Palestine Conciliation Commission, Nineteenth Progress Report, Addendum, the Joseph E. Jonhson Mission
A/4921. (November 22, 1961)
Another effort was made by the United Nations to find a way out of the impasse into which the Arab refugee question had sunk. The Palestine Conciliation Commission appointed Dr. Joseph E. Jonhson, President of the Carnegie Foundation, to explore means of seeking progress on this issue. Following are excerpts from his initial report:
III. Findings and Conclusions
A. Underlying Considerations
39. The members of the Commission will wish to know how I conceived the scope, and particularly the limitations, of my assignment, as these conceptions determined my conduct of my mission and underlie this report. In the first place, as noted above in paragraphs 5 and 9, I considered myself bound by paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) and therefore limited to exploration of the possibilities of progress with respect to the Palestine Arab refugee question and to suggestions in relation to such progress. Such is the interrelationship of the various aspects of the Palestine question, however, particularly as seen by the Governments concerned and by the refugees themselves, that one or more of the other aspects were referred to, and often heavily emphasized, in virtually all the conversations I engaged in. I felt obliged in each case to explain my understanding of my assignment and endeavoured to make it clear that any suggestions I might make would therefore necessarily be confined to the refugee question.
40. Secondly, my specific instructions were to explore the question with the Governments of the host countries and of Israel. I was given complete freedom to receive any relevant proposals from them and to make such suggestions and proposals as I should deem appropriate within the limitations set forth in the preceding paragraph.
41. I did not interpret the reference to the four (now five) Governments concemed as exclusive. I felt it important to talk with other informed persons and to visit refugee camps and other installations of UNRWA in order to gain first-hand impressions of present conditions and to hear the views of refugee spokesmen. I let it be known that I was willing to hear the views of officials of other interested Governments and of the Arab League, and to receive comments and suggestions from persons who held no official position. Under this interpretation of my instructions, I held conversations with officials of the Arab League, including its Secretary-General, and with other interested persons. I also sought the views of responsible United Nations officials, especially the Director of UNRWA and senior members of his staff.
42. A fourth consideration has particular bearing on the content of this report. As has already been suggested, the Palestine question as a whole and all aspects of it, but perhaps most notably the refugee problem, relate directly to fundamental policies and conceptions of national interest in all the host countries and in Israel, and, beyond that, stir very deeply the emotions of all involved. This means that everything said and almost everything done in relation to the issue is likely to be the subject of controversy. The history of the Palestine question over the years has demonstrated all too clearly that in this case at least controversy is not conducive to understanding, to accommodation, to eventual agreement or even to the slightest progress. Were this report to go into detail on the views expressed to me, it would risk misinterpretation, at least in nuance, and thereby almost certainly add fuel to the flames of controversy. Moreover, any attempt even to analyse, much less to pass judgement upon, differences of interpretation of historical events or of the meaning of documents would also lead to fruitless and even destructive challenge and debate. Whatever purpose might be served by a full expose at some other time, at present it could do nothing but harm to any prospects that may exist for the progress on the refugee question that the United Nations seeks.
43. There is one final and very basic premise. The people of the United Nations, according to the preamble to the Charter, have expressed their determination to "live together in peace with one another as good neighbours" and all Members of the United Nations have undertaken to "settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered". In keeping with the intent of these provisions of the Charter, the organs of the United Nations have, as Mr. Hammarskjold wrote in the Introduction to his last Annual Report, "consistently maintained that the use of force, contrary to the Charter as interpreted by those organs, cannot be permitted to yield results which could be accepted as valid by the Organization, and as establishing new rights". A special representative of a United Nations commission is as bound by the fundamental principles of the Organization as are the Members themselves and the officials of the Secretariat.
B. General Observations and Findings
44. The following paragraphs are based in part on the observations made to me by responsible statesmen and officials and by other individuals, in part on my reading of the record of the past, and in part on my own estimate and analysis of the situation as it is today.
45. Despite all too frequent signs of intransigence and even of a bellicose attitude, I believe that responsible statesmen on both sides want peace in a general way and as a long-term goal.
46. Unhappily, however, these statesmen have not yet been able or willing to translate that generalized desire into a sufficiently strong and active search for peace with the "other side" to make certain adjustments that would seem to be necessary for true peace in the area. Indeed, the public record, as can be seen very clearly from the summaries of the positions of the Governments in the two recent working papers of the Commission, reveals a consistency of obdurate determination on both sides. There is even evidence that the Passage of time has witnessed a hardening of public positions on some issues.
47. No one who has had an opportunity to confer at length with responsible statesmen in the area can fail to conclude that there is a large degree not only of mistrust and suspicion but of active fear on both sides. Whether these fears are justified and each side believes that its own are and finds it hard to understand the fears of the other the fact of the mutual fear is undeniable. It underlies, and to a certain extent probably explains, governmental policies on both sides. It thus constitutes a serious barrier to progress on any issue that divides the parties. Any measures designed to lead to progress on the refugee question must take account of these fears or they will not be accepted. Moreover, the measures should be so cast as to contribute to allaying the fears.
48. A fourth general observation is that both sides, though for different reasons, tend to view the refugee problem as an inextricable part of the Palestine question as a whole. While, because of the expressly limited nature of my assignment, I did not seek, and was not presented with, a full expression of the views of any party on the whole Palestine question, enough was said about aspects of the question other than the refugee problem to make this conclusion inescapable.
49. Despite this common insistence on the intertwined nature of the issues, both sides expressed a willingness though with much reservation and scepticism to consider a step-by-step process that might lead to progress on the refugee issue without prejudice to the positions of the respective Governments on the other related issues.
50. A fifth general observation relates to the ways in which people regard the present plight and the future of the refugees. As suggested earlier, responsible Ministers and government officials inevitably start from a premise based upon a conception of the national interest and upon governmental policies. All, however, Arab and Israeli alike, have expressed humanitarian interest in the refugees and have recognized the need to focus attention on the interests and welfare of these unfortunate fellow human beings. This, of course, does not imply a willingness to surrender national interests, but it does indicate a conscientious desire to harmonize the two.
51. A final observation stems from my analysis of the total situation with respect to the refugees and the difficulties involved in converting them from unfortunate objects of international charity into useful and active members of the human family. Even under the most optimistic assumption with regard to moving the refugees out of the camps and rehabilitating them, it is clear that there will be a need for assistance for a long time to come. It would be unwise to plan United Nations or national policies on any other assumption than that there will be Palestine Arab refugees for at least a decade. It will indeed be essential to continue basic relief for a very large, even though, hopefully, a declining number of refugees. An increasing number should also receive training and almost all will need help to become effectively reintegrated into society, wherever that may be. It is difficult to conceive of this assistance not requiring a large measure of international participation, both financially and otherwise.
C. Conclusions
52. It is clear that as matters now stand there is no prospect of an early resolution of the Palestine question as a whole and, as can be seen from the preceding section, there are many indications that no progress can be made on the Palestine Arab refugee question apart from, or in advance of, an over-all settlement.
53. However, the willingness that the parties expressed to me (paragraph 49 above) to consider the possibility of a step-by-step process without prejudice to positions on the other related issues, leads me to believe that it is worth while continuing the effort that the Commission has now begun. Whether progress will be possible no one can now say for certain, but, to state the matter in the most negative way, the signs that no progress is possible are not so conclusive as to justify a decision not to try.
54. There are certain fundamental considerations that must underlie any continuing effort. The first is that the focus should be upon the refugees. The General Assembly in paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) spoke of their wishes; it has repeatedly reaffirmed the humanitarian concern of the international community for these unfortunate people. The second is the need to obtain the co-operation of the Governments directly concerned. The third is to recognize that, even if there is some prospect of progress, there can be no early end to the refugee problem. It can only be dealt with on a step-by-step basis with emphasis upon the need for parallel and co-ordinated action by all those involved, not only the Governments concerned but the United Nations itself. A fourth consideration is the need for appropriate machinery, procedures and financial assistance.
55. Moreover, as has been suggested above, there will be a continuing need for international assistance. I hope this will be determined, imaginative and generous. Unless there is such continued assistance, the cautious hopes here expressed cannot be fulfilled. On the other hand, if the international community is to go on carrying most of the financial burden, it is entitled to expect that those immediately concerned Israel, the Arab host countries and the refugees themselves will co-operate with determination and willingness in bringing about real progress on this tragic issue.
56. In the last thirteen years a number of approaches to the problem of the Palestine Arab refugees have been tried. That of appointing a special representative of the Conciliation Commission is new and has not yet been given a thorough test. In the time available to me I could not explore all possible avenues intensively enough to determine with certainty whether progress in the implementation of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) can be made by this approach. Such a determination should be possible in a year. Provided, therefore, that the qualified and cautious optimism expressed in this report continues to be justified, careful consideration should be given to the appointment as Special Representative, to serve until the autumn of 1962, of an individual who should have the confidence not only of the Commission but of the States directly concerned. This individual should understand from the start that the odds will not be in his favour. He should be prepared for the real possibility that even though at the time of his appointment there may be ground for hope, that hope could be destroyed at any moment.
57. The considerations set forth in these Conclusions, particularly those in paragraph 54, will almost certainly have to form the basis of the Special Representative's endeavours.
58. The essentially preliminary explorations undertaken in the last two months have revealed that there is a need for careful analysis and for special studies in connection with the work of the Special Representative if he is to be successful in advancing towards the goal of returning the refugees to a useful and worthwhile life.
59. A final and more general conclusion is the following. An implementation of the letter alone of paragraph 11 of resolution 194 (III) would be meaningless to the refugees if it did not also lead to an implementation of what I would term the spirit of the paragraph, namely, opportunities for them to live worthwhile lives. This thought is, in fact, reflected in the language of the paragraph itself which looks to "repatriation, resettlement and economic and social rehabilitation of the refugees". For this to come about in the sixties will require accelerated economic growth for the area as a whole. Indeed the reintegration of the Palestine Arab refugees, whether by repatriation, resettlement or both, with compensation where appropriate, into a useful life in the Near East will depend upon the rate of this development. Such development is essential for the well-being of all the inhabitants of the region and it would be only elementary justice that refugees have a chance to share in it.
60. These conclusions may well close with a passage from the Introduction to the last Annual Report of Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjold: ". . . A failure to gain respect for decisions or actions of the Organization within the terms of the Charter is often called a failure for the Organization. It would seem more correct to regard it as a failure of the world community, through its Member nations and in particular those most directly concerned, to co-operate in order, step by step, to make the Charter a living reality in practical political action as it is already in law.
Download our mobile app for on-the-go access to the Jewish Virtual Library
