The Israel-Hamas War: The Day After

The Biden administration is concerned with what will happen to Gaza after the war ends. Secretary of State Antony Blinken is insisting on pursuing the two-state solution to offer the Palestinians hope of achieving a political victory following Hamas’s defeat. State Department spokesman Vedant Patel said, “There is no returning to the October 6 status quo,” and “our viewpoint is that Palestinians must be at the forefront of these decisions and Gaza is Palestinian land, and it will remain Palestinian land.”

The Israeli government, which opposed the idea of a Palestinian state before the war, gave no indication it was going to change its position. In the short term, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, “I think Israel will for an indefinite period have security responsibility” for Gaza. He ruled out any international force and insisted that Gaza must be demilitarized.

Israel told American officials to stop talking publicly about the two-state solution. National Unity Party chairperson Benny Gantz, President Isaac Herzog, and opposition leader Yair Lapid have also conveyed their discomfort with the Biden administration’s repeated assertion that it supports the establishment of a Palestinian state. “What I want to urge is against just saying ‘two-state solution.’ Why? Because there is an emotional chapter here that must be dealt with. My nation is bereaving. My nation is in trauma,” Herzog said.

The army also moved to take over the “Philadelphi Corridor,” a strip of land less than 9 miles (14 km) wide separating Gaza from Egypt. Israel had controlled the area for some time, but handed responsibility over to Egypt. Hamas then began to tunnel under it to bring weapons and supplies into Gaza. At one point, Egypt flooded the tunnels to prevent smuggling. Still, on October 16, 2023, NPR reported that the original tunnels used to smuggle cigarettes and other goods had been expanded to form part of the “metro.”

Taking the area will give Israel control over the Rafah crossing, which is the only connection between Gaza and the Arab world and the principal route for travelers. Egypt has rejected Israel’s request to give up the area, which its soldiers are responsible for patrolling, according to a security protocol signed with Israel. Alternatively, Israel has requested that sensors be installed along the corridor to alert Israel in case Hamas attempts to rebuild its tunnel and smuggling network after the war. Egypt said it would consider the option but rejected another Israeli proposal to send surveillance drones in response to alerts.

The administration opposes Israel’s reoccupation of Gaza and has suggested that the Palestinian Authority (PA) take over responsibility for the Strip. Israelis, however, do not believe the hugely unpopular PA is capable of controlling the area, given its inability to manage the West Bank effectively and its failure in Gaza when it was the authority there.

Israel must also worry about Hamas terrorists in the West Bank. Simultaneously with the Gaza offensive, the IDF staged raids to kill and arrest Hamas members on its eastern border. MEMRI translated a message from the West Bank branch of Hamas’s student organization calling on Palestinians there to imitate the October 7 attack, and the group posted operational instructions for carrying out terrorist attacks.

Israel would have its own rebuilding effort after the war. In addition to the communities in the south that terrorists overran, the country will have to recover from the tremendous economic cost of the war, and the reservists who had to leave their jobs. In early November, the Bank of Israel stated that the absence of workers cost the economy approximately $600 million per week.

Reforming the PA

Despite the corruption, incitement, and violence emanating from the PA, the Biden administration was pressuring Israel to accept a “revamped and revitalized” PA to take control of Gaza after the war ended. Netanyahu pointedly rejected the idea. “After the great sacrifice of our civilians and our soldiers, I will not allow the entry into Gaza of those who educate for terrorism, support terrorism, and finance terrorism.” He added, “I will not allow Israel to repeat the mistake of Oslo.”

Israeli analysts, including former ambassador to the United States Michael Oren, suggested that Netanyahu was trying to ensure his political survival. Netanyahu is “saying Oslo was a worse catastrophe for Israel than Oct. 7, and I am the best guarantor you have that [such an agreement] won’t happen again.”

“At the moment, Bibi is just playing to the gallery, and the gallery is his political base,” said journalist Ehud Yaari. “I don’t think we’re at a point where Bibi feels he is obliged to make a decision.”

It is possible that Netanyahu will not be prime minister when a decision on who rules Gaza needs to be made, as he might resign or be forced from office. Other cabinet officials might see “little to be gained from defying the White House,” said Yaari.

The Biden administration was also angered by comments by ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir, calling for Gazans to be encouraged to immigrate to other countries. “If in Gaza there will be 100,000 or 200,000 Arabs and not 2 million, the entire conversation on ‘the day after’ will look different,” Smotrich said. Ben-Gvir also suggested that Jews return to settle in Gaza.

The State Department spokesman responded, “This rhetoric is inflammatory and irresponsible. We have been told repeatedly and consistently by the Government of Israel, including by the Prime Minister, that such statements do not reflect the policy of the Israeli government. They should stop immediately.”

Subsequently, Netanyahu stated unequivocally: “Israel has no intention of permanently occupying Gaza or displacing its civilian population.” He added, “Our goal is to rid Gaza of Hamas terrorists and free our hostages. Once this is achieved, Gaza can be demilitarized and deradicalized, thereby creating a possibility for a better future for Israel and Palestinians alike.”

The same two ministers have clashed with the IDF Chief of Staff and the Defense Minister.

The Gallant Plan

Defense Minister Yoav Gallant presented a four-pronged plan for the future of Gaza on January 4, 2024. He made clear that Israel would retain control of the borders and the right to take military action, if necessary, inside Gaza. Civil governance would remain the responsibility of the Palestinians. “Gaza residents are Palestinian, therefore, Palestinian bodies will be in charge, with the condition that there will be no hostile actions or threats against the State of Israel,” Gallant said.

These steps would be taken over time, leaving several issues unresolved, such as who would be responsible for law and order in Gaza.

Gallant also said that Palestinians would not be allowed to return to their homes in northern Gaza until all the hostages were released.

According to the TOI, Gallant wants UNRWA replaced by another agency to gradually provide refugee services. Shortly after, UN Watch reported that a Telegram group of 3,000 UNRWA teachers was filled with posts praising the 10/7 massacre and photos of dead and captured Israelis.

“This is the motherlode of UNRWA teachers’ incitement to Jihaditerrorism,” said Hillel Neuer, executive director of UN Watch.

While the U.S. agreed with Israel about UNRWA and suspended funding, the administration was again angered when 12 Israeli ministers attended a conference on January 28, 2024, calling for the rebuilding of settlements in Gaza. Gallant subsequently told U.S. officials that the military would not allow any illegal outposts or settlements to be built in Gaza.

The two countries were also at odds over Israel’s stated intention of creating a buffer zone on the Gaza side of the security fence on the southern border. Blinken made clear the U.S. opposed any reduction in the size of the territory in Gaza.

Creating A Path To Statehood

After several weeks of not speaking, Biden called Netanyahu on January 19, 2024, to try to convince him to agree to create a path for the establishment of a Palestinian state after the war. Blinken had returned from Saudi Arabia earlier, insisting that this was the only way the kingdom would agree to normalize relations with Israel. Netanyahu publicly rebuffed both. “My insistence is what has prevented — over the years — the establishment of a Palestinian state that would have constituted an existential danger to Israel,” he said two days later. “As long as I am prime minister, I will continue to strongly insist on this.” The day before, he had said he would insist on “full Israeli security control of the entire area west of the Jordan River — and that is irreconcilable with a Palestinian state.”

Biden tried to minimize the disagreement by saying, “There are a number of types of two-state solutions....There’s a number of countries that are members of the UN that are still — don’t have their own militaries. Number of states that have limitations.” He added, “And so I think there’s ways in which this could work.”

Competing Visions for the Future

The State Department was reportedly working with its allies to create a timeline to recognize a Palestinian state similar to that demanded by the Palestinians and repeatedly rejected by Israel: withdrawal of many, if not all, Israeli communities in the West Bank; a Palestinian capital in eastern Jerusalem; the reconstruction of Gaza; and security and governance arrangements for a combined West Bank and Gaza. The normalization of relations with Saudi Arabia is intended to incentivize Israel to accept the deal.

The entire PA government, including Prime Minister Mohammad Shtayyeh, submitted its resignation at the end of February to show the United States that it was willing to make changes. Despite an overwhelming majority of Gazans calling for him to resign, Abbas did not. His four-year term continued into its 19th year.

Israeli officials expressed little faith that the PA would change and pointed out that it had ruled Gaza unsuccessfully before being overthrown by Hamas. Netanyahu insisted that a buffer zone be created near the border and that Israeli troops have freedom of action in Gaza as they do in the West Bank. He said, “I will not allow the State of Israel to repeat the critical mistake of Oslo, which brought to the heart of our land—and to Gaza—the most extreme elements in the entire Arab world, who are committed to the destruction of the State of Israel and who teach that goal to their children.”

Some analysts, including Israelis, did not believe there was an alternative to the PA but insisted that the PA would have to do more than make cosmetic changes. Maurice Hirsch and Yossi Kuperwasser, for example, said the PA would have to condemn the October 7 massacre, end the pay-for-slay policy, recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people, cease all incitement to murder and glorification of terror, immediately halt all PA attacks on Israel in international forums, and actively fight terror.

PA officials were also talking about including Hamas in the reformed government, a non-starter for Israel. They were also wary of taking control of Gaza and being seen as tools of the Israelis.

A problem for Israel is that its desire to see leaders of clans in Gaza assume authority is nearly impossible so long as Hamas exists. Any Palestinian who agrees to an Israeli plan will be treated as a collaborator. Even before the war ended, for example, a clan leader was executed after Hamas heard he had been contacted to assist in the distribution of aid.

Hamas is Killing the PA

Not waiting for Israel to decide on a policy for the day after the war ends, the Palestinian Authority is maneuvering to gain control but is running into violent opposition from Hamas. The PA’s General Intelligence Service (GIS), headed by Maj. Gen. Majed Faraj is reportedly establishing a security presence in coordination with Israel, Egypt, and other Arab countries. Several GIS members whom Hamas accused of entering Gaza disguised as aid workers were arrested, and at least two were reportedly shot.

Meanwhile, leaders in Israel clashed over the future of Gaza as Gallant spoke out publicly that it was imperative to plan if the military operation was to succeed. He said that he would not agree to Israel governing Gaza after the war. “The end of the military campaign must come together with political action. The ‘day after Hamas’ will only be achieved with Palestinian entities taking control of Gaza, accompanied by international actors, establishing a governing alternative to Hamas’s rule, Gallant declared. “Indecision is, in essence, a decision. This leads to a dangerous course, which promotes the idea of Israeli military and civilian governance in Gaza,” he warned. “This is a negative and dangerous option for the State of Israel—strategically, militarily, and from a security standpoint.”

His position was aligned with the U.S. but clashed with Netanyahu, who declared that no discussion of the day after could occur before Hamas was defeated. Netanyahu insisted he was “not prepared to switch from Hamastan to Fatahstan.”

Gantz Gives Ultimatum

In another example of the internal dissension over the future, Gantz, a member of the war cabinet, went public with his dissent over the conduct of the war, arguing that the IDF should have gone into Rafah months earlier and that he would leave the government on June 8 if a plan for the day after was not adopted. He implied the prime minister was acting out of selfish political reasons rather than the national interest and that “A small minority has taken over the bridge of the Israeli ship and it is steering it towards the rocks.”

Acknowledging there are “no magic solutions,” he outlined six strategic goals of national importance:

2. Dismantle the rule of Hamas, to demilitarize the Gaza Strip, and to ensure Israeli security control.

3. Form a U.S.-European-Arab-Palestinian administration that will run civilian affairs in the Gaza Strip and lay a foundation for a future alternative that is not Hamas and not Abbas (Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas).

4. Return the residents of the north to their homes by September 1 and rehabilitate the Western Negev.

5. Advance normalization with Saudi Arabia as part of a general move to create an alliance with the free world and the Arab world against Iran.

6. Adopt a service plan to see all Israelis serve the country and contribute to the supreme national effort.

Gantz’s position, like Gallant’s, was more in line with the U.S. position, and, as with Gallant, Netanyahu immediately rejected the outline. Netanyahu said Gantz’s conditions would amount to “defeat for Israel, abandoning most of the hostages, leaving Hamas intact and establishing a Palestinian state.”

Gantz subsequently carried out his threat and left the government on June 9. “Unfortunately, Netanyahu prevents us from progressing to real victory,” Gantz said. “We are leaving the emergency government today with a heavy heart but wholeheartedly.”

Netanyahu continued to ignore pleas from the military and the Biden administration to formulate a plan. He did rule out Israeli resettlement in Gaza and called for “sustained demilitarization of Gaza,” “a civilian administration that is run by Gazans who are neither Hamas nor committed to our destruction,” and “a reconstruction of Gaza, if possible, done by the moderate Arab states and the international community.”

The Academics’ Plan

Four Israeli academics submitted a paper to the government with a “day after” plan that was predicated on the defeat of Hamas, which would mean Hamas would have no control in Gaza, and that the leaders would be put on trial. Once accomplished, the goal would be to “rehabilitate and transform a nation that was led by a murderous ideology, to produce stable institutions and an Arabic culture that does not educate for jihad, a culture that accepts the existence of the State of Israel as the nation-state of the Jewish people.”

To do this, it will be necessary to overhaul the education system by “eradicating jihadist ambitions” and removing extremist teachers and textbooks, with responsible educators using materials devoid of radical content.

In the short term, the professors stated that a governing apparatus would need to be established to foster trust with the local population and provide the opportunity to create an autonomous Palestinian entity after the initial objectives are achieved. They did not advocate creating a democracy, which has no precedent in the Arab world, but an Arab-Muslim entity that is moderate and not jihadist.”

Netanyahu showed no signs of accepting this or any other proposed plan but was reportedly easing his opposition to the involvement of civil servants who managed affairs in Gaza before the Hamas coup in 2007. The Financial Times reported on July 1 that Israel was planning to launch a pilot program to establish humanitarian bubble zones in the cities of Beit Hanoun and Beit Lahia. Israel would provide security until a U.S.-trained Palestinian security force can take control. If the plan is successful, it will be expanded to other areas.

The preferred plan for the future was originally to give power to local clans; however, those who agreed to participate were beaten or executed by Hamas. The group said it would “sever any hand of the [Israeli] occupation trying to tamper with the destiny and future of our people.”

A source told the Financial Times, “The idea in Israeli minds is that someone — the Arab states, the international community — will pay for it, and locals in Gaza will run it. But no one is biting.”

“Arab states will not support reconstruction in Gaza or postwar plans unless Israel takes concrete steps towards the establishment of a Palestinian state,” an Arab diplomat told the publication.

A report suggesting that the UAE was willing to send troops to a Gaza peacekeeping force contradicted previous claims. Additionally, Abu Dhabi hosted a secret meeting with Israeli and U.S. officials to discuss postwar plans, hinting that Israel might be softening its stance. However, the prospects for a postwar agreement were undermined when the PLO and Hamas announced a reconciliation agreement during talks in China. In response, Israel firmly stated that it would not allow Gaza to be governed by any authority, including Hamas.

Hamas-Fatah Reconciliation Declaration

On July 23, 2024, Palestinian factions Hamas and Fatah agreed to form a government together to resolve their long-standing rivalry. This agreement, facilitated by China, outlined a vision for postwar governance in Gaza. The unity effort aimed to broaden the Fatah-led Palestine Liberation Organization to include Hamas. The factions announced this deal without specific details or a timetable, marking it as an initial step toward reconciliation. Based on history, the two will unlikely end their rivalry, and Hamas reiterated its objection to recognizing Israel, which the PLO did in the Oslo Accords.

Israel vehemently opposes turning over the governance of Gaza to any Palestinian entity, including Hamas. Similarly, State Department spokesman Matthew Miller said, “When it comes to governance of Gaza at the end of the conflict, there can’t be a role for a terrorist organization.... as we have made clear, we want to see the Palestinian Authority governing a unified Gaza and the West Bank. But no, we do not support a role for Hamas.”

Hamas senior official Khaled Mashal told the New York Times, “All their illusions about filling the vacuum are behind us.” He said, “Assuming Hamas won’t be in Gaza or influencing the situation is a mistaken assumption.”

Maj. Gen. Gadi Shamni, a former commander of the Israeli military’s Gaza division, agreed with Mashal, telling the Times that Hamas has retaken towns within “15 minutes” of Israeli withdrawals and “there’s no one that can challenge Hamas there after Israeli forces leave.”

While the future remained uncertain, Israel’s economy, already struggling due to factors like a lack of tourism, faced another setback. Several foreign airlines announced they would not fly to Israel unless the country amended its travel law, which requires airlines to compensate passengers if flights are canceled on short notice. The airlines argued that the law did not account for the wartime situation. By then, nearly all airlines had already suspended flights, with some doing so for months.

In early December, Fatah and Hamas again announced that they had agreed to establish a committee to administer the supply and distribution of humanitarian aid, manage civic affairs, reconstruct the Rafah border crossing with Egypt, and oversee the Crossing. This “Communal Support Committee” would be subordinate to the Palestinian government on administrative, financial, and legal matters. Given Israel’s opposition to any future role for Hamas, the committee was unlikely to get off the ground.

The defense establishment gradually changed its view and became more accepting of the PA having a postwar role. According to the Jerusalem Post. “Once some of the more independent Gazan sheiks were killed by Hamas, they endorsed the PA, which would rule in coordination with the UAE, Egypt, the CIA, and possibly other players, along with overall Israeli security responsibility.”

Netanyahu, however, remained opposed to the idea and continued to delay any decision on the future of Gaza in anticipation of Donald Trump winning the U.S. election.

The hostage deal negotiated in January 2025 did not establish the framework for the governance of Gaza but did allow Israel to create a buffer zone on the border that will be 700 meters wide, except for five points that Israel will choose where it can move up to a kilometer away from the border. President Trump did not have any specific ideas, but his incoming national security adviser, Mike Waltz, reassured Israelis that “Hamas will never govern Gaza. That is completely unacceptable.”

On January 30, 2025, U.S. Middle East Peace Envoy Steven Witkoff stated that rebuilding Gaza could take 10 to 15 years due to the extensive destruction caused during the 15-month war. He visited Gaza to inspect the situation firsthand, describing it as “uninhabitable” with no water, electricity, or standing structures. While aid is entering Gaza and security measures are holding, Witkoff emphasized that clearing debris alone could take five years, with additional delays due to underground tunnels.

Trump’s Dramatic Plan

In a press conference following his meeting with Netanyahu, Trump announced: “The U.S. will take over the Gaza Strip...We’ll own it, and be responsible for dismantling all of the dangerous, unexploded bombs and other weapons on the site.”

Asked if he was planning a “permanent occupation” of Gaza, Trump said: “I do see a long-term ownership position,” which he claimed would bring “great stability” to the region. The president, who has frequently criticized the use of American troops in foreign lands, went so far as to acknowledge the possibility of sending U.S. soldiers to participate in his plan.

Trump also reiterated that some two million Palestinians would be relocated so Gaza could be rebuilt but did not commit to allowing them to return to their homes. Instead, he talked about ”the world’s people,” including Palestinians, coming to what he said could become “the Riviera of the Middle East” and “supply unlimited numbers of jobs and housing for the people of the area.”

Trump explained that Gaza had been “absolutely destroyed” and the people who had been “living in hell” would “now be able to live in peace.” Trump said it was time to “do something different” because “if you go back, it’s gonna end up the same way it has for a hundred years.” Reassuringly, he concluded, “We’ll make sure that it’s done world class. It will be wonderful for the people. Palestinians, Palestinians, mostly we’re talking about, and I have a feeling that despite them saying no, I have a feeling that the king in Jordan and that the general in Egypt will open their hearts and will give us the kind of land that we need to get this done, and people can live in harmony and in peace.”

Responding to Trump’s ideas about Gaza, he said, “ I think it’s something that could change history, and it’s worthwhile really pursuing this avenue.” He added, “You see things others refuse to see. You say things others refuse to say. And then, after the jaws drop, people scratch their heads. And they say, ‘You know, he’s right.’ And this is the kind of thinking that enabled us to bring the Abraham Accords.”

Trump’s remarks on Gaza overshadowed the two main issues Netanyahu had come to discuss – the hostages and Iran. Regarding the former, Netanyahu thanked Trump for his role in bringing hostages home and reiterated his three goals: “three goals, destroy Hamas’s military and governing capabilities, secure the release of all of our hostages, and ensure that Gaza never again poses a threat.

The reaction to Trump’sGaza plan was unsurprisingly negative from Democrats, Europeans, and Arab states. For example, Senator Chris Murphy (D-CT) posted, “He’s totally lost it. A U.S. invasion of Gaza would lead to the slaughter of thousands of U.S. troops and decades of war in the Middle East. It’s like a bad, sick joke.”

“Trump’s remarks about his desire to control Gaza are ridiculous and absurd, and any ideas of this kind are capable of igniting the region,” Hamas official Sami Abu Zuhri told Reuters.

The Saudi Foreign Ministry said, “The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia also reaffirms its unequivocal rejection of any infringement on the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people, whether through Israeli settlement policies, land annexation, or attempts to displace the Palestinian people from their land.”

Despite the criticism, Trump did not back down, posting that “The Gaza Strip would be turned over to the United States at the conclusion of fighting.” He said the Palestinians “would have already been resettled in far safer and more beautiful communities, with new and modern homes, in the region. They would actually have a chance to be happy, safe, and free.” Meanwhile, “the U.S., working with great development teams from all over the world, would slowly and carefully begin the construction of what would become one of the greatest and most spectacular developments of its kind on earth.” Then, clarifying a point that had concerned even his supporters, he concluded, “No soldiers by the U.S. would be needed! Stability for the region would reign!!!”

Israel appeared prepared to help implement the plan. “I welcome the bold initiative of U.S. President Trump, which could enable a large part of the population in Gaza to leave to various locations throughout the world,” Defense Minister Israel Katz said in a statement. “I instructed the IDF to prepare a plan that would allow any resident of Gaza who is interested to leave to any place in the world that agrees to accept them. The plan will include exit options at land crossings as well as special arrangements for exit by sea and air.”

The Riviera of the Middle East

Unfazed by criticism, Trump continued to insist he was serious about his plan for Gaza, though some details changed and others remained ambiguous. “As far as us rebuilding it, we may give it to other states in the Middle East to build sections of it; other people may do it, through our auspices,” he said. “But we’re committed to owning it, taking it, and making sure that Hamas doesn’t move back.”

Trump elaborated on his real estate plan in an interview with Fox News. “We’ll build beautiful communities, safe communities — could be five, six, could be two — we’ll build safe communities, a little bit away from where they are, from where all of this danger is,” Trump said.

When asked if the Palestinians would be allowed to return after being sent away, Trump responded, “No, they wouldn’t,” explaining that “They will have much better housing.” He added, “I’m talking about building a permanent place for them.”

Trump also alluded to the billions of dollars the U.S. gives to Jordan and Egypt as an incentive for them to cooperate in taking in Palestinians.

Interestingly, he did not say the United States would own Gaza. Trump said, “I will own it.”

On February 11, 2025, President Donald Trump discussed his plans for Gaza during a meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah at the White House.

Abdullah indicated Jordan’s willingness to host 2,000 sick children from Gaza but also emphasized the importance of a solution that serves the interests of all parties involved. Trump suggested Arab states should respond to the Gaza plan with visits to the U.S.

Abdullah wanted to make no decisions until Egypt responded to Trump’s plans. Trump expressed confidence in reaching an agreement, saying he was “99%” sure something can be worked out with Egypt.”

Later, Abdullah said he had “reiterated Jordan’s steadfast position against the displacement of Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank” in his meeting with the president. “This is the unified Arab position. Rebuilding Gaza without displacing the Palestinians and addressing the dire humanitarian situation should be the priority for all.”

Meanwhile, it was reported that Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi’s visit to Washington has been postponed indefinitely. Cairo is reportedly upset over U.S. and Israeli statements about the Palestinians and has firmly rejected any proposal to allocate Egyptian land for Gaza residents. Instead, Cairo released a statement expressing the desire to cooperate with Trump and present “a comprehensive vision for the reconstruction” of the Gaza Strip that “ensures the Palestinian people stay on their land and in line with the legitimate and legal rights of this people. Sissi also said the establishment of a Palestinian state was “the only guarantee for achieving lasting peace” in the region.

Witkoff explained Trump’s position and the debate it provoked. He asked why the administration should adopt a policy prescription that hasn’t worked for decades. “Now we have the Egyptians saying we have a plan. The Jordanians are saying we have a plan. And people are actually engaging in really important, cogent discussion about what ought to happen there.”

On February 21, the leaders of the Gulf Arab states met with their Egyptian and Jordanian counterparts in Riyadh to discuss an alternative to Trump’s plan. They reached no conclusion but were focused on keeping the Palestinians in Gaza. The question of who would control Gaza remained unresolved, as Abbas insisted that he have full control, a proposition rejected by Israel. Equally unacceptable is any involvement of Hamas. A broader Arab summit on March 4 in Egypt was expected to produce a plan.

Saudi Arabia and the UAE insist that Hamas must disarm and relinquish governance before they contribute financially or practically to rebuilding Gaza. Egypt and Qatar oppose these conditions.

On February 23, 2025, in an interview for CNN, Witkoff reaffirmed that, based on realistic assessments, Gaza’s reconstruction is expected to take 15 to 20 years. He also noted that the issue of returning displaced people to Gaza after reconstruction remains complex and is currently under discussion.

In response to its widespread rejection, Trump appeared to back away from his plan. “I’ll tell you the way to do it is my plan. I think that’s the plan that really works,” Trump said on Fox News. “But I’m not forcing it. I’m just going to sit back and recommend it. And then the U.S. would own the site, there’d be no Hamas. And they’d be developed and you’d start all over again with a clean slate.”

Still, he insisted, “if you gave people the choice between that and living in a nice community, I think I know where they’d go. But we’ll see what happens.”

He added that he didn’t understand why Israel gave up Gaza. “Somebody from Israel, I can’t tell you who, but was well known, decided to give it up. It’s one of the bad real estate deals.”

Israeli opposition leader Yair Lapid proposed a plan for the reconstruction of Gaza, framing it as complementary to Trump’s proposals. The plan involved Egypt assuming responsibility for Gaza for 15 years in exchange for erasing its $155 billion external debt, with international and regional allies covering the costs. Under this arrangement, Egypt would oversee Gaza’s reconstruction, manage internal security, and work to prevent arms smuggling and terrorism, with assistance from an Egyptian-Israeli-American security mechanism. The UN Security Council would define Egypt’s role as a “trusteeship,” aiming to transition Gaza to Palestinian Authority control following reforms. Saudi Arabia, the Abraham Accords countries, and the U.S. would contribute to the rebuilding effort. At the same time, Egypt would allow Gazans who wish to emigrate to do so in an orderly manner.

Meanwhile, Witkoff criticized the Biden administration’s plan for Gaza, which assumed that reconstruction and rehabilitation of the territory were feasible in five years. After visiting the territory, he said a 15- to 25-year timeline was much more realistic. Witkoff denied that Trump wanted to evict Palestinians, only to create a better environment for them. That better life required changing the Palestinian education system and providing better career and quality of life prospects for the Palestinians. “Maybe we should be talking about the ability to come back later on,” he said, “but right here, right now, Gaza is a long-term redevelopment plan.”

The Arab Plan

Arab leaders meeting in Cairo on March 4 endorsed Egypt’s five-year, $53 billion plan for Gaza that would allow the Palestinians to remain in temporary housing units during the reconstruction. The first phase would involve removing unexploded ordnance and clearing more than 50 million tons of rubble. The World Bank would oversee a fund to receive donations for the plan. The plan envisions creating sustainable housing, renovating agricultural lands, and developing industrial zones and parks. An airport, fishing port, and commercial port would also be built.

The Arab League called on the UN Security Council to deploy an international peace force not only in Gaza but also on the West Bank. Politically independent Gazans would govern until a reformed Palestinian Authority could take its place.

Egyptian President el-Sissi said there would be no “true peace” without the establishment of the Palestinian state, which is a non-starter for Israel.

Notably, two of the wealthiest Arab states expected to contribute to the reconstruction – Saudi Arabia and the UAE – were absent from the summit. The Saudis insist on Hamas’s removal from Gaza. The UAE is also concerned with educational reconstruction that would eliminate the anti-Israel, anti-Semitic aspects of the current system.

“The plan shows a realistic path to the reconstruction of Gaza and promises – if implemented – swift and sustainable improvement of the catastrophic living conditions for the Palestinians living in Gaza,” the foreign ministers from France, Germany, Italy, and the U.K. said in a joint statement.

The statement said Hamas “must neither govern Gaza nor be a threat to Israel anymore” and that the four countries “support the central role for the Palestinian Authority and the implementation of its reform agenda.”

Israel and the United States rejected the plan. “The current proposal does not address the reality that Gaza is currently uninhabitable and residents cannot humanely live in a territory covered in debris and unexploded ordnance,” National Security Council spokesman Brian Hughes said. “President Trump stands by his vision to rebuild Gaza free from Hamas.”

Hamas objected to the plan’s requirement that it disarm. “The weapon of the resistance is a red line, and it is not negotiable,” Sami Abu Zuhri told Reuters.

Witkoff Creates Confusion

Still, Witkoff surprised many observers when he told Tucker Carlson that Hamas is not “ideologically intractable” and that while their desire to rule Gaza is “unacceptable,” it was possible for them to “stay there a little bit… be involved politically” if they disarmed.

“Nobody is expelling any Palestinians,” President Trump said on March 12. “We should go to other countries of interest with humanitarian hearts, and there are many of them that want to do this and build various domains that will ultimately be occupied by the 1.8 million Palestinians living in Gaza, ending the death and destruction.”

“Stability on Gaza could mean some people come back, it could mean some people don’t come back,” according to Witkoff. “We’re going to attempt to ascertain different development plans for Gaza. They could involve the word two-state (solution). [They] could not.”

Witkoff added, “We need real elections in Gaza… We need a real security force there… If Israel thinks they’re going to have a problem in Gaza because Hamas is going to be there long-term, this is never going to end.”

Israel also set up a bureau to facilitate the voluntary relocation of Gazans. Defense Minister Katz’s office said the new directorate would work to “prepare for and enable safe and controlled passage of Gaza residents for their voluntary departure to third countries, including securing their movement, establishing movement routes, checking pedestrians at designated crossings in the Gaza Strip, as well as coordinating the provision of infrastructure that will enable passage by land, sea and air to the destination countries.” To reinforce the impetus for the decision, the statement said it would be done “subject to Israeli and international law, and in accordance with the vision of U.S. President Donald Trump.”

In a possible reversal, a Lebanese newspaper offered an unconfirmed report that Sisi told Arab leaders that Egypt was willing to temporarily relocate half a million residents from Gaza to northern Sinai in a designated city during reconstruction in Gaza.

Trump spoke to the leaders of Egypt, France, and Jordan on April 7. The trio “emphasize[d] the need to create conducive conditions for a genuine political horizon and mobilize international efforts to end the suffering of the Palestinian people, restore security and peace for all, and implement the two-state solution.”

Following the meeting with Trump, Netanyahu said, “We’re currently in contact with countries talking about the possibility of absorbing a large number of Gazans. That’s important — because in the end, that’s what needs to happen.”

Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto announced that Indonesia will temporarily host around 1,000 Palestinian medical evacuees and orphaned children from Gaza. They will remain in Indonesia until they recover and conditions in Gaza allow for their return. He emphasized that this is not a permanent resettlement plan and directed his foreign minister to coordinate the evacuation with the Palestinian authorities.

On April 27, 2025, Netanyahu said Israel would retain military control over Gaza and not allow the PA to replace Hamas. “Hamas will not be there... we’re not going to put the Palestinian Authority there. Why replace one regime that is sworn to our destruction with another regime that is sworn to our destruction? We won’t do that...We will not succumb to any pressure not to do that,” Netanyahu said.

He also praised Trump’s idea of the voluntary relocation of Palestinians from Gaza. “Believe me, many of them want to leave,” Netanyahu said.

In the same month, the U.S. and Israel have held preliminary talks about Washington possibly leading a temporary post-war administration in Gaza, modeled after the Coalition Provisional Authority in Iraq, to oversee the strip until it is demilitarized and stable, and a viable Palestinian leadership emerges. The proposed transitional government, led by a U.S. official and possibly joined by other countries and Palestinian technocrats (excluding Hamas and the Palestinian Authority), lacks a fixed timeline and remains in early stages without agreement or designated roles.

In May, Netanyahu offered his most explicit statement about the outcome of the war: “all areas of the Gaza Strip will be under Israeli security control.”

Israel to Take Control of Gaza

On August 8, 2025, Israel’s security cabinet approved a phased strategy to take over Gaza City, disarm Hamas, and then hand control to a civilian administration—explicitly excluding Hamas and the Palestinian Authority. Five conditions for ending the war were spelled out: disarmament, return of all hostages, Gaza demilitarization, Israeli security control, and the establishment of a new civilian government. The wording avoided “occupy” for legal reasons, instead using “take over,” though a senior official said the distinction was superficial and amounted to full military rule. In an occupation, Israel would take on direct responsibility for the welfare of the Palestinians.

Weeks earlier, Reuters reported U.S. and Israeli consideration of a temporary, multinational governance of Gaza, modeled on Iraq’s post-war Coalition Provisional Authority. This administration would include Arab and Western nations and exclude both Hamas and the PA.

Meanwhile, Egypt-led proposals endorsed by the Arab League call for keeping Gazans in place, marginalizing Hamas, and installing a technocratic committee under the PA to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction over a 3–7-year period—contingent on PA reforms and international aid.

Journalist Dan Perry noted the sea change in world opinion: “At its core is a possible end of the abnormal tolerance for Iranian-backed jihadist militias, like Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon, that the Middle East — and, to some extent, the world at large — has demonstrated in recent decades. The false narrative of ‘resistance’ is giving way to an understanding that these groups have always been obstacles to peace.”

This transformation was also reflected, he said, in the UN statement endorsed by the Arab League in which all 22 Arab leaders, including Hamas’s Qatari patron, called for Hamas to disarm and disband. “This declaration represented a startling break from years of ambiguity, during which Arab leaders hedged on Hamas, treating it as part of a messy internal Palestinian dispute,” observed Perry. “Now, they are naming it for what it is: the chief obstacle to Palestinian freedom and regional peace.”

A Great Plan

Trump opposes Israeli annexation of Gaza. Instead, the Washington Post reported in September 2025 that the administration was developing a plan for Gaza that placed the territory under a U.S.-run trusteeship for at least a decade, transforming it from a war-ravaged landscape into what he calls the “Riviera of the Middle East.” In his plan, Gaza would shed its association with poverty and conflict and instead become a hub for luxury tourism, high-tech manufacturing, and AI-driven smart cities.

At the heart of the proposal is the GREAT Trust (Gaza Reconstitution, Economic Acceleration and Transformation Trust), a mechanism designed to attract $100 billion in investment. Unlike traditional aid, this would not be charity but a profit-making venture, with investors promised a fourfold return over ten years. Gaza’s redevelopment would be financed in part by seizing 30% of its land, deemed “publicly owned,” and turning it into the foundation of an investment portfolio.

The plan rests on an ambitious population relocation scheme. All of Gaza’s two million residents would either be “voluntarily” resettled abroad—enticed by a package of $5,000 in cash, four years’ rent subsidies, and a year of food support—or confined in secure zones inside Gaza while reconstruction proceeds. Palestinians who leave would receive digital land tokens redeemable for apartments in new smart cities or cash to finance resettlement abroad. Trump has openly said that Palestinians would “live beautifully in another location,” suggesting they would not return to Gaza once the project is complete.

Infrastructure development is a centerpiece of the proposal. The vision includes AI-powered smart cities with schools, hospitals, green spaces, and golf courses, along with new highways named after Saudi and Emirati leaders who would be expected to fund the projects. Gaza would also get a modern port and airport, linking it to Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia. Meanwhile, massive utility projects—solar fields, desalination plants, data centers—would turn Gaza into a showpiece of innovation.

Politically, the plan sidesteps the long-discussed idea of Palestinian statehood. Instead, Gaza would be integrated into the Abraham Accords framework, with Israel retaining overarching security control. Governance would begin under Western contractors and gradually shift to a “reformed” local police force.

The plan has drawn sharp criticism. Arab governments, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE, reject Trump’s proposal outright, preferring a model where Gaza is governed by technocrats under the Palestinian Authority with Gulf funding for reconstruction—while preserving the prospect of Palestinian statehood. Human rights experts warn that Trump’s approach amounts to a modern form of forced displacement, dressed up as voluntary migration. Palestinians themselves have been vocal in their rejection, saying they will not abandon their homes regardless of financial incentives.

Comparison of the Trump and Arab Plans for Gaza

Feature	Trump Plan (GREAT Trust)	Arab/Egyptian Proposal
Governance	U.S.-run trusteeship for 10+ years; eventual local police under Israeli oversight	Technocratic administration led by the Palestinian Authority, backed by Egypt, Gulf states
Population	Relocate Palestinians abroad with financial incentives; others confined in “secure zones”	Keep Palestinians in Gaza; focus on humanitarian support and rebuilding communities
Funding Model	$100B investment fund (GREAT Trust) with promised 4x returns for investors; backed by land assets	Gulf state funding (UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar) in coordination with international donors
Economic Vision	“Riviera of the Middle East” with smart cities, luxury resorts, EV factories, data centers	Rebuild basic infrastructure: housing, utilities, schools, hospitals, jobs
Land Policy	30% of Gaza’s land seized as “publicly owned” to back investor trust	Land remains under Palestinian control; no forced asset transfers
Incentives to Leave	$5,000 cash, 4 years’ rent subsidies, 1 year food aid, plus digital land tokens for resettlement	None; Palestinians remain in Gaza, rebuild with international support
Security	Initially, Western contractors and foreign security; Israel retains overall control	Security reform under PA/Egyptian coordination; eventual Palestinian-led policing
International Alignment	Integrated into the Abraham Accords framework; minimal Arab consultation	Backed by the Arab League, aligned with UN/Western calls for a two-state solution
Controversy	Seen as coerced displacement, it undermines Palestinian self-determination	Criticized as slow and bureaucratic, but preserves Palestinian presence and statehood aspirations

The Sharm el-Sheik Summit

Originally, Israel was not invited, but Trump asked Netanyahu to attend. The president told el-Sissi to extend the invitation, which he did in the first phone call between the leaders since the war began. Netanyahu initially agreed but then backed out, citing the start of the holiday of Simchat Torah. He thanked Trump but not el-Sissi for the invitation. The leaders of Iraq and Turkey threatened to boycott the meeting if Netanyahu attended. The Kan public broadcaster reported that Netanyahu canceled the trip due to concerns that traveling on a Jewish festival might spark strife within his coalition. However, the ultra-Orthodox United Torah Judaism Party stated it made no objections or threats in that regard.

Before the summit, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine issued a joint statement rejecting any “foreign guardianship” over Gaza while welcoming Arab and international participation in the reconstruction of the enclave.

This seemed to contradict Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty’s announcement that a 15-member committee of Palestinian technocrats had been selected and secretly vetted by Israel to govern post-war Gaza. This committee, whose members remain undisclosed, is intended to manage the daily affairs of Gaza’s citizens. Abdelatty claimed that all Palestinian factions, including Hamas, approved of this committee. The technocrats will operate under the supervision of the proposed “Board of Peace,” and will be tasked with managing the flow of reconstruction funds. Abdelatty asserted that Hamas agreed to have “no role in the transitional period.”

A Saudi diplomatic source told Israel Hayom, “Excessive Qatari involvement in the next stages of the plan and Gaza’s reconstruction will cause Trump’s plan to collapse. Qatar's interests are different, it will undermine deradicalization efforts and try to ensure that Hamas remains in the picture and returns to power in the not-so-distant future.”

According to the New York Times, “Several officials described the cease-fire agreement so far as amounting to a simple trade in which Israel gave away roughly half of Gaza in exchange for its hostages. To get Israel to leave the rest of Gaza’s territory, they said, it will need to give up its arms and let another entity step in to govern the enclave.”

Trouble was brewing as Hamas began to reassert itself openly. According to the BBC and Palestinian sources, the group recalled about 7,000 fighters and began arresting and executing suspected opponents after the ceasefire began. Maintaining peace will be difficult unless and until a multinational force is created to take responsibility for Gaza.

Stabilizing Gaza

The U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officially opened the Civil-Military Coordination Center (CMCC) in Israel on October 17, establishing a central hub to coordinate Gaza stabilization efforts following a U.S.-brokered peace plan to end the Israel-Hamas war. Staffed by about 200 U.S. personnel with expertise in logistics, planning, and engineering, the CMCC will oversee humanitarian aid, security coordination, and implementation of the ceasefire—but no U.S. troops will enter Gaza. Led by Lt. Gen. Patrick Frank of U.S. Army Central, the center will integrate partner nations, NGOs, and international institutions to support Gaza’s transition to civilian governance and long-term stability.

The UK sent a small group of military planning officers, including a two-star deputy commander, to join a U.S.-led task force supporting post-war stabilization efforts in Gaza, the Defense Ministry confirmed. The force, operating from the CMCC, is part of a broader effort by the U.S., Egypt, and Qatar to solidify the Gaza ceasefire and implement President Trump’s 20-point truce plan. The U.S. will provide up to 200 support troops—none stationed inside Gaza—and is seeking contributions from several Muslim-majority nations. British Defense Minister John Healey said the deployment, made at Washington’s request, reflects the UK’s commitment to assisting the peace process with its “specialist experience and skills.”

The United States and mediators initially envisioned a multinational contingent comprising troops from Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Indonesia, and possibly Turkey or Jordan. Egypt, given its border with Gaza and history as a mediator, has privately signaled readiness to play a central role, but only under a United Nations or Arab League mandate that clearly defines the mission and ensures Egyptian forces won’t be drawn into open combat with Hamas. Cairo has made clear it will not “do Israel’s security work” or occupy Gaza in any form.

Indonesia’s president, Prabowo Subianto, told the UN that his country could send 20,000 troops to “help secure peace in Gaza.” Still, Indonesian officials have since indicated they would participate only as part of a broader Arab-led or U.N.-sanctioned coalition. Turkey, meanwhile, has publicly offered to join a cease-fire “monitoring task force,” though Israel is skeptical of Ankara’s involvement given President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s fierce criticism of Israeli policy. The UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Jordan have been approached as potential contributors but remain hesitant, wary of domestic backlash if Arab troops are seen as enforcing an arrangement that leaves Israel in de facto control or sidelines Palestinian sovereignty.

Analysts say that without Arab participation, the stabilization force will lack legitimacy in the region and could collapse before deployment. Yet Arab capitals insist their involvement must be linked to a political horizon—specifically, progress toward a Palestinian state. “No Arab country wants to send troops into Gaza without a clear Palestinian mandate and a path to statehood,” said Ghaith al-Omari of the Washington Institute for Near East Policy.

Until such terms are clarified, diplomats warn, Israel is unlikely to withdraw further from Gaza, leaving Hamas as the only authority on the ground. And unless Hamas disarms—a step it has so far refused—the proposed Arab or international force may never materialize, leaving the ceasefire fragile and Gaza’s future in limbo.

Witkoff told 60 Minutes that “the Egyptians and the Jordanians have been training—Palestinians—on how to be a proper police force.” Israeli sources said about 1,000 officers had been trained and that the Egyptians hoped that number would reach 10,000.

The king of Jordan made clear, however, that he believes the stabilization force should keep but not enforce the peace. King Abdullah said he hoped the mandate “is peacekeeping, because if it’s peace-enforcing, nobody will want to touch that.” Abdullah added that Jordan would not contribute troops to the stabilization force.

Meanwhile, Hamas was quietly involved in forming the proposed technocratic government to administer Gaza after the war, according to Israel’s Kan public broadcaster. Regional diplomatic sources said Hamas selected about half of the candidates—figures aligned with its principles but not openly affiliated—while the Palestinian Authority, with Egypt and other Arab mediators, chose the rest. The complete list was submitted to Hamas for approval, aiming to secure its tacit backing and preserve its postwar influence despite Israeli and international demands for its ouster.

According to Haaretz, the IDF believes Hamas has reasserted full control over Gaza’s governing institutions since the October 10 cease-fire. Despite widespread devastation, there have been no major protests or signs of opposition. Local militias Israel once supported have been dismantled, and Hamas forces are reportedly killing suspected collaborators. Hamas has restaffed government offices, reactivated its police, and begun restoring order and infrastructure. Israeli officials see no viable alternative leadership, fearing Turkish involvement could further entrench Hamas’s power. Meanwhile, postwar governance and security arrangements remain unresolved.

On October 21, President Trump said that several U.S.-aligned Arab and regional states have offered to send forces into Gaza to “deal with Hamas” if the group violates the ceasefire agreement. He described their willingness as unprecedented enthusiasm for regional cooperation and claimed such unity “has not been seen in a thousand years.” Trump said he told these countries—and Israel—to wait, expressing hope that Hamas would comply with its commitments. If not, he warned, the response would be “fast, furious, and brutal.”

Separate from debates over the stabilization force was the question of who would pay for Gaza’s reconstruction, which the World Bank and United Nations estimate will cost roughly $70 billion. Countries like Saudi Arabia insisted they would not provide any funding until a Palestinian governing authority was in place.

In late October, an Israeli official said reconstruction on the IDF-controlled side of Gaza’s “Yellow Line” could begin immediately without waiting for the second phase of President Trump’sGaza peace plan. “The land is clear now, and actually we can start building,” the official told the Times of Israel, adding that Israel welcomes pro-Israel investors and builders from abroad. U.S. Vice President JD Vance expressed support for the approach during his visit to Israel, saying the goal is to rebuild quickly in areas free of Hamas to provide Gazans with housing, jobs, and stability.

When asked how he would get Hamas to disarm, Trump said on 60 Minutes, “If I want them to disarm, I’ll get them to disarm very quickly. They’ll be eliminated.”

At the end of October, a group of senior former politicians and diplomats known as “The Elders” urged President Trump to pressure Israel to release Fatah leader Marwan Barghouti because of his popularity among Palestinians and potential to be a unifying figure as the head of a reformed PA governing Gaza. Trump confirmed that the proposal was under discussion at the White House but said no decision had been made. Barghouti, a convicted terrorist serving five consecutive life sentences for orchestrating deadly attacks during the Second Intifada, remains a deeply controversial figure. His release would almost certainly be opposed by Israel, particularly given Prime Minister Netanyahu’s prior assurance to National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir—a vocal opponent of any such move—that Barghouti would not be freed as part of a hostage exchange.

Israeli Concern Over Turkey

Turkey’s mediation and willingness to send troops have alarmed Israel, which views President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s Islamist sympathies and ties to Hamas as a strategic threat. “This idea of the Turks and Turkish groups going inside Gaza makes the Israelis crazy,” former Israeli intelligence official Michael Milshtein told the Washington Post.

IHH Humanitarian Relief Foundation, a Turkish aid group that Israel has banned for years for alleged ties to terrorist organizations, has become active in Gaza. For Ankara, Gaza represents both a humanitarian and economic opportunity: Turkish firms are poised to win multi-billion-dollar reconstruction contracts and expand Turkey’s regional influence.

“Turkey seeks to build a similar proxy threat around us,” observed Nadav Shragai in Israel Hayom. “It is already militarily present in Libya and Syria. It established a drone base in Cyprus. It is trying to extend influence into Egypt, and now it is present in Gaza.”

Nevertheless, the administration was pressuring Israel to allow Turkey to be involved in the next phase. While acknowledging Israeli opposition, U.S. Ambassador to Turkey Tom Barrack argued that Turkey could disarm Hamas. “If I were personally advising Netanyahu, I’d say that’s one of the most brilliant things he could do,” Barrack said. “Do I think it’s going to happen? No. It’s trust and I don’t think that trust exists.”

A UN Mandate

On November 17, 2025, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 2803 endorsing President Trump’s Comprehensive Plan. It authorizes an American-chaired transitional administration, the Board of Peace (BoP), along with an International Stabilization Force (ISF) charged with enforcing Gaza’s demilitarization. While Jerusalem welcomed the plan’s emphasis on total disarmament and the return of hostages, Israeli officials stress that its core mechanisms remain dangerously uncertain.

The most significant Israeli concern centers on enforcement. The ISF is empowered to use “all necessary measures,” yet virtually no major Arab state is willing to contribute troops, and many potential participants refuse to engage in coercive disarmament. Israel opposes involvement by Turkey and Qatar, while other governments have clear red lines against confronting Hamas remnants directly. Without a credible enforcement coalition—or significant U.S. military participation—the ISF may default into a monitoring mission incapable of preventing militant rearmament. Israeli analysts note the painful precedents: UNIFIL failed to halt Hezbollah’s buildup, and other international peace forces proved similarly reluctant to confront armed groups. The fear is that Gaza could follow the same pattern.

Israel is also uneasy about the BoP’s hybrid legal structure. Because it is independent of the UN system yet internationally mandated, its authority is broad but ambiguous. Jerusalem worries that overlapping jurisdictions—in intelligence-sharing, border management, and counterterrorism operations—could restrict IDF freedom of action at precisely the moment when Israel still faces active threats emanating from Gaza. A U.S.-chaired civilian authority may align with Israeli security priorities in theory, but in practice, it could create disputes over operational control when time-sensitive decisions are required.

The resolution conditions IDF withdrawal on successful demilitarization and functioning transitional forces, but Hamas refuses to disarm, and many ISF contributors will not use force. This creates a potential policy trap: either Israel remains longer than anticipated—inviting international backlash—or it withdraws prematurely into an environment where militants can reconstitute, jeopardizing Israeli civilians and undermining the resolution’s entire logic.

In Jerusalem’s view, Resolution 2803 contains promising elements—chiefly the U.S.-led push for full demilitarization—but its operational gaps remain profound. Unless the ISF is willing to enforce its mandate, the PA can meet unprecedented reform benchmarks, and the BoP can function without constraining Israeli security prerogatives, the resolution risks reproducing the very failures it seeks to correct.

Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Gaza rejected the resolution, calling it a U.S.-driven plan imposed “outside the Palestinian national will.” In a joint statement, the groups warned that the proposed force would amount to foreign “guardianship” that undermines Palestinian self-determination. They further condemned the initiative as legitimizing what they describe as an Israeli “war of extermination.”

Splitting the Strip

On November 4, a senior Hamas official, Moussa Abu Marzouk, announced that Hamas and the Palestinian Authority agreed to form a temporary committee to manage the Gaza Strip on behalf of the PA. The committee, to be led by a PA minister, would oversee border crossings and security forces in the territory. However, Abu Marzouk did not specify whether the arrangement had been approved by the U.S. or formally endorsed by the PA, leaving the agreement’s legitimacy and implementation uncertain.

Due to the challenges in assembling a planned multinational force, the CMCC is reportedly coordinating with local militias and clan leaders in Gaza to manage newly designated humanitarian zones and distribute aid to displaced Gazans in both the north and south. The long-term goal is to transform these militias into a local order-enforcing force with broader authority across the Gaza Strip. Key groups include militias led by Husam al-Astal and Yasser Abu Shabab, both clan-backed and engaged in daily clashes with Hamas fighters.

Al-Astal, formerly part of the Palestinian Authority’s Preventive Security Service under Mohammed Dahlan, allied with Abu Shabab’s militia in eastern Rafah before establishing his own “safe zone” in Khan Younis. Reports indicate his militia receives equipment and support from Israel, with ongoing coordination between the two militia leaders and Israeli forces.

Meanwhile, the U.S. and Israel were exploring a plan to divide Gaza into separate zones controlled by Israel and Hamas, with reconstruction limited to the Israeli-controlled areas until Hamas was disarmed and removed from power. Israel currently controls about 53% of Gaza under the ceasefire, and the goal was to expand safe areas where Palestinians can live and work. Reconstruction funds would not be allocated to Hamas-controlled regions. Arab mediators have expressed strong opposition, warning that the plan could create a permanent Israeli-controlled zone and are unlikely to provide troops to enforce it.

Map of Gaza as of October 10, 2025
Click to Enlarge
Ecrusized, influenced by user Rr016., CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons

Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto said on November 11, 2025, that the Carabinieri police would train the Palestinian security forces if the ceasefire held. “We will not do it in Gaza or in Rafah,” he said, “but at an external location to ensure the security of our Carabinieri.”

Palestinians are Unwanted

Khaled Abu Toameh reports that Palestinians released under the Israel–Hamas ceasefire agreement “cannot find any Arab country willing to receive them.” The refusal is rooted in decades of hard lessons. Arab governments remember the PLO’s attempted takeover of Jordan in 1970, the destabilization of Lebanon during the 1980s, and Kuwait’s mass expulsion of Palestinians after they backed Saddam Hussein in 1990.

Hamas proudly describes itself as “one of the wings of the Muslim Brotherhood in Palestine,” a declaration that makes its members unwelcome in states such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain—all of which have banned the Brotherhood. Across the region, Palestinians face restricted rights, limited movement, and denial of citizenship; no Arab government is eager to import more political volatility.

This longstanding reluctance explains why, from the earliest days of the Gaza war, Arab states categorically opposed any plan to relocate Gazans—even temporarily.

Throwing a major wrench into Trump’s plans for reconstruction of Gaza, Qatar’s prime minister, Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, said Qatar will continue humanitarian support for Palestinians but will not take responsibility for reconstruction, declaring, “We are not the ones who are going to write the check to rebuild what others destroyed.”

Consequently, the U.S. told Israel it must pay to clear Gaza’s massive war destruction—an estimated 68 million tons of debris. Israel agreed to begin by clearing a model neighborhood in Rafah, a project costing tens to hundreds of millions of shekels. It was expected to ultimately shoulder over $1 billion in cleanup costs across the Strip. Removing rubble is a prerequisite for Phase Two, which aims to rebuild Rafah first as a showcase.

Meanwhile, Trump was pushing for the second phase to begin, and Netanyahu appeared willing to move ahead once the last hostage was returned. He said the second phase was “no less daunting, and that is to achieve the disarmament of Hamas and the demilitarization of Gaza. And as I mentioned to the Chancellor [of Germany visiting Jerusalem], there is a third phase, and that is to de-radicalize Gaza, something that also people believed was impossible. But it was done in Germany. It was done in Japan. It's done in the Gulf states. It can be done in Gaza, too. But, of course, Hamas has to be dismantled. These are challenges in front of us, but we do not shirk from them. We think we have great opportunities.”

Hamas left no doubt as to its position. In a public address on December 6 in Istanbul, Khaled Mashal declared that Hamas had no intention of disarming, giving up its weapons, its rule, or its objective of destroying Israel. He also rejected any form of external oversight in Gaza - including the idea of an international force. He said Palestinians now had the opportunity to drive Israel out of the Palestinian homeland and off the international stage.

Israel says Qatar and Turkey are trying to shield Hamas from fully disarming, proposing alternatives that would allow the group to retain influence in Gaza—either by handing weapons to the Palestinian Authority or placing them in “secure storage” under supervision. Jerusalem rejects both ideas and insists Hamas must be completely weapon-free.

Israeli officials expect the dispute to be settled only through direct talks, making it a central agenda item for Netanyahu’s meetings with Trump at Mar-a-Lago from December 28 to January 1.

Tony Blair was reportedly removed from consideration for the “board of peace” after objections from several Arab and Muslim states, largely due to his association with the 2003 Iraq War and concerns that Palestinians would be sidelined. Although Blair had welcomed the plan and expressed willingness to serve, regional resistance made his appointment untenable.

Blair’s team disputes that he was pushed out, saying the board will consist only of sitting world leaders and that Blair, as a former prime minister, was never eligible. Instead, he is expected to join a smaller executive committee with Jared Kushner, Trump adviser Steve Witkoff, and senior Arab and Western officials.

Reforming the PA

Meanwhile, Israel has laid out stiff conditions for any Palestinian Authority role in Gaza:

Trouble with the ISF

U.S. officials say a UN-authorized International Stabilization Force (ISF) could deploy to Gaza as early as next month as part of President Trump’s phased peace plan, though significant uncertainty remains. The force would initially deploy in areas currently controlled by Israel, allowing the IDF to withdraw gradually “based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization,” once security and stability are established. More than 25 countries are expected to participate in a U.S. Central Command–hosted planning conference in Doha, with discussions covering command structure, rules of engagement, and force composition. While many states have expressed interest, firm troop commitments remain limited; Indonesia has said it is preparing a potential deployment focused on health and reconstruction, while Azerbaijan and others say the mandate remains unclear.

A central unresolved issue is how Hamas would be disarmed. Although U.S. officials initially said the ISF would not fight Hamas, the UN Security Council mandate authorizes the force to ensure Gaza’s demilitarization, including the destruction of terror infrastructure and permanent decommissioning of weapons. U.S. Ambassador to the UN Mike Waltz underscored that authority, saying the ISF is empowered to demilitarize Gaza “by all means necessary,” adding, “Obviously that’ll be a conversation with each country,” as discussions on rules of engagement continue. Hamas, for its part, says disarmament has not been formally discussed with mediators and insists it will not give up its weapons absent the establishment of a Palestinian state.

Mediators backing the Gaza ceasefire expressed support for President Donald Trump’s peace plan after meeting in Miami, but officials said little progress was made beyond maintaining the current truce.

In a joint statement, the United States, Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey urged Israel and Hamas to adhere to the plan, exercise restraint, and avoid a return to war. They called for the rapid creation of a proposed “Board of Peace” and a technocratic government to manage Gaza after the war, though no new initiatives were announced.

According to a source briefed on the meeting, moving to the second phase of the ceasefire will require difficult compromises by both Israel and Hamas, particularly over IDF withdrawal from Gaza and Hamas’s disarmament. While mediators discussed ways to pressure both sides, the source said neither can be forced into agreement.

Project Sunrise

“Project Sunrise” is a Trump administration proposal to rebuild Gaza into a futuristic, high-tech coastal metropolis, pitched to foreign governments and investors as a path from humanitarian collapse to long-term prosperity. Developed by a team led by Kushner and Witkoff, the 32-page plan envisions moving Gaza’s population from emergency shelters to permanent housing and eventually transforming the enclave into what supporters call the “Riviera of the Middle East.”

The proposal, estimated to cost $112.1 billion over 10 years, is explicitly contingent on Hamas fully disarming and dismantling its tunnels. It outlines a phased reconstruction starting with rubble removal, unexploded ordnance clearance, and temporary humanitarian infrastructure, followed by permanent housing, schools, hospitals, and basic services, and only later luxury coastal development and advanced transportation. The U.S. would act as a financial “anchor,” supporting nearly $60 billion through grants and debt guarantees, with additional funding expected from Gulf states, Turkey, Egypt, and international institutions such as the World Bank.

U.S. officials have shown the plan to potential donors, but many remain skeptical about its feasibility, questioning whether Hamas would ever disarm and whether investors would commit funds in a volatile postwar environment. Critics argue the plan is aspirational and unrealistic, while supporters say it offers the most detailed and hopeful vision yet for Gaza’s future and is preferable to allowing humanitarian conditions to deteriorate further.

Colonel (res.) Dr. Eran Lerman argued that, given the unlikelihood of Hamas being disarmed by the ISF, Israel has four possible strategic paths for Gaza. One option is maintaining the status quo, which leaves Hamas controlling much of Gaza and continuing to pose a threat. A second option is a renewed full-scale Israeli offensive to destroy Hamas and take over the remaining territory, particularly if hostage constraints are removed, and U.S. support is secured. A third approach would tighten the blockade on Hamas-controlled areas while directing significant U.S. and international investment into a rebuilt “New Gaza,” aiming to draw civilians away from Hamas rule. The fourth option envisions a gradual, modular campaign in which Israel pushes Hamas back in stages with limited force, then transfers cleared areas to new security and governing authorities, minimizing Israeli losses while steadily dismantling Hamas.

On January 11, 2026, Hamas said it had instructed its government agencies to prepare to hand over their powers to an independent committee of Palestinian technocrats that is supposed to administer Gaza under Trump’s ceasefire plan. The announcement came days before Trump was expected to announce the composition of the Board of Peace.

In the meantime, Nickolay Mladenov was appointed director-general of the Board. A Bulgarian politician and former UN envoy to the Middle East was considered a reasonable choice because he had cultivated good relations with both Israelis and Palestinians.

Phase 2 Begins

Today, on behalf of President Trump, we are announcing the launch of Phase Two of the President’s 20-Point Plan to End the Gaza Conflict, moving from ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.

Phase Two establishes a transitional technocratic Palestinian administration in Gaza, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza (NCAG), and begins the full demilitarization and reconstruction of Gaza, primarily the disarmament of all unauthorized personnel. The US expects Hamas to comply fully with its obligations, including the immediate return of the final deceased hostage. Failure to do so will bring serious consequences.

Importantly, Phase One delivered historic humanitarian aid, maintained the ceasefire, returned all living hostages, and the remains of twenty-seven of the twenty-eight deceased hostages. We are deeply grateful to Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar for their indispensable mediation efforts that made all progress to date possible.

Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey issued a joint statement supporting the move, which clearly indicated their emphasis on what it would do for the Palestinians rather than ensure Israel’s security. They also announced that former Palestinian deputy minister Ali Shaath will lead the new technocratic committee, the National Committee for the Administration of the Gaza Strip (NCAG).

Many members have close ties to the PA and Fatah, a factor Israeli officials say makes them “acceptable” and non-extremist. Israel has agreed to the appointments, though officials stress that the true test will be implementation—beginning with a pilot reconstruction project in Rafah. For now, Israel does not expect changes to security conditions or withdrawal from the so-called Yellow Line in the near term.

Contrary to Netanyahu’s pledge that the PA would not govern Gaza after the war, sources told Ynet, “The committee will coordinate government in Ramallah on public and social services in Gaza, while also working with international aid organizations and the United Nations.” Donor states are expected to set up a dedicated fund to finance their activities. PA sources say the committee will be reinforced with civilian and security personnel, operate from multiple offices across Gaza, and maintain direct contact with residents to establish professional governance.

The committee will first establish its internal structure, staffing, and operating mechanisms. Despite public statements by Hamas that it will relinquish control, the group is demanding that the administrative bodies it created after taking power in 2007 continue to operate—an insistence rejected by other stakeholders.

Israel did not publicly oppose the move to Phase 2, but officials remain dissatisfied that a new phase was declared before the return of the last Israeli hostage, police Sgt. Ran Gvili. From Israel’s perspective, it is equally troubling that Phase 2 began without Hamas first relinquishing its weapons.

The United States and the mediators are focused on heavy weaponry such as launchers and RPGs, with far less urgency regarding the rifles and small arms Hamas uses to enforce its rule in Gaza. American and Arab officials have floated an ambitious “buy-back” program to address Hamas’s arsenal, but it is unclear whether this would meet Israel’s demands or whether Hamas would agree to take part.

Israel is also concerned that Phase 2 will bring pressure to allow the entry of materials beyond humanitarian aid into the Strip. Israeli officials widely believe that metals, concrete, and heavy construction equipment would be diverted to rocket production and tunnel reconstruction. During Phase 1, Hamas “taxed” the large aid convoys in a way that enabled it to fully reestablish its prewar administrative control in areas beyond the yellow line under its authority.

Members of the NCAG held their first meeting in Cairo on January 15. The committee also held a FaceTime call with Kushner and Witkoff. Shaath posted a mission statement on X on January 17, which said its mission “is to rebuild the Gaza Strip not just in infrastructure but also in spirit.” He continued, “We are committed to establishing security, restoring the essential services that form the bedrock of human dignity such as electricity, water, healthcare, and education, as well as cultivating a society rooted in peace, democracy, and justice. Operating with the highest standards of integrity and transparency, the NCAG will forge a productive economy capable of replacing unemployment with opportunity for all. We embrace peace, through which we strive to secure the path to true Palestinian rights and self determination.”

One of Shaath’s first proposals was to push the vast amounts of Gaza rubble into the Mediterranean Sea to expand the Strip’s territory to ameliorate the housing crisis created by the population displacement during the fighting.

“The technocratic committee is just a group of 15 people,” an Arab diplomat told the Times of Israel. “They need civil servants. But right now, Israel is blocking both those on the Hamas payroll as well as those on the PA payroll. The same is the case for police. If Israel doesn’t want those tied to the PA, what’s left are the ones on the Hamas payroll,” the Arab diplomat said.

A U.S. official confirmed Israeli resistance to even limited PA involvement in Gaza’s administration but said the issue would be addressed in the coming weeks, stressing that the Cairo meeting was primarily intended to set the tone for future work.

On January 15, Trump declared that the United States would reach an agreement forcing Hamas to fully disarm, warning the terror group of consequences if it refused.

“With the support of Egypt, Turkey, and Qatar, we will secure a COMPREHENSIVE demilitarization agreement with Hamas, including the surrender of ALL weapons, and the dismantling of EVERY tunnel,” Trump wrote on Truth Social.

“Hamas must IMMEDIATELY honor its commitments, including the return of the final body to Israel, and proceed without delay to full demilitarization,” he added. “As I have said before, they can do this the easy way, or the hard way. The people of Gaza have suffered long enough. The time is now.”

The Board of Peace (BoP)

The Times of Israel published the charter of the Board of Peace that accompanied the invitations President Trump sent to world leaders to oversee postwar Gaza. The charter established Trump in an unprecedented position of authority. He would serve as the inaugural chairman, a position with no end date and sweeping executive powers. According to the charter, the chairman could only be replaced “following voluntary resignation or as a result of incapacity, as determined by a unanimous vote of the Executive Board.”

This chairman’s role carried extensive authority, including the power to invite and remove members, veto decisions, set the agenda, and choose a successor. The charter granted the chairman “exclusive authority to create, modify, or dissolve subsidiary entities as necessary or appropriate to fulfill the Board of Peace’s mission.”

Trump would serve not only as chairman but also as the United States' representative. While the charter specified that each country would be represented by its head of state or government, Trump held both roles simultaneously.

Though Trump had initially conceived the Board of Peace as a supervisory body for the Gaza ceasefire, its charter described something far more expansive. The document outlined a body concerned with peace worldwide, but does not mention Gaza or Israel. Its mission was to “promote stability, restore dependable and lawful governance, and secure enduring peace in areas affected or threatened by conflict.”

The charter’s preamble made clear that the board was born of dissatisfaction with existing international institutions, “declaring that durable peace requires pragmatic judgment, common-sense solutions, and the courage to depart from approaches and institutions that have too often failed.” It emphasized “the need for a more nimble and effective international peace-building body.”

Before announcing the Board members, the White House unveiled the names of the Board’s Executive Committee and a separate Gaza Executive Board. The former includes Secretary of State Rubio, Witkoff, Kushner, former UK prime minister Sir Tony Blair, Apollo Global Management CEO Marc Rowan, Ajay Banga, President of the World Bank Group, and U.S. deputy national security advisor Robert Gabriel. The White House said “each Executive Board member will oversee a defined portfolio critical to Gaza’s stabilization and long-term success, including, but not limited to, governance capacity-building, regional relations, reconstruction, investment attraction, large-scale funding, and capital mobilization.”

Trump also appointed Aryeh Lightstone and Josh Gruenbaum as “senior advisors to the Board of Peace, charged with leading day-to-day strategy and operations, and translating the Board’s mandate and diplomatic priorities into disciplined execution.” Lightstone worked with Kushner on the Abraham Accords, and Gruenbaum, a private equity investor, served in the administration as commissioner of the Federal Acquisition Service.

Separately, Trump appointed a board to oversee NCAG. The members are: Witkoff, Kushner, Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, senior Qatari diplomat Ali Thawadi, Egyptian intelligence chief Hassan Rashad, UAE Minister of International Cooperation Reem Al-Hashimy, Apollo Global Management CEO Marc Rowan, Israeli-Cypriot businessman Yakir Gabay, former UN humanitarian coordinator Sigrid Kaag, and former UN envoy to the Mideast Nickolay Mladenov, and former UK prime minister Tony Blair.

Mladenov will also serve as the Board of Peace’s High Representative for Gaza. “In this capacity, he will act as the on-the-ground link between the Board of Peace and the NCAG,” the White House said. He “will support the Board’s oversight of all aspects of Gaza’s governance, reconstruction, and development, while ensuring coordination across civilian and security pillars.”

Though no countries had joined the ISF, Trump named Major General Jasper Jeffers its commander. The White House said, “he will lead security operations, support comprehensive demilitarization, and enable the safe delivery of humanitarian aid and reconstruction materials.”

Israel was upset by the inclusion of Turkey and Qatar’s representatives. Netanyahu’s office said on January 17 that the board’s makeup “was not coordinated with Israel and contradicts its policy

In response, an American official told Axios, “This is our show, not his show,” and “If he wants us to deal with Gaza, it will have to be our way.”

Leaders from some 60 countries were reportedly invited to join the board. Trump fixed board members’ terms at three years but dangled a permanent seat in exchange for a $1 billion contribution earmarked for Gaza’s reconstruction. Invitations were sent to the King of Jordan, the Presidents of Turkey, Belarus, the European Commission, and Russia, and the prime ministers of Pakistan, Hungary, Greece, Germany, Cyprus, Australia, India, Canada, France, Paraguay, Argentina, Albania, and the UK. The pope was also invited. France’s Macron was expected to decline the invitation, believing it would undermine UN institutions. Germany and the UK also passed. Hungarian PM Victor Orban said he had accepted the invitation, as did Vietnam’s Communist Party chief, To Lam. Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Egypt, Jordan, Qatar, Pakistan, and Indonesia jointly announced they were joining Trump’s “Peace Council.”

Netanyahu was also invited to join the board; nevertheless, Israel was likely to be further upset by the news that Pakistan had been invited to join the Board of Peace. Pakistan has no diplomatic relations with Israel and has been a vocal critic of its war with Hamas.

Hamas sources told Asharq Al-Awsat that several senior political and military leaders who survived the war are preparing to leave Gaza under coordinated arrangements with the group’s external leadership, though some military figures strongly oppose any departure. The reports say those leaving could include former prisoners from the Shalit exchange and may relocate to countries such as Türkiye or Qatar, possibly for years, while some exits could be temporary for talks in Egypt. Hamas officials abroad and inside Gaza have publicly denied or downplayed the claims. The reports follow earlier statements by Netanyahu that Israel was considering safe passage for Hamas leaders as part of a U.S.-backed plan, and prior media reports that Hamas signaled openness to limited relocation of leaders and operatives.

President Trump said that if Hamas does not disarm, “they’re going to be blown away.” On moving to Phase B, Trump said, “We’ll know within 2–3 days if Hamas is disarming, at most two to three weeks. If they don’t do it – they’ll be destroyed pretty quickly.”

Palestinian Police Responsible for Disarming Hamas

A Palestinian police force trained in Egypt is reportedly prepared to carry out Hamas’s disarmament if the group accepts an ultimatum from President Trump. Reporting directly to a newly announced Palestinian technocratic committee, the force would be responsible for collecting all Hamas weapons—from rockets and IEDs to rifles and small arms—making the process an internal Palestinian operation rather than one led by the IDF or a still-unformed International Stabilization Force.

Under the plan, Hamas would be given a short window to accept a demand for full disarmament. If it agrees, the Egyptian-trained force could enter Gaza as early as February or March, with officials estimating the process would take three to five months. However, both Israeli and Palestinian officials remain sceptical. Palestinians fear the lightly equipped force could be overmatched by Hamas, as in 2007, while Israel opposes any role for the Palestinian Authority in Gaza.

Trump Inaugurates Board of Peace

On January 22, 2026, President Donald Trump stood before a packed room at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, to inaugurate his Board of Peace and issue a stark warning to Hamas. The moment marked a pivotal juncture in his administration’s ambitious effort to reshape the Middle East, though the grand vision presented would immediately face skepticism from key American allies.

Trump’s message to Hamas was unequivocal and threatening. “Hamas has agreed to give up their weapons,” the president declared to the assembled world leaders and business executives. “If they don’t do it, they’ll be blown away very quickly.” The threat was not open-ended; Trump established a concrete timeline for determining Hamas’s compliance. “They’ve got to do it, and we’re going to know over the next two or three days, certainly over the next two or three weeks, whether or not they’re going to do it,” he said.

The president acknowledged the difficulty of what he was demanding, noting that disarmament is “not an easy thing” for Hamas. He offered a cultural observation about the militant group, saying that its members are “born with a weapon in their hands.” Later in his remarks, he rephrased this as “they were born with rifles in their hands.” Despite recognizing the challenge, Trump remained adamant: “They have to give up their weapons, and if they don’t do that, it’s gonna be the end of them.”

Trump boasted of international support for potential military action against Hamas, claiming, “We have 59 countries that are part of that whole peace deal, and some of those countries aren’t even near the Middle East, and they want to come in and take out Hamas. They want to come in and they want to do whatever they can.” He repeated this theme later, asserting that “many countries have told me we want to go in and do it.”

The administration was one week into Phase 2 of Trump’s 20-point Gaza peace plan, which, according to Witkoff, moves from “ceasefire to demilitarization, technocratic governance, and reconstruction.”

The centerpiece of the Davos event was the formal signing ceremony for Trump’sBoard of Peace, which he framed in grandiose terms: “We’re going to have peace in the world, and boy, wouldn’t that be a great legacy for all of us.”

The president made clear this was not merely an American initiative. “This isn’t the United States, this is for the world,” he said, adding, “I think we can spread it out to other things as we succeed in Gaza.” Trump expressed confidence about the board’s eventual power, declaring, “Once this board is completely formed, we can do pretty much whatever we want to do.”

Trump claimed impressive participation numbers, stating that “59 countries” had signed onto the board and telling attendees, “You’re the most powerful people in the world.” However, the actual attendance at the signing ceremony told a different story. Only 19 countries, plus the United States, sent representatives to the event. The attendees included Bahrain, Morocco, Argentina, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Hungary, Indonesia, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, Pakistan, Paraguay, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, and Mongolia. According to Reuters, 35 of the 50 invited countries had agreed to join.

The Trump administration’s team in Davos—Chief of Staff Susie Wiles, Secretary of State Rubio, Witkoff, i Kushner, and Gruenbaum—had spent the hours leading up to the event working to bring more countries on board.

Trump’s rhetoric about the United Nations vacillated between criticism and cooperation. “The UN has got tremendous potential, and it has not used it,” he told the gathering, having commented earlier in the week that the Board of Peace “might” replace the UN. Yet at the Davos ceremony, he struck a more diplomatic tone: “We’ll do it in conjunction with the United Nations,” he said, even as he denigrated the UN for not doing enough to resolve global conflicts.

Trump himself appeared to amplify concerns that the initiative could expand beyond its original scope and drift toward a de facto replacement for a UN-led role. Earlier in the week, he had said the Board of Peace “might” replace the UN. At the signing ceremony, he declared that the board “has a chance to be one of the most consequential bodies ever created, and it’s my honor to serve as its chairman. I take it very seriously.”

Trump’s comments about Iran at the ceremony added another layer of complexity to the board’s potential scope. He said that the U.S. bombing in June was because “they were two months from having a nuclear weapon, and we can’t let them have that. Iran does want to talk, and we’ll talk.”

According to Bloomberg, U.S. diplomats had been instructed to say that the Board of Peace was meant to complement the UN, not replace it—though Trump’s own words suggested otherwise.

Trump insisted, “Just about every country” wanted to be a part of the Board of Peace, though the attendance numbers and European rejections suggested otherwise. The ambitious scope and structure of the Board of Peace created immediate friction with some of America’s closest allies. Major European democracies expressed serious reservations about joining an organization that appeared designed to rival or replace the United Nations and that granted permanent leadership to a single foreign leader.

Britain’s Foreign Secretary Yvette Cooper explained her country’s decision not to participate: “This is about a legal treaty that raises much broader issues.” She added a pointed concern about one of the board’s potential members: “And we do also have concerns about President Putin being part of something which is talking about peace, when we have still not seen any signs from Putin that there will be a commitment to peace in Ukraine.”

France declined after its officials expressed concern that the board’s charter “goes beyond the framework of Gaza alone” and “raises major questions, particularly regarding respect for the principles and structure of the United Nations, which must under no circumstances be called into question.”

Norway and Sweden indicated they would not participate. Canada, Ukraine, China, and the European Union’s executive arm had not committed. Italy faced a unique constitutional problem: joining might violate its constitution because it would mean joining a body led by a single foreign leader in which Italy would not have equal standing with other countries.

The invitation to Russian President Vladimir Putin proved particularly controversial. Putin said Russia was “still consulting with Moscow’s ‘strategic partners’“ before deciding whether to commit. The Kremlin revealed that Putin, while hosting Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas in Moscow on Thursday, planned to discuss a proposal to send $1 billion to the Board of Peace for humanitarian purposes—if Russia could use assets the U.S. had previously blocked.

Even Israel, the primary beneficiary of the Gaza peace plan, sent mixed signals. Netanyahu agreed to join the Board of Peace, but his office had “earlier criticized the makeup of the board’s committee tasked with overseeing Gaza.” Despite Israeli PresidentIsaac Herzog and Economy Minister Nir Barkat being present in Davos, Israel sent no representative to the Thursday signing ceremony. The premier’s office explained that the Board of Peace was under Netanyahu’s remit, not Herzog’s.

An Arab diplomat, speaking on condition of anonymity in a European capital, revealed that Middle Eastern governments had coordinated their response to Trump’s invitation. The diplomat said the acceptance was crafted to limit it to the Gaza plan as mandated by the UN Security Council. The announced acceptance was “preliminary,” the diplomat explained, noting that the charter presented by the U.S. administration “contradicts in some parts the United Nations’ mission.” The diplomat predicted that other major powers were unlikely to support the board in its current form.

Secretary of State Rubio tried to put a positive spin on the absences, saying that some countries’ leaders had indicated they planned to join but still required approval from their parliaments. The Trump administration also claimed to have received queries about membership from countries that hadn’t yet been invited to participate.

He also attempted to reassure skeptics about the board’s mission. At the ceremony, he stated that the board’s focus was “first and foremost on making sure that this peace deal in Gaza becomes enduring.” He vouched for Trump’s commitment: “Trump will give it everything he has to make sure this is successful.”

The Board of Peace was a “board of action,” Rubio asserted, saying the new body would “serve as an example of what’s possible in other parts of the world without losing focus on what’s before us right now.”

Kushner’s Master Plan

The most visually striking element of the Davos presentation came from Kushner, who unveiled an ambitious master plan for Gaza’s reconstruction, featuring slides depicting gleaming skyscrapers rising along Gaza’s coast and the construction of entirely new cities. The plan included a seaport and an airport.

Kushner explained his approach with characteristic confidence: “We said, ‘Let’s plan for catastrophic success.’ There is no Plan B.” The reconstruction would require an investment of at least $25 billion in the devastated Palestinian enclave.

The implementation would follow a phased approach from south to north. “It will start with Rafah, then move northward in phases until Gaza City,” Kushner explained. The southern city of Rafah, which Israel had largely razed during its war against Hamas, would be rebuilt in two to three years.

Kushner outlined his economic philosophy for Gaza, saying the White House wanted to bring “free market economy principles to Gaza,” reflecting the “same mindset, same approach” that Trump was implementing in the U.S.

The next 100 days, Kushner stated, would focus on “aid and reconstruction.” He announced that a conference on investment for Gaza would be held in Washington in the coming weeks. He made a request to critics: “Calm down for 30 days” in criticism of countries like Israel, Turkey, and Qatar.

Kushner framed the ultimate objective in humanitarian terms: “Our goal here is peace between Israel and the Palestinian people. Everyone wants to live peacefully. Everyone wants to live with dignity.”

Kushner’s presentation also addressed the critical issue of Hamas’s disarmament. According to his slides, the next phase would “work with Hamas on demilitarization.” The plan called for Hamas’s “heavy weapons” to be decommissioned immediately, while small arms would be decommissioned by sector by the new Palestinian police force.

The presentation made clear that reconstruction and disarmament would be directly linked: “Reconstruction will only begin in sectors with full disarmament,” according to Kushner’s slide.

In a controversial element of the plan, Hamas members would be “rewarded with amnesty and reintegration, or safe passage.” Even more controversially, some terrorists would be “integrated” into the new Palestinian police force after “rigorous vetting,” according to the plan.

Once demilitarization was completed and verified, Kushner said, the IDF would withdraw to the security perimeter around Gaza.

Central to the governance transition was Shaath. In a video message played at the ceremony, Shaath emphasized the conditionality of success: “This transition will succeed only if it delivers real tangible improvements in daily life for Gazans.”

The arrangement with Hamas remained incomplete, however. While Hamas had agreed to hand over day-to-day governance to Shaath’s committee, it had not agreed to hand over control of the enclave’s security. Most critically, Hamas had not agreed to lay down its arms and disband its battalions of fighters.

Shaath made a major announcement that caught many by surprise: the Rafah border crossing would reopen next week in both directions. This was significant because Israel had vowed to keep the border closed until Hamas returned the body of Ran Gvili, the last Israeli captive whose remains were still in Gaza.

Israeli authorities initially did not confirm the reopening plan. An anonymous Israeli official, speaking on behalf of Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office, told reporters: “A special effort is underway to return the body of the late Ran Gvili, while making full use of the information in our possession. The security cabinet will discuss this issue and the matter of opening the Rafah crossing at the beginning of next week.”

Later, the Board of Peace High Representative Nickolay Mladenov announced that “an agreement has been reached” on the matter, indicating that Jerusalem had been consulted and was on board with the reopening.

Analysts noted that the committee’s success would partly depend on whether Israel eased the restrictions it had imposed on Gaza. In recent months, Israel had kept the Rafah border crossing all but closed, even though it had agreed to open it as part of the truce agreement.

Obstacles Remain

Despite the glossy presentations and confident pronouncements, significant gaps remained between the Trump administration’s ambitious plans and the situation on the ground. As one report noted bluntly, “At this point, however, those sweeping ideas exist mostly on paper.”

The fundamental challenges were substantial:

First, Hamas had not agreed to disarm—the cornerstone requirement for the entire plan to proceed. Israel saw disarmament as non-negotiable, but the militant group that had controlled the Palestinian territory since 2007 showed no signs of surrendering its weapons.

Second, the United States had struggled to convince countries to contribute soldiers to a proposed peacekeeping force for Gaza. The yet-to-be-established International Stabilization Force remained largely hypothetical. Azerbaijan, one of the two countries Washington had publicly touted as participants, announced earlier in January 2026 that it would not be participating.

Third, it remained unclear who would provide the billions of dollars required by the Trump administration’s reconstruction plans. The $25 billion investment Kushner described remained aspirational rather than committed.

Fourth, months into the ceasefire, Gaza’s more than 2 million Palestinians continued to suffer the humanitarian crisis unleashed by more than two years of war. Violence in Gaza continued despite the truce.

Despite the significant obstacles remaining, Trump expressed optimism about the trajectory of events in Gaza. “The war in Gaza is really coming to an end,” he declared, though he acknowledged, “We have little fires that we’ll put out. But they’re little,” adding that they had been “giant, giant, massive fires.”

Trump reiterated his administration’s commitment: The U.S. is “committed to Gaza being fully demilitarized, properly governed and properly rebuilt.” Looking to the future, he predicted, “We’re going to be very successful in Gaza; it’s going to be a great thing to watch.”

Trump continues to say an agreement was reached with Hamas on disarmament, while the group denies it. Mousa Abu Marzouk said on January 29 that Hamas has never agreed to hand over its weapons. “We haven’t discussed the weapons yet; no one has spoken to us directly about it. We haven’t spoken with the American side or the mediators on this issue,” he insisted.

Similarly, on the same day, PIJ spokesman Muhammad AL-Hajj Musa said their weapons would remain in the hands of the resistance and would not be stored or put away. “We will never surrender them,” he said.

Nevertheless, Trump said later, “it looks like” Hamas is “going to disarm,” and Witkoff added, “They’re going to give up their AK-47s.”

Shaath’s Radical Past

In April 2025, long before Ali Shaath could have imagined he would be tapped to chair the future administration of Gaza, the Palestinian civil engineer sat for a podcast interview. At the time, unburdened by the political necessity of appearing as a moderate, Shaath spoke with a candor that aligned him squarely with the Palestinian Authority’s traditional ideological rhetoric.

During the conversation, Shaath dismissed the sovereignty of Israel entirely, characterizing the nation as a foreign entity. He declared that the state is a "colonialist [Israel] who was planted by America and Western Europe," arguing that these powers "planted it in Palestine since the Balfour Promise." By framing Israel as a colonial implant rather than a legitimate state, Shaath adopted the PA’s foundational justification for resistance, refusing to even use the name "Israel" and instead referring to the entire country as "the occupation."

Shaath also looked back on his history as a youth organizer of unrest in the Gaza Strip with pride. He described his early years as being defined by "activity with young people at school" and "demonstrations against the Israeli occupation." He recounted how he and his peers would "stand in areas where there are checkpoints of the occupation and their positions and throw rocks at them."

Far from viewing these actions as youthful indiscretions, Shaath boasted of his tactical success in mobilizing Khan Yunis residents. "We set this day ablaze," he recalled, noting that he was the primary "organizer of this activity or this national act." He concluded by highlighting his ability to incite the local population, claiming he "succeeded in awakening all the opinions and feelings of the people" until they moved in force against the Israeli military positions.

Aside from concern over its director, Israel was furious when NCAG changed its logo to be nearly identical to that of the Palestinian Authority. The Prime Minister’s Office distanced itself from the altered logo, stating the press version was inconsistent with what was shown to Israel. This was accompanied by a firm declaration: Israel will not tolerate the PA's symbols or its involvement in Gaza’s governance.

Will Hamas Disarm

A senior U.S. official involved in President Trump’s Board of Peace initiative said on February 11 that efforts to dismantle Hamas' military capabilities in Gaza are on track despite ceasefire tensions. The disarmament process will proceed in stages, beginning with tunnel dismantling, followed by weapons manufacturing facilities, then rocket-propelled grenades and mortars, and finally small arms. The official confirmed that Hamas has resisted immediate full disarmament, arguing that rival clans could target its members if it disarms all at once. Addressing a New York Times report that the U.S. may allow Hamas to retain light weapons, the official clarified that small arms would simply be the last category addressed rather than permanently exempted. The official emphasized the goal is consensus-based disarmament to ensure durability, noting that even the Israeli military has not fully eliminated all tunnels in designated areas, and that such efforts inherently take time. The report came even as Israel was preparing a large-scale operation to disarm Hamas in anticipation of the failure of the Board of Peace plan.

Israeli Cabinet Secretary Yossi Fuchs said Israel, in coordination with the Trump administration, is granting Hamas a 60-day window to fully disarm, and that if it does not, the IDF will return to intensive combat in the Gaza Strip. Prime Minister Netanyahu clarified that the requirement includes small arms, including roughly 60,000 AK-47 rifles remaining in Gaza, which were central to the October 7 massacre. Fuchs said U.S.-led “Board of Peace” drafts suggested Hamas might initially keep some small arms, but he emphasized the demand is for Hamas to surrender all weaponry within the 60-day period.

Meanwhile, an Israeli military assessment said, “Hamas is advancing steps on the ground meant to preserve its influence and grip in the Gaza Strip ‘from the bottom up’ by means of integrating its supporters in government offices, security apparatuses and local authorities.”

Ahead of the first meeting of the Board of Peace, Trump urged Hamas to move forward with disarmament under his plan for postwar Gaza, and said members of the BoP had pledged $5 billion to the Palestinian territory’s reconstruction. “Very importantly, Hamas must uphold its commitment to Full and Immediate Demilitarization,” Trump posted on February 15.

In addition, the AP reported that Morocco, Albania, and Greece were joining Indonesia in the ISF. Indonesia was the first country announced, with 1,000 soldiers deploying in April and a full force of around 8,000 targeted for June. Morocco is expected to be one of the two largest contributors alongside Indonesia, though deployment timelines for the three additional countries haven't been specified. Indonesia cautioned, however, that it may postpone deployment if conditions in Gaza are unsuitable.

Trump was also having trouble recruiting countries to serve on the Board of Peace. Mexico, for example, declined because it recognizes Palestine as a state, but Palestine won’t be represented.

The PA Gains A Foothold

The United States has approved the creation of a coordination committee linking the PA with the BoP. The committee formalizes existing contacts between the two sides, with PA Prime Minister Mohammed Mustafa representing Ramallah and Gaza High Representative Nickolay Mladenov representing the Board.

The arrangement is viewed as a compromise: the PA had sought full membership on the BoP—particularly given Israel’s presence—but instead secured a more limited coordination mechanism, reportedly after lobbying by Arab states. While the committee’s practical impact may be modest, the PA hopes it will increase its influence over reconstruction decisions, especially since its civil servants, security forces, and land registration records will be essential to rebuilding efforts.

Ramallah ultimately aims to ensure that Gaza’s reconstruction leads to the reunification of Gaza and the West Bank under a single political authority. However, both Israel and the U.S. oppose granting the PA a larger formal role in Gaza until it implements significant reforms.

Meanwhile, Trump insisted the war was over, though he acknowledged on February 19 that there were still “little flames” that persisted. Trump maintained that Hamas “is going to give up its weapons,” warning, “If they don’t, they’ll be harshly met.” He also dismissed claims that Hamas fighters are willing to die, saying, “Everyone said, ‘Oh, they don’t mind dying.’ No, they don’t want to die.”

At the same time, Trump praised Hamas for recovering the remaining hostage bodies and said, “The world is now waiting on Hamas… It’s the only thing that’s right now standing in the way,” appearing to minimize broader obstacles to rebuilding Gaza.

Complicating Trump’s vision, Palestine Liberation Organization Secretary General Azzam al-Ahmed said it does not designate Hamas as a terrorist organization, rejected calls for its disarmament, and insisted Hamas will participate in upcoming Palestinian Authority municipal elections in April. “All talk of disarming Hamas and labeling it a terrorist organization is unacceptable to us,” Ahmed told Egypt’s Shorouk News on February 23.

The First Board Summit

At the inaugural Board of Peace meeting on February 19, 2026, President Trump announced the United States would contribute $10 billion to the newly established body overseeing Gaza's postwar management — far surpassing earlier expectations of $1 billion. He declared that nine additional countries — Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, and Kuwait — would collectively contribute over $7 billion, primarily as a humanitarian relief package. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs is separately raising $2 billion for Gaza aid.

Among the largest individual pledges, the UAE’s foreign minister announced a $1.2 billion contribution, bringing the total to nearly $3 billion since the war began. Qatar’s prime minister pledged over $1 billion, describing it as “aimed at reaching a final resolution that fulfills Palestinian aspiration for statehood and recognition and the Israeli aspiration for security and integration.” Saudi Arabia committed $1 billion over the coming years.

Trump also revealed that FIFA would raise $75 million to build soccer fields, academies, and stadiums in Gaza. Japan will host a fundraiser, and Norway will host a future Board of Peace event. The summit concluded with a resolution unanimously adopted, establishing principles of financial integrity and transparency. Trump told assembled leaders: “We will help Gaza. We will straighten it out. We will make it successful. We will make it peaceful.”

ISF Commander Maj. Gen. Jasper Jeffers revealed the International Stabilization Force would consist of 20,000 soldiers and 12,000 police officers. “The ISF will do two things: stabilize the security environment in Gaza and enable civilian governance,” Jeffers said. He confirmed that the U.S. has already established a joint operations center that will serve as ISF headquarters, located in southern Israel at the Civil-Military Coordination Center in Kiryat Gat.

Jeffers thanked Indonesia, Morocco, Kazakhstan, Kosovo, and Albania for contributing troops, and Egypt and Jordan for agreeing to train Palestinian police. Indonesia committed the largest contingent — 8,000 soldiers — and will serve as the deputy commander.

According to contracting records reviewed by the Guardian, the Trump administration is planning a 5,000-person military base in southern Gaza spanning more than 350 acres. The plans call for the phased construction of a fortified outpost ringed by 26 armored watch towers, a small-arms range, bunkers, and equipment warehouses, all encircled by barbed wire. International construction firms with experience in conflict zones have already conducted site visits.

Morocco’s foreign minister confirmed Rabat would contribute police officers to the ISF, help train Palestinian police, and build a military field hospital. He added that “Morocco is ready to lead a de-radicalization program to fight hate speech and promote tolerance and coexistence.” Turkey’s foreign minister also offered troops, though Israel has adamantly opposed Turkish participation.

The NCAG — the Palestinian technocratic body created under Trump’s 20-point peace plan — opened applications for a transitional police force, announcing it was “recruiting qualified candidates for a professional, accountable, transparent, and merit-based transitional police force in Gaza.” Eligible applicants must be Gaza residents aged 18–35, with no criminal record and good physical fitness. Over 2,000 people applied within the first few hours. Training will take place in Egypt.

Board of Peace coordinator Nikolay Mladenov announced that a framework for weapons decommissioning had been approved by mediators. “We now need to move forward on communicating it and negotiating the details of the implementation plan with the factions on the ground,” he said, adding an appeal for unity: “If I can ask one thing of all of us, it is to make sure that we have one message: there is no other option except the full demilitarization and decommissioning of all weapons in Gaza for reconstruction to begin and for people to have a new way of life going forward.”

Board of Peace Executive Board member Yakir Gabay, an Israeli-Cypriot real estate mogul, outlined the scale of the challenge: clearing over 70 million tons of rubble and unexploded ordnance, along with hundreds of miles of tunnels. He described “a detailed master plan for housing and infrastructure of modern schools and hospitals, manufacturing and agriculture, roads and trains, water and energy plants, logistic hubs, telecom, tech and data centers, sports and leisure facilities, seaport and airport and much more.”

Gabay envisioned Gaza’s 26-mile coastline developed as “a new Mediterranean Riviera with 200 hotels and potential islands,” with the value flowing to Gazans through a sovereign fund. He emphasized that “this plan is all subject to a full disarmament of Hamas.”

Apollo Global Management CEO Marc Rowan detailed the housing plan, starting with 100,000 homes for 500,000 residents in Rafah during the first phase, followed by 400,000 additional homes across Gaza. “This is not a problem of money or collateral,” Rowan said. “This is a problem of peace.” A Trump administration video presentation projected Rafah fully rebuilt within three years and Gaza “connected to the world through an Abrahamic gateway, linking it with Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and extending to India and Europe.” By year ten, Gaza would be “self-governed, integrated into the region with thriving industries and housing for all.”

World Bank President Ajay Banga announced the creation of a Gaza Reconstruction and Development Fund to manage contributions transparently.

Several participants used the summit to emphasize Palestinian statehood. Egypt’s prime minister praised Trump’s “firm position on rejecting the annexation of the West Bank” and stressed that “preserving the institutional and geographical link between the West Bank and Gaza is vital for the Palestinian Authority to eventually resume its role in Gaza.” Saudi Arabia’s minister of state reiterated support for a two-state solution under the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative. Turkey’s foreign minister noted that ceasefire violations persist and declared: “We remain convinced that the foundation of such peace is a two-state solution.” Morocco’s foreign minister also highlighted the importance of West Bank stability, where settler violence has reached record levels and settlement expansion has peaked.

Kazakhstan's president announced that 500 Gazan students would receive scholarships to study at Kazakh universities over five years. Romania's president pledged medical treatment for 4,000 sick children and 4,000 of their family members, along with expertise in rebuilding Gaza's fire safety infrastructure.

Five Principles For Disarmament

In late March, Mladenov outlined five principles underlying the disarmament proposal submitted to Hamas, framing them as the foundation for any credible path to reconstruction and Israeli military withdrawal.

The first principle was reciprocity. Mladenov said that weapons decommissioning would proceed in parallel with staged IDF withdrawal, calling it “fundamental to the credibility of the entire process.”

The second principle was sequencing. The most dangerous weapons — rockets, heavy munitions, explosive devices, and assault rifles held by armed groups — were to be addressed first, with tunnels neutralized as a priority. “Personal weapons are addressed later through a registration and collection process,” Mladenov said, referring to a buy-back program in which funds and jobs would be offered to those who surrendered their weapons to a newly forming Palestinian police force.

The third principle was verification. Mladenov said that compliance with the program would need to be monitored and independently verified, and that reconstruction of Gaza was strictly contingent on weapons decommissioning. Egypt had agreed to serve as the “lead training partner” for the Palestinian police force overseeing the process.

The fourth principle addressed people, not just weapons. The framework included “pathways for individuals currently affiliated with armed groups to re-enter civilian life with dignity, through structured amnesty arrangements and reintegration programs.” Israel had reportedly ruled out immunity for those it said took part in the October 7, 2023, attacks or other acts of terrorism.

The fifth and final principle concerned timeline flexibility. Mladenov said his office held authority to grant extensions when parties were making good-faith efforts, describing it as “a managed process with built-in flexibility because the reality on the ground does not always conform to the timelines on paper.”

Mladenov said that at their most recent meeting with Hamas and other Palestinian factions in Cairo, mediators had stressed that implementing the disarmament proposal was “the only way to ensure that reconstruction in Gaza and Israeli military withdrawal happens.”

Hamas official Bassem Naim “firmly rejected” the proposal, calling it “biased toward Israel” and a violation of prior agreements. He warned that conditioning humanitarian aid and rebuilding on disarmament is “unacceptable” and comes “at the expense of Palestinian rights.”

Hamas Given a Deadline

The Board of Peace gave Hamas until the end of the week of April 6 to accept a disarmament proposal, setting a firm deadline after the terror group spent nearly four weeks stalling on a plan first presented by Mladenov. The ultimatum followed a meeting in Cairo between Mladenov and senior Hamas officials, where the group stopped short of an outright rejection but raised objections about Israeli compliance with the first phase of the ceasefire rather than engaging substantively with the disarmament terms.

The disarmament plan itself is highly specific and tightly sequenced. Over an eight-month timeline, Hamas would phase out its entire military infrastructure — beginning with the Palestinian technocratic authority, the National Committee for the Administration of Gaza, taking security control of the Strip within the first 15 days. By day 90, Hamas would be required to surrender all heavy weapons and military equipment to that body and allow the complete destruction of its tunnel network, explosives, and military infrastructure. In the fourth stage, running through day 250, all remaining weapons, including personal firearms, would be collected and registered. Only after independent verification that Gaza was entirely free of weaponry would Israeli forces complete their withdrawal. Reconstruction would be permitted only in areas certified as demilitarized, giving Hamas a powerful economic incentive to comply — and leaving it with nothing if it refused. Mladenov telegraphed the consequences in a pointed post on X: “He who will not cross the river will drown in the sea.”

Arab mediators from Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey were less optimistic than Mladenov that Hamas would agree, with one Arab diplomat saying the group was “unlikely to say ‘yes’ without significant caveats” — and that even if it did, Netanyahu would likely resist authorizing additional withdrawals from Gaza during an election year, with coalition partners still pushing for a permanent Israeli military presence in the Strip.

U.S. envoy Aryeh Lightstone met chief Hamas negotiator Khalil al-Hayya in Cairo on April 14 and found him unwilling to accept the sequencing of the peace plan. A senior Hamas source told CNN the proposal “reduces the whole process to a single clause – disarmament – while other first phase obligations are postponed or marginalized.” The group insisted that Israel first meet its commitments—ending strikes and allowing more aid—before any discussion of disarmament.

Hamas officials argued the framework is fundamentally skewed, warning that “Israel’s security [comes] first, while Palestinians’ humanitarian, political, and administrative rights are postponed.” They also claimed increasing pressure to concede, with one source alleging that mediators warned them to “accept the paper or face a return to war.”

After missing the deadline, Hamas proposed a partial disarmament, offering to surrender thousands of automatic rifles and other weapons used by its internal security forces to a U.S.-backed governing body in Gaza. This was viewed as a change in approach, as Hamas had previously refused to give up any arms. However, Hamas planned to keep its core military capabilities, including rockets, missiles, and its armed battalions, indicating an intention to maintain a degree of power and influence.

The proposal did not align with the requirements set by Israel, the U.S., or the Board of Peace plan, which called for complete demilitarization and the removal of Hamas from governance.

“Hamas may only be trying to avoid turning down Trump’s plan,” Mkhaimar Abusada, a political science professor who taught at Al Azhar University in Gaza told the New York Times. “But if they accept giving up police weapons, it could open the door to further negotiations over the rest of its weapons.”

Meanwhile, the State Department transferred $1.25 billion of the $10 billion Trump pledged to the Board of Peace.

In response to a flotilla organized to break the blockade maintained by Israel and Egypt, the Board of Peace issued a statement on April 30:

Since the ceasefire last October, the Board of Peace has SIGNIFICANTLY scaled up support for the people of Gaza. Food aid is reaching 3 times more people than before. Hamas’ theft of aid has dwindled from 90% to less than 1%. According to the United Nations, nutrition has improved dramatically. We are currently hard at work on the next critical step in Gaza’s recovery: finalizing the process by which Hamas decommissions its weapons and allows for the transition to a new government that will lead the redevelopment of this war-torn region. This will allow us to accelerate aid and rebirth.

The “flotilla” heading to Gaza is the performative love-boat activism of people who know nothing of and care even less for the condition of Gazans. It is distasteful to trade on the misery of people to build your social media profiles.

For those actually wanting to help Gaza, here is a suggestion: use whatever influence you have to maintain the pressure on Hamas so they fulfill their obligations to pave the way forward for the communities they destroyed. If you would like to contribute to the recovery, we welcome support through established humanitarian channels coordinated by the Board of Peace, the United Nations, and the World Bank, so that your contributions reach those who deserve and need our aid.

In May 2025, it was reported that the Trump administration was considering asking Israel to transfer part of the Palestinian tax revenues it is withholding, estimated by the Palestinian Authority at about $5 billion, to Trump’s “Board of Peace” to help fund the U.S. postwar reconstruction plan for Gaza, which is estimated to cost $70 billion. No formal request was made, but sources said one proposal would direct some of the money to a U.S.-backed transitional government for Gaza and some to the PA if it implements reforms. The PA was not invited to join the Board of Peace.

The Israel-Hamas War: The Day After

Looking to the Future

Reforming the PA

The Gallant Plan

Creating A Path To Statehood

Competing Visions for the Future

Hamas is Killing the PA

Gantz Gives Ultimatum

The Academics’ Plan

Hamas-Fatah Reconciliation Declaration

Trump’s Dramatic Plan

The Riviera of the Middle East

The Arab Plan

Witkoff Creates Confusion

Israel to Take Control of Gaza

A Great Plan

Comparison of the Trump and Arab Plans for Gaza

The Sharm el-Sheik Summit

Stabilizing Gaza

Israeli Concern Over Turkey

A UN Mandate

Splitting the Strip

Palestinians are Unwanted

Reforming the PA

Trouble with the ISF

Project Sunrise

Phase 2 Begins

The Board of Peace (BoP)

Palestinian Police Responsible for Disarming Hamas

Trump Inaugurates Board of Peace

Kushner’s Master Plan

Obstacles Remain

Shaath’s Radical Past

Will Hamas Disarm

The PA Gains A Foothold

The First Board Summit

Five Principles For Disarmament

Hamas Given a Deadline

Table of Contents for the Israel-Hamas War
Bibliography and Photo Credits