The Palestine Papers: 6th Negotiation Team Meeting Minutes
(November 8, 2007)
The Palestine Papers: The Palestine Papers: Table of Contents
This is the sixth in a series of meetings leading up to the Annapolis Conference in Washington. The first half of the meeting deals with the language for a joint statement that might precede the conference; negotiators also discuss the Arab Peace Initiative, the Road Map, and other issues.
Minutes from 6th Negotiation Team Meeting
(In Preparation for Annapolis)
Thursday, 8th November 2007, 6h15pm
Office of the Foreign Ministry, Tel Aviv
Attendees:
Palestinian
- Ahmed Querei (AA)
- Yaser Abd Rabbo (YAR)
- Akram Haniyeh (AH)
- Dr. Saadi Kronz (SK)
- Zeinah Salahi (ZS)
- Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)
Israeli
- FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
- Yoram Turbovich (YT)
- DG Abromovich (Abr)
- Tal Becker (TB)
Detailed minutes:
TL:
- Let’s start where we left off.
TB:
- [reads 2nd Israeli proposal]:
The two sides agree to implement their respective obligations under the Roadmap beginning with Phase 1.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, it is understood that the implementation of any future peace treaty is subject to the full implementation of the Roadmap.
The two sides agree to ask the United States of America to establish a monitoring mechanism on behalf of the Quartet in accordance with the Roadmap and in consultation with the two sides. This monitoring mechanism will monitor and judge the implementation of all obligations of the parties under the Roadmap.
AA:
- Time is short if we want the conference in November. Negotiation tactics won’t help if we want to reach an agreement before November.
- We discussed this language before. We agreed the principle.
- [Begins reading from US draft] The parties commit to immediate and parallel implementation of the Roadmap.
TL:
- We never agreed [to immediate and parallel]. I will not take one word from the Roadmap [“RM”] and put it before RM [referring to the text language].
AA:
- What is the problem with parallel? You intend to wait until we implement before you do?
TL:
- No. [Reiterates point that they have proven that they won’t use the RM as an excuse by having agreed to discuss permanent status before Phase 1 implementation.] We agreed to full and complete implementation of the RM.
SE:
- [Describes recent phone conversations with American officials, including David Welsh.] We are not [creating separate agreements] with the US, but we understood that you agreed [to language with the US which they shared with the Palestinians.]
- [Reads language from Jake Walles]
The parties commit to immediate and parallel implementation of the Roadmap.
The parties agree to form an American, Palestinian, and Israeli committee to follow up on the immediate implementation of the Roadmap.
The parties commit themselves to continue the implementation of the ongoing obligations of the Roadmap until they reach a peace treaty.
The US will monitor and judge the fulfillment of the commitments of both sides of the Roadmap.
Unless otherwise agreed by the parties, implementation of the future peace treaty will be subject to the implementation of the Roadmap, as judged by the US.
- Just tell me if it is agreed.
TL:
- We agreed three principles: (1) full implementation of the RM. I’m sure you’ll ask for CBMs later, it’s not now the discussion. [As for] parallel – [we accept] what the RM says, as it is. We both need this to work. (2) [with respect to monitoring and judging and the trilateral committee] I said I needed to check. Olmert said he needed to check. (3) The most important part for us is the “subject to” language for implementation.
AA:
- If this is your intention, can you get a cabinet decision calling for a settlement freeze?
TL:
- Listen – [we agreed the principle of “subject to” for implementation]. In the paper this is how I see it. 1. The understanding is subject to implementation of the RM. 2. The day after Annapolis…
AA:
- [Which is] negotiations.
TL:
- Well we didn’t discuss this yet.
AA:
- This is what I understood from Annapolis.
TL:
- From your side, it is negotiations, serious ones that will [resolve] all the core issues. You will raise this, we will raise some of our concerns.
- 3. CBMs. What can be reached on the ground.
AH:
- Why CBMs?
SE:
- It’s implementation of the RM.
TL:
- We thought you wanted things outside the RM, like prisoners. It’s not our interest.
YT:
- Maybe we want to ask for something.
TL:
- The role of the international community that we need.
[discussion on CBMs and settlement freeze]
- What you are asking is something that is facts on the ground, before, during, after Annapolis.
AA:
- [Makes point that the importance of parallel is to address the settlement freeze. That’s why it is so important to Palestinians.]
TL:
- You know in the past there are different opinions on what implementation of the RM means. Let’s go principle by principle. Implementation of the RM means… if we have a different opinion as to what comes first then the US will judge.
SE:
- But the Americans failed the test [already, referring to the US draft language on the table that Israel refuses to accept]. They told us that this is agreed – and it’s not.
AA:
- [Makes clear that the first four lines of the US language were agreed. On the fifth line he wants a small change which he has suggested language for.]
TL:
- The story is between us. If you want to play this with the Americans…
AA:
- I’m explaining why we need parallel. Stop all settlement activity.
TL:
- There are some things that are parallel. Some are not. Let’s take for example Nablus. It took some time but it was coordinated. Israel couldn’t leave before Palestinians were ready. If you want to agree something before Annapolis we can discuss. Let’s agree first the principle that full implementation is subject to full implementation of the RM.
- We can discuss it [referring to the settlement freeze] before the leaders sign the joint statement.
- Since the drama will be anyway the day after [Annapolis].
AA:
- So the trilateral committee – when will it meet?
TL:
- The trilateral meeting – we have a problem.
- [She suggests a change to their suggested language]
The two sides agree to implement their respective obligations [fully, completely [you can put language like that in here]] under the Roadmap beginning with Phase 1.
…
The two sides agree to ask the United States of America to establish a monitoring mechanism [including by inviting both sides to its meetings] on behalf of the Quartet in accordance with the Roadmap and in consultation with the two sides. This monitoring mechanism will monitor and judge the implementation of all obligations of the parties under the Roadmap.
- [TL suggests various permutations of the invitation language throughout the meeting.]
- I know that the US wants it [the trilateral committee].
AA:
- Olmert agrees.
TL:
- Olmert said ok if it’s in the RM.
AA:
- I still have [a clear head] …
SE:
- He doesn’t have Alzheimer’s yet. [Turning to AA] Olmert said if it is in the RM [he agrees].
TL:
- It is very difficult for us to agree the trilateral committee. They [the US] think that they need it to judge.
SK:
- I don’t see the big deal because it is just a coordination committee. It’s good for you!
TL:
- I don’t know how you agreed to have Barak.
YT:
- [Makes point that just because something is good for Israelis doesn’t mean it is bad for Palestinians, and vice versa.]
TL:
- [Reads first and second paragraphs of their proposal again. In the third paragraph she includes the invitation language. Discussion ensues on the role of advisors, and whether they should be more hard line than those they are advising.]
- If you want to take more steps pre-Annapolis we can discuss.
AA:
- [Starts re-reading US proposal.]
YT:
- With all due respect, it was not agreed.
AA:
- [Reading from the minutes of his four eyes meeting with TL.] Both sides are committed to the immediate implementation of the RM. Both sides agree to form a trilateral committee to follow up implementation of the RM. [TL: I said that I needed to check.] Both sides agree to continue implementation of the mutual obligations of the RM until they reach a peace treaty. [Short discussion on the timing implied by this language.] The US will monitor and judge the implementation of the obligations of both sides.
[Discussion continues, reiterating points made earlier.]
- We need to know that you will stop building settlements[, etc.]
TL:
- Since 2004 there has been a government decision not to give money to the [settlements. There has not been] one tender or bid except Maale Addumim. So…
AA:
- [Sarcastically] Because Maale Addumim is not part of the [occupied Palestinian territory]?
TL:
- Well it won’t be in the end [joking].
[Palestinian side protests.]
SE:
- So the US didn’t agree this with you or with us?
TL:
- Is this what is the most important to you? I will not engage on this. If you think that you just need to have an answer to Welsh’s next call…
YAR:
- You said the issue that is the most important thing is the implementation of the first phase – which is important for both of us. We accepted it as a priority. Now that we accepted it, you are saying no that the US will be the judge?
TL:
- I have some problems with the trilateral committee. I am willing to add it [referring to the invitation language she suggested earlier].
AA:
- I think that the American paper [reflects everyone’s concerns].
TL:
- No – there are two problems. We did not agree immediate and parallel.
- What was the purpose of the meeting between the four of you? [referring to the subcommittee to draft]
SE:
- To [confirm and write]. Your team came in with something [totally different from what we had understood was agreed]. I said I didn’t have the mandate to make decisions.
AH:
- Condi thought this [referring to the US draft] is the only think that she achieved on her tour!
YT:
- We thought more – Olmert’s speech at Saban.
AA:
- [Goes back to US language. Rereads it.]
- I have a problem with the implementation – I need to be sure it will actually be done!
[Teams break for about thirty minutes to discuss, as it seems that there is deadlock.]
[TL returns alone.]
TL:
- I’d like to put an offer. The best track is the bilateral track. But I will add the trilateral track.
AA:
- [Insisting on US language in its entirety.]
[TL leaves again. A few minutes later, entire team returns.]
TL:
- I understand your tactic. I didn’t think that this is the best for the future understandings of us. Although we’ll enjoy the American drafting.
YAR:
- American drafting? No – it’s mutual.
TL:
- I didn’t agree to this [referring to the US language].
YAR:
- The Americans came and said we understand the logic of the Israeli position, and we agree with it. 2. we understand that you both accepted the US as judge; we said yes. 2. as long as you have these two elements – the “subject to” and the US as judge and we will present a paper reflecting this…
AA:
- The Americans listened to you first, then they came to us.
TL:
- Yes and I know it’s not tactics but since it’s bilateral and we agree on the three principles.
- They came with the same principles but there [are] problems in Israel with the trilateral track.
YAR:
- But we’ve come all the way to your position…
TL:
- We’re going to spend months from now finding an understanding between us.
YAR:
- [Translating a side comment in Arabic about what she really meant is that this process will result in gouging out the eyes of the Palestinians.] You are telling us you will make life horrible for us. We agreed on the principles. Since we are going to be fighting [etc.] for the next months. Bilateral is better.
- If you insist on the American track it is tactical. If you can get this idea it addresses everything. If you can accept [it] we can live happily ever after.
AA:
- I think that we finished the drafting with this [referring to the US draft].
TL:
- Without this I don’t see the need for the drafting committee. If you are willing to accept without the “parallel”… [disagreement over the word “immediate” and whether the Israeli side had previously agreed to that language]. Rest is your position. We’ll think about your position and you think about ours.
- To make progress we need to move on to other issues.
YAR:
- Now we rally need to think about implementation. This is what we need to take back. Are we going to do anything about the first phase of the RM? CBM? If you are thinking just to have some prisoners – this will not help anything. Second, to give an example about Nablus. You agreed not to go in. [TL: during the day!] During the day, during the night – it doesn’t matter; it is embarrassing [and undermines us]. If we want this to succeed we need to work together.
TL:
- There is Annapolis as a point in time. There is the before, the after, the during – it is a combination of what was achieved the day before. What was agreed after. The seriousness of the process the day after and changes on the ground. As Annapolis [gets closer] I think we should concentrate on the day after.
- About the RM, according to the RM there are things that can show seriousness. Nablus was not a good example. There are other issues not related directly to security but are problematic for Israel one way or the other.
- I’m speaking about the Arab world.
- At the end of the day, before Annapolis we need to think of CBMs that will bring the Arabs on board. Not just that they’ll come to Annapolis, but after. This can help you. You are always being criticized by Hamas [etc., making the point that support from the Arab world would undermine this criticism].
- We started the preamble. We can end it Sunday or Monday. We need to discuss the day after. Something about CBMs. The Arab world…
AA:
- Can I tell you something about the Arabs? Egypt is the most important country in the Arab world. After Egypt did any Arab state make relations with you from the Arab world? No!
YT:
- Jordan…
AA:
- No – Jordan was after Oslo. After Oslo five Arab countries had embassies in Israel. You got the Arab Peace Initiative (“API”). This was [an enormous step by the Arab world]. No reception from Israel. Now they are in retreat. Now we are at another test. If we come to Annapolis with a fair statement… [Reiterates the importance of economic cooperation and regional issues.] It depends on what we achieve. If it is fair, they will come, if not, they will not come…
TL:
- I more than agree with you. The Arab world thinks that we want peace in order to normalize with the Arab world. Not true. Peace with you is the prize… [The Arab states] are not willing to say publicly what they say behind closed doors. [Continues on regional elements.] In parallel, when Israel takes steps towards the Palestinian to support the process, they need to take steps to support the process. Build [invest] in the West Bank. And steps towards Israel.
AH:
- Annapolis?
TL:
- No – [Annapolis] is like an engagement [party]. After the big party, we still need to decide if we’re getting married. We need them the day after, until the wedding.
- Before Annapolis we will raise points and show that we are serious.
AH:
- Next week, the President and possibly AA will be on a tour of the Arab world. We’re trying to invite more people as well. The Islamic conference [for example]. The idea is to get the backing of the Arab countries. He needs to tell them what we expect. I’ll tell you about the expectations of the Arabs. Cessation of all settlement activity, like the RM [says], open Jerusalem institutions, roadblocks…
TL:
- Can I ask you something to ask the Arabs? You can’t have the answer now – we don’t have a list of what will be done now, after, etc.
AH:
- When will we have the list?
TL:
- We wasted two weeks on [the RM language]… Can you ask him…?
YAR:
- We know what are the weak points of the Arab positions historically. We lived with it. Between you and the Arab world. The nice treatment of you. The nice treatment of the Arab world. There is a chance now to try to come down off the fence. [Makes point that Hezbollah has three times the arms since the war.
TL:
- When you think about international forces, think of it.
YAR:
- But they built forces away from UNIFIL. If there is something with the Iranians. What are their concerns. Syria, Lebanon. All worried about Iran. A region where the alliances and priorities are all different. [There is a] change in the regional dynamics.
AA:
- I want to say something about this. This is not in our hand. Your response to the API was not good. [Not] you personally… You need to speak to the Arabs, not impose [your will] on them…
TL:
- Trying to understand your concerns. We have to answer some problems. Some problematic pillars:
- No answer to Gaza
- Problems on the ground in the West Bank
- RM suggested first problems in the WB [would be addressed] through the fight against terror [etc.]. Netanyahu called the partner a “virtual” partner.
- [I am] deeply in favor of this process. Steps… these are real problems. As you said, you need to show seriousness on the Israeli side because of things that were signed and not implemented. I think the Arab world can help you to convince us to take the right steps with respect to you.
AA:
- [Let’s go] back to the joint statement. The five points, the Terms of Reference [“TOR”], timetable – the day after Annapolis [TL: first the nature of the negotiations] I’m coming to that. We’ll see what’s possible about the core issues, negotiations [process] – venue, structure[, etc.]. Each 2-3 months [we will] have a committee evaluate where we are, difficulties, achievements. The second international conference, according to the RM. Also we can talk later about the international community role and the Arab role.
TL:
- We can finish the TOR.
AA:
- And the timetable.
TL:
- [We have a] problem with the timetable.
YT:
- Timetable was agreed. No timetable. That it was agreed “X months” [meaning a set number of months was never agreed]. Then Olmert said in the speech his intention to complete negotiations and reach an agreement in President Bush’s tenure.
AA:
- So we can talk about it…
- The TOR:
- RM
- API
- International resolutions
- 242, 338, 1397, 1515, 194
- President Bush’s vision – Palestinian state, viable, democratic, independent [etc.] living side by side [etc.]
- International law.
TL:
- I want to ask something about the API. I have questions about other things, but [the API] first.
- [It’s] clear the API is Arab ideas on how to end the conflict. [There are] two possibilities – one – to do what we decided to do – [include] the RM as it is without changing. If it is in the RM, it’s there…
AA:
- But you want the Arabs –
TL:
- There are things I am not willing to do to get the Arabs. If we want to make the TOR easier, we should focus only on what was agreed.
TB:
- Previous agreements [in Hebrew].
TL:
- But this is the basis.
YAR:
- API for the Saudis; it is important.
TL:
- But it’s not agreed.
AA:
- But it is the biggest Arab concession!
[Israeli side argues that it is not a concession…]
AA:
- Our position.
SE:
- Not our position – it’s part of the RM!
TL:
- If you guys want to internally refer to the API as part of the RM, that’s fine. But I can’t sign something that has the API as a TOR.
SE:
- What about if we use the language verbatim from the RM? [Reads the language from the RM that refers to the API.]
TL:
- I think that the TOR should be what’s already agreed. Previous agreements between both sides.
AA:
- Timetable – Olmert said within the timetable of Bush.
YT:
- [He said] “make every effort…”
AA:
- Rice [said] 14 months. The same thing. I want to push [to agree] 7-8 months, but not to exceed President Bush’s [term].
TL:
- It was agreed no timetable. Olmert [was] forthcoming in his speech.
YT:
- We were all there. When the Chairman and Olmert agreed.
SE:
- I’m honest. [Reminding team of his honesty regarding Olmert’s response to the trilateral committee. Making the point that AM did not agree to no timetable.]
TL:
- We see the TOR:
- 242, 338
- RM and previous agreements as accepted by the parties
- President Bush’s vision
- 3 Quartet principles (these are important for you too)
SE:
- These are conditions to talk to the Hamas government…!
TL:
- This joint statement – there are some things that I am willing to do to get the Arab world but accepting the API is not [one of them]. We can then [argue for the inclusion of] the declaration of independence of the State of Israel!
AA:
- To sum up: we agreed on the five points. [TL: we agreed the principles! We have different drafts. [Long argument ensues on how to label the drafts. Israel was trying to argue that their language was a joint draft because the subcommittee discussed its language, Palestinian side made very clear that they never accepted the draft and that SE did not have the mandate to agree that draft at the subcommittee meeting. TB agreed that was clear and that was how he reported it back in his notes. Discussion turned to the evolution of the US draft.]]
- We hope that the trilateral committee will start working immediately.
- [On the] TOR – we heard yours. You heard ours. We came in with the minimum [TOR]. [On the] timetable [it is within President Bush’s term]. We hope it will be before that.
- Next meeting of the drafting committee [will be to] write this out. Next meeting we discuss the core issues. [We will also discuss] how to discuss post Annapolis… the Arab world.
TL:
- With respect to the connection [of the] RM and the joint statement [restates Israel’s view on the link]. The two papers answer the needs of the two sides.
SE:
- So you don’t want immediate and parallel?
TL:
- Yes. Without this the whole idea of the drafting committee will not work [meaning if we cannot agree and end up with two different papers]. At the end of the meeting the principles were understood.
SE:
- There was no mutual paper. Just because we tried to understand your paper doesn’t mean that we agreed. [Discussion continues on the labeling of the two drafts. It was made clear that Israelis would consider the “other” paper, without the word “parallel” and Palestinians would consider the Israeli draft.]
TL:
- The principles drafted in two different ways – the American way and the “other” way. It doesn’t help to have a third position. You want me to accept the other paper. Next meeting, we need to write what was agreed. To the TOR, in order to cut some of the waste, the API – we cannot accept. That doesn’t mean we accept the others, but this I know it’s important to you.
YAR:
- The timetable?
SE:
- What if we say by 8 months, not exceeding Bush’s term?
TL:
- [We’ll discuss it] next meeting.
[It was agreed that the next meeting would be held on Sunday. TL and AA had a four eyes meeting after the group meeting.]
Sources: Al Jazeera
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