was supposed to give.” He could not countenance Israeli control
over Jewish holy spots, nor would he agree to the security
arrangements; he wouldn’t even allow the Israelis to fly
through Palestinian airspace. He rejected the refugee formula
as well.
The reason for Arafat’s
rejection of the settlement, according to
Ross, was the critical clause in the agreement
specifying that the agreement meant the end
of the conflict. Arafat, whose life has
been governed by that conflict, simply could
not end it. “For him to end the
conflict is to end himself,” said Ross. Ben-Ami agreed with this
characterization:
“I certainly believe that Arafat is a problem
if what we are trying to achieve is a permanent
agreement. I doubt that it will be possible
to reach an agreement with him.”Daniel Kurtzer, former
U.S. ambassador to Israel and Egypt concurred: “The
failure of Camp David is largely attributed
to the fact that Arafat did not even negotiate....It
didn't matter what he put on the table; he
put nothing on the table.” Kurtzer
added that he would never understand why
Arafat withdrew from the talks without even
offering a maximalist position.
Instead, Arafat pursued the path of terror
in hope of repositioning the Palestinians as victims in the
eyes of the world. “There’s no doubt in my mind,” Ross said,
“that he thought the violence would create pressure on the
Israelis and on us and maybe the rest of the world.” That judgment proved to be correct.
Clinton’s term in office soon ended, and with Barak’s
premiership waning, he agreed to a meeting with the Palestinians in Taba, Egypt. That meeting ended
with an optimistic joint communiqué being issued, but with no actual settlement or agreements.
The Palestinians and some commentators have subsequently
claimed that breakthroughs were achieved at Taba, particularly on the
refugee issue; however, this was disputed by one of the principal Israeli
negotiators, Yossi Beilin.
“The discussions in Taba revolved principally around the ‘narrative,’
regarding the history of the creation of the refugee problem and the
number of refugees that Israel will agree to absorb,” according
to Beilin. “We did not reach any agreements....Regarding the number
of refugees, an anticipated disagreement erupted, but once the discussion
turned to quotas, we were no longer talking about a ‘right.’
The numbers that we agreed to were symbolic and took humanitarian problems
and family reunification issues into account. The numbers proposed by
the Palestinians were far higher.” Beilin said the Palestinians
should tell the refugees that once peace is achieved, and their state
is established, “they will be allowed to immigrate to [the Palestinians
state] and live in it in dignity. Not in Haifa.”
Barak was subsequently replaced as Prime Minister by
Ariel Sharon, and, as the violence and Palestinian terrorism intensified,
negotiations were put on hold in favor of security arrangements. Barak
has since condemned his “peace partner,” and publicly supported Sharon’s
tougher security tactics. Clinton, too, did an about face on Arafat at the
conclusion of his presidency. In his last conversation with Clinton,
three days before his term ended, the PA Chairman told Clinton that
he was “a great man.”
“The hell I am,” Clinton said he responded. “I’m a
colossal failure, and you made me one.”
Sources: Ma�ariv, (April 6, 2001).
Saul Singer, ”Camp David, Real and Invented,“
Middle East Quarterly, (Spring 2002).
Interview with Dennis Ross, Fox News Sunday,
(April 21, 2002).
Press
conference, (July 25, 2000).
Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, �Camp
David: Targedy of Errors.� New York Review of Books, (August
9, 2001).
�Camp David: An Exchange.�
The New York Review of Books. 9/20/01.
Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, �Camp
David: Targedy of Errors.� New York Review of Books, (August
9, 2001).
Robert Malley and Hussein Agha, �Camp
David: Targedy of Errors.� New York Review of Books, (August
9, 2001); Saul Singer, ”Camp David, Real and Invented,”
Middle East Quarterly, (Spring 2002).
Ross interview.
�Myths of the Intifada,� by Fred Barnes, The
Daily Standard. 4/25/02; Dennis Ross, speech at Georgetown University,
March 3, 2003 in Near
East Report, (March 17, 2003).
Ross interview; Dennis Ross, “Yasir Arafat,”
Foreign Policy, (July/August 2002).
Ibid.
Ma�ariv interview, (April 6, 2001).
Jerusalem Post, (May 4, 2006).
Ibid.
Yedioth Ahronoth,
(August 18, 2003).
MSNBC,
(March 26, 2002).
Ibid. |