The Middle East Road Map
(Updated July 2004)
The road map issued by the Quartet initially
provided a stimulus to the peace
process not only between Israel and the Palestinians, but between Israel and the broader Arab world.
Unfortunately, the Palestinians made no effort to satisfy the principal
terms of the road map and recent statements by their leaders suggest
they have no intention of fulfilling the promises they made in April
2003.
A road map typically offers multiple routes, and it
is clear that even the sponsors recognized their plan was not “a
sacred text or treaty” as the acting U.S. consul general in Jerusalem put it. The map will inevitably change, as the UK Ambassador to Israel
stated, and should be viewed as a guideline for resuming negotiations.
The actual text of the road map is different
from what was described in the press, so it is important to read it
carefully. Upon doing so, it is clear that the first point is that a
two-state solution “will only be achieved through an end to violence
and terrorism, when
the Palestinian people have a leadership acting decisively against terror
and willing and able to build a practicing democracy based on tolerance
and liberty.” This has been Israel’s position all along.
Terror must end for progress to be made.
The Palestinian
Authority has consistently said it has no intention of fulfilling
its promise to dismantle terrorist organizations or to confiscate illegal
weapons. Palestinian terrorists rejected the road map and declared their
intention to use violence to sabotage peace negotiations, and they did
just that, launching more than 200 attacks between May 2003-July 2004. It was clear from the outset the plan would
never get off the ground unless the Palestinian Prime Minister disarmed
the terrorists and arrested their leaders. One visible test suggested
last May was the arrest of Sheik Ahmed
Yassin, the leader of Hamas,
who said “Our resistance...will continue and no one will stop
it.” Neither Yassin nor any other leaders of terrorist organizations
were arrested.
The plan has what many analysts considered too optimistic
a timeline, envisioning a final agreement in just three years. The sponsors
recognized progress depended on compliance. This was crucial, because
the failure of past peace efforts was in part due to the unwise adherence
to a timetable without regard to Palestinian compliance with their obligations.
The Palestinians' intransigence in meeting their obligations has subsequently
made the timetable irrelevant and led Israeli Prime Minister Ariel
Sharon to formulate his disengagement
plan.
Sharon and President Bush have agreed that the disengagement plan is consistent with the road
map, but it represents unilateral actions on the part of Israel to fulfill
most of its road map commitments. The Palestinians still have to do
their part to achieve the goals of the Quartet.
A key to the plan is the establishment of democracy
in the Palestinian Authority.
To date, the Palestinian Authority has been characterized by one-man
rule and has not demonstrated a commitment to democracy. The first Palestinian
Prime Minister, Abu Mazen,
was not elected and did not enjoy wide support in the Palestinian
Authority. He was appointed by Yasser
Arafat and never had full authority to negotiate with Israel or
to carry out the necessary security measures.He resigned in frustration
and was replaced by another Arafat loyalist, Abu
Alaa, who has been given no more power than his predecessor.
The road map calls for the entire Arab world to recognize
Israel. Egypt and Jordan remain the only Arab nations to have done so. Moreover, the Arab states
have failed to fulfill the plan’s requirement that they stop all
funding and support of terrorist organizations.
Many of the obligations laid out for Israel have already
been met. For example, Prime Minister Sharon has said he supports the creation of a Palestinian state, and Israeli
institutions have never been engaged in incitement against Palestinians.
Still, Israel will have to make tough compromises to reach a final agreement
with the Palestinians, Syrians,
and Lebanese. In the short-run,
Israel expressed a willingness to ease the plight of the Palestinians
and took measures aimed at helping Abu
Mazen succeed, but these steps were undermined by violence, which
forced Israel to do what was necessary to protect its citizens.
Israel is asked to freeze all settlement activity, “consistent with the Mitchell
Report.” It is important to recall that former Senator Mitchell
himself made clear that violence had to end first before Israel was
expected to implement this step. Similarly, the Road Map calls first
for the “unconditional cessation of violence” by the Palestinians.
The plan also requires an end to incitement by Palestinian institutions,
which was also a key component of the Oslo
accords that has never been fulfilled.
The IDF is to withdraw “as security performance moves forward.”
Israel has consistently expressed a willingness to withdraw from areas
where the Palestinians exert control; however, each time Israel has
withdrawn in the past, new rounds of terrorism have followed. This cannot
be permitted. Despite the risk, Israel is now preparing to disengage
from the Gaza Strip and part
of the West Bank.
The United States must be the party that ultimately
determines whether the parties have met their obligations before moving
forward with additional phases of the road map. Unfortunately, the other
members of the Quartet, the Russians, Europeans, and United
Nations have a long history of one-sided support for the Arabs in
the conflict and cannot be trusted to be fair arbiters of performance.
According to the road map, Phase II was supposed to
be completed by the end of 2003 with Palestinian elections and the “possible”
creation of an independent state with provisional borders “through
a process of Israeli-Palestinian engagement.” Unless the Palestinians
dramatically shift their policy, it is unlikely this phase will be completed
by the end of 2004.
The plan calls for an international conference. This
could be constructive if is used to support the bilateral decisions
of the parties; however, the history of Middle East peace conferences
has been that most of the participants gang up on Israel, the Arab states
attack Israel, and the rejectionists hold a veto over any decisions.
A conference cannot impose a settlement on the parties. Given the divisions
within the Quartet over the Iraq war and other issues, it is unlikely
a conference will be held or could be productive.
Reviving the multilateral discussions on key regional issues could help make progress on water
resources, environment, arms control and other matters. Some of these
forums did make some progress after the Madrid
conference before they were abandoned. To date, these multilateral
discussions have not been resumed and this component of the plan has
been ignored.
Phase II calls on the Arab
states to take an important step and “restore pre-intifada
links to Israel.” There is no reason why Arab states could not
immediately resume trade and diplomatic ties with Israel. More than
a year later, they have largely moved in the opposite direction, increasing
their level of incitement against Israel and calling for a strengthening of the Arab League boycott.
Like the Oslo
accords, the road map puts off the resolution of the most difficult
issues until the last phase. As in the prior phase, the sponsors rely
on an international conference to support the negotiation of these issues.
Israel and the Palestinians, however, must negotiate a resolution in
bilateral talks to the issues of borders, refugees, settlements,
and Jerusalem.
The goal of the road map can be achieved. The positions
of the parties are already clear, and the possible areas of compromise
have been discussed in past negotiations. If the violence stops, the
people of Israel will take the risks necessary to allow the Palestinians
to have an independent state. And if the Arab states are willing to
normalize relations with Israel, the dream of a comprehensive peace
can be realized.
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