Camp David Two Years
Later - What Might Have Been
(Updated September 2002)
In 2000,
Israel offered the Palestinians what they had long claimed
to have desired, an independent Palestinian state. They rejected
the offer and have conducted a premeditated war of terror that has taken the lives of more
than 600 Israelis and maimed hundreds more, mostly civilians.
Had Yasser Arafat said yes to a Palestinian state in the West
Bank and Gaza Strip instead of holding out for a Palestinian state in place of
Israel, it is likely the Palestinians would be enjoying full
independence today.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak offered the Palestinians dramatic and previously
unthinkable concessions. By eschewing the piecemeal approach
of Oslo, Barak
hoped to bring the conflict to an end, but Arafat was unwilling
to make peace. "For him to end the conflict is to end
himself," said Ambassador Dennis Ross, the chief negotiator
for the U.S.
According to Ambassador Ross, Barak offered to withdraw
from 95% of the West Bank and 100% of the Gaza Strip and
to allow the Palestinians to establish an independent state.
Putting the lie to the old refrain that settlements are an obstacle to peace, Barak offered to dismantle isolated
settlements and Arafat himself agreed to allow Israel to
maintain blocs of settlements within the area annexed to
Israel. Not even removing the hated settlements could move
Arafat to make peace.
A year after the summits, apologists for the Palestinians
claimed Arafat turned down the deal because it would have
left the Palestinians with only cantons. This is simply a
lie. Ambassador Ross states flatly that Israel offered to
create a Palestinian state that was contiguous.
Barak also made previously unthinkable concessions on Jerusalem,
agreeing that Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem would
become the capital of the new state and the Palestinians
would have "religious sovereignty" over the Temple
Mount.
Israel also addressed the concern about the Palestinian
refugees. Since every Israeli leader since Ben-Gurion has said that allowing the refugees to return to Israel would
be suicide, and even Palestinians such as Sari Nusseibeh
acknowledged it was an unreasonable demand, Barak guaranteed
the right of Palestinian refugees to return to the Palestinian
state and proposed that they receive reparations from a $30
billion international fund.
Contrary also to subsequent Palestinian claims that Israel
planned to deny the new state access to water,
Israel agreed to give the Palestinians desalinization plants
to ensure them adequate water.
In return for these risky Israeli concessions, Arafat was
asked to accept Israeli sovereignty over the parts of the Western Wall religiously significant to Jews, and three early warning
stations in the Jordan Valley, which Israel would withdraw
from after six years. Most important, however, Arafat was
expected to agree that the conflict was over at the end of
the negotiations. This was the deal breaker. Arafat was not
willing to end the conflict.
The consensus of Mideast analysts — that Israel offered
generous concessions and that Arafat rejected them to pursue
a violent insurrection — was undisputed for more than
a year before the Palestinians recognized they had to counter
the widespread view that Arafat was the obstacle to peace.
They subsequently manufactured excuses for why Arafat failed
to say "yes" to a proposal that would have established
a Palestinian state. Had the terms of the proposal really
been the problem, all Arafat had to do was offer a counterproposal.
He never did.
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